Category: Pakistan

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683: FROM OSIRAK TO NATANZ: OPERATION RISING LION AS A CONTINUATION OF ISRAEL’S BEGIN DOCTRINE OF DENIAL

 

My Article published on “The EurasianTimes” website on 17 Jun 25. 

 

On June 13, 2025, Israel launched Operation Rising Lion, a bold and sophisticated military campaign targeting Iran’s nuclear facilities, missile bases, and key military personnel. The operation, which struck sites like Natanz, Fordow, and Arak, and killed high-ranking figures such as IRGC Commander-in-Chief Hossein Salami, was a direct application of the Begin Doctrine—Israel’s strategic policy of pre-emptively denying adversaries the ability to acquire nuclear weapons. Named after Prime Minister Menachem Begin, who authorised the 1981 strike on Iraq’s Osirak reactor, the doctrine has shaped Israel’s approach to regional threats for over four decades. This article examines Operation Rising Lion as a continuation of the Begin Doctrine, tracing its evolution from Osirak to Natanz, analysing its strategic execution, and exploring its implications for Israel’s security and regional stability.

 

The Begin Doctrine

The Begin Doctrine is a cornerstone of Israeli strategic policy, centered on the pre-emptive prevention of adversaries, particularly in the Middle East, from acquiring nuclear weapons that could pose an existential threat to Israel. Named after former Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin, the doctrine emerged following Israel’s airstrike on Iraq’s Osirak nuclear reactor on June 7, 1981, known as Operation Opera. It reflects Israel’s commitment to ensuring its survival in a region surrounded by hostile states, some of which have historically pursued nuclear capabilities.

Key Principles of the Begin Doctrine include the following:-

    • Pre-emptive Action. Israel reserves the right to use military force to prevent any hostile state or non-state actor from developing nuclear weapons.
    • Existential Threat Mitigation. The doctrine prioritises neutralising capabilities that could enable adversaries to produce weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), notably nuclear weapons.
    • Unilateral Action. Israel will act independently if necessary, even without international approval or coordination, to safeguard its security.
    • Deterrence and Regional Dominance. By demonstrating its willingness and ability to strike pre-emptively, Israel reinforces its military superiority and deters adversaries. Historical Context and Application.

 

Historical Precedents: Osirak and Orchard

Operation Opera (1981). On June 7, 1981, eight Israeli F-16s, escorted by F-15s, flew 1,100 kilometers to destroy Iraq’s Osirak reactor, a French-built facility suspected of producing plutonium for nuclear weapons. The strike was meticulously planned, relying on intelligence from Mossad and defectors. Despite international outrage, including a UN Security Council resolution condemning Israel, the operation delayed Iraq’s nuclear program significantly. It established the Begin Doctrine as a proactive strategy, emphasising Israel’s willingness to act alone to ensure its survival.

Operation Orchard (2007). On September 6, 2007, Israel struck Syria’s Al-Kibar nuclear reactor in Deir ez-Zor, believed to be a North Korean-designed plutonium facility. The operation, kept secret for months, involved precision airstrikes by F-16s and F-15s, supported by cyberwarfare and Mossad intelligence. Unlike Osirak, Orchard faced minimal international backlash, partly due to Syria’s secrecy and the operation’s surgical nature. It reinforced the Begin Doctrine’s adaptability, incorporating advanced technology and covert tactics to neutralise emerging threats.

Both operations demonstrated Israel’s ability to combine intelligence, air superiority, and strategic surprise, setting the stage for Operation Rising Lion’s complexity.

 

Operation Rising Lion: A Modern Application

Launched on June 13, 2025, Operation Rising Lion targeted Iran’s nuclear and military infrastructure, reflecting the Begin Doctrine’s evolution in scale, technology, and geopolitical context. Iran’s nuclear program, by 2025, posed an unprecedented challenge, with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reporting enough enriched uranium for up to 15 nuclear bombs. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu framed the operation as a “12th-hour” necessity to prevent a “nuclear holocaust,” echoing Begin’s rhetoric from 1981.

Strategic Execution. Operation Rising Lion was a multi-domain assault, integrating air, cyber, and covert operations. Over 200 Israeli aircraft, including F-35s, struck key nuclear sites, the Natanz Enrichment Complex, the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant, the Arak Heavy Water Facility and the Isfahan Uranium Conversion Facility. Missile bases like Asfajaabad, IRGC command centers, and air defence systems were hit. Mossad-activated drones and smuggled munitions neutralised launchers and radars, ensuring air superiority. The operation killed key figures, including IRGC leaders Hossein Salami, Mohammad Bagheri, and Amir Ali Hajizadeh, and nuclear scientists like Fereydoon Abbasi and Mohammad Mehdi Tehranchi, crippling Iran’s command and expertise. Mossad’s covert operations, including a secret drone base near Tehran and disinformation about diplomatic rifts, misled Iran’s leadership into underestimating the attack.

Scale and Impact.  Operation Rising Lion was unprecedented in scope, targeting over 100 sites with 330 munitions. Iran reported 78–128 deaths, including 20 children, and over 320 injuries, particularly in Tehran’s residential areas, sparking international criticism. The IAEA confirmed no radiation leaks, indicating precise strikes. The operation delayed Iran’s nuclear program, damaged its military infrastructure, and disrupted its chain of command, reinforcing Israel’s regional dominance.

 

Iran’s Response: Operation True Promise III. Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei vowed “severe punishment,” describing Israel’s actions as a “doomed aggression based on a grave miscalculation.”  Iran retaliated with Operation True Promise III (Persian: Va’de-ye Sādeq III), which began on the evening of June 13, 2025, approximately 18 hours after Israel’s initial strikes. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) led the operation, supported by Iran’s armed forces and possibly proxy groups like Hezbollah, the Houthis, and the Islamic Resistance in Iraq. Iran fired “dozens” to “hundreds” of ballistic missiles and drones, targeting Israeli military centres, airbases, and strategic sites, including the Kirya military headquarters in Tel Aviv. Specific targets included Nevatim, Hatzerim, and Tel Nof airbases, which house advanced Israeli fighter jets like F-35s and F-15s. The operation involved waves of attacks, with ballistic missiles and kamikaze drones aimed at overwhelming Israel’s multilayered air defences, including the Iron Dome and Arrow missile defence systems. While Israel’s Iron Dome and Arrow systems, aided by U.S., British, and French forces, intercepted most projectiles, some strikes caused damage in Tel Aviv, injuring 21–95 people. Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, called the strikes a “crushing response”.

Analytical Perspectives

Continuity and Evolution of the Begin Doctrine. Operation Rising Lion reflects the Begin Doctrine’s continuity and evolution. Like Osirak and Orchard, Rising Lion was a unilateral, preemptive strike to deny an adversary nuclear capability. Israel acted without U.S. involvement, prioritising national security over international approval, and justified the operation as existential. The operation’s scale—over 200 aircraft and 100 targets—dwarfs previous strikes. It integrated advanced technologies (AI-assisted targeting, drones, cyberwarfare) and Mossad’s covert infrastructure, showcasing Israel’s technological edge. Unlike Osirak’s single-target focus or Orchard’s secrecy, Rising Lion was a broad assault on nuclear, military, and leadership targets, reflecting the complexity of Iran’s threat.

Strategic and Ethical Challenges. The Begin Doctrine’s application in Operation Rising Lion raises significant issues.

    • Strategic Success. The operation delayed Iran’s nuclear program, possibly by years, and weakened its military leadership and missile capabilities. It reinforced Israel’s deterrence, signalling to adversaries like Hezbollah and the Houthis that escalation would be costly.
    • Escalation Risks. Though limited, Iran’s Operation True Promise III underscores the potential for a broader conflict. The Houthis’ missile strike on Hebron and possible proxy involvement from Iraq and Syria highlight the regional ripple effects.
    • Ethical Concerns. Civilian casualties, including 20 children in Tehran, drew condemnation from the UN, Saudi Arabia, and Russia. Critics argue the doctrine’s preemptive nature risks disproportionate harm, complicating Israel’s international standing.
    • Limitations. Deeply buried facilities like Fordow remain resistant to conventional strikes, suggesting the doctrine’s reliance on airpower may need adaptation for future threats.

Geopolitical Impact. Operation Rising Lion has transformed the Middle East’s strategic landscape. By eliminating key Iranian leaders and damaging critical infrastructure, Israel has significantly weakened Iran’s regional influence, though its proxy groups, such as Hezbollah and the Houthis, remain active. Global oil prices have surged 8% amid fears of supply disruptions, sending ripples through international markets. The United States backed Israel’s defensive measures but called for restraint, while Russia offered to mediate and Saudi Arabia adopted a cautious approach, highlighting the region’s complex dynamics. The breakdown of scheduled U.S.-Iran nuclear talks in Oman underscores the diplomatic fallout of Israel’s Begin Doctrine.

Israel’s Strategic Blind Spot: Pakistan’s Nuclear Program.  Israel’s Begin Doctrine prioritises pre-emptive strikes against adversaries developing nuclear weapons, yet Pakistan’s nuclear program, successful by 1998, never prompted Israeli action. This stems from geopolitical and strategic factors. Unlike Iraq, Syria, or Iran, Pakistan lies outside Israel’s immediate Middle Eastern sphere of influence, reducing its perceived threat. Pakistan’s nuclear ambitions were primarily driven by rivalry with India, not hostility toward Israel. Diplomatic relations, though limited, existed indirectly, and Pakistan’s leadership, including Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and Pervez Musharraf, avoided framing Israel as a primary enemy. Israel’s intelligence, via Mossad, likely assessed Pakistan’s program as India-focused, not aimed at Tel Aviv. Additionally, U.S. influence, a mutual ally, restrained escalation, as Pakistan’s nuclear development was tacitly accepted to counter India. Thus, Israel conserved resources for proximate threats like Iran, aligning with the Begin Doctrine’s focus on existential risks.

 

Conclusion

From Osirak to Natanz, the Begin Doctrine has guided Israel’s strategy to prevent nuclear proliferation among its adversaries. With its unprecedented scale and technological sophistication, Operation Rising Lion represents the doctrine’s most ambitious application yet. By targeting Iran’s nuclear facilities, missile bases, and leadership, Israel reaffirmed its commitment to existential security, even at the cost of regional escalation and international criticism. However, the operation’s success in delaying Iran’s nuclear ambitions comes with challenges: fortified sites like Fordow, retaliatory risks, and ethical questions about civilian casualties. As of this date, the Israel-Iran conflict remains volatile, with the Begin Doctrine both a shield for Israel’s survival and a catalyst for regional tensions. The doctrine’s future will depend on Israel’s ability to adapt its pre-emptive strategy to an increasingly complex geopolitical landscape.

 

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Israel ‘Spares’ Pakistan Under Its Begin Doctrine! Why IDF Bombed Iraq, Syria & Iran’s Nuclear Facilities But Left Pakistan?

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Disclaimer:

Information and data included in the blog are for educational & non-commercial purposes only and have been carefully adapted, excerpted, or edited from reliable and accurate sources. All copyrighted material belongs to respective owners and is provided only for wider dissemination.

 

 

References:-

  1. International Atomic Energy Agency. (2025, June 12). Report on Iran’s Nuclear Program Compliance. Vienna: IAEA.
  1. United Nations. (2025, June 13). Statement by Secretary-General António Guterres on Israeli Airstrikes in Iran. New York: United Nations Press Office.
  1. Al Jazeera. (2025, June 14). “Iran Vows ‘Harsh Response’ After Israeli Strikes on Nuclear Sites.” Al Jazeera English.
  1. BBC News. (2025, June 13). “Israel Launches Operation Rising Lion: What We Know About the Strikes on Iran.” BBC World Service.
  1. Reuters. (2025, June 15). “Oil Prices Surge as Israel-Iran Tensions Escalate After Operation Rising Lion.” Reuters.
  1. The Jerusalem Post. (2025, June 13). “Netanyahu: Operation Rising Lion Prevented Nuclear Holocaust.” The Jerusalem Post.
  1. The New York Times. (2025, June 14). “Mossad’s Covert Role in Israel’s Strike on Iran Revealed.” The New York Times.
  1. Center for Strategic and International Studies. (2025, June 14). Operation Rising Lion: Assessing Israel’s Strike on Iran’s Nuclear Program. Washington, DC: CSIS.
  1. Institute for National Security Studies. (2025, June 15). The Geopolitical Fallout of Operation Rising Lion. Tel Aviv: INSS.
  1. Israel Defence Forces. (2025, June 13). Official Statement on Operation Rising Lion. Jerusalem: IDF Press Office.
  1. U.S. Department of State. (2025, June 13). Press Briefing by Secretary of State Marco Rubio on Israel-Iran Conflict. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State.
  1. Bergman, Ronen. (2018). Rise and Kill First: The Secret History of Israel’s Targeted Assassinations. New York: Random House.
  1. Pollack, Kenneth M. (2021). The Persian Puzzle: Iran’s Strategic Challenge. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.

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682: OP SINDOOR: INDIA’S POLICY OF PUNITIVE DETERRENCE AGAINST PAKISTAN-SPONSORED TERRORISM

 

My article was published on the “Life of Soldier” and the IIRF  website

on 14 Jun 25.

 

India’s national security strategy has been profoundly shaped by the persistent threat of Pakistan-sponsored terrorism, particularly in the contested region of Kashmir. For decades, Pakistan has been employing terrorism as a state policy to destabilise India, primarily through proxy groups like Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM), and Hizbul Mujahideen. In response, India has transitioned from a policy of strategic restraint to one of punitive deterrence, aiming to impose significant costs on Pakistan for its support of terrorist activities.

Necessity for Change of Approach. The origins of Pakistan-sponsored terrorism against India lie in the 1947 invasion of Jammu and Kashmir by tribal militias backed by Pakistan, sparking the first Indo-Pakistani war. Over the decades, Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) has been implicated in supporting militant groups targeting India, with major attacks including the 2001 Parliament attack, the 2008 Mumbai attacks, the 2016 Uri attack, and the 2019 Pulwama bombing. Pakistan’s overt nuclearisation in 1998 emboldened its strategy, as it leveraged its nuclear arsenal to shield its proxy warfare, believing India would refrain from conventional retaliation due to the risk of nuclear escalation. This dynamic allowed Pakistan to exploit the sub-conventional space, sustaining low-intensity conflict without triggering full-scale war. India’s initial restraint, while diplomatically prudent, failed to deter Pakistan’s persistent sponsorship of terrorism, necessitating a shift toward a more assertive approach.

 

Evolution of Punitive Deterrence

In the last decade, India began adopting punitive deterrence, a strategy designed to deter Pakistan by demonstrating a willingness to escalate in response to terrorist provocations. This approach combines conventional military actions, diplomatic pressure, and economic measures to raise the costs of Pakistan’s actions, challenging its reliance on nuclear deterrence to shield proxy warfare.

2016 Surgical Strikes. The Uri attack, which killed 19 Indian soldiers, prompted India to conduct surgical strikes across the Line of Control (LoC) targeting terrorist launch pads in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK). These strikes marked a shift from restraint, signalling India’s readiness to respond militarily. However, their limited scope had a modest impact on Pakistan’s strategic behaviour.

2019 Balakot Airstrikes. The Pulwama attack led to airstrikes on a JeM training camp in Balakot, Pakistan. As the first Indian airstrikes on Pakistani soil since 1971, Balakot represented a significant escalation, demonstrating India’s willingness to cross the LoC and strike deep inside Pakistan. The operation temporarily reduced terrorist activity in Kashmir.

Operation Sindoor (2025).  Launched on May 7, 2025, in response to the April 22, 2025, Pahalgam attack that killed 26 civilians, Operation Sindoor was a high-intensity military operation targeting nine terrorist facilities in Pakistan and PoK. Unlike previous operations, Sindoor was publicly declared, reinforcing India’s commitment to punitive deterrence and challenging Pakistan’s nuclear blackmail. The operation’s scale and transparency marked a doctrinal shift toward mainstreaming conventional retaliation as a response to terrorism.

 

Strategic Framework and Analysis of Punitive Deterrence

India’s policy of punitive deterrence is a strategic doctrine aimed at dissuading Pakistan from sponsoring cross-border terrorism by imposing credible costs through calibrated military responses. Rooted in the need to break the cycle of provocation and restraint, this policy combines political resolve, precision strikes, and international diplomatic engagement to establish red lines. As exemplified by earlier responses, it marks a shift from reactive to proactive counter-terrorism. This framework underscores India’s intent to reshape adversary behaviour, strengthen national security, and reinforce deterrence without escalating into full-scale war, thereby maintaining strategic stability in South Asia. India’s punitive deterrence policy has several facets.

Conventional Response to Sub-Conventional Threats. India now treats Pakistan-sponsored terrorism as an act of aggression equivalent to conventional warfare, justifying military retaliation. Operation Sindoor framed Pakistan’s proxy attacks as the initiation of hostilities, placing the burden on Pakistan to prevent such actions to avoid escalation.

Public Declaration of Intent. By openly announcing Operation Sindoor, India established a “tripwire strategy,” setting clear red lines to deter future attacks. This transparency strengthens domestic support and signals resolve to international audiences, reducing Pakistan’s ability to deny involvement.

Targeting Terrorist Infrastructure. India focuses on disrupting terrorist networks, including training camps and launch pads, while avoiding civilian targets. Operation Sindoor’s inclusion of air bases marked a bold escalation, signalling that India could target strategic assets if provoked.

Diplomatic and Economic Pressure. India has complemented military actions with non-kinetic measures. Post-Pahalgam, India suspended the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT), demanding that Pakistan cease terrorism as a condition for reinstatement. India has also isolated Pakistan diplomatically,  condemning its actions at the United Nations and multilateral organisations.

Psychological Deterrence. By targeting air bases and demonstrating escalation dominance, India aims to undermine Pakistan’s confidence in its nuclear shield, forcing its military to reassess the costs of proxy warfare.

Legitimacy India’s airstrikes during Operation Sindoor were firmly rooted in international law and the UN Charter, which upholds the right to self-defence. The operation targeted terror camps of Jaish-e-Mohammed and Lashkar-e-Taiba in Pakistan and PoK. India presented a detailed dossier, backed by satellite imagery and intelligence inputs, confirming the presence and activity of terror infrastructure. The precision of the strikes, aimed at minimising civilian casualties, further reinforced India’s commitment to lawful action. These elements collectively underscored the legitimacy and proportionality of India’s response.

Acceptance and Reactions. Operation Sindoor elicited varied international reactions. The United States and European Union expressed concern over escalation risks but acknowledged India’s right to self-defence, urging both nations to exercise restraint. China, Pakistan’s ally, condemned the operation as a violation of sovereignty, while Russia adopted a neutral stance, advocating dialogue. The UN Security Council’s failure to issue a unified statement highlighted the global divide, with India leveraging its growing geopolitical clout to deflect criticism. India’s rejection of third-party mediation, insisting on bilateral resolution, underscored its assertive diplomatic posture.

Challenges and Limitations. India’s punitive deterrence policy faces significant challenges.

    • Escalation Risks. Targeting air bases in Operation Sindoor raised fears of nuclear escalation, given Pakistan’s low nuclear threshold. While a ceasefire was achieved, the operation highlighted the delicate balance India must maintain to avoid catastrophic conflict.
    • Commitment Traps. Public declarations create domestic expectations, where failure to respond to future attacks could erode government credibility. This dynamic risks forcing India into disproportionate responses to minor provocations.
    • Pakistan’s Resilience. Pakistan’s military views anti-India violence as a core strategic objective, making it resistant to deterrence. Despite economic pressures and FATF scrutiny, Pakistan resumed proxy attacks as conditions improved.
    • International Dynamics. Western calls for restraint, driven by nuclear fears, allow Pakistan to deflect accountability. India’s unilateral approach risks diplomatic isolation if not balanced with strategic outreach.
    • Attribution Challenges. Pakistan’s denials and the difficulty of conclusively linking attacks to its state apparatus complicate India’s justification for retaliation. Operation Sindoor’s preemptive approach reflects a shift toward acting on intent rather than exhaustive evidence, but it invites criticism.

Effectiveness and Outcomes. The policy’s effectiveness is mixed. The Balakot strikes reduced terrorist activity from 2019 to 2024, but the resurgence of attacks thereafter, including Pahalgam, indicates deterrence was not sustained. Operation Sindoor re-established India’s resolve, with the ceasefire suggesting Pakistan may recalibrate its strategy. However, the ideological commitment of Pakistan’s military to proxy warfare remains a persistent challenge. The policy has created a distinct operational space below the nuclear threshold, allowing India to impose costs without triggering all-out war.

Future Implications. For India’s policy of punitive deterrence to remain effective in the future, several strategic actions are essential. First, India must maintain credible military capabilities, including precision strike assets, advanced surveillance systems, and real-time intelligence networks to enable swift, proportionate responses. Second, seamless civil-military coordination and decision-making agility are critical to capitalise on narrow windows of opportunity. Third, India must invest in modern technologies such as unmanned systems, AI-driven targeting, and cyber capabilities to expand its deterrence toolkit. On the diplomatic front, continuous engagement with global powers is necessary to reinforce the legitimacy of India’s actions under international law and counter Pakistan’s disinformation campaigns. Furthermore, India should proactively expose terror infrastructure through satellite imagery and dossiers, shaping global opinion. Finally, internal resilience through adequate border security, counter-infiltration measures, and societal preparedness is vital to blunt future attacks. Together, these measures will sustain deterrence, minimise escalation risks, and reinforce India’s strategic credibility.

Conclusion

India’s policy of punitive deterrence marks a paradigm shift from strategic restraint to assertive coercion in countering Pakistan-sponsored terrorism. From the 2016 surgical strikes to the Balakot airstrikes and Operation Sindoor, India has demonstrated its willingness to escalate militarily, diplomatically, and economically to deter Pakistan’s proxy warfare. While effective in signalling resolve and disrupting terrorist infrastructure, the policy faces challenges in managing escalation risks, sustaining deterrence, and navigating international dynamics. As India refines its approach, balancing military decisiveness with diplomatic engagement will be critical to securing long-term stability and countering Pakistan’s use of terrorism as a tool of statecraft.

 

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OP SINDOOR: INDIA’S POLICY OF PUNITIVE DETERRENCE AGAINST PAKISTAN-SPONSORED TERRORISM

OP SINDOOR: INDIA’S POLICY OF PUNITIVE DETERRENCE AGAINST PAKISTAN-SPONSORED TERRORISM

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Information and data included in the blog are for educational & non-commercial purposes only and have been carefully adapted, excerpted, or edited from reliable and accurate sources. All copyrighted material belongs to the respective owners and is provided only for broader dissemination.

 

 

For regular updates, please register your email here:-

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References and credits

To all the online sites and channels.

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Disclaimer:

Information and data included in the blog are for educational & non-commercial purposes only and have been carefully adapted, excerpted, or edited from reliable and accurate sources. All copyrighted material belongs to the respective owners and is provided only for wider dissemination.

 

References:-

  1. Bhaumik, Anirban. “Operation Sindoor: India’s Bold Strike Against Terror.” The Hindu, May 8, 2025.
  2. Chaudhury, Dipanjan Roy. “India Suspends Indus Waters Treaty Amid Rising Tensions.” The Economic Times, April 28, 2025.
  3. Fair, C. Christine. Fighting to the End: The Pakistan Army’s Way of War. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014.
  4. Ganguly, Sumit, and S. Paul Kapur. India, Pakistan, and the Bomb: Debating Nuclear Stability in South Asia. New York: Columbia University Press, 2010.
  5. Kapur, S. Paul. “India’s Surgical Strike and the Logic of Punitive Deterrence.” Journal of Strategic Studies 40, no. 4 (2017): 567–589.
  6. Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India. “Statement on Operation Sindoor and India’s Counter-Terrorism Policy.” May 7, 2025.
  7. Pant, Harsh V., and Kartik Bommakanti. “India’s National Security Strategy: The Shift to Punitive Deterrence.” ORF Issue Brief No. 392, Observer Research Foundation, June 2025.
  8. Rajagopalan, Rajeswari Pillai. “Balakot Airstrikes: A Case Study in Escalation Dynamics.” Strategic Analysis 43, no. 6 (2019): 512–526.
  9. Riedel, Roberta. Avoiding Armageddon: America, India, and Pakistan to the Brink and Back. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2013.
  10. Singh, Sushant. “From Restraint to Retaliation: India’s Evolving Counterterrorism Strategy.” India Today, May 15, 2025.
  11. United Nations Security Council. “Press Statement on India-Pakistan Tensions Post-Pahalgam Attack.” April 25, 2025.
  12. Tellis, Ashley J. “India’s Emerging Strategic Doctrine: From Restraint to Proaction.” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, July 2020.
  13. Joshi, Yogesh, and Anit Mukherjee. “From Denial to Punishment: The Evolution of India’s Military Strategy.” India Review 18, no. 3 (2019): 283–308.
  14. Swami, Praveen. “The Return of Terror: Pakistan’s Proxy War in Kashmir.” Frontline, March 15, 2025.
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679: OP SINDOOR: ASIM MUNIR – SWORD OF HONOUR TO DISGRACING THE SWORD

 

My Article was published on “The Eurasian Times” website on 12 Jun 25.

 

Syed Asim Munir Ahmed Shah, once celebrated as a decorated and promising officer of the Pakistan Army, has emerged as a deeply polarising figure. His career, which began with distinction marked by the rare honour of winning the Sword of Honour as an Officers Training School (OTS) graduate, now faces harsh criticism amid accusations of ideological zealotry, political manipulation, and strategic failures. The transformation from a respected military leader to one accused of “disgracing the sword” is a compelling narrative that encapsulates the complexities and contradictions of Pakistan’s civil-military relations, the role of religious ideology in the armed forces, and the nation’s fraught political landscape.

 

Early Life.  Born in 1968 in Rawalpindi, Pakistan, Asim Munir came from a family with deep religious roots. His father, Syed Sarwar Munir, was a school principal and an imam at Masjid-al-Quraish in Rawalpindi’s Dheri Hassanabad, delivering Friday sermons that likely influenced Munir’s worldview. Unlike many of his peers from elite military families, Munir’s background was modest, with his family having migrated from Jalandhar, India, during the 1947 partition. His early education at the Markazi Madrasah Dar-ul-Tajweed, an Islamic seminary, instilled a strong religious foundation, significantly shaping his leadership style and raising concerns about religious ideology’s influence in the military.

 

Entry and Military Career.  Unlike many senior officers who rose through the prestigious Pakistan Military Academy (PMA) ranks, Munir was commissioned via the Officers Training School (OTS) in Mangla, an alternative path often viewed as less prestigious. He graduated in 1986, earning the Sword of Honour for his exceptional performance. Commissioned into the 23rd Battalion of the Frontier Force Regiment, he quickly established himself as a promising officer. His career included diverse roles, such as serving as a military attaché in Saudi Arabia, where he memorised the Quran, earning the title of Hafiz-e-Koran, and commanding troops in strategic locations. Munir’s academic credentials are equally impressive, with an MPhil in Public Policy and Strategic Security Management from the National Defence University in Islamabad, alongside training at military institutions in Japan and Malaysia.

 

Rise in the Pakistan Army and Governance. Several high-profile intelligence and command assignments marked Munir’s career. He served as Director-General of Military Intelligence (MI) and later as head of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). However, his term as ISI chief was short-lived, reportedly due to differences with then-Prime Minister Imran Khan, especially over corruption reports implicating the latter’s close aides. This fallout would later shape Munir’s implicit role in the military’s manoeuvring to oust Khan from power. Munir also served as commander of the Force Command Northern Areas (FCNA) in Gilgit-Baltistan and the XXX Corps in Gujranwala. By 2021, he had become Quartermaster General at GHQ Rawalpindi, a key logistical and administrative post. On November 29, 2022, Munir was appointed Chief of Army Staff, becoming the first Hafiz-e-Quran to lead the Pakistan Army. His selection came amid intense political turmoil, and his tenure immediately saw an aggressive consolidation of military influence over civilian institutions. This aggressive consolidation could weaken civilian governance structures and entrench military control in Pakistan’s political landscape. Munir became the central figure in Pakistan’s governance, overshadowing the Prime Minister and the judiciary in decision-making.

 

My Way or the Prison Way: Vindictive Attitude. Former Prime Minister of Pakistan Imran Khan has been imprisoned since August 2023. He claims that Munir harbours personal animosity, stemming from Khan’s decision to remove him as ISI chief in 2019. Khan also alleges that Munir has retaliated by targeting his wife, Bushra Bibi, leading to her 14-month detention under harsh conditions, including solitary confinement and restricted family access. Khan’s narrative, amplified by PTI supporters and a Times Square billboard campaign branding Munir a “Fraud Marshal,” portrays the general as orchestrating a broader crackdown on PTI to suppress dissent. Khan’s calls for judicial inquiries into these actions face challenges from a judiciary he claims is aligned with the military. The critics see a pattern of politically motivated persecution, highlighting the highly vindictive character of Munir.

 

‘Jihadi Mullah General’ with Religious Ideology. Munir’s worldview blends military strategy with Islamic theology, reminiscent of General Zia-ul-Haq’s Islamisation policies in the 1970s and 1980s. He overtly infuses religious ideology into military affairs. In a speech to a grand jirga in Peshawar, Munir explicitly stated that the Pakistan Army operates under the principles of “imaan, taqwa, and jihad fi sabeelillah.” He declared, “We are waging jihad in the path of Allah and success will be ours, Inshallah.” These statements are more in line with militant organisations than modern militaries. Munir’s rhetoric has emboldened radical groups and blurred the line between conventional military operations and religious militancy. The term ‘jihadi general’ began to circulate in international media and think tanks, raising concerns about Pakistan’s nuclear command under such ideological leadership. Internally, his policies led to greater appeasement of hardline clerics and religious political factions, weakening Pakistan’s secular democratic institutions.

 

Mullah-Military Alliance Doctrine. Munir’s speeches frequently invoke the two-nation theory, emphasising irreconcilable differences between Muslims and Hindus. On April 16, 2025, addressing a Pakistani diaspora audience in Islamabad, he stated, “Our forefathers believed we are different from the Hindus in every aspect of life. Our religions, customs, traditions, thoughts, and ambitions differ.” He described Kashmir as Pakistan’s “jugular vein,” a phrase perceived as a signal to terror proxies, preceding the April 22 Pahalgam attack that killed 26 civilians. Munir’s ideology aligns with a mullah-military alliance, where the army positions itself as the defender of Pakistan’s ideological frontiers, not just its borders. His leadership has seen the military provide state funerals for senior terrorists and align rhetoric with groups like Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed, raising concerns about state-sponsored terrorism. Unlike his predecessor Bajwa, who advocated for geo-economics and a 2021 ceasefire with India, Munir has not uttered a word of peace, focusing instead on jihadist rhetoric and military escalation. His strained relations with Indian leadership and refusal to engage diplomatically contrast with past generals like Zia-ul-Haq and Pervez Musharraf, who maintained channels with Indian counterparts. The long-term effects of this shift in policy could lead to increased tensions with India and further destabilisation within Pakistan as the military’s focus shifts from conventional defence to ideological warfare.

 

Self-Promotion: A Disgrace. During India’s Operation Sindoor in May 2025, Pakistan suffered considerable economic, diplomatic, and military setbacks. Indian airstrikes damaged key military installations, whereas Pakistan’s retaliatory efforts lacked cohesion. Moreover, international isolation deepened due to Pakistan’s perceived role in harbouring terror proxies. Despite this humiliation, Munir self-promoted himself to the rank of Field Marshal, the first such elevation since Ayub Khan in 1965. In the face of significant national challenges, this act of self-promotion raises critical questions about Munir’s leadership and priorities.

 

The “Failed Marshal” Narrative. Munir’s overreach into civil governance is backfiring. His alliance with the fragile coalition government has led to widespread public resentment. The crackdown on political opponents, media censorship, and manipulation of the judiciary has further alienated the citizenry. Economic conditions have deteriorated as foreign investments have dried up. Pakistan’s regional and global reputation has also suffered under Munir’s leadership. Relations with the U.S. have remained lukewarm, while ties with China have grown increasingly transactional. Meanwhile, his harsh rhetoric against India, especially communal remarks linking Hindus to historical grievances, is considered incitement of terror attacks. Domestically, Munir’s legitimacy is being questioned. Civil society has begun to refer to him as a “failed marshal,” suggesting that his promotion was not earned through strategic brilliance but political manipulation. The military’s internal cohesion also reportedly weakened, with factionalism surfacing within the ranks. Some officers allegedly opposed the overt ideological and political shift under Munir’s command.

 

Conclusion. Asim Munir’s career arc, from a Sword of Honour cadet to a disgraced Field Marshal, reflects broader themes in Pakistan’s military and political evolution. His initial promise as a disciplined, devout officer has led to a tenure marked by ideological rigidity, strategic miscalculations, and political entanglement. The sword of honour that once symbolised Asim Munir’s excellence and promise now stands metaphorically tarnished by the controversies of his later years. His transformation, from a highly respected officer to a leader accused of disgracing the military institution, underscores the complex interplay of ambition, ideology, and power in Pakistan’s armed forces.

 

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From Sword Of Honor To Disgracing The Sword, How Most Powerful Man In Pakistan, Asim Munir, Has Dented Country’s Credibility: OPED

 

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