Category: Geo-politics

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838: YEAR IN REVIEW

 

The review was published in the IIRF Strategic Yearbook 2026

Co-authored with Rishi Athreya 

The last year has been very eventful. The Global order continues to be in flux. It is increasingly becoming Realist and Anarchical. Global disarmament is clearly in tatters. World military expenditure reached $2887 billion in 2025, up 2.9 per cent in real terms from 2024. The top three military spenders—the USA, China, and Russia—spent a combined total of $1480 billion, or 51 per cent of the global total. India, the world’s fifth-largest military spender in 2025, increased its military spending by 8.9 per cent to $92.1 billion[1].

 

Immediate Neighbours

Continental neighbours are of relevance to India.

Nepal: Nepal has a new government. This is a change to the entire political order. India continues to provide development assistance to Nepal[2]. India has resumed land trade with China through the Lipulekh Pass in Uttarakhand, Shipki La Pass in Himachal Pradesh, and Nathu La Pass in Sikkim[3]. India continues to have close ties with Bhutan[4].

Bangladesh: Bangladesh elections have restored an elected government. The current Prime Minister, Tarique Rehman of the Bangladesh National Party, represents a change from the Awami League. This government creates an opportunity for India to restore ties that had dipped during the Yunus caretaker government[5]. Here too India continues to assist in the political, security, economic and cultural domains[6].

Pakistan: OP SINDOOR has changed the entire South Asian scenario. One result is Pakistan’s rapid military modernisation. Pakistan’s military spending increased by 11 per cent to $11.9 billion[7]. Further, Pakistan is acquiring advanced military hardware that brings it nearly on par with India. However, this is largely driven by borrowing and overseas support. Moreover, Pakistan is integrated into collective security with Saudi Arabia[8]. Pakistan continues to be a global hub of terror. Pakistan is a base of operations and/or target for numerous armed, non-state militant groups, some of which have existed since the 1980s. The Lashkar-e-Taiba, Jaish-e-Mohammed, Harakat-ul Jihad Islami, Harakat ul-Mujahidin, and Hizbul Mujahideen are the main anti-India groups[9]. Pakistan has a unique ability to chase with the hounds and run with the hares[10].

China: China remains active along its borders with India and neighbouring countries. China’s establishment of new administrative counties near the tri-junction of Xinjiang, Afghanistan, and Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir (POK) must be understood not merely as an internal adjustment but as part of a geopolitical strategy with significant implications for India’s territorial sovereignty and regional security[11]. China is engaging in the Sinicisation of Tibet to reduce the legitimacy of the Tibetan Government in exile in India. Further, it is building dams on the rivers in Tibet to restrict water flow to India and increase the danger of flooding. These create threats that India would need to address[12].

Maritime Scenario: As a largely maritime nation, India faces vital challenges in this sphere[13]. India’s ‘Neighbourhood First’ policy and Vision MAHASAGAR, i.e. Mutual and Holistic Advancement for Security and Growth Across Regions[14]. The entire Indian Ocean Region remains important to India[15].  As part of its global strategy, China has been developing ports and other infrastructure in littoral countries of the Indian Ocean Region for many years. It has a maritime presence in the Indian Ocean Region, including anti-piracy escort missions, port calls, and the deployment of research and survey vessels. India’s relations with regional countries are distinct from those with other countries[16]. India continues to have security links with several littoral states. It also has links in economic, developmental, humanitarian, and technological spheres[17]. The recent crisis in Iran has disrupted maritime security[18].

Iran Crisis

The attacks by the US on Iran commencing 28 Feb 2026, titled OP EPIC FURY, are a mark of the greatest watershed in the West Asia region in several decades. These attacks are the culmination of several decades of effort by the US, Europe, Oman, and the IAEA to curtail Iran’s nuclear programme. Notwithstanding various efforts, Iran remained nuclear-capable. The US and Israel claim to have attacked because they feared an Iranian strike[19]. Israel launched OP ROARING LION on Iran alongside the US. Besides removing nuclear installations, the objective was the overall degradation of Iran’s missile capability. Both the US and Israel expected a short operation of around 72 Hrs. Israel has, for over a year, been targeting Iran[20]. This has clearly been a miscalculation. There are fears of long-term strategic overreach by the US[21]. In response, Iran claims to have never started a war. It claims that starting with the coup in 1953, and later support for Iraq in the war, the US has been hostile to Iran. Iran claims that US bases in the region pose a threat to it. Iran condemns the destruction of their infrastructure. Further, it claims a legitimate right to defend itself[22]. Iran continues to claim readiness to respond to attacks, even as mediation continues[23].

Doubtful Planning: As pointed out in a RUSI Commentary, there has been poor planning by the US in anticipating the implications for maritime security, especially in the Strait of Hormuz. While the US and Israel deployed aerial power, they provided little maritime support. Iran enjoys a geographic advantage and operational readiness in the region[24]. As highlighted in an NMF Commentary, the maritime aspect is a serious casualty of the US-Iran conflict. The US has apparently damaged parts of the Iranian Navy assets using land-based air power. However, the IRGC Navy (Sepah), a distinct entity, has not been damaged. The US has assets through CENTCOM. However, these may not be deployable in the narrow waters of the Strait of Hormuz and the Gulf of Oman[25]. Any US naval asset deployed in the region becomes a soft target[26].

Hormuz Strait: Iran has blocked the Strait of Hormuz. While a few ships are selectively allowed, any ship deemed affiliated with the USA or Israel is not permitted. In response, the USA has blockaded the Strait and is stopping ships bound for Iranian ports[27]. Saudi Arabia has reportedly expressed concern to the US administration that its action may encourage the Iran-backed Houthis to attack and disrupt Red Sea shipping routes, as was the case from 2023 to 2025. Iran has said that it would threaten trade in the Persian Gulf, Red Sea and Gulf of Oman if the US “create[s] insecurity for Iran’s commercial vessels”, describing the US action as a “prelude to a violation of the ceasefire”[28]. Irrespective of a ceasefire being announced, the US claims that it is serving as a deterrent to Iran[29]. The Strait of Hormuz remains a flashpoint. The USA claims to be enforcing a blockade on Iranian ships[30]. However, Iran claims that its ships are crossing the Hormuz Strait[31]. At another level, Iran is treating US actions as piracy and terrorism[32].

Negotiations: Pertinently, the USA has released a statement claiming that there is ample legal justification for the attack on Iran. They claim that even after June 2025, hostilities between Iran, Israel and the USA continued. They also assert that negotiations with Iran failed[33]. Conversely, Iran claims that the attack was launched amid negotiations[34].  A day before the commencement of OP EPIC FURY, Iran released a statement that claimed that negotiations were going well[35].

Israel Factor: Iran considers the US a proxy for Israel[36]. A noteworthy point is that the USA has openly supported Israel[37]. In some ways, Israel is a major factor in the West Asian scenario. Israel and the US said that Pakistan’s agreement did not include Lebanon. Iran said any negotiations with the US would be “unreasonable” if the Israel–Hezbollah conflict were to continue[38].

GCC Countries: Iran’s strategy to cause a rift between the Arab states and their US and  Israeli allies appears to have failed; rather, it had an opposite effect of unifying them in their opposition to Iran and improving their security bond with America and possibly with Israel further. At the High-level GCC summit in Jeddah on 28 April 2026, the six GCC members Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates supported American action. Emphasising the need to secure the Strait of Hormuz’s opening, which impedes the flow of one-fifth of the world’s oil and liquefied natural gas supplies, the US must caution that any finalised deal must result in a permanent, long-term arrangement[39]. At a deeper level, the GCC Countries have a larger oil supply than Iran. Moreover, they have invested in Artificial Intelligence and technology. This gives them a clear edge over Iran, as well as China and the USA[40].

Russian Stance: Russia remains a major player in the region and globally. It is an active party in the war in Ukraine. It is also present geographically in the West Asian context. Russia is a continental neighbour of Iran. Their relationship has long been troubled, driven by pragmatic considerations. The Comprehensive Strategic Partnership was signed in 2025[41]. It is not a mutual defence agreement. Russia was quick to condemn the attacks on Iran. A key point was that these attacks occurred while Iran was engaged in negotiations, including on the nuclear issue. Russia claims this attack is akin to the 2003 attack on Iran, based on false claims of weapons of mass destruction[42]. Most recently, the Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi visited Russia and met President Vladimir Putin. Russia commended Iran for facing the American aggression[43].  Russia appreciates India’s multi-pronged foreign policy and respects it unconditionally. However, it believes in the particularly privileged strategic partnership with Russia[44].

Sanctions: The USA has applied sanctions on China for buying and refining Iranian Oil[45]. These target independent “teapot” oil refineries in China, primarily in Shandong Province, because they continue to import and refine Iranian crude oil[46].

Talks and Mediation: Pakistan is mediating talks between the US and Iran, and issues under discussion include freedom of navigation through the Strait of Hormuz, Iran’s nuclear and ballistic programme, reconstruction and sanctions, and a long-term peace agreement. On 11 April, talks were held in Islamabad, Pakistan’s capital. Both sides reported progress, but they reached no agreement. No further talks have been confirmed[47]. Pakistan has been facilitating talks between the USA and Iran. This is an example of Pakistan’s effective Perception Management. It has long been very effective in the Cognitive and Information domains.

Challenges for India: The recent crisis in Iran has once again posed a maritime challenge[48].  There is the targeting of civilians, of infrastructure and of commercial shipping. It also raises economic concerns, including energy, fertilisers, and food security[49]. The sinking of IRIS Dena by the US is a diplomatic incident with extensive consequences[50].  From India’s perspective, the issue has raised questions about whether the entire Indian Ocean could be seen as India’s sphere of influence. While India is not expansionist, deeper strategic challenges remain[51].

Multilateral Reactions. The current situation in the Strait of Hormuz has drawn the attention of multilateral organisations, especially the International Maritime Organisation, and the United Nations Security Council.

    • IMO Task Force: A major concern has centred on the safety of merchant mariners. The International Maritime Organisation has raised this issue[52]. France and the UK chaired a conference on the Strait of Hormuz Maritime Navigation Initiative. The conference brought together around fifty non-belligerent states[53]. The meeting underlined the international community’s determination to support freedom of navigation, uphold international law, and safeguard global economic stability and energy security. France and the United Kingdom confirmed that they are establishing an independent, strictly defensive multinational mission. It would protect merchant vessels, reassure commercial shipping operators, and conduct mine-clearance operations. Further planning is underway to implement this multinational force[54].
    • United Nations Resolution: the SC Resolution of 11 March 2026, which demanded that Iran stop the attacks on its neighbours[55]. The UN Security Council has failed to adopt a resolution aiming to boost security in the Strait of Hormuz as the critical shipping corridor remains largely closed to global trade and the transport of humanitarian aid, with war continuing to rage across the region. Bahrain submitted the text alongside Jordan, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. Eleven countries voted in favour of the draft, which the permanent members vetoed.  China and Russia voted in favour, while Colombia and Pakistan abstained. One concern of China and Russia was that the resolution was biased against Iran and failed to mention the role of the USA and Israel in initiating the attack[56].
    • UN Open Debate: The United Nations Security Council held a High-Level Open Debate on the Safety and Protection of Waterways in the Maritime Domain[57]. The Secretary-General highlighted the current disruption to global shipping caused by the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz. He mentioned the humanitarian effects, including in energy and food security. The SG also mentioned the dangers faced by seafarers and commercial vessels. Other issues raised were piracy, terrorism, and damage to critical maritime infrastructure. The Black Sea Initiative is cited as a successful example of a humanitarian navigational agreement, even during a war[58]. Several member nations raised broader concerns about commercial vessels, seafarers, economics, piracy, and shadow fleets[59]. China made a statement condemning the attack by Israel and the USA on Iran. China commended Pakistan’s mediation efforts. Further, China raised issues of UNCLOS, Piracy, and Ocean Governance[60]. China also expressed concern about the situation in Gaza and the humanitarian fallout. They believe that Israel is unnecessarily attacking Gaza, and the two-state solution is non-negotiable[61]. Russia continues to hold the USA and Israel responsible for the war in Iran. Further, they hold that in times of war, a coastal State under attack may limit navigation in its territorial waters for security purposes. Russia also raised concerns about energy, the economy, fertilisers, and food security[62]. The USA also lamented China and Russia vetoing the aforementioned resolution. The USA also mentioned the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz. The support by Iran of the Houthis in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden is also condemned. They highlighted the issue of nuclear non-proliferation. A concern raised was around sea mines supposedly planted by Iran. Finally, the USA called for commercial shipping, maritime finance and insurance, humanitarian aid agencies, and militaries to come together to address this situation. The USA mentioned the need for an anti-piracy force in the Strait of Hormuz[63]. The Baltic states also share concerns about navigation in the Strait of Hormuz[64]. The UK condemned the veto on the UN resolution. They stressed the need to open the Strait of Hormuz and highlighted their joint efforts with France[65]. In this context, the IMO mentioned freedom of navigation without tariffs. They also said seafarers are being evacuated[66].

 

Ukraine War

The war in Ukraine continues unabated, with several consequences.

Military Spending: The main contributor to the global increase in military spending in 2025 was a 14 per cent rise in Europe to $864 billion. Spending by Russia and Ukraine continued to grow in the fourth year of the war in Ukraine. At the same time, ongoing rearmament by European NATO members drove the sharpest annual growth in spending in Central and Western Europe since the end of the Cold War. Russia’s military spending grew by 5.9 per cent in 2025 to $190 billion, bringing its military burden to 7.5 per cent of GDP. Ukraine, the seventh-largest spender in 2025, increased spending by 20 per cent to $84.1 billion, or 40 per cent of GDP. The USA made no new allocation for Ukraine in 2025[67].

Changing US Stance: The USA has reduced assistance to Ukraine. The European Union, the UK and NATO are picking up the tab[68]. Some argue Europe should emerge as a military bloc independent of the USA[69]. There are calls to use the European Defence Industrial Programme to build more weapons within Europe. Europe is described as a sleeping giant[70]. Ukraine, for its part, calls for more support from Europe and NATO. It links the broader European safety from Russia to the Ukrainian front. There is even a view that the USA is appeasing Russia to the detriment of Ukraine and even Europe[71].

Maritime Aspects: Russia, at another level, accuses Ukraine of armed attacks on civilian vessels flying the Russian flag or transporting Russian energy resources in different waterways around the globe. These concerns affect seafarers, energy, the environment, and trade.  Russia claims that attacks are occurring on the coasts of countries supporting Ukraine, which raises questions about their complicity in these attacks. The Black and Mediterranean Seas, and the Bosphorus Strait, are mentioned as sites of these attacks. Russia suggests upholding UNCLOS 1982 to prevent future incidents[72]. On the other hand, the EU is concerned that Shadow Fleets support the Russian war economy[73]. Nordic countries also worry about Russia’s interference with the satellite navigation system in the Baltic Sea[74].

Minerals Deal: The US and Ukraine signed a deal granting the US access to Ukraine’s vast mineral wealth, including Critical Minerals[75].  This is supposed to give the US access to mining while recognising Ukraine’s ownership. This pact would make it difficult for the USA to recognise Russian sovereignty over Ukrainian territory and deter further territorial claims[76].

China Factor: Some view China as supporting Russia in the war in Ukraine. China has supplied military supplies, including Drones. China is also buying oil from Russia[77].

Sanctions: The USA has applied sanctions on both Iran and Russia. These are in response to Iran’s support for Russia in the Ukraine War[78].

 

Global Energy Scenario

Both wars are affecting the global supply of natural resources and their prices[79].

Oil: A major consequence of this crisis is the need to use alternative, often more expensive, sea routes[80]. Around 20% of global petroleum and 20% of liquefied natural gas traverse the strait each year. Pre-conflict, around 3,000 vessels used the strait each month. Their numbers now stand at around 5% of this level. This has pushed up global oil and gas prices (benefiting both Russia and, temporarily, Iran). Several Arab states were forced to cut or suspend oil production due to Iranian attacks[81].  Russia remains India’s leading supplier of Hydrocarbons[82].

Effect on Fertiliser: The sustained reduction in LNG production and/or shipments from the Gulf (Qatar supplies around 10% of globally traded natural gas) will affect worldwide nitrogen fertiliser production. Natural gas is both a key feedstock and the primary energy source for producing ammonia, the building block for all nitrogen fertilisers. Other ingredients include urea, Phosphate, and Sulphur. India is particularly affected by these shortages[83]. Fertiliser shortages also threaten major global food insecurity[84].

Alternative Energy Routes: Only Saudi Arabia and the UAE have operational crude oil pipelines that could reroute flows to bypass the Strait of Hormuz. While additional capacity may exist in major pipelines to bypass the Strait, the logistics and supply chains needed to reroute and export substantial flows have not been tested under stress[85].

Maritime Insurance: Opening the Strait of Hormuz remains a grave issue. A deeper problem is whether commercial underwriters will insure vessels at reasonable rates. This would essentially need a political solution[86]. One suggestion is for India to have national Protection and Indemnity Clubs[87]. Most recently, the Government of India has approved this in principle[88].

Indian Energy Situation. India has made significant strides in energy and climate change.

    • Power Generation: India is successfully balancing the twin goals of meeting rising electricity demand and promoting sustainability. According to the International Energy Agency, 85% of the increase in global electricity demand over the next three years will come from emerging and developing economies. As one of the fastest-growing major economies, India plays a central role in the global energy transition. India’s share in global primary energy consumption is projected to double by 2035. Electricity generation has increased from 1,168 billion units (BU) in 2015–16 to an estimated 1,824 BU in 2024–25. Similarly, total installed capacity has grown from 305 gigawatts (GW) in 2015–16 to a projected 475 GW in 2024–25[89].
    • Multiple Energy Sources: India’s energy journey is no longer defined by a single source; it’s now drawing strength from solar parks, rooftop panels, hydrogen pilots, modernised nuclear frameworks, smart meters, and digital platforms. Milestones such as expanding renewable capacity, advancing the National Green Hydrogen Mission, strengthening DISCOMs, and building the India Energy Stack reflect a structured, forward-looking transition. Policy reform, infrastructure investment, technological innovation, and global cooperation support this transformation. As India moves toward its Net Zero 2070 commitment, the evolving energy mix shows that growth and sustainability can go hand in hand. India is redesigning how power is produced, delivered, and shared for a future that is secure, sustainable, and self-reliant[90]. India is increasing its use of renewable energy, and the country now ranks third globally[91].

 

Emerging Trends

Events over the past year point to a few emerging trends to watch in the coming years.  The war in Ukraine remains a stalemate. The West Asia scenario got more complicated with the US-Israel attacks on Iran. This is also an asymmetric conflict and remains inconclusive. Both these conflicts show the chasm in NATO. While continental Europe is fighting against Russia in the Ukraine War, the USA has reduced its support. While the EU and even the UK offer diplomatic support to the USA in West Asia, this does not translate into military backing. Russia is the active party in the war in Ukraine. Iran has been supporting Russia. The USA sanctioned this. China has also been supporting Russia. Currently, both Russia and China are providing diplomatic support to Iran against the USA. The partnership agreement, while not necessarily military, has political objectives.  While it may not be obvious, there are currently two powers, namely the USA and Russia, at war, where the other supports the adversary. China, while not a party to either war, is on the opposite side to the USA.

Both wars are linked in the maritime sphere. Discussing one leads to the other. There are concerns about maritime aggression by both the USA and Russia. Russia, for its part, accuses Ukraine of maritime hostility. China, while apparently concerned about the USA’s maritime belligerence in the Iran War, is itself confrontational in the South China Sea. The concerns of the UN and the IMO, supported by France and the UK, show that the Hormuz Strait has morphed from a military issue to a constabulary one. The IMO is taking positive steps to address humanitarian issues.

The Iran War is also in the Cognitive domain, with both sides making claims and counterclaims. While specific battles and incidents are a matter of detail, the underlying issue is around the legitimacy of the USA and Israel invading Iran. Moreover, there is the whole issue of whether Iran is justified or not in building up an arsenal, including nuclear weapons.

 

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[1] SPIRI, (27 April 2026), Global military spending rise continues as European and Asian expenditures surge, https://www.sipri.org/media/press-release/2026/global-military-spending-rise-continues-european-and-asian-expenditures-surge

[2] Ministry of External Affairs, (13 March 2026), Lok Sabha Question No. 310 Strategic Challenges to Neighbourhood Policy, https://www.mea.gov.in/lok-sabha.htm?dtl/40887/question+no+310+strategic+challenges+to+neighbourhood+policy

[3] Ministry of External Affairs, (18 Dec 2025), Rajya Sabha Question No- 2150 Resumption of Broder Trade Through Nathula, https://www.mea.gov.in/rajya-sabha.htm?dtl/40504/question+no+2150+resumption+of+broder+trade+through+nathula

[4] Ministry of External Affairs, (18 Feb 2026), Prime Minister’s meeting with the Prime Minister of Bhutan, https://www.mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/40791/prime+ministers+meeting+with+the+prime+minister+of+bhutan+february+18+2026

[5] Kesarwani, N., (24 April 2026), Conditional Reset: India’s Calculus in Post-Election Bangladesh, https://rsis.edu.sg/rsis-publication/rsis/conditional-reset-indias-calculus-in-post-election-bangladesh/

[6] Ministry of External Affairs, (13 March 2026), Ibid

[7] SPIRI, (27 April 2026), Ibid

[8] CENJOWS, (21 Jan 2026), The Phoenix Protocol: A Comprehensive Assessment of Pakistan’s Post-Sindoor Military Transformation and Strategic Rebalancing, https://cenjows.in/publications/the-phoenix-protocol-a-comprehensive-assessment-of-pakistans-post-sindoor-military-transformation-and-strategic-rebalancing/

[9] Kronstadt, K. A., (25 March 2026), Terrorist and Other Militant Groups in Pakistan,  https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/IF11934

[10] Gupta, A., (03 March 2026), Pakistan: The Manufactured Ally and the Militant Paradox, https://cenjows.in/publications/pakistan-the-manufactured-ally-and-the-militant-paradox/

[11] Langeh, A., (17 April 2026), Strategic Depth and Silent Expansion: China’s Growing Presence Around Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir, https://cenjows.in/publications/strategic-depth-and-silent-expansion-chinas-growing-presence-around-pakistan-occupied-kashmir/

[12] Kant, M.R., (27 Jan 2026), Water and Worship: China’s Asymetric Warfare in Tibet, https://cenjows.in/publications/water-and-worship-chinas-asymetric-warfare-in-tibet/

[13] Maritime Doctrines and Concepts Centre, (2025), Indian Maritime Doctrine, NSP 1.1, Indian Navy

[14] Ministry of External Affairs, (13 March 2026), Ibid

[15] Ministry of External Affairs, (11 April 2026), Remarks by EAM Dr. S. Jaishankar at the 09th Indian Ocean Conference, Mauritius, https://www.mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/41038/remarks+by+eam+dr+s+jaishankar+at+the+09th+indian+ocean+conference+mauritius

[16] Ministry of External Affairs, (13 March 2026), Ibid

[17] Ministry of External Affairs, (11 April 2026), Ibid

[18] Sinha, M., (7 March 2026), Maritime Dimensions of OPERATION EPIC FURY, https://maritimeindia.org/maritime-dimensions-of-operation-epic-fury/

[19] House of Commons Library, (9 March 2026), US-Israel strikes on Iran: February/March 2026, https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-10521/

[20] Zoubi, A., (3 March 2026), Israel’s ‘Roaring Lion’: Military Target to Political Decision in Iran, https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/israels-roaring-lion-military-target-political-decision-iran

[21] Pandey, D.P., (19 March 2026), Operation Epic Fury Already a Success: US Must Exercise Strategic Restraint to Avoid Overreach, https://claws.co.in/operation-epic-fury-already-a-success-us-must-exercise-strategic-restraint-to-avoid-overreach/

[22] Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, (02 April 2026), President Pezeshkian says Iran has never initiated war, https://irangov.ir/detail/479346

[23] Ministry of Foreign Affairs Iran, (22 April 2026), Iran reaffirms readiness to defend against any hostility or threat, https://en.mfa.gov.ir/portal/newsview/786682

[24] Roberts, D.B. (24 March 2026) The Strait of Hormuz Problem: What ‘Securing’ the Waterway Actually Requires, https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/strait-hormuz-problem-what-securing-waterway-actually-requires

[25] Sinha, M., (7 March 2026), Ibid

[26] Roberts, D.B. (24 March 2026) Ibid

[27] House of Commons, (24 April 2026), Israel/US-Iran conflict 2026: Reopening the Strait of Hormuz, https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-10636/

[28] House of Commons, (24 April 2026), Ibid

[29] White House, (08 April 2026), Peace Through Strength: Operation Epic Fury Crushes Iranian Threat as Ceasefire Takes Hold, https://www.whitehouse.gov/releases/2026/04/peace-through-strength-operation-epic-fury-crushes-iranian-threat-as-ceasefire-takes-hold/

[30] US Department of War, (24 April 2026), Joint Force Enforces Maritime Blockade in Gulf of Oman, Globally

https://www.war.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/4470128/joint-force-enforces-maritime-blockade-in-gulf-of-oman-globally/

[31] Investing (27 April 2026), Seven ships cross Strait of Hormuz as Iran-US talks stall, https://www.investing.com/news/economy-news/seven-ships-cross-strait-of-hormuz-as-iranus-talks-stall-93CH-4638508

[32] Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Iran, (21 April 2026), Statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs regarding the US attack on an Iranian commercial vessel and the hostage-taking of Its crew and their families, https://en.mfa.gov.ir/portal/newsview/786655

[33] US Department of State, (21 April 2026), Operation Epic Fury and International Law, https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-legal-adviser/2026/04/operation-epic-fury-and-international-law

[34] Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, (02 April 2026), President Pezeshkian says Iran has never initiated war, https://irangov.ir/detail/479346

[35] Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, (27 Feb 2026), Significant Progress Made in Third Round of Iran–U.S. Talks in Geneva, FM Says, https://irangov.ir/detail/478575

[36] Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, (02 April 2026), Ibid

[37] US Department of State, (21 April 2026), Ibid

[38] House of Commons, (24 April 2026), Ibid

[39] GCC SG, (28 April 2026), Media Statement by HE GCCSG on the Occasion of the 19th Consultative Meeting of Their Majesties and Highnesses, the Leaders of the Cooperation Council States, https://www.gcc-sg.org/en/MediaCenter/News/Pages/news2026-4-28-5.aspx

[40] Marks, J., (20 April 2026), Iran’s Instability and the Gulf’s Indispensability, https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/irans-instability-and-gulfs-indispensability

[41] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, (02 Oct 2025), Foreign Ministry statement in connection with the entry into force of the Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership between the Russian Federation and the Islamic Republic of Iran, https://mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/2050909/

[42] Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the UN, (28 Feb 2026), Statement by Permanent Representative Vassily Nebenzia at UNSC Briefing in connection with US and Israeli Strikes against Iran, https://russiaun.ru/en/news/28022026

[43] President of Russia, (27 April 2026), Meeting with Foreign Minister of Iran Abbas Araghchi, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/79633

[44] The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, (25 April 2026), Foreign Ministry Spokeswoman Maria Zakharova interview with an Indian news website Firstpost, April 25, 2026, https://mid.ru/ru/detail-material-page/2100214/?lang=en

[45] US Department of State, (01 May 2026), U.S. Sanctions Tighten Grip on Iran-China Oil Trade, https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesperson/2026/05/u-s-sanctions-tighten-grip-on-iran-china-oil-trade/

[46] US Department of Treasury, (28 April 2026), Treasury Warns of Sanctions Risks Linked to China-Based Independent “Teapot” Oil Refineries, https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0476

[47] House of Commons, (24 April 2026), Ibid

[48] Ministry of External Affairs, (11 April 2026), Ibid

[49] Ministry of External Affairs, (11 April 2026), Ibid

[50] Mahdevan, P, (17 March 2026), Crouching Europe, Resilient Iran, https://www.vifindia.org/article/2026/march/17/Crouching-Europe-Resilient-Iran

[51] Palavalsa, S., (10 March 2026), India’s Ocean Strategy: No ‘Monroe Doctrine’ — Only Cooperative Security, https://maritimeindia.org/indias-ocean-strategy-no-monroe-doctrine-only-cooperative-security/

[52] IMO, (17 April 2026), France-UK: Summit on Freedom of Navigation in the Strait of Hormuz: Keynote Remarks by IMO Secretary-General Arsenio Dominguez, https://www.imo.org/en/mediacentre/secretarygeneral/pages/statement-summit-uk-france-strait-of-hormuz.aspx

[53] President of France, (17 March 2026), Strait of Hormuz maritime navigation initiative, https://www.elysee.fr/en/emmanuel-macron/2026/04/17/strait-of-hormuz-maritime-navigation-initiative

[54] Ministry of Defence, (22 April 2026), UK and France to lead multinational Strait of Hormuz military planning conference, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-and-france-to-lead-multinational-strait-of-hormuz-military-planning-conference

[55] United Nations Security Council, (11 March 2026), Overview of Security Council Resolutions

https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/un-documents/document/s-res-2817.php

[56] United Nations, (07 April 2026), Security Council: Russia and China veto resolution on Strait of Hormuz, https://news.un.org/en/story/2026/04/1167261

[57] United Nations Security Council, (27 April 2026), 10145th meeting – Maintenance of international peace and security: Maritime security, https://main.un.org/securitycouncil/en/events/10145th-meeting-maintenance-international-peace-and-security-maritime-security,

[58] United Nations Secretary General, (27 April 2026), Secretary-General’s remarks to the Security Council – on Maritime Security, https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/statements/2026-04-27/secretary-generals-remarks-the-security-council-maritime-security

[59] United Nations, (27 April 2026), Immediately Restore Freedom of Navigation through Strait of Hormuz, Speakers Urge in Security Council Condemning Critical Waterway’s Use as ‘Bargaining Chip’, SC/16349, https://press.un.org/en/2026/sc16349.doc.htm

[60] Permanent Mission of PRC to UN, (27 April 2026), Remarks on the Safety and Protection of Waterways in the Maritime Domain by Ambassador Fu Cong at the UN Security Council Open Debate, https://un.china-mission.gov.cn/eng/hyyfy/202604/t20260428_11901374.htm

[61] Permanent Mission of PRC to UN, (27 April 2026a),  Remarks on the Situation in the Middle East by Ambassador Fu Cong at the UN Security Council Open Debate, https://un.china-mission.gov.cn/eng/hyyfy/202604/t20260429_11902127.htm

[62] Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the UN, (27 April 2026), Statement by Permanent Representative Vassily Nebenzia at a UNSC Briefing on the Safety and Protection of Waterways in the Maritime Domain, https://russiaun.ru/en/news/27042026

[63] United States Mission to the United Nations, (27 April 2026), Remarks at a UN Security Council Open Debate on Maritime Security, https://usun.usmission.gov/remarks-at-a-un-security-council-open-debate-on-maritime-security-2/

[64] Permanent Mission of Iceland to the UN Statements, (27 April 2026), N5 Statement at the Security Council Open Debate on the Safety and Protection of Waterways in the Maritime Domain

https://www.government.is/publications/statements/statement/n5-statement-at-the-security-council-open-debate-on-the-safety-and-protection-of-waterways-in-the-maritime-domain

[65] FCDO, (27 April 2026), We must step up efforts together to safeguard international waterways from disruption: UK statement at the UN Security Council, https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/we-must-step-up-efforts-together-to-safeguard-international-waterways-from-disruption-uk-statement-at-the-un-security-council

[66] IMO, (27 April 2026), Keynote Remarks by IMO Secretary-General at UN Security Council High-Level Open Debate, https://www.imo.org/en/mediacentre/secretarygeneral/pages/un%20security%20council%20high-level%20open%20debate-27%20april.aspx

[67] SIPRI, Ibid

[68] Mills, S., (09 March 2026), Military assistance to Ukraine: What has changed since January 2025?, https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-10308/

[69] Gic, A., Landsbergis, G., and Sohn, R., (20 March 2026), Europe’s Power is Defined by the Ability to Take Action in Ukraine,

https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/europes-power-defined-ability-take-action-ukraine

[70] European Commission, (10 Feb 2026), Speech by Commissioner Kubilius at the Plenary Session of the European Parliament “Building a stronger European defence in light of an increasingly volatile international environment”, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_26_367

[71] President of Ukraine, (14 Feb 2026), Speech by the President of Ukraine at the Munich Security Conference, https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/vistup-prezidenta-ukrayini-na-myunhenskij-bezpekovij-konfere-102861

[72] Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the UN, (27 April 2026), Ibid

[73] Delegation of the European Union to the United Nations, (27 April 2026), EU Statement – UN Security Council: The Safety and Protection of Maritime Waterways

https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/un-new-york/eu-statement-%E2%80%93-un-security-council-safety-and-protection-maritime-waterways_en

[74] Permanent Mission of Iceland to the UN Statements, (27 April 2026), Ibid

[75] US Department of State, (30 April 2025), Agreement between the Government of Ukraine and the Government of the United States of America on the Establishment of a United States-Ukraine Reconstruction Investment Fund, https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/25-523-Ukraine-Reconstruction-and-Investment.pdf

[76] Gould-Davies, N., (08 May 2025), The US–Ukraine minerals deal: a triumph for Ukrainian diplomacy, https://www.iiss.org/online-analysis/online-analysis/2025/05/the-us-ukraine-minerals-deal-a-triumph-for-ukrainian-diplomacy/

[77] CFR, (07 Jan 2026), China in Russia and Ukraine: October 2025, https://www.cfr.org/articles/china-russia-and-ukraine-october-2025

[78] US Department of State, (10 Sept 2024), New Iran and Russia Sanctions Designations, https://2021-2025.state.gov/new-iran-and-russia-sanctions-designations/

[79] Frittelli, J., and Goldman, B., (04 May 2026), The Strait of Hormuz in Brief: Non-Oil Shipments and Effects on U.S. Shippers, https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/R48903

[80] Labh, N, (13 March 2026), Conflict in the Strait of Hormuz is spilling into the Indian Ocean. https://www.chathamhouse.org/2026/03/conflict-strait-hormuz-spilling-indian-ocean

[81] House of Commons, (24 April 2026), Israel/US-Iran conflict 2026: Reopening the Strait of Hormuz, https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-10636/

[82] The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, (25 April 2026), Foreign Ministry Spokeswoman Maria Zakharova interview with an Indian news website Firstpost, April 25, 2026, https://mid.ru/ru/detail-material-page/2100214/?lang=en

[83] Hebebrand, C., Glauber, J., Vos, R.,  and Rice, B.,  (01 April 2026), The Iran war’s impacts on global fertilizer markets and food production, https://www.ifpri.org/blog/the-iran-wars-impacts-on-global-fertilizer-markets-and-food-production/

[84] Food and Agriculture, (26 March 2026), FAO Chief Economist warns of severe global food security risks from disruption to Strait of Hormuz trade corridor, https://www.fao.org/newsroom/detail/fao-chief-economist-warns-of-severe-global-food-security-risks-from-disruption-to-strait-of-hormuz-trade-corridor/en

[85] International Energy Agency, (Feb 2026), Strait of Hormuz Factsheet, https://www.iea.org/about/oil-security-and-emergency-response/strait-of-hormuz

[86] Roberts, D.B. (24 March 2026) The Strait of Hormuz Problem: What ‘Securing’ the Waterway Actually Requires, https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/strait-hormuz-problem-what-securing-waterway-actually-requires

[87] Mishra, M., and Vachaparambil, J.J. (30 April 2026), Insurance and Indemnification for Maritime India, https://maritimeindia.org/insurance-and-indemnification-for-maritime-india/

[88] Prime Minister of India, (18 April 2026), Cabinet approves proposal for creation of ‘Bharat Maritime Insurance Pool’ (BMI pool) with a sovereign guarantee of Rs 12,980 crore to facilitate continuous maritime insurance coverages, https://www.pmindia.gov.in/en/news_updates/cabinet-approves-proposal-for-creation-of-bharat-maritime-insurance-pool-bmi-pool-with-a-sovereign-guarantee-of-rs-12980-crore-to-facilitate-continuous-maritime-insurance-coverage/

[89] Press Information Bureau, (22 July 2025), Indias Energy Landscape Powering Growth with Sustainable Energy, https://www.pib.gov.in/PressNoteDetails.aspx?NoteId=154717&ModuleId=3&reg=3&lang=2

[90] Press Information Bureau, (28 Feb 2026), The Evolving Spectrum of Energy Sources, https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2233832&reg=3&lang=2

[91] Ministry of New and Renewable Energy, (08 April 2026), India Ranks third globally in Renewable Energy Installed Capacity: Shri Prahlad Joshi, https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleseDetailm.aspx?PRID=2250039&reg=3&lang=1

Posted on

828: 16TH INDIA-JAPAN ANNUAL SUMMIT

 

The 16th India-Japan Annual Summit was held in New Delhi from July 1–3, 2026. It brought together Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and the recently appointed Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi. It was PM Takaichi’s first official visit to India. The high-level meeting aimed to consolidate the “Special Strategic and Global Partnership”.

 

Landmark Outcome Documents

The bilateral talks yielded three critical joint statements designed to foster long-term resilience: –

    • Joint Declaration on Economic Security. Accelerated cooperation on critical minerals, secure semiconductor supply chains, and robust industrial networks.
    • Joint Statement on Artificial Intelligence Cooperation. Establishing frameworks for collaborative AI innovation, deployment, and ethical standards.
    • Joint Statement on Energy Resilience. Enhancing green tech, clean energy transitions, and clean hydrogen infrastructure.

Defence and Technology Highlights

    • Defence Industrial Co-development. The materialisation of the UNICORN marked progress in the integrated naval mast project, signalling a breakthrough in defence tech transfers.
    • Financial Infrastructure. The International Financial Services Centres Authority (IFSCA) signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the Japan Financial Services Agency (JFSA) to deepen sub-national regulatory cooperation and supervise unified financial services.
    • Support for Japanese Commerce. Building upon Japan’s prior 10-trillion-yen investment target, PM Modi announced that the Indian Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) will dedicate a specialised weekly window to directly resolve operational bottlenecks faced by Japanese companies under the Make in India framework.

Diplomatic and Cultural Horizons

    • 75 Years of Diplomacy. Both leaders announced that 2027 will be designated and celebrated as the “Year of Shared Horizons” to commemorate 75 years of formal diplomatic ties, featuring year-long cultural and people-to-people exchange programs.
    • Sub-National Outreach. The summit highlighted the rapid increase in state-to-prefecture alignment, bolstered by the newly formed India–Japan Governors’ Network for Friendship and Exchange.
    • 17th Annual Summit Invitation. PM Takaichi extended an official invitation to PM Modi to visit Japan for the 17th Annual Summit in 2027, which was accepted with pleasure.

 

Inputs to the Questions by the Journalists

 

What, according to you, was most striking about PM Sanae Takaichi’s visit to India, and why do you think so?

    • The depth and breadth of outcomes in a short visit stood out the most.
    • It marked a clear shift in the relationship from one primarily centred on economic cooperation to a broader one encompassing strategic technology, defence, and supply chain resilience.
    • The emphasis on emerging technologies, semiconductor cooperation, and defence collaboration demonstrates that the partnership is no longer transactional but is becoming structural.

 

  1. How will Indo-Japan’s joint focus on “free and rules-based Indo-Pacific” help the cause of the greater region?
    • A free and rules-based Indo-Pacific is all about preserving international law, freedom of navigation, open trade, and peaceful resolution of disputes.
    • India and Japan are among the largest democratic powers in Asia, and their cooperation would help in reinforcing these principles.
    • Their cooperation would improve maritime security, strengthen disaster response, and diversify supply chains.
    • It would result in regional stability and economic growth.

 

  1. India and Japan also signed their first agreement for the co-development of defence projects. What’s most significant about it? How do you think this will develop in the next five years?
    • The agreement signifies a shift from a conventional buyer-seller relationship to one centred on co-development and co-production.
    • It exemplifies an increasing strategic trust between the two nations.
    • The agreement is in alignment with India’s’ Make in India’ initiative and defence policies.
    • It will afford Japanese companies enhanced opportunities to engage in India’s growing defence industrial ecosystem.
    • Over the next five years, collaboration is likely to increase in areas such as unmanned systems, maritime surveillance technologies, electronic warfare, cyber capabilities, and next-generation defence manufacturing.

 

  1. Modi and Takaichi signed at least 129 MoUs on technology, investment and Artificial Intelligence (AI). What impact will this have on India’s economy and broader supply chains in the Indo-Pacific region?
    • Japan historically has been known for advanced manufacturing and high-quality standards.
    • These agreements could deepen India’s integration into global supply chains.
    • Partnerships in AI and technology could accelerate India’s digital transformation. It would strengthen semiconductor and electronics manufacturing in India. It would also enhance research collaboration and create high-skilled employment.
    • For the Indo-Pacific, it would diversify production networks. This, in turn, would make the regional supply chains more resilient to geopolitical disruptions.
    • However, the ultimate impact will depend less on the number of MoUs signed and more on their timely implementation, regulatory coordination, and sustained private-sector participation.

 

  1. Is there anything else that you would like to share on this topic with my readers?
    • At a time when the global economy is being reshaped by geopolitical competition, trusted partnerships are becoming as important as traditional trade relationships.
    • The India-Japan cooperation is a long-term strategic partnership.
    • The two countries can become anchors of stability, innovation, and sustainable economic growth in the region.
    • This partnership could become one of the crucial bilateral relationships in Asia.

 

16th India-Japan Annual Summit Joint Statement

 

Advancing a Partnership of Strategic Convergence and Trust for Shared Growth, Prosperity and Resilience

  1. At the invitation of the Prime Minister of India, H.E. Shri Narendra Modi, the Prime Minister of Japan, H.E. Ms TAKAICHI Sanae, paid an Official Visit to India from 1-3 July 2026 for the 16th India-Japan Annual Summit. A high-level delegation, including senior officials, CEOs, and industry leaders, accompanied Prime Minister Takaichi. This was Prime Minister Takaichi’s first official visit to India.
  2. The two Prime Ministers reviewed developments since the last Annual Summit. They discussed a wide range of areas for further cooperation to enhance the India-Japan Special Strategic and Global Partnership. They recognised that strengthening such strategic and global cooperation between the two countries will be mutually beneficial and contribute to a resilient and prosperous Indo-Pacific and beyond.
  3. In recognition of the strategic salience of the India-Japan partnership in an increasingly volatile and uncertain geopolitical environment, the two Prime Ministers reaffirmed their commitment to developing a mutually complementary relationship. Building on the success of the 15th India-Japan Annual Summit, they agreed to advance cooperation in three priority areas: defence and security cooperation; economic partnership, including economic security, energy resilience, technology, and innovation; and people-to-people exchanges. They shared the view that India and Japan are natural and indispensable partners in their efforts to realise respective national interests.
  4. The two Prime Ministers reiterated that as leading democracies and major economies of the world, they have a duty to shape and uphold an international order which is free, open and based on the rule of law. To this end, Prime Minister Modi welcomed the updated “Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP)” and shared that it closely aligns with the Indo-Pacific Oceans’ Initiative (IPOI) and Mutual and Holistic Advancement for Security and Growth Across Regions (MAHASAGAR). They reiterated their commitment to deepen further concrete cooperation in line with their shared strategic outlook.
  5. The two Prime Ministers expressed deep satisfaction that bilateral defence and security cooperation is on an upward trajectory and reaffirmed their commitment to deepening cooperation based on the Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation, adopted at the last Annual Summit. They directed their Ministers to hold the fourth round of the 2+2 Ministerial Meeting in Tokyo by the end of this year. They welcomed the progress in cooperation among the respective services, including the successful conduct of the naval exercise “JAIMEX 25”, supported by both services on the Japanese side. India welcomed Japan’s participation in the International Fleet Review 2026, held in Visakhapatnam. They concurred on deepening maritime security cooperation through enhanced exercises, maritime domain awareness using satellite capabilities, naval maintenance, repair and overhaul (MRO) cooperation, and defence equipment and technology cooperation under the framework of “Make in India”.
  6. Prime Minister Modi welcomed Japan’s review of the three principles on the transfer of defence equipment and technology and hoped that it would further deepen the defence partnership between the two countries. The two Prime Ministers expressed satisfaction that an agreement has been reached in principle on the remaining technical details regarding the Unified Complex Radio Antenna (“UNICORN”) project. They expressed their expectation of an early conclusion of the project and agreed to explore ways to materialise other projects in the field of defence equipment and technology.
  7. The two Prime Ministers recognised that the current international situation calls for both countries further to promote tangible cooperation in the areas of economic security. They committed to deepening economic security cooperation and developing key initiatives to support a resilient and prosperous region. They reiterated their grave concerns about the use of economic coercion and non-market policies and practices, including arbitrary export restrictions that may lead to supply chain disruptions, particularly in critical minerals and critical industrial sectors, as well as price manipulation. They underscored the importance of diversified, resilient and reliable global supply chains, a fair and competitive global environment, and the need to avoid reliance on any one country. They reaffirmed their commitment to promote and protect key technologies while respecting their regulations and related rules.
  8. Both sides consented to further protecting high technology trade while mutually easing export control challenges. Further, they decided to advance consultations among the relevant Ministries of the two countries. They appreciated the strides made by the two countries under the Economic Security Initiative, which was launched at the last Annual Summit, including the inaugural Private-Sector Economic Security Dialogue and the second round of the Economic Security Dialogue earlier this year. They adopted the India-Japan Joint Declaration on Economic Security Cooperation to promote further project-based collaboration in the key sectors of semiconductors, critical minerals, information and communication technology, clean energy and pharmaceuticals.
  9. Recognising their shared status as major energy-consuming nations impacted by volatility in global energy markets, the two Prime Ministers underscored the urgency of deepening India-Japan cooperation on energy security. They reiterated the importance of ensuring unimpeded freedom of navigation and the uninterrupted flow of global commerce, including through the Strait of Hormuz, and of opposing any restrictive measures that hamper the flow of commercial vessels. They welcomed the prospects for expanded collaboration across the energy value chain. They reaffirmed their commitment to working together, bilaterally and through multilateral platforms, to enhance the resilience of energy supply chains and to promote stability in global energy markets.
  10. The two Prime Ministers concurred on exploring collaborative opportunities, including joint investments, across the maritime energy transport value chain. They highlighted the importance of regional initiatives to strengthen energy resilience, such as Japan’s Partnership on Wide Energy and Resources Resilience (POWERR Asia), India’s support to energy security in South Asia, and the Quad Initiative on Indo-Pacific Energy Security. They welcomed the adoption of the Joint Statement on Energy Resilience. They also agreed to strengthen cooperation on strategic petroleum reserves, including through the exchange of best practices and technical collaboration on the strategic stockpiling ecosystem. Against this backdrop, Prime Minister Takaichi affirmed her support for India’s membership in the International Energy Agency (IEA).
  11. The two Prime Ministers concurred on taking forward their partnership in the clean energy sector. They appreciated the launch of the India-Japan Cooperative Biogas for Growth Initiative (CBG Initiative) as a new project of India-Japan cooperation to scale up biogas production, in light of India’s target of establishing 1,000 biogas and organic fertiliser plants across the country. They welcomed the signing of a Memorandum of Cooperation (MoC) between the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry of Japan and the Ministry of Cooperation and the Department of Animal Husbandry and Dairying of India. They recognised the importance of hydrogen and ammonia not only for decarbonization but also for enhancing energy security. They reaffirmed their commitment to promoting the landmark clean ammonia project in Odisha, with continued support from both governments. They also acknowledged the importance of promoting clean energy projects in areas such as clean ammonia, green hydrogen, solar PV technologies, and nuclear energy.
  12. The two Prime Ministers shared the view that promotion of innovation in new technologies, including AI, is crucial to further broadening the base of cooperation. They concurred on the need to enhance national capabilities in AI and strengthen cooperation on trusted and resilient digital infrastructure. They confirmed the necessity to promote innovation through the utilisation and application of AI technology for the sustainable and inclusive development of AI, including in the area of hard infrastructure, while harnessing opportunities and appropriately mitigating related risks and ensuring a resilient, agile, diverse, and trustworthy AI supply chain in the spirit of the Hiroshima AI Process and the New Delhi Declaration on AI Impact. In this context, they welcomed the inaugural India-Japan AI Strategic Dialogue. They adopted the Joint Statement on AI cooperation to further build on the progress made under the India-Japan AI Cooperation Initiative.
  13. The two Prime Ministers welcomed the increasing private investment from Japan to India and recognised its contribution to India’s national goal of Viksit Bharat. They appreciated the progress made towards achieving the target of 10 trillion Yen set at the last Annual Summit. They agreed to work towards enhancing the investment environment by using the fast-track mechanism under the India-Japan Industrial Competitiveness Partnership (IJICP). Noting that more than 15 years have passed since the two countries signed the Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) and recognising the need to enhance and diversify bilateral trade, they agreed to accelerate the review of its implementation and the full and effective utilisation of the CEPA to make it more forward-looking. The Japanese side recognised the facilitation extended to leading Japanese financial institutions and banks to strengthen their presence in India’s banking and non-banking financial sectors in accordance with applicable laws and regulations. They endorsed bilateral efforts to strengthen cooperation in logistics, textiles, food processing, agriculture, automotives, and industrial capital goods under IJICP. They also reaffirmed the importance of enhancing bilateral financial cooperation and collaboration on payment systems between India and Japan, including local currency transactions. They also recognised the importance of strengthening collaboration in the healthcare sector, including pharma supply chains.
  14. The two Prime Ministers welcomed the inauguration of the India-Japan SME Forum and the visit of an SME Mission on the aeronautical sector from Japan to India. They welcomed the steady progress of various efforts to improve the business environment and to enhance the network for both Japanese and Indian businesses, especially SMEs and startups. Building on the Japan-India Startup Support Initiative (JISSI), they expressed a willingness to further encourage the participation of Japanese SMEs and startups in the Indian market, in collaboration with various universities. They also underscored the importance of greater participation of Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises (MSMEs) and linkages between Japanese enterprises and India’s Tier-II and Tier-III supplier ecosystem. In this context, they reiterated their commitment to facilitate greater investment flows, industrial collaborations and technology partnerships.
  15. The two Prime Ministers noted with satisfaction the significant contribution of Japan’s development cooperation support to the socio-economic development of India. They welcomed the recent progress on four projects: Mumbai Metro (Line 11), Bengaluru Metro (Phase 3), the healthcare delivery and education systems in Maharashtra, and sustainable horticulture in Punjab, which will help strengthen connectivity and promote clean, sustainable socio-economic development. They shared the intention to promote development cooperation in a way that contributes to co-creating economic growth.
  16. The two Prime Ministers reaffirmed the importance of the Mumbai-Ahmedabad High Speed Rail as a flagship project between India and Japan. Prime Minister Takaichi stated that Japan fully understands India’s target to commence commercial operations on priority sections in 2027 and remains committed to extending the necessary cooperation. They acknowledged the goal of introducing the E10. They also expressed a willingness to explore ways to cooperate on future high-speed corridors to achieve India’s vision of a national High Speed Rail network of 7,000 km. Prime Minister Modi invited Japanese companies to explore opportunities to participate in developing future corridors and conveyed his readiness to facilitate such engagement, a welcome from the Japanese side. They also shared the view that private-sector-led cooperation and investment in High Speed Rail and comprehensive mobility should be accelerated, to combine Japan’s advanced mobility technologies with India’s excellent human resources and market potential across the country. To this end, they welcomed the signing of the MoC on the Next-Generation Mobility Partnership between the two sides. They acknowledged the importance of cooperation in the shipbuilding sector, including collaboration among human resources.
  17. The two Prime Ministers underscored that collaboration and exchange in the field of cutting-edge science and technology is a key pillar of the bilateral ties. In this connection, they noted with satisfaction the ongoing joint research collaborations between academic institutions, exchange visits by scientists and researchers from the two countries, and industry-academia collaborations through internship opportunities at Japanese companies. They noted the increasing number of Indian talents accepted under the LOTUS Programme, and the Sakura Science Exchange Program of the Japan Science and Technology Agency, with Japanese high school students invited under the initiatives by the Department of Science and Technology (DST). They also underlined the importance of further advancing student and university exchanges through programs such as the Indo-Japan Cooperative Science Programme (IJCSP) of DST, the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science (JSPS), the MEXT Scholarship, and the Inter-University Exchange Project. They noted with satisfaction the ongoing progress in the Lunar Polar Exploration (LUPEX) Mission between the Indian Space Research Organisation and the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency. They welcomed the recent signing of the Letter of Intent in Quantum Technologies between India’s DST and Japan’s Cabinet Office.
  18. The two Prime Ministers reaffirmed their commitment to promote people-to-people exchanges further, recalling that the talent circulation between the two countries constitutes a mutually complementary relationship that addresses challenges on both sides. They affirmed further promotion of Japanese language education in India, appreciating the progress made so far, including through the Nihongo Partners programme. They welcomed the fact that visitors between the two countries numbered 540 thousand in 2025 and reiterated their commitment to promoting two-way tourism. They appreciated the ongoing intellectual and cultural exchanges between the two countries aimed at deepening institutional and people-to-people connections. They highlighted the important role of creative industries, such as anime, manga, gaming, and film, especially among youth. Recognising the increasing people-to-people exchange, including among tourists, they confirmed the importance of promoting dialogue on consular affairs between relevant authorities.
  19. The two Prime Ministers acknowledged the important role played by Indian States and Japanese prefectures and municipalities in deepening economic and people-to-people connections between the two countries. They welcomed the ever-growing exchanges at the regional level, including the establishment of India-Japan Governors’ Network for Friendship and Exchange and recent high-level collaborations between Yamanashi Prefecture and Uttar Pradesh, Toyama Prefecture and Andra Pradesh, Shizuoka Prefecture and Gujarat, Hamamatsu City and Ahmedabad, Wakayama Prefecture and Maharashtra, San’in Region and Kerala, Ehime Prefecture and Tamil Nadu, Fukuoka Prefecture and Delhi as well as Kitakyushu City and Telangana.

Regional and Global Issues

  1. In light of the updated FOIP and the Act East Policy and to realise a resilient and prosperous Indo-Pacific, the two Prime Ministers highlighted the strategic importance of India’s North Eastern Region (NER). Prime Minister Modi appreciated Japan’s robust support in enhancing hard, soft, and people-to-people connectivity in the region, including road networks, bridges, social infrastructure in healthcare, forest management, and disaster risk reduction. They welcomed vibrant economic activity by Japanese and Indian enterprises in the semiconductor and biofuel sectors, as well as skill development, Japanese-language training, and human resource exchange. They reaffirmed their shared commitment to developing industrial value chains connecting the NER with the Bay of Bengal region, in close collaboration with relevant partners and regional organisations, including BIMSTEC. They also acknowledged the successful holding of the Sixth India-Japan Intellectual Conclave in February 2026 in Shillong, Meghalaya. They concurred on the importance of holding the next round of the Act East Forum (AEF) at an early date.
  2. Towards the shared goal of a resilient and prosperous Indo-Pacific, the two Prime Ministers reiterated their commitment to advancing cooperation among like-minded countries. They welcomed the steady progress under the Quad framework and reaffirmed their shared commitment to enhancing practical cooperation. They underscored the importance of Quad collaboration across the four pillars of maritime and transnational security; economic prosperity and security, including critical minerals; critical and emerging technologies; and humanitarian assistance and emergency response. They noted that growing bilateral cooperation in these areas would further strengthen and complement the Quad efforts. They reaffirmed their commitment to cooperating towards an early convening of the next Quad Leaders’ Summit. They also highlighted the importance of cooperation with ASEAN Member States to strengthen regional resilience and promote peace, stability and prosperity. In this context, they agreed to begin preparations for the inaugural trilateral 1.5-track policy dialogue with the Philippines. They reiterated their strong support for ASEAN’s Centrality and unity and their unwavering support for the “ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP)”. Furthermore, they underscored the importance of cooperation in strengthening critical mineral supply chains among like-minded countries, including through Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs)s, such as the World Bank Group’s Resilient and Inclusive Supply-chain Enhancement (RISE) Partnership and Asian Development Bank (ADB) Critical Minerals-to-Manufacturing Financing Partnership Facility (CMM-FPF).
  3. The two Prime Ministers expressed serious concern over the situation in the East China Sea and the South China Sea. They reiterated their strong opposition to any unilateral actions that endanger the safety and freedom of navigation and overflight, as well as attempts to change the status quo by force or coercion. They shared their serious concerns over the growing militarisation of disputed features. They reaffirmed that maritime disputes must be resolved peacefully and in accordance with international law, as reflected in UNCLOS.
  4. The two Prime Ministers shared serious concern over North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs. They reaffirmed their commitment to the complete denuclearisation of North Korea in accordance with relevant United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolutions. They stressed the importance of addressing continued concern regarding the proliferation of nuclear and missile technologies to and from North Korea in the region and beyond. They urged all UN Member States to abide by their international obligations under the UNSC resolutions to implement sanctions, including the prohibition on the transfer to North Korea or procurement from North Korea of all arms and related material. They reconfirmed the necessity of the immediate resolution of the abduction issue.
  5. The two Prime Ministers remain concerned over the situation in Myanmar and its regional impact. They reiterated their call for the immediate cessation of hostilities and the creation of a conducive environment for inclusive dialogue among all stakeholders toward a Myanmar-led, Myanmar-owned, peaceful and durable solution.
  6. The two Prime Ministers reiterated their commitment to sustainable peace and stability in the Middle East. Regarding the situation surrounding Iran, they stressed the importance of ensuring free and safe navigation through the Strait of Hormuz, maintaining stable supply chains for energy and other essential goods, and upholding international law, particularly as reflected in UNCLOS. They stressed the imperative of advancing the Comprehensive Plan to rebuild Gaza and of living up to the commitment to ensuring a two-state solution. They reaffirmed that continued diplomatic efforts are indispensable to restoring stability at the earliest and achieving lasting peace in the region.
  7. The two Prime Ministers reaffirmed their commitment to promoting collaboration in Africa as envisioned in the India-Africa Forum Summit (IAFS) mechanism and Japan’s Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD), as well as the Economic Region Initiative of the Indian Ocean-Africa. Towards this end, they noted the formulation of the Strategic Outlook for Expanding Japan-India Cooperation in Africa and the industrial concentration in India to establish a hub for trade and investment and to advance the India-Japan Cooperation Initiative for Sustainable Economic Development in Africa. They reiterated their commitment to further promoting concrete cooperation based on the synergy of these initiatives.
  8. The two Prime Ministers expressed support for a just and lasting peace in Ukraine in accordance with international law, including the UN Charter. They also welcomed the ongoing diplomatic efforts by various countries to achieve a just and lasting peace.
  9. On the multilateral front, the two Prime Ministers reiterated their commitment to working closely with the other G4 countries for an urgent reform of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), including through the expansion of both permanent and non-permanent categories, which a majority of member states support, to reflect the current geopolitical realities better better. They expressed their determination to accelerate UNSC reforms, particularly by commencing text-based negotiations under the Inter-Governmental Negotiations framework, with the overall objective of achieving concrete outcomes within a fixed time frame. They expressed their mutual support for each other’s candidacies for permanent seats on a reformed UNSC. They also noted with appreciation that India and Japan have reached an understanding on mutual support for respective candidatures to non-permanent seats in the years 2028-29 and 2033-34. They also underscored the need for UN reform to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of the UN, thereby contributing to global governance in a changing world.
  10. Prime Minister Modi welcomed Japan’s support for India to host the 4th United Nations World Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction in 2030 with the intention to carry forward the spirit and principles of the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030, such as the importance of investment in disaster risk reduction and “Build Back Better.” They committed to continuing cooperation in the field of disaster risk reduction, including through the Asia-Pacific Ministerial Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction to be held in Sendai, Japan, in 2027. They concurred on further enhancing policy consultations between the Foreign Ministries on regional affairs such as Africa, Asia, and the Middle East/West Asia, and on the multilateral agenda, including UN reform, space, cybersecurity and maritime domains, climate change, terrorism, and the Arctic, as well as policy planning.
  11. The two Prime Ministers unequivocally and strongly condemned terrorism and violent extremism in all its forms and manifestations, including cross-border terrorism from Pakistan. They condemned in the strongest terms the terrorist attack in Pahalgam, Jammu and Kashmir, on 22 April 2025. They took note of the United Nations Security Council Monitoring Team Report dated 29 July 2025, which mentions The Resistance Front (TRF). They also condemned in the strongest terms the terror incident in Delhi on 10 November 2025. They called for the perpetrators, organisers, and financiers of this reprehensible act to be brought to justice without any delay. They also called for concerted actions against all UN-listed terrorist groups and entities, including Al Qaeda, ISIS/Daesh, Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT), Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) and their proxies, and to take resolute actions to root out terrorists’ safe havens, eliminate terrorist financing channels and their nexus with transnational crime, and halt cross-border movement of terrorists.
  12. The two Prime Ministers reaffirmed the importance of the Annual Summit mechanism to advance India-Japan cooperation across a range of sectors. Celebrating 75 years of diplomatic relations as the India-Japan Year of Shared Horizons, they renewed their commitment to further strengthening the Special Strategic and Global Partnership and to deepening people-to-people ties through year-long commemorative programmes.
  13. Prime Minister Takaichi thanked Prime Minister Modi for the hospitality extended during the visit and extended an invitation to Prime Minister Modi to visit Japan next year for the 17th Annual Summit, which Prime Minister Modi accepted with pleasure.

New Delhi
July 02, 2026

 

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References: –

  1. Ministry of External Affairs. (2026, July 2). 16th India–Japan Annual Summit: Joint statement—Advancing a partnership of strategic convergence and trust for shared growth, prosperity and resilience. Government of India. https://www.mea.gov.in/
  1. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. (2026). Japan–India summit meeting. https://www.mofa.go.jp/
  1. Prime Minister’s Office. (2026). 16th India–Japan Annual Summit. Government of India. https://www.pmindia.gov.in/
  1. International Financial Services Centres Authority. (2026). Press releases. https://ifsca.gov.in/
  1. Japan Financial Services Agency. (2026). News releases. https://www.fsa.go.jp/en/

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827: Every Citizen, A Sentinel of National Security

 

Keynote address at the Nationalist Collective Conclave

 

There is a persistent tendency in public discourse to treat national security as the exclusive concern of the uniformed services. This tendency is understandable. The nature of the threat has changed. The character of the battlefield has changed. And the consequence of that change is that the responsibility for national security has extended to every Indian, regardless of profession or age.

India today is the world’s largest democracy with a functional constitutional order. The last eight decades have seen it rise remarkably.  The achievements include a continental-scale economy, a space programme of global ambition, and digital infrastructure that outpaces many advanced economies. Its armed forces have repeatedly demonstrated the ability to conduct complex multi-domain operations with precision and calibration. India’s rise in global economic rankings, its growing geopolitical weight, and its increasingly confident independent foreign policy have combined to place it in the top ranks of emerging powers. The world is watching it take its place.

But history does not reward nations for their potential. It rewards them for execution. The growth is also tested for resilience by hostile powers. India’s security imperatives, in this moment of ascent, are as demanding as they have ever been. Understanding those imperatives and every citizen’s role in meeting them is no longer optional. It is the defining obligation.

 

The External Environment

India’s external security environment is unique. No other nation concurrently confronts two nuclear-armed, territorially revisionist neighbours who are also engaged in active strategic convergence.

China. Roughly 3,488 kilometres of the undemarcated Line of Actual Control run with China through Ladakh, the Middle Sector, and Arunachal Pradesh. China’s strategy is patient and incremental. A road built today, a village established this year, a patrol pattern normalised over eighteen months. The cumulative effect of each individually deniable step is a slow but deliberate change in ground realities. The 2020 Galwan Valley clash has marked a genuine inflexion point. India’s response was measured but decisive. However, the posture has shifted from a protocol-based, treaty-reliant approach to one that explicitly anticipates contestation as the normal condition along this frontier. There is now a permanent deployment of troops, and defence expenditure has risen. 

Pakistan. On the Western Front, Pakistan has sustained a doctrinally consistent posture for decades. An inability to compete conventionally, compensated through asymmetric means of cross-border terrorism, proxy warfare, and increasingly persistent information operations. India prefers peace, but is ready to respond resolutely if provoked. The Indian shift from strategic restraint to punitive deterrence shows its commitment to defending itself. The signals from Balkot and Sindoor are clear. There will be a high cost for violations, and nuclear deterrence won’t offer protection for sub-conventional terror attacks.

Collusivity. What sustains Pakistan’s conventional relevance beyond its own diminishing economic base is Chinese material support: fighter aircraft, frigates, air defence systems, and intelligence cooperation that keeps the Pakistani military artificially current. The two fronts are connected at the strategic level, and India’s planning must treat them as such. India’s response to this environment has evolved.

 

The New Character of the Battlefield

The most consequential shift in the security environment is the dissolution of the traditional boundary between the combatant-manned battlefield and the civilian hinterland. Further, war is no longer exclusively kinetic. It is in the domains of cyber, cognitive, economic, and informational. Further, it is continuous with no declaration, no armistice, no peacetime in the old sense. The competition between states now operates permanently below the threshold of conventional conflict, targeting not military assets primarily but the civilian infrastructure and social fabric on which a modern society depends.

A cyberattack on critical infrastructure can produce effects comparable to those of a conventional strike. The cognitive domain is even more treacherous than the cyber domain. Social media platforms enable adversaries to fabricate and amplify narratives that sow doubt among citizens. The enemy’s objective is to erode social trust and institutional confidence. The tools employed include fake news, deepfakes, and disinformation. The target is the fault lines of caste, religion, region, and language.  A society that can be influenced to distrust its own armed forces, doubt its own judiciary, and view every fellow citizen through the lens of a manufactured grievance does not need to be invaded to be strategically weakened.

 

The Non-Negotiable Imperatives

Against this backdrop, India’s security imperatives span domains that cannot be managed in isolation.

Border Security Remains Foundational. Vigilance across land, maritime, and air domains is a necessary condition for everything else. The connectivity corridors of the northeast, the Siachen heights, and the sea lanes of the Indian Ocean are the geographic reality within which India’s security calculus must function every day. India is a maritime nation, with the bulk of its trade and energy supply transiting sea lanes in an increasingly contested ocean. Maritime security is an inseparable part of national security.

Technological Self-Reliance. Technological Self-Reliance is no longer a development aspiration but is now a survival requirement. Technological dependence translates directly into strategic vulnerability.  A nation that relies on foreign platforms for its combat aircraft carries strategic dependency at the core of its deterrent. A nation without an indigenous satellite capability, a secure communications architecture, and artificial intelligence will fight the next war at a disadvantage. Self-reliance in defence production and critical technologies is a strategic necessity. The laboratories, the factory floors, and the engineering colleges have become central to national security. Innovation is the new arsenal of national power, and nations that create technology will shape the future while those that merely consume it will follow.

Strategic Autonomy.  Strategic autonomy is the third imperative, and the most complex to sustain because it requires continuous calibration. Partnerships are valuable, and India has built a sophisticated network of defence and strategic relationships across the Indo-Pacific and beyond. But no partnership substitutes for indigenous capability, and no relationship should constrain Indian decision-making at the moment of national need. Sovereignty is non-negotiable. Partnerships are instruments of it, not substitutes for it.

Internal Resilience. Internal resilience is the fourth imperative and is directly dependent on citizens’ conduct. Strong institutions (the judiciary, civil service, independent press, and a functional electoral process) are the load-bearing walls of the democratic structure. The nation’s structural integrity is compromised if these institutions are undermined.

 

A Whole-of-Nation Effort

The Indian Armed Forces are among the finest in the world. The men and women who serve in them do so with a commitment that the nation owes it to itself to match in civic life. But armed forces alone cannot secure a nation in a security environment where the contest extends into every domain of national life. National security is a whole-of-nation effort. The strength of a nation is measured not only by the power of its military but by the resilience of its society. Citizens are force multipliers. A disciplined, informed, and vigilant public extends the reach of national security capability in ways that no institutional investment can fully replicate.

Youth. Youth is central to this calculus. India’s demographic dividend, i.e. its largest cohort of young people in the world, is a strategic asset.  Young Indians will shape the future of national security not only in the armed forces but in classrooms, laboratories, startups, and the broader services sector. The question is whether they arrive at that role equipped with the strategic awareness, civic responsibility, and sense of national obligation that the moment demands. Education for citizenship is not supplementary to professional preparation. It is foundational to it.

Women Power. Women’s contribution to national security is no longer a matter of social equity alone.  A nation cannot draw on the full depth of its human capital if half of that capital is structurally constrained. The increasing induction of women into combat roles in the armed forces is not merely a statement of inclusion. It is a recognition that the force multiplier India needs is the full talent of its population, deployed without socially created artificial limitations. Women-led development (in the economy, the defence industry, and strategic research, etc) is a core component of comprehensive national power.

Indian Diaspora. The Indian diaspora constitutes another dimension of a national strategic asset. Over thirty-five million people of Indian origin live and work in the institutions, economies, and capitals of the world’s major powers. Besides being a remittance engine, they represent a cultural, intellectual, and geopolitical presence. Their capacity to advocate India’s interests, counter anti-India narratives in foreign information environments, and channel investment into strategic sectors is an asset that national strategy should actively cultivate.

 

The Citizen’s Specific Responsibilities

The imperatives above remain abstractions unless they translate into concrete responsibilities for every citizen.

Social Cohesion. Social cohesion is the most immediately actionable and the most immediately threatened. Internal division is not a private concern, but is a public security vulnerability. Fault lines are created by manufacturing conflict between communities, fueling communal tension, amplifying regional grievances, and driving a wedge between citizens along lines of caste, religion, or language. The adversary can exploit these. The citizen’s responsibility is to recognise this dynamic and to refuse to amplify divisive narratives. Diversity is India’s identity, and our unity is India’s strength. No adversary can defeat a nation that refuses to be divided.

Responsible Digital Citizenship. The information environment today is saturated with questionable content. Fake news travels fast, and deepfakes are indistinguishable from authentic content to the untrained eye. The smartphone in every pocket is a potential instrument for influence operations. Every citizen needs to pause before sharing, verify before amplifying, and resist the emotional manipulation that disinformation is engineered to produce. Civic awareness and disciplined action constitute a meaningful and immediate contribution to national security.

Civic Preparedness. Civic preparedness for disaster readiness, basic cyber hygiene, emergency response awareness, and community resilience is the fourth dimension of citizen responsibility, and the one most amenable to practical preparation. A population that panics in crisis extends the damage that any adversary, natural or human, can inflict. Schools, colleges, local bodies, and community institutions that normalise security awareness build a population that is harder to destabilise and faster to recover.

 

India@2047: The Defining Question

The defining question is not whether India will rise. The evidence of that rise is already visible. India at the centenary of its independence in 2047 can be a nation that has fulfilled the promise of its founding. It can be a nation that is secure, prosperous, technologically sovereign, self-reliant, and socially cohesive. The conditions for that outcome are being assembled now. The trajectory is positive. But trajectories can be deflected by complacency, by division, and by the failure of citizens to understand their role in a contest that involves them, whether or not they choose to acknowledge it.

They are about the kind of nation we choose to be—a nation whose citizens understand that their daily choices and conduct are themselves a component of national power. A Viksit Bharat can be built through discipline, cohesion, and purpose.

 

Concluding Thought

The greatest strategic asset India possesses is not its missile inventory, its space programme, or its growing military power and reach, formidable as all of these are. It is 1.4 billion citizens who, if they understand what is at stake and accept their role in it, constitute a national resilience that no adversary can easily overcome. Every citizen is a stakeholder in India’s security. Every citizen is a force multiplier.

 

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