636: PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE IN UKRAINE: SUCCESS OR FAILURE

 

My Article was published in the News Analytics Journal of Mar 25.

 

 

Psychological warfare (psywar) aims to influence perceptions, morale, and decision-making, often targeting adversaries and domestic populations. In the context of the Russia- Ukraine conflict, Russia’s psywar likely seeks to demoralise Ukrainians, fracture their resistance, sow distrust in their leadership, and bolster domestic support within Russia for the war effort. An evaluation of Russia’s psychological warfare (psywar) in Ukraine would need an assessment of its objectives, tactics, and measurable impacts based on available evidence and recent developments.  This paper argues that while Russia’s psychological warfare has succeeded in shaping domestic narratives and straining Western unity, it has failed to break Ukrainian resistance or achieve a decisive strategic victory.

 

Historical Perspective of Russian Psychological Warfare

Russian psychological warfare (psywar) has a rich and intricate history, deeply ingrained in the nation’s strategic culture. From the Tsarist era to modern hybrid warfare, Russia has consistently employed psychological operations to manipulate perception, control narratives, and weaken adversaries. The roots of Russian psywar can be traced back to the early 20th century when the Bolsheviks effectively used propaganda to consolidate power during and after the Russian Revolution. Lenin and Trotsky understood that controlling information was just as crucial as military victories, leading to the institutionalisation of propaganda through organisations like Agitprop, which shaped Soviet political messaging.

During the early Soviet period, psywar techniques were used not only to suppress internal dissent but also to influence communist movements worldwide. The concept of “reflexive control,” developed in Soviet military thought, became a key element of Russian psywar, aiming to manipulate opponents into making decisions that ultimately benefit Russian interests. By the time of World War II, Soviet psychological operations had evolved into large-scale deception campaigns, including the use of maskirovka (military deception) to mislead Nazi Germany. Throughout the Cold War, the Soviet Union refined these methods, launching extensive “Active Measures” under the KGB to manage information and exploit societal divisions in Western nations.

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia, under Vladimir Putin, revived and modernised its psychological warfare strategies, adapting them to the digital age. The contemporary Russian approach to psywar, often called “information confrontation”, integrates cyber operations, media manipulation, and social engineering to achieve strategic objectives.

 

Russian Psywar during the Ukraine War

Russian psychological warfare in the context of the Ukraine war has been a multifaceted effort aimed at shaping perceptions both domestically and internationally. The multi-layered strategy integrates military, political, and information operations to shape perceptions, demoralise opponents, and influence global narratives.  Psychological warfare has played a central role in Russia’s strategy throughout the Ukraine war, aiming to weaken Ukrainian resistance, shape international perceptions, and manipulate domestic narratives. Russia has employed a mix of cyber operations, information management campaigns, battlefield deception, and psychological intimidation to erode Ukrainian morale and divide Western support.

One of the key elements of Russia’s psychological warfare has been its use of information management. Russian state media and social media bots have employed online platforms with narratives that neo-Nazis run Ukraine to accusations that NATO is using Ukraine as a puppet to attack Russia. These narratives justify the war to the Russian population, confuse Ukrainian citizens, and create divisions within Western democracies by amplifying anti-war and isolationist sentiments. Russian narratives have also sought to exploit war fatigue in Western nations, emphasising that financial and military support for Ukraine is futile, expensive, or escalatory.

One prominent example of Russia’s psychological warfare tactics is the ‘Doppelganger’ campaign initiated in 2022 by the Russian IT firm Social Design Agency (SDA). This operation aimed to undermine support for Ukraine by manipulating public opinion in countries like Germany, France, Italy, and the United Kingdom. The campaign involved creating news articles that presented a pro-Russian perspective on the conflict and deploying AI-powered bot networks to disseminate these narratives on social media platforms. These bots were programmed to engage with users, spreading Russian narratives and pro-Russian sentiments. The ‘Doppelganger’ campaign demonstrates how Russia uses digital platforms and AI to shape international perceptions and influence public opinion in its favour.

Cyber warfare has also been a critical psychological tool. Russian cyber groups have often launched cyber attacks on Ukrainian government institutions, banks, and critical infrastructure. Beyond disabling systems, these attacks serve a psychological function, creating uncertainty, fear, and the impression that Ukraine’s leadership cannot protect its citizens.  Russian cyber efforts extend beyond Ukraine, targeting Western institutions with cyber sabotage to weaken overall support for Kyiv.

 

All-Out or Restricted Psywar.

While Russia is undeniably engaged in psywar, it may not be pushing it to its fullest potential. A maximalist Russian psywar would have included massive global disinformation by flooding international media and social platforms with tailored narratives to isolate Ukraine diplomatically and erode Western support. It would have shut down Ukraine’s communication networks entirely (e.g., via cyber and electronic warfare) to prevent resistance messaging and sow chaos. Russia would have infiltrated Ukrainian society with agents or digital campaigns to fracture trust in leadership and incite internal dissent. Russia employed these tactics, but not at an all-out scale or intensity.

Russia isn’t indulging in a full-fledged war not because it’s unwilling but because strategy, resources, and context constrain it. The war’s hybrid nature means that psywar is a key component, but it’s subordinated to military and economic priorities rather than unleashed as a standalone juggernaut. Russia seems content with a steady, if not maximal, psychological pressure adequate to grind Ukraine down but not bold enough to gamble on total dominance.

Strategic Restraint or Compulsion.  A no-holds-barred psywar could provoke stronger NATO responses, like direct intervention or crippling sanctions beyond the current scope. Putin appears to calibrate efforts to avoid provoking direct NATO intervention strategically (e.g., nuclear rhetoric is loud but not yet acted upon). Escalating psywar abroad might require diverting resources from domestic propaganda, which keeps Putin’s regime intact. A complete external focus could weaken the internal control. A full-fledged psywar demands significant investment in cyberinfrastructure, media saturation, and personnel. Putin may believe conventional military gains suffice to force Ukraine into submission, reducing the need for an all-out psychological blitz.

 

Success or Failure

Despite relentless Russian strikes, Ukrainian resolve appears mixed. Reports from Kyiv indicate fatigue among civilians and soldiers, with some expressing doubts about a negotiated peace due to distrust in Russia. However, Ukraine’s counteroffensives and continued drone strikes on Russian territory demonstrate resilience and a refusal to capitulate. This suggests Russia has not fully broken Ukrainian will, though exhaustion is a growing factor after three years of war. It has partially succeeded in weakening civilian morale and straining resources but hasn’t achieved a decisive psychological collapse.

Russian psywar has aimed to undermine trust in President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s government. While Ukraine faces internal challenges, such as ammunition shortages and delayed Western aid, there’s no clear evidence of widespread distrust or collapse in governance.  The psychological toll on Ukrainians is undeniable. Studies from 2023-2024 highlight high rates of PTSD, anxiety, and depression exacerbated by displacement and infrastructure attacks. Yet, it hasn’t translated into mass surrender or acceptance of Russian dominance.

 

Impact on Putin’s Image

While the Western narrative often portrays Putin as weakened by the war in Ukraine, Russia’s psychological warfare has succeeded mainly in projecting him as an even stronger leader, both domestically and among some international audiences.

Russia has effectively presented the Ukraine war as a fight for national survival against the West, rallying both elites and the public behind Putin. The Russian narrative frames the war not as an invasion of Ukraine but as a defensive struggle against NATO and Western aggression. This narrative positions Putin as the leader defending Russian sovereignty and traditions against Western imperialism, liberalism, and decadence. State media constantly refers to the war as the “Great Patriotic War 2.0,” drawing parallels with WWII to reinforce the idea of national struggle. The Kremlin has portrayed Putin as the last stronghold against Western cultural and moral decay. Messaging around traditional values, national pride, and resistance to globalisation strengthens his appeal among conservative Russians and foreign audiences in the Global South.  The War has allowed Putin to eliminate political threats, tighten control over society, and silence opposition, reinforcing his image as an unchallenged ruler.

Western leaders expected economic collapse from sanctions, but Russia’s economic resilience has strengthened Putin’s image as a leader who can outmanoeuvre Western pressure. Despite unprecedented Western sanctions, Russia avoided a total economic collapse. Trade was rerouted through China, India, Turkey, and the Middle East, showing Putin’s ability to adapt and counter Western strategies. State propaganda framed sanctions as proof of Russia’s global importance. Putin positioned himself as the leader who could make Russia self-sufficient, reducing its reliance on the West.

 

Influence on Europe.

Russia’s psychological warfare has significantly influenced Europe’s collective response to the war in Ukraine, exploiting political, economic, and social vulnerabilities to create divisions and slow decision-making. While the European Union (EU) has managed to maintain a generally pro-Ukraine stance, Russian psy ops have repeatedly tested and weakened European cohesion on military aid, sanctions, and strategic policy.

 Exploiting Political Divisions in Europe. Russia has effectively deepened political polarisation within and among European nations by amplifying opposing narratives across the political spectrum. Right-wing nationalist movements have been targeted with anti-Ukraine rhetoric, portraying the war as an unnecessary financial burden. Simultaneously, left-wing anti-interventionist factions have been influenced to frame NATO and Western military aid as imperialist warmongering. Additionally, Russian information campaigns have sown doubts about Ukraine’s governance, corruption, and war prospects, eroding the moral justification for sustained European support. For example, pro-Russian political factions in Hungary, Slovakia, and parts of Germany have advocated for diplomatic negotiations with Russia over continued military aid to Ukraine. This has complicated EU-wide decision-making, as unanimous support is often required for major foreign policy measures. Far-right and populist parties in Hungary, Slovakia, and Italy have leveraged Russian-aligned narratives to challenge the EU consensus. Hungary’s Orbán, for instance, has stalled EU sanction packages (e.g., the 13th package in late 2024) by citing “peace” over confrontation, aligning with Kremlin talking points and fracturing policy cohesion.

 Weakening European Resolve on Military Aid. Russia has employed psychological pressure to deter European military assistance to Ukraine. Moscow frequently warns that Western arms supplies could escalate the conflict into a direct NATO-Russia war. President Vladimir Putin’s nuclear threats have had a chilling effect, particularly in Germany, where concerns over escalation delayed the provision of Leopard 2 tanks and later raised hesitations about supplying long-range Taurus missiles. Public opinion has also been a battleground for Russian influence. Moscow-backed media and social media campaigns have exaggerated the economic hardships caused by military aid, fuelling war fatigue. In Germany and France, protests calling for peace talks have been driven by narratives echoing Russian disinformation. In countries like France, polls from early 2025 show that 66% support EU aid to Ukraine, but 78% oppose troop deployment unless it is part of a peace deal. In Germany, scepticism about prolonged support grows amid economic pressures, with some voters echoing Russian claims of “war fatigue” amplified online. These divisions weaken the political will for a unified, robust response.

Economic Warfare and the Energy Weapon. Russia’s historical leverage over Europe’s energy supply has been a key psychological tool. The 2022 energy crisis, exacerbated by Russia’s gas cutoffs, heightened European economic fears. Russian psywar further exaggerated the risks of economic collapse, intensifying divisions within the EU. Under Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, Hungary has been a prominent example of how Russian energy influence can weaken EU unity. Orbán has repeatedly blocked or diluted Russian oil and gas sanctions, citing economic concerns. Additionally, Russia has cultivated business relationships in Germany, Italy, and Hungary to lobby against stronger sanctions, delaying EU consensus on measures such as price caps on Russian energy exports.

Encouraging Fractures in NATO and the EU. Russia has sought to drive a wedge between Europe and the United States by portraying Washington as manipulating the war for its strategic benefit. This narrative has traction among European leaders who advocate for greater strategic autonomy. French President Emmanuel Macron, for example, has suggested that Europe develop a more independent security framework rather than relying solely on NATO. Russian psyops have also exacerbated differences between Eastern and Western Europe. Poland and the Baltic states have been staunch supporters of Ukraine, pushing for aggressive military aid and sanctions. In contrast, France, Germany, and Italy have sometimes been more hesitant, leading to internal EU friction. Russia amplifies these divisions to slow collective decision-making, delaying much-needed aid to Ukraine.

 

Conclusion

Russia’s psychological warfare in Ukraine has proven to be a sophisticated and adaptive strategy that not only targets Ukraine’s internal stability but also seeks to fracture the unity of its Western allies. By deploying a combination of information management, cyber-attacks, and strategic political manoeuvres, Russia has managed to unsettle a coherent European response by amplifying divisions, fostering hesitation, and exploiting vulnerabilities. It hasn’t derailed EU support for Ukraine but has slowed and fragmented it.

Russia’s psywar has reinforced Putin’s strongman image by shaping domestic narratives, exploiting Western vulnerabilities, and asserting global influence. While it hasn’t overturned the Western perspective entirely, it has created a parallel reality where Putin’s strength is maintained and enhanced, particularly among Russian and non-Western audiences. Whether this perception holds as the war evolves remains uncertain, but for now, Russia’s psywar has undeniably kept Putin’s strongman myth alive and potent.

 

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References and credits

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Disclaimer:

Information and data included in the blog are for educational & non-commercial purposes only and have been carefully adapted, excerpted, or edited from reliable and accurate sources. All copyrighted material belongs to respective owners and is provided only for wider dissemination.

 

References:-

  1. Thomas, Timothy. 2021. “Russian Military Thought: Concepts of Psychological Operations.” Journal of Slavic Military Studies 34 (1): 1-24.
  1. NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence. 2022. “Russia’s Grand Strategy in the Information Space.” Riga: NATO StratCom COE.
  1. RAND Corporation. 2021. “Russian Information Warfare: The Role of Narrative and Propaganda.” Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation.
  1. European Council on Foreign Relations. 2022. “The Kremlin’s Playbook: Russia’s Information Operations in Europe.”
  1. Carnegie Europe. 2022. “Why Europe is Struggling to Counter Russian Information Warfare.” Brussels: Carnegie Europe.
  1. European Union External Action Service (EEAS). 2023. “Russia’s Disinformation Ecosystem and its Impact on Europe.”
  1. Chatham House. 2023. “Putin’s Strongman Image and the Role of Propaganda.” London: Chatham House.
  1. The Atlantic Council. 2023. “The Resilience of Putin’s Popularity Amid Western Sanctions.” Washington, D.C.: The Atlantic Council.
  1. The Wilson Center. 2022. “How Putin Weaponises Weakness Perception.” Washington, D.C.: The Wilson Center.
  1. Harding, Luke. 2023. Invasion: Russia’s Bloody War and Ukraine’s Fight for Survival. London: Guardian Faber.
  1. Kofman, Michael, and Rob Lee. 2024. “Assessing Ukraine’s Strategy Amidst Western Uncertainty.” War on the Rocks, February 10, 2024.
  1. The Guardian. 2024. “EU Divided Over Continued Support for Ukraine.” March 2024.
  1. NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence. Reports on Russian Information Warfare. Accessed March 2024.
  1. Brookings Institution. 2023. “The West’s Cognitive Dissonance on Russia: A Strategic Weakness.” Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution.

618: INPUTS TO QUESTIONNAIRE ON CHINESE DAMS

 

1a: What’s the historical legacy of the trans-border Rivers between India and China?

    • The trans-border rivers between India and China, most notably the Brahmaputra (Yarlung Tsangpo in Tibet), the Indus, and the Sutlej, have long played a crucial role in shaping the historical and contemporary relationship between the two countries.
    • Their legacy is deeply intertwined with colonial-era geopolitics, water resource competition, and the evolving strategic tensions between India and China.
    • The Brahmaputra, Indus, and Sutlej rivers originate in Tibet, historically having fluid sovereignty claims before its integration into China in 1950.
    • British India recognised Tibet as an autonomous region, but the Chinese annexation of Tibet significantly altered the strategic importance of these rivers.
    • The British Raj was concerned about Chinese influence over the water sources and actively sought treaties and diplomatic manoeuvres (e.g., the 1914 Simla Accord, which China never fully recognised) to define border arrangements.
    • Despite British concerns, pre-1947 did not see active contestation over river resources since China lacked the technological and economic capability to alter water flows significantly.
    • After India’s independence and China’s annexation of Tibet (1950), both countries engaged in limited cooperation on water sharing.
    • However, the deterioration of relations in the 1950s, culminating in the 1962 Sino-Indian War, disrupted diplomatic communication on river management.
    • Unlike India and Pakistan (who signed the Indus Waters Treaty in 1960), China never agreed to a formal water-sharing agreement with India.

 

  •  1b: How does this legacy play in contemporary relations?
    • The legacy of these rivers plays a significant role in modern geo-strategic, economic, and environmental disputes between India and China.
    • China controls the headwaters of major rivers flowing into India but has no legally binding treaty on water sharing with India.
    • This gives China an asymmetrical advantage over India, raising fears of diversifying and strategically manipulating river flows.
    • China has constructed multiple dams on the Yarlung Tsangpo (Brahmaputra), including the Zangmu Dam, and plans a mega-dam at the Great Bend near Arunachal Pradesh.
    • India fears that Chinese upstream dams could reduce water flow, especially during dry seasons, affecting agriculture, livelihoods, and ecosystems in Assam and Arunachal Pradesh.
    • China officially states that these projects are run-of-the-river and do not significantly alter flows, but India remains wary.
    • In the event of a military conflict, India fears that China could weaponise water by artificially creating floods or droughts.
    • China has, at times, withheld hydrological data from India during monsoon seasons (e.g., in 2017 during the Doklam standoff), exacerbating flood risks in the northeastern states.
    • Existing mechanisms, such as the annual hydrological data-sharing agreement, are limited in scope and do not address more significant concerns over dam-building and strategic manipulation of river flows.
    • The historical legacy of colonial geopolitics and the asymmetry of water control continue to shape contemporary Sino-Indian relations, making trans-border rivers a critical flashpoint in their evolving rivalry.

 

2: How do dams today define and complicate the disputed border management between India and China?

      • Dams have become critical in the complex and disputed border management between India and China, influencing water security and strategic, military, and geopolitical dynamics.
      • These dam projects, primarily on trans-border rivers such as the Brahmaputra (Yarlung Tsangpo) and the Sutlej, intersect with the broader territorial disputes along the Line of Actual Control (LAC), exacerbating tensions.
      • Dams along the Sino-Indian border are not just hydropower and irrigation projects; they serve as strategic assets with potential military and geopolitical consequences.
      • China controls the headwaters of major rivers flowing into India, including the Brahmaputra and the Sutlej. This upstream control allows Beijing to dictate the volume and timing of water flow.
      • China’s ability to divert, manipulate, or withhold water during crises or conflicts gives it a non-conventional weapon against India.
      • During the 2017 Doklam standoff, China withheld hydrological data on the Brahmaputra, flooding Assam and reinforcing Indian fears of water weaponisation.
      • Any large-scale water diversion could create flashpoints for diplomatic and military escalation.
      • Dams near the disputed borders have also created security risks and military vulnerabilities. If targeted in a military conflict, these could lead to environmental and humanitarian disasters.
      • Dams are no longer economic or energy infrastructure; they are now geo-strategic tools shaping the border dispute.

 

3: Are there any particular dams by China that threaten India?

      • Several Chinese dam projects on trans-border rivers, particularly the Brahmaputra (Yarlung Tsangpo) and Sutlej rivers, pose potential threats to India.
      • The Great Bend Mega-Dam, a massive hydropower project, is planned at the Great Bend of the Yarlung Tsangpo, near where the river turns into the Brahmaputra and enters India. This project could be one of the largest hydropower plants in the world, with a capacity of 60 GW, nearly three times the size of the Three Gorges Dam. India fears the dam could reduce water flow into Arunachal Pradesh, impacting agriculture and drinking water supply. China could suddenly release excess water, leading to catastrophic floods in Assam and Arunachal Pradesh. The project is close to the disputed Arunachal Pradesh border, reinforcing China’s territorial claims over the region. India has raised strong diplomatic objections, but China has refused to provide assurances that it will not alter natural water flows.
      • China’s Zangmu Dam (510 MW), commissioned in 2015, is the first large-scale hydropower project on the Yarlung Tsangpo. It is part of a cascade of six dams, including Jiexu, Jiacha, and Dagu, which China is building upstream of Arunachal Pradesh. While officially a run-of-the-river dam, multiple reservoirs upstream could be used to control water release. China could store water in the dam during monsoons and release it suddenly, causing flash floods downstream in India.
      • Dagu, Jiexu, and Jiacha Dams. These three dams, built in succession along the Brahmaputra’s upper reaches, further increase China’s capacity to regulate and potentially divert the river’s flow before reaching India. The combined effect of multiple dams allows Beijing to control water release precisely, creating a hydrological choke point for India. These projects could permanently reduce water flow into India, especially in dry seasons.
      • Lalho Dam, completed in 2019, is built on a major tributary of the Yarlung Tsangpo, holding back over 295 million cubic meters of water. While it is not on the main course of the Brahmaputra, its operation reduces tributary inflow into the river. Less water reaching the Brahmaputra in Tibet means lower flow into Arunachal Pradesh and Assam. This dam is part of China’s broader plan to harness Tibetan water resources, raising fears of future large-scale diversions.
      • Proposed North-to-South Water Diversion Project (Long-Term Threat). China has long debated a massive water diversion project to transfer water from Tibet to its arid northern regions. If implemented, this project could significantly alter the flow of the Brahmaputra before it even reaches India.
      • China is also building smaller-scale hydropower projects on the Sutlej River (which flows from Tibet into Himachal Pradesh). These dams have not been widely publicised, but they could potentially affect seasonal water flow into India’s northern regions.

4 Are any specific Indian states more threatened by the Chinese dams on the border?

      • Several Indian states are particularly vulnerable to the impact of Chinese dams on trans-border rivers, with Arunachal Pradesh and Assam facing the highest risks.
      • Arunachal Pradesh is most directly threatened. It shares a long border with Tibet, and the Brahmaputra (Yarlung Tsangpo) enters India here. China’s Great Bend Mega-Dam and Zangmu Dam could alter or reduce water flow into Arunachal Pradesh. Sudden water releases from Chinese dams could flood Indian villages, disrupt agriculture, and damage infrastructure.
      • Assam faces severe economic and ecological Threats. The Brahmaputra enters Assam from Arunachal Pradesh and is vital to the state’s agriculture, fishing industry, and transportation. Assam has a history of devastating floods, and any Chinese dam activity upstream could worsen the situation. Assam faces catastrophic flooding if China releases excess water (as suspected in the 2000 and 2017 floods). If China holds back water, it could impact agriculture, drinking water, and hydropower production. The Brahmaputra, including the Majuli River Island and Kaziranga National Park, supports a rich ecosystem. Flow changes could harm biodiversity and fisheries. Reduced or erratic water flow threatens rice farming and fishing-dependent communities. Infrastructure Damage: Increased flood risks make roads, bridges, and urban areas more vulnerable.
      • Sikkim faces moderate risk, as it depends on tributaries of the Brahmaputra, including the Teesta River, which could be affected by China’s upstream water management. Though not directly on the Brahmaputra, Chinese water diversion projects could impact Sikkim’s river networks. If China diverts water from Tibetan rivers feeding into Sikkim, it could impact the Teesta and Rangit rivers. Many of Sikkim’s rivers are fed by Himalayan glaciers, which are melting due to climate change. Chinese dams could exacerbate water shortages in dry seasons.  Sikkim has multiple hydropower projects on the Teesta, which could suffer from erratic water flow.
      • Himachal Pradesh faces a more minor, indirect risk because the Sutlej River, which originates in Tibet, flows into it. Chinese dam-building on the upper Sutlej could reduce water flow into the state. India has reported fluctuations in the Sutlej’s water levels, which could be linked to upstream Chinese activity. Reduced Sutlej flow could affect irrigation and hydropower projects. Farmers and hydropower plants depend on steady river flow, which could be disrupted. Unlike Assam or Arunachal Pradesh, Himachal Pradesh faces a long-term risk rather than an immediate crisis.
      • Ladakh faces a lesser-known, potentially serious threat, as the Indus River, which originates in Tibet, flows into Ladakh. Chinese upstream projects could impact the Indus water flow, affecting Ladakh’s water availability. China has previously explored diverting Tibetan rivers to supply its drier northern provinces. Ladakh is an arid region, and any reduction in Indus water could harm local farming.
      • Arunachal Pradesh and Assam are the most threatened, with risks of floods, water shortages, and geopolitical disputes.
      • Sikkim and Himachal Pradesh face indirect threats, mainly related to water flow disruptions.
      • Ladakh could become a flashpoint, especially if China diverts the Indus tributaries.

5: Is ‘Dam for a dam’ the only way out between India and China?

      • A “dam for a dam” strategy, where India builds its dams to counter Chinese upstream projects, is not the only way to address the water security threats posed by China’s control over trans-border Rivers. While building dams can provide some leverage, it is neither a long-term solution nor a risk-free strategy.
      • Excessive dam-building could worsen floods by altering natural river flow. The Northeast is a seismically active zone, and excessive dam construction increases the risk of earthquakes and landslides.

6: What are your recommendations for India to counter China’s dam Aggression?

      • India must adopt a multi-pronged approach that includes diplomacy, technological advancements, international cooperation, and legal mechanisms.
      • Diplomatic engagement should try to reach a water-sharing agreement. India must push for bilateral negotiations on water flow guarantees, especially for the Brahmaputra. A possible framework could include year-round data sharing on water flows, a dispute resolution mechanism, and prohibitions on unilateral water diversion projects.
      • India should resort to technological and intelligence-based monitoring, using satellites, drones, and AI-based hydrological models to track Chinese dam activity in Tibet. Early warning systems could help predict and mitigate sudden water releases or drought-like conditions. Sensor networks along Indian rivers could provide real-time data on water levels, quality, and possible upstream activity.
      • India must work with Bangladesh, Bhutan, and Nepal, which depend on trans-border rivers. A joint water-sharing agreement with downstream countries can increase diplomatic pressure on China. India can engage global institutions like the UN Water Conference and Indo-Pacific Alliances (QUAD) to raise concerns over China’s water militarisation.
      • India could take the “China Dam Issue” to international forums such as the International Court of Justice (ICJ) (though China is unlikely to comply), UNESCO, and the Mekong River Commission (as precedents for cross-border river management). India can also push for a South Asian Water Treaty, similar to the Mekong region’s agreements.
      • Developing India’s water infrastructure, such as innovative water storage projects that can absorb excess water from floods and small-scale hydropower projects that reduce risk while ensuring water security.
      • Instead of relying on a reactionary “dam for a dam” approach, India should pursue a balanced mix of diplomacy, surveillance, legal pressure, and selective dam-building.
      • While building some dams is necessary, it should be part of a broader water security strategy.

 

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617: INPUTS FOR QUESTIONNAIRE ON INDIA-TAIWAN RELATIONS

 

1: How important are semiconductors between the India-Taiwan bilateral ties?

    • Taiwan dominates semiconductor manufacturing, and India aspires to initially become self-reliant and a semiconductor hub in the long run.
    • Semiconductor cooperation can be a key element in India-Taiwan’s bilateral relations.
    • Taiwan is home to TSMC (Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company), the world’s leading contract chip manufacturer, and other key semiconductor firms like UMC and MediaTek.
    • Taiwan accounts for over 60% of global semiconductor production, making it indispensable in the global semiconductor supply chain.
    • India strives to become a major semiconductor manufacturing and design player with government initiatives like the Semiconductor Mission and incentives under the PLI (Production-Linked Incentive) scheme.
    • However, India lacks advanced fabrication facilities and relies on imports for its semiconductor needs.
    • Taiwanese firms, including TSMC and UMC, have been in discussions about establishing semiconductor plants in India.
    • India and Taiwan have explored partnerships to set up semiconductor packaging and testing facilities.
    • The most prominent initiative in the past was Foxconn’s joint venture with Vedanta to set up a semiconductor fab in India. However, this project faced setbacks, and Foxconn later withdrew.
    • Taiwan’s MediaTek has R&D operations in India, and more companies are eyeing design and software collaborations.
    • Taiwan faces increasing pressure from China, while India has border tensions with Beijing. Strengthening semiconductor ties helps both nations reduce reliance on China.
    • Amid U.S.-China tech tensions, India is a potential alternative for Taiwan to de-risk its semiconductor supply chains. However, due to pressure from China, Taiwan’s firms may hesitate to invest heavily in India.
    • Semiconductor cooperation offers mutual benefits in economic growth, technological advancement, and strategic realignment.

 

2a: How’s the development of an AI-technology innovation ecosystem linked to semiconductors?

    • This relationship between AI and Semiconductors is symbiotic.
    • Developing an AI-technology innovation ecosystem depends on robust, specialised chips for computation. On the other hand, advances in AI drive semiconductor innovation.
    • AI is revolutionising the semiconductor industry.
    • AI workloads like machine learning (ML), deep learning, and generative AI require enormous computational capacity, which is powered by advanced semiconductor technologies like Graphics Processing Units (GPUs).
    • Application-Specific Integrated Circuits (ASICs) and custom chips (e.g., Google’s TPUs) are optimised for AI workloads, enhancing performance and efficiency.
    • Future AI applications would demand breakthroughs in semiconductor design (Neuromorphic & Quantum Chips), mimicking brain-like processing or leveraging quantum computing.
    • AI-enabled devices (smartphones, IoT, autonomous systems) require power-efficient chips for real-time AI inference.
    • A thriving AI ecosystem requires cutting-edge semiconductor technology, while AI drives semiconductor innovations.
    • Countries investing in AI are also focusing on semiconductor self-sufficiency.
    • To stay competitive, nations aiming to lead in AI must also invest in advanced semiconductor capabilities.

 

2b How’s Taiwan important for Indian AI?

    • Taiwan is Important for Indian AI development, and it can play a critical role in India’s AI ambitions due to its dominance in semiconductor manufacturing, expertise in AI hardware, and potential for technological collaboration.
    • Taiwan is home to TSMC, MediaTek, and other key players; India’s AI growth is closely linked to its semiconductor partnerships with Taiwan.
    • Taiwan’s MediaTek supplies AI-driven smartphone processors, the key to India’s mobile AI market.
    • Taiwan’s semiconductor firms could help India build chip fabrication and packaging infrastructure, supporting India’s AI industry.
    • Taiwan’s expertise in embedded AI, 5G chips, and smart sensors can enhance India’s AI-driven IoT industry.
    • Taiwan has top research institutions (e.g., Academia Sinica, ITRI) specialising in AI-chip co-development, with which India can collaborate.
    • India’s AI Software Strength – India excels in AI/ML software development, while Taiwan specialises in hardware. This complementary relationship can lead to co-innovation in AI applications.
    • Taiwan and India can expand cooperation in AI-powered automation, fintech, and healthcare solutions.
    • India relies on Taiwan for high-end GPUs and AI chips, which are essential for AI supercomputing and cloud AI services.
    • Taiwan is vital for India’s AI ecosystem due to its semiconductor leadership, AI hardware expertise, and potential investment in India’s chip industry.

 

2c  Is ‘AI bias’ one sphere in which India and Taiwan should collaborate? I think AI bias will be used in narrative warfare by China. So, it sounds logical that India will look towards Taiwan for it. That’s why this question.

    • Yes, AI bias is a critical area where India and Taiwan should collaborate, especially considering how China could leverage AI for narrative warfare, disinformation, and ideological control.
    • Given Taiwan’s experience in countering Chinese propaganda and cognitive warfare and India’s strength in AI software development, a partnership between the two could be mutually beneficial.
    • AI models learn from data, and if this data is manipulated, it can shape narratives in ways that serve geopolitical agendas. China has a history of AI-enabled information control.
    • Chinese AI firms develop models that filter, distort, or suppress certain narratives (e.g., Tiananmen Square and Uyghur issues).
    • AI-driven bot networks and deepfakes help China push state-controlled narratives globally.
    • AI-powered language models can spread biased historical or political perspectives on global platforms.
    • Given these threats, India and Taiwan must proactively develop AI systems that resist bias and manipulation to safeguard their information sovereignty.
    • India (with its AI research institutions like IITs, IIITs, and NITI Aayog) and Taiwan (via Academia Sinica, ITRI) can create joint frameworks for identifying and countering AI bias.
    • Instead of relying on U.S. or China-dominated AI models (GPT, ERNIE), India and Taiwan can work on regional AI models trained on neutral or diverse datasets.
    • Taiwan is already a leader in countering Chinese misinformation; India can integrate these capabilities into its AI-driven news verification systems.
    • India and Taiwan should limit dependency on Chinese AI tools, chips, and cloud services to avoid hidden biases and surveillance risks.
    • China can manipulate AI models. India and Taiwan must ensure independent, bias-resistant AI tools.
    • Both countries face Chinese psy-ops through TikTok clones, AI-driven chatbots, and misinformation on global platforms. Collaboration on AI-driven digital hygiene strategies is essential.
    • AI bias is not just a technical issue but a geopolitical weapon. Given China’s advancements in AI-enabled narrative control, India and Taiwan must collaborate to develop AI models that are transparent, unbiased, and resilient to manipulation.

 

3: Do you think Taiwan will determine the QUAD’s Indo-Pacific policy? Do you think Taiwan will be included in QUAD Plus?

    • Taiwan is strategically important for the Indo-Pacific.
    • Its inclusion in QUAD+ or any official QUAD policy is highly sensitive due to geopolitical constraints, primarily the One-China policy followed by QUAD members.
    • However, Taiwan is already a de facto part of the Indo-Pacific security architecture, and its role may increase informally without direct QUAD membership.
    • Taiwan plays a key role in significant aspects of the Indo-Pacific strategy.
    • India, Japan, and Australia have quietly increased economic, diplomatic, and military engagement with Taiwan.
    • The U.S. openly supports Taiwan’s defence and maintains strong military ties with Taiwan (e.g., arms sales, intelligence-sharing).
    • Joint statements focus on ‘peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait’, a veiled warning to China.
    • This suggests Taiwan is a silent but critical factor in QUAD’s Indo-Pacific strategy.
    • The idea of QUAD+ (expanded QUAD partnerships) includes countries like South Korea, Vietnam, the Philippines, and European allies. Taiwan’s inclusion is politically tricky but possible in indirect ways.
    • QUAD could integrate Taiwan into its semiconductor, AI, and cyber initiatives without direct military ties.
    • Taiwan is already working with the U.S. and Japan on cyber defence against China.
    • QUAD’s Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) could involve Taiwan in trade and investment deals.
    • Taiwan’s inclusion could provoke Chinese military aggression, making regional stability harder to maintain.
    • India’s stance on Taiwan is cautious but evolving, with no diplomatic recognition (it follows the One-China policy but doesn’t reaffirm it actively), expanding economic & tech ties, and a measured stance on security issues (India doesn’t directly engage on Taiwan’s defence but is watching U.S.-China tensions closely).
    • Taiwan will likely play a more significant role in QUAD’s Indo-Pacific policy, but formal membership in QUAD+ is unlikely in the near future due to China’s geopolitical sensitivities.

 

4. Do you think,  that Taiwanese TSMC’s $100 billion investment in the US has any lessons for India-Taiwan bilateral ties?

Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company’s (TSMC) $100 billion investment in the U.S. offers several lessons for India-Taiwan bilateral ties, particularly in the semiconductor sector.

TSMC’s investment in the U.S. is not merely a business move but a strategic decision driven by geopolitical concerns, primarily supply chain resilience and U.S.-China tensions. Similarly, India must recognise the strategic value of deepening semiconductor cooperation with Taiwan, not just as an economic initiative but as a crucial aspect of national security and self-reliance (Atmanirbhar Bharat).

Taiwan seeks to diversify its semiconductor production due to concerns about a potential Chinese invasion. The U.S. has emerged as one alternative, and India could position itself as another. New Delhi can present itself as a stable and growing economy with skilled labour and a commitment to semiconductor self-sufficiency.

The U.S. successfully attracted TSMC by offering massive incentives under the CHIPS Act, including subsidies, tax breaks, and infrastructure support. Under its Semiconductor Mission, India is offering similar incentives, but the challenge is ensuring a competitive ecosystem, covering land acquisition, power supply, and water availability (all crucial for fabs). If India wants Taiwanese firms like TSMC or UMC to invest, it must streamline regulatory processes and enhance the ease of doing business.

 

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