Category: Article

Posted on

491: PRACHAND: THE HIMALAYAN GRIFFIN

 

 

My Article published on the Chanakya Forum

 

In mid-June, news channels and strategic community circles were abuzz with the news that the Ministry of Defence, Government of India, had issued an RFP for the procurement of 156 Light Combat Helicopters (90 for the Indian Army and 66 for the Indian Air Force). LCH is the first indigenous Multi-Role Combat Helicopter designed and manufactured by Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL). “Prachand” (which means “fierce” in Hindi), the name given to India’s LCH, reflects the helicopter’s aggressive and powerful capabilities. It stands out with its ground attack and aerial combat capability, setting it apart from other helicopters in the market. Other attack helicopters and armed helicopters (held in the Indian armed forces inventory) are severely limited in operating at high altitudes and are best suited for operations in lower terrains.

 

HAL has thus far manufactured 15 limited-series Prachand helicopters (10 for the IAF and 5 for the IA), already in service from 2021 onwards. The new procurement order will enhance the operational capability of the Indian defence forces and further boost India’s drive for self-reliance. Reviewing the aircraft (features, performance, capabilities, and roles) and the project (development, production capabilities, Indigenous content, etc.) will be worthwhile.

 

Development Project. The need for such a helicopter was felt by the Indian armed forces during the Kargil conflict in 1999 when they were required to dislodge intruding Pakistani forces entrenched at altitudes around 18,000 feet. HAL started developing the LCH in the early 2000s, unveiling its plan to build the LCH in 2006. The Indian government sanctioned the project in the same year. The first flight on a prototype on 29 March 2010 was followed by an extensive test programme on four prototypes. The LCH became the first attack helicopter to land in Siachen at altitudes as high as 15,800 feet (4,815 metres). The LCH received a certificate of basic configuration in October 2015 and achieved initial operational clearance in August 2017.

 

Induction. The LCH was developed to meet the requirements of the Indian Air Force and the Indian Army. In August 2017, limited-series production began for 15 aircraft. In January 2019, after completing all weapon integration tests, HAL declared the LCH ready for operational induction. On November 19, 2021, the LCH was formally handed over to IAF, starting the process of full-scale induction. On October 03, 2022, the LCH was formally inducted into the IAF and was officially named ‘Prachand’. By November 2022, the IA had begun receiving its LCH. The Ministry of Defence (MoD) has now given preliminary approval to acquire 156 more Light Combat Helicopters.

 

 

Features. The LCH, an attack helicopter derived from a weaponised version of the HAL-manufactured Dhruv helicopter ‘Rudra’, is a light and agile machine with a unique feature that sets it apart from any other combat helicopter in the world: its ability to operate at high altitudes. This is a significant advantage, as it allows the LCH to operate effectively in the mountainous terrain of the Himalayas, a crucial area for India’s defence strategy. The helicopter possesses modern stealth characteristics, robust armour protection, advanced weapon systems, and electronic warfare systems. Its performance characteristics and features are as follows, showcasing its unique and impressive capabilities:

 

    • Performance. The LCH is designed for high-altitude operations, with a service ceiling of about 6,500 meters (21,300 feet), the highest among all attack helicopters worldwide. It has a maximum Take-off Weight of around 5,800 kg and can carry 700 kg of payload. The helicopter can cruise at 260km/h and achieve a maximum speed of 268km/h. With a range of 550 km with weapons, it can fly for about 3 hours, showcasing its impressive performance capabilities.

 

    • Armament. The LCH has a chin-mounted and twin-barrel M621 20mm cannon on a Nexter THL-20 turret, integrated with the Helmet Mounted Sighting System. Its modular design allows it to be armed with various weapons, including air-to-air and air-to-ground missiles, rocket pods, iron bombs, cluster bombs, and grenade launchers. This versatility in carrying different weapons makes the LCH suitable for various missions, from air-to-air combat to ground attack. It has four hardpoints capable of carrying a combination of multiple weapons. It is also equipped with a Forges de Zeebrugge-built FZ231 rocket launcher capable of carrying 70mm rockets, MBDA air-to-air, air-to-surface, anti-radiation missiles, and Helina anti-tank guided missiles (Dhruvastra).

 

    • Engine: The helicopter is powered by two HAL/Turbomeca Shakti turboshaft engines, each of which can generate approximately 1000kW and has a Full Authority Digital Electronic Control system (FADEC). The French Turbomeca and HAL jointly developed the Shakti engine, which was also fitted on the Dhruv and Rudra helicopters.

 

    • Advanced Technology (Sensors and Avionics): The helicopter features a glass cockpit, a composite airframe structure, and a state-of-the-art sensor suite, enhancing operational efficiency and durability. The glass cockpit accommodates two crew members in tandem. It has an Integrated Avionics Display System (IADS), multi-function displays, a target acquisition and designation system (TADS) with FLIR (laser range finder and a designator), a helmet-mounted sight and a digital video recorder to capture battlefield footage for debriefing. The sensors fitted on the helicopter include a charge-coupled device camera, a forward-looking infrared camera and a laser designator. The two cameras capture the enemy’s location and position. The targeting system features an electro-optical pod, helmet-mounted sight display (HMSD), and a laser range finder and designator for precise targeting and engagement. The LCH is also equipped with a data link for network-centric operations.

 

    • Survivability: The helicopter has numerous features to increase its survivability, including stealth features to reduce radar and infrared signatures. It has systems like Radar warning receivers (RWR), missile approach warning systems, laser warning systems, and chaff and flare dispensers for self-protection. The helicopter also has engine exhaust Infra-Red Suppression Systems (IRSS). The IRSS enhances aircraft resilience against IR-guided missiles by diminishing the missile lock-on distance and facilitating the superior functioning of IR jammers and flares. It has several other protection features, such as armour protection, self-sealing fuel tanks, a digital camouflage system, and crashworthy landing gear to enhance its survivability in hostile environments. The pressurised cabin of the helicopter offers protection from Nuclear, Biological and Chemical (NBC) attacks.

 

    • Versatility and Agility: The features above allow LCH to perform numerous roles under all weather and day-night conditions. Its narrow fuselage and advanced aerodynamics provide high agility, making it difficult to detect and target. The specially designed hinge-less rotor makes it highly agile due to its immediate response to flight control commands.

 

Roles and Tasks. The LCH meets the requirements of modern warfare and has the capability parameters to operate under varied conditions. Equipped with advanced systems and various weapons, it can perform multiple combat and support roles. In attack roles, it can undertake missions like the destruction of enemy air defence (DEAD), anti-tank warfare, battlefield air support, interdiction, and counter-surface force operations. It is capable of battlefield reconnaissance and target acquisition. It can also be used to escort convoys and provide aerial coverage. The LCH can track and attack slow-moving aerial targets and remotely piloted aircraft. It is also effective in counter-insurgency operations in jungle and urban environments.

 

Capability Enhancement. The LCH’s versatility and offensive potential are at par or better than most attack helicopters operating globally. Its presence itself deters adversaries. The induction of the Light Combat Helicopter adds unique capability to India’s combat potential. The LCH is noted for its capability to operate at high altitudes up to 6,500 meters, making it particularly suitable for operations in mountainous regions like the Himalayas along India’s northern and northeastern borders. This versatility, along with advanced avionics and weaponry, makes the LCH a force multiplier, significantly enhancing the combat capabilities of the Indian armed forces. It is a potent platform with day and night ground attack and aerial combat capability. It is a game changer, reflecting its multiple capabilities and strategic importance. It offers strategic flexibility through rapid deployment, allowing quick responses to emerging threats. The helicopter’s data link will mesh into the IAF’s networked environment.

 

Self-reliance and Challenges. Being an Indigenous platform developed by Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL), the LCH reduces reliance on foreign military technology and supports India’s defence industry. With the Indian thrust on indigenisation, the LCH is being developed under a public-private partnership model, with the active participation of the private sector. There is still much left to be achieved regarding self-reliance. The LCH reportedly has an indigenous content of 45% by value, which is likely to progressively increase to more than 55%. The development of indigenous engines is the foremost challenge. Developing an aircraft engine is tough and expensive; it requires considerable investment in R&D and sustained effort over many years. These helicopters are on one of the government’s positive indigenisation lists. The list bans importing weapons, systems, and ammunition. Integration of Indigenous Anti-Tank Guided Missiles is another challenge. Helina/Dhruvastra, a helicopter version of the Nag missile, has already been tested on ALH (Rudra) and is in the process of integration with LCH. Next on the list is the challenge of production rate. The new order of 156 LCH aircraft will likely take 5 to 6 years to complete.

 

The induction of an additional 156 LCH is a significant development. The LCH’s high-altitude operational capability, advanced avionics, versatile armament, and Indigenous development make it a crucial asset for India’s defence forces. Its ability to operate in challenging terrains and perform multiple combat roles effectively positions it as a game changer in modern warfare, particularly in India’s unique geographic and strategic challenges.

 

Suggestions and value additions are most welcome.

 

1957
Default rating

Please give a thumbs up if you  like The Post?

 

Link to the article on Chanakya website: -https://chanakyaforum.com/prachand-the-himalayan-griffin/ 

 

For regular updates, please register here:-

Subscribe

 

References and credits

To all the online sites and channels.

References:-

  1. Air Chief Marshal Fali H Major (retd), “Why India’s Light Combat Helicopter could be a game changer”, DailyO, 28 Feb 2020.
  1. Air Marshal Anil Chopra (Retd), “Rotary Wing Platforms: India’s Great Indigenisation Story”, Indian Defence Review, Issue Vol. 38.1, Jan-Mar 2023, 13 Apr 2023.
  1. “Ten reasons why indigenously-built Light Combat Helicopter is a game changer for the Indian Air Force”, India News Network, 04 Apr 2022.
  1. Rahul Singh, “Govt to buy 156 light combat helicopters from HAL at ₹50k-cr”, Hindustan Times, 18 Jun 2024.
  1. D Raghunandan, “India’s Combat Helicopter: Re-discovering Self-reliance?”, NEWSclick, 14 Oct 2022.
  1. Lt Gen (Retd) BS Pawar, “Induction of ‘Prachand’ Light Combat Helicopter: Impact on Operations At High Altitudes”, Bharat Shakti, 13 Jan 2024.
  1. “HAL Light Combat Helicopter (LCH)”, Air Force Technology, 18 Apr 2024.
  1. Ministry of Defence, “Indigenously Designed and Developed Light Combat Helicopter (LCH) inducted into Indian Air Force”, Press Release, 03 OCT 2022.
  1. Gordon Arthur, “India advances light attack helicopter program with large tender”, Air Warfare, 21 Jun 2024.
  1. Huma Siddiqui, “MoD Issues RFP for 156 Prachand Helicopters to HAL for IAF and Army”, Financial Express, 20 Jun 2024.

Disclaimer:

Information and data included in the blog are for educational & non-commercial purposes only and have been carefully adapted, excerpted, or edited from reliable and accurate sources. All copyrighted material belongs to respective owners and is provided only for wider dissemination.

Posted on

490: NUCLEAR TRENDS, THREATS AND CHALLENGES

 

 

The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) released its highly anticipated 55th edition of the SIPRI Yearbook 2024 on 17 June 24. This comprehensive yearbook, a cornerstone in the field, presents the institute’s annual evaluation of the state of armaments, disarmament, and international security, with a specific focus on nuclear threats and challenges.

 

Key findings of the SIPRI Yearbook 2024 are that the number and types of nuclear weapons in development have increased as states deepen their reliance on nuclear deterrence.

 

Relevant Excerpts

 

The nine nuclear-armed states are the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France, China, India, Pakistan, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea) and Israel. The nuclear countries continued modernising their nuclear arsenals, and several deployed new nuclear-armed or nuclear-capable weapon systems in 2023.

 

 

Of the total global inventory of an estimated 12,121 warheads in January 2024, about 9585 are in military stockpiles for potential use. An estimated 3904 of those warheads are deployed with missiles and aircraft; the rest are in central storage. Around 2100 deployed warheads are kept in a high operational alert on ballistic missiles. Nearly all of these warheads belonged to Russia or the USA, but for the first time, China is believed to have some warheads on high operational alert.

 

While the global total of nuclear warheads continues to fall as Cold War-era weapons are gradually dismantled, regrettably, there is a year-on-year increase in the number of operational nuclear warheads.

 

India, Pakistan, and North Korea are all pursuing the capability to deploy multiple warheads on ballistic missiles, something Russia, France, the UK, the USA and—more recently—China already have.

 

Russia and the USA together possess almost 90 percent of all nuclear weapons. The sizes of their respective military stockpiles (i.e., useable warheads) seem to have remained relatively stable in 2023. In addition to their military stockpiles, Russia and the USA each hold more than 1200 warheads previously retired from military service, which they are gradually dismantling.

 

Russia. Russia is estimated to have deployed around 36 more warheads with operational forces than in January 2023. Transparency regarding nuclear forces has declined, and debates around nuclear-sharing arrangements have increased in saliency. Notably, there were several public claims made in 2023 that Russia had deployed nuclear weapons on Belarusian territory. However, there is no conclusive visual evidence that the actual deployment of warheads has taken place.

 

China. SIPRI’s estimate of the size of China’s nuclear arsenal increased from 410 warheads in January 2023 to 500 in January 2024, and it is expected to keep growing. For the first time, China may also now be deploying a small number of warheads on missiles during peacetime. Depending on how it decides to structure its forces, China could potentially have at least as many intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) as either Russia or the USA by the turn of the decade. However, its stockpile of nuclear warheads is still expected to remain much smaller than the stockpiles of either of those two countries.

 

United Kingdom. Although the UK is not thought to have increased its nuclear weapon arsenal in 2023, its warhead stockpile is expected to grow in the future due to the British government’s announcement in 2021 that it was raising its limit from 225 to 260 warheads. The government also said it would no longer publicly disclose its quantities of nuclear weapons, deployed warheads or deployed missiles.

 

France. In 2023, France continued its programmes to develop a third-generation nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) and a new air-launched cruise missile and refurbish and upgrade existing systems.

 

India. In 2023, India slightly expanded its nuclear arsenal and continued developing new nuclear delivery systems. India appears to be placing growing emphasis on longer-range weapons, including those capable of reaching targets throughout China.

 

North Korea. North Korea continues to prioritise its military nuclear programme as a central element of its national security strategy. SIPRI estimates that the country has now assembled around 50 warheads and possesses enough fissile material to reach a total of up to 90 warheads, both significant increases over the estimates for January 2023. While North Korea conducted no nuclear test explosions in 2023, it appears to have carried out its first test of a short-range ballistic missile from a rudimentary silo. It also completed the development of at least two types of land-attack cruise missiles (LACM) designed to deliver nuclear weapons.

 

Israel. Israel does not publicly acknowledge possessing nuclear weapons. It seems to be modernising its nuclear arsenal and upgrading its plutonium production reactor site at Dimona.

 

Global Security and Stability in Peril

 

The impacts of the wars in Ukraine and Gaza are visible in almost every aspect of the issues connected to nuclear, armaments, disarmament and international security.

 

Increasing Reliance on Nuclear Deterrence. Russia has continued to make threats regarding the use of nuclear weapons in the context of Western support for Ukraine. In May 2024, Russia carried out tactical nuclear weapon drills close to the Ukrainian border.

 

Setback to Nuclear Arms Control and Disarmament. Nuclear diplomacy suffered more significant setbacks in 2023.

 

    • In February 2023, Russia announced it was suspending its participation in the 2010 Treaty on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (New START)—the last remaining nuclear arms control treaty limiting Russian and US strategic nuclear forces. The USA also suspended the sharing and publication of treaty data as a countermeasure.

 

    • In November, Russia withdrew its ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), citing ‘an imbalance’ with the USA, which has failed to ratify the treaty since it opened for signature in 1996. However, Russia confirmed it would remain a signatory and continue participating in the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) work.

 

    • An informal agreement reached between Iran and the USA in June 2023 seemed to temporarily de-escalate tensions between the two countries, which had intensified over Iran’s military support to Russian forces in Ukraine. However, the start of the Israel–Hamas war in October upended the agreement, with proxy attacks by Iran-backed groups on US forces in Iraq and Syria ending Iranian–US diplomatic efforts.

 

    • The war also undermined efforts to engage Israel in the Conference on the Establishment of a Middle East Zone Free of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction.

 

Comments

 

    • While global nuclear destructive power is stable (if not decreasing) for the time being, the increase in the number of warheads on high op alert is a cause of concern. The number of warheads deployed on missiles and aircraft shows an upward trend.

 

    • The capability to deploy multiple warheads on missiles would enable a rapid potential increase in deployed warheads, as well as the possibility for nuclear-armed countries to threaten the destruction of significantly more targets.

 

    • Several nuclear-armed states are putting new emphasis on developing their arsenal of tactical nuclear weapons. The concern is about the early use of these weapons in a conflict.

 

    • Given that the USA and Russia possess 90% of the total global nukes, the Ukraine conflict (Russia – NATO/West conflict in a broader sense) is not safe. Reduction in their stockpile will make the world safer.

 

    • China is expanding its nuclear arsenal faster than any other country. China deploying nuclear warheads on missiles on op alert indicates a strategic shift and a possible change in its nuclear policy.

 

    • Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal has shown no change in numbers. However, Pakistan, too, has advanced its nuclear delivery systems. Considering its internal conditions and prevailing geo-political situation, fear of its nuclear weapons falling into the wrong hands remains.

 

    • The gradual reductions in nuclear stockpiles that characterised the post-Cold War period are over, and the world is sliding back into nuclear competition and arms race.

 

    • Cold War II has enhanced nuclear capabilities, reduced nuclear transparency, and increased reliance on nuclear deterrence.

 

    • The world is slowly moving one step closer to the speedier initiation of a nuclear exchange.

 

    • Launch due to accidental firing, miscalculation, or foolhardiness is worrisome. Mutually acceptable safety measures need to be implemented on priority.

 

    • Adequate security measures must be instituted to avoid these launch-ready weapons falling into the hands of non-state actors.

 

    • Nuclear weapons are once again (like in the Cold War era) playing a prominent role in international relations. Despite two years back, leaders of the five largest nuclear-armed states jointly reaffirmed that “a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought”.

 

    • Recent developments demonstrate the fragile nature of Nuclear Arms Control and Disarmament treaties. Fresh impetus is required to maintain the relevance of measures taken for Nuclear Disarmament:-

  

    • Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons 2017 prohibits the development, testing, production, acquisition, possession, or use of nuclear weapons.

 

    • The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) 1968 aims to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, promote cooperation in peaceful uses of nuclear energy and achieve nuclear disarmament.

 

    • Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), 1996, prohibits nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, outer space, and underwater.

  

    • The world is now in one of the most dangerous periods. Numerous sources of instability (political rivalries, economic inequalities, and ecological disruption) encourage and accelerate an arms race.

 

    • It is time for the nuclear powers and the multi-lateral organisations to step back and reflect together.

 

Addendum

 

India’s Nuclear Policy. India has adhered to a nuclear no-first-use (NFU) policy since 1999. The country’s stated doctrine from January 2003 includes a pledge not to use nuclear weapons first but with a significant caveat that nuclear weapons could be used if Indian forces are attacked with biological or chemical weapons. India reaffirmed in 2018 that it could also use nuclear forces to retaliate against attacks by non-nuclear weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

 

Recent Developments. In November 2019, India formally declared the operationalisation of its nuclear triad after the country’s first SSBN, INS Arihant, completed its first deterrence patrol.  In March 2024, India successfully conducted “Mission Divyastra” by launching Agni-V with multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicle (MIRV) technology. This placed India into a club of the few countries capable of delivering multiple nuclear warheads using a single missile.

 

Suggestions and value additions are most welcome.

 

1957
Default rating

Please give a thumbs up if you  like The Post?

 

For regular updates, please register here:-

Subscribe

References and credits

To all the online sites and channels.

  1. SIPRI Year Book 2024.
  2. Eliana Johns, “We’re Entering A New Period”, Federation of American Scientists, 17 Jun 24.
  3. https://currentaffairs.khanglobalstudies.com/sipri-yearbook-report-2024/

Disclaimer:

Information and data included in the blog are for educational & non-commercial purposes only and have been carefully adapted, excerpted, or edited from reliable and accurate sources. All copyrighted material belongs to respective owners and is provided only for broader dissemination.

Posted on

489: COMBAT AVIATION: MOST ESSENTIAL, LEAST UNDERSTOOD

 

 

My Article published in the Indus International Research Foundation Year Book 2024.

 

 

“Air power is not only a fascinating subject, but its theory and practice also constitute a very demanding profession, and even a lifetime’s study and devotion is inadequate to unravel its mystique or fully understand its imperatives.”

– Air Cmde Jasjit Singh

 

Air power is a revolutionary force that transformed the fundamental nature of war in less than a century. The concept of air power is often considered one of the most essential elements in modern military operations, but it can also be the least understood aspect for various reasons. Aviation technology advances open up many new possibilities for air power applications. Developing, maintaining, and operating a modern air force is resource-intensive. Balancing budget constraints with the need for cutting-edge technology and capabilities is a complex task. The effective integration of air power with surface forces can be challenging. Joint operations require seamless communication, coordination, and a shared understanding of each other’s roles, tasks, and core competencies. These complexities make it challenging to understand the potential of air power and the nuances of its application for both the practitioners of air power and those affected directly or indirectly by it.  Douhet, Mitchell, and Trenchard, the three airpower prophets from military aviation’s earliest years, articulated their airpower theories that shaped military aviation for decades. While it is good always to remember the basics, it is worthwhile to revisit and review them, especially with the ongoing and urgent debate about proposed organisational changes.

 

Continue reading “489: COMBAT AVIATION: MOST ESSENTIAL, LEAST UNDERSTOOD”

English हिंदी