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The Department of Defence (DoD) of the USA released its annual report to Congress, “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China”. The DoD annual report on Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China charts the course of the PRC’s national, economic, and military strategy and offers insight into the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) strategy, current capabilities, and activities as well as its future modernisation goals. This report covers security and military developments involving the PRC through early 2024.
This is a summary of the 182-page report.
UNDERSTANDING THE PRC’S STRATEGY
The PRC’s National Strategy. The PRC’s longstanding national strategy is to achieve “the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” by 2049. This strategy determinedly pursues political, social, economic, technological, and military development to increase the PRC’s national power and revise the international order to support the PRC’s governance system and national interests.
The PRC’s Foreign Policy. The PRC’s stated foreign policy seeks to reshape the international order into a “community of common destiny” to support its strategy to realise “rejuvenation.” PRC leaders claim their power to shape world events continues to grow, presenting “new strategic opportunities” to create an environment favourable for PRC interests and national rejuvenation.
The PRC’s Economic Policy. The PRC acknowledges internal and external challenges that complicated its economic recovery and growth in 2023. For 2024, the PRC plans to leverage perceived favourable factors in the PRC’s long-term growth trajectory while mitigating risks to economic stability. The PRC’s ongoing military modernisation objectives are commensurate with and part of its broader national development aspirations to invest heavily in technological self-sufficiency and concentrate on advanced manufacturing.
The PRC’s Defence Policy and Military Strategy. In 2023, the PRC’s stated defence policy remained oriented toward advancing its sovereignty, security, and development interests while emphasising a more significant global role for itself. Beijing has demonstrated an increasing willingness to use military coercion and inducements to achieve these aims.
PLA FORCES AND CAPABILITIES
The PLA’s Modernisation and Reform. The PLA has sought to modernise its capabilities and improve its proficiencies across all warfare domains to become a joint force capable of the full range of land, air, and maritime as well as nuclear, space, counter space, electronic warfare, and cyberspace operations. Despite its progress, the force still has significant deficiencies, including commander proficiency, long-distance logistics, and urban warfare. In 2023, the PLA continued to adjust its military structures, field modern indigenous systems, build readiness, and strengthen its competency to conduct joint operations.
PLA Army (PLAA). The PLAA continues its decades-long effort to modernise equipment and focus on combined arms and joint training to become a world-class military by 2049. The PLAA demonstrated long-range joint fire capabilities during the April 2023 JOINT SWORD exercise.
PLA Navy (PLAN). Numerically, the PRC has the largest navy in the world, with a battle force of over 370 ships and submarines, including more than 140 major surface combatants. The PLAN is composed mainly of modern multi-mission ships and submarines. In 2023, the PLAN continued to grow its ability to perform missions beyond the First Island Chain (FIC) by conducting the first extended area deployment of its new YUSHEN-class amphibious assault ship and three deployments with CV-17 Shandong to the Philippine Sea, a record number for any PLAN carrier in a calendar year.
PLA Air Force (PLAAF). The PLAAF is rapidly modernising and indigenising its aircraft and unmanned aerial systems, matching U.S. standards. In 2023, the PLA transferred significant portions of PLAN shore-based, fixed-wing combat aviation units, facilities, air defence, and radar units to the PLAAF. Given time, this shift will probably enable better command and control over the PRC’s integrated air defence systems and the ground-based air domain awareness radars supporting the PRC’s national integrated air defence system network.
PLA Rocket Force (PLARF). The PLARF is advancing its long-term modernisation plans to enhance its “strategic deterrence” capabilities. The PRC is developing new intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) that will significantly improve its nuclear-capable missile forces and require increased nuclear warhead production. The PRC may also explore developing conventionally armed intercontinental-range missile systems. If developed and fielded, such capabilities would enable the PRC to threaten conventional strikes against targets in the continental United States, Hawaii, and Alaska.
The Former Strategic Support Force (SSF). On 19 April 2024, Beijing announced the dissolution of the SSF and the alignment of its subordinate forces—Aerospace Force (ASF) and Cyberspace Force (CSF)—directly under the CMC. Beijing established a new Information Support Force (ISF) under the CMC to coordinate the management of the military’s networks and communications systems. The updated PLA organisational structure features four theatre-grade services—the PLAA, PLAN, PLAAF, and PLARF—and four deputy-theatre-grade forces or service arms: the ASF, CSF, ISF, and the Joint Logistic Support Force (JLSF).
Joint Logistic Support Force (JLSF). JJSF improves joint strategic and campaign-level logistic efficiencies through training and integrating civilian products and services. The JLSF supports multimodal transportation methods to facilitate the movement of PLA forces and equipment for training. During wartime or mobilisation, the JLSF will probably rely on its military representative offices and dispatch centers to route military traffic.
PLA Reserves, Paramilitary, and Militia Forces. Interoperability and integration between the PLA, its reserve components, and the PRC’s paramilitary forces continue to grow in scale and sophistication, including the coordination between the PLAN, the China Coast Guard (CCG), and the China Maritime Militia (CMM). The PRC primarily relies on its CCG and CMM for maritime coercion while selectively using the PLAN to provide overwatch to deter rival claimants and quickly respond with force, if necessary. The People’s Armed Police (PAP) is another paramilitary component of the PRC’s armed forces. Its primary missions include internal security, maritime security, and augmentation to the PLA during conflict.
Special Operations Forces (SOF). Despite unilateral and multilateral training, all PRC SOF units lack real-world combat experience. PRC SOF does not have a national-level special operations command to oversee all SOF activities. Despite emphasising joint training, theatre commanders have no authority over PAP units, making it challenging to incorporate PAP SOF into PLA training exercises.
PLA Capabilities in Development. The PLA remains focused on developing capabilities to provide options for the PRC to dissuade, deter, or, if ordered, defeat third-party intervention in the Indo-Pacific region. The PLA continues developing its capabilities to conduct military operations more profoundly in the Indo-Pacific region and globally. The PLA has undertaken critical structural reforms, introduced a new military doctrine to strengthen joint operations, and is testing joint capabilities in and beyond the FIC.
Joint Capabilities for Power Projection. The PLA continues to increase its military capabilities to achieve the PRC’s regional and global security objectives beyond its immediate periphery. The PLA has primarily emphasised power projection capabilities in the maritime domain while its joint operational capabilities beyond the FIC remain limited. Improvements in PLA air and naval systems enable PLA forces to operate further from the PRC for longer.
Advancements toward an Informatised and Intelligentised Military. The PLA considers information operations (IO) as a means of achieving information superiority early in a conflict, which is regarded as a critical requirement for the success of any military campaign, and continues to expand the scope and frequency of IO in military exercises. The PRC presents a significant, persistent cyber-enabled espionage and attack threat to an adversary’s military and critical infrastructure systems. The PLA is pursuing next-generation combat capabilities based on its vision of future conflict, which it calls “intelligentised warfare,” defined by the expanded use of AI, quantum computing, big data, and other advanced technologies at every level of warfare.
Nuclear Capabilities. Over the next decade, the PRC probably will continue to modernise, diversify, and expand its nuclear forces rapidly. The PLA seeks a larger and more diverse nuclear force comprised of systems ranging from low-yield precision strike missiles to ICBMs with multi-megaton yields to provide it with multiple options on the escalation ladder. In 2023, Beijing continued its rapid nuclear expansion. DoD estimates the PRC has surpassed 600 operational nuclear warheads in its stockpile as of mid-2024 and will have over 1,000 operational nuclear warheads by 2030, much of which will be deployed at higher readiness levels. The PRC will continue growing its force through at least 2035.
OPERATIONAL STRUCTURE AND ACTIVITIES ON THE PRC’S PERIPHERY
Theater Commands. The PRC continues to refine military reforms associated with establishing the Eastern, Southern, Western, Northern, and Central Theater Commands. These command structures are organised based on the PRC’s revisionist ambitions and perception of peripheral threats. Under the direction of the CMC, each Theatre Command has operational authority over conventional forces within the theatre.
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- The Eastern Theater Command (ETC) is oriented toward Taiwan and the East China Sea and would likely oversee a Taiwan campaign. In April 2023, the ETC executed the exercise JOINT SWORD, which was aimed at pressuring Taiwan.
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- The Southern Theater Command (STC) is oriented toward the South China Sea (SCS) and Southeast Asia border security. It responds to U.S. freedom of navigation operations in the SCS. It can assume command, as needed, of the overall CCG and CMM ships, enforcing the PRC’s claimed sovereignty and supporting PLA operations. In 2023, STC units conducted multiple live-fire drills and amphibious training events near PRC-occupied features in the SCS and led live-fire drills, including deploying howitzers and counter-battery radars at the PRC-Burma border.
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- The Western Theater Command (WTC) is oriented toward India and counterterrorism missions along the PRC’s Central Asian borders. It focuses on the Xinjiang and Tibet Autonomous Regions, where the CCP perceives a high threat of what it defines as the “three evils” of “separatism, terrorism, and extremism.”
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- The Northern Theater Command (NTC) is oriented toward the Korean Peninsula and Russian border security.
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- The Central Theater Command’s (CTC’s) mission is to defend Beijing while supporting other theater commands.
Developments in the Security Situation in the Taiwan Strait. In 2023, the PRC amplified diplomatic, political, and military pressure against Taiwan. Throughout 2023, Beijing continued to erode longstanding norms in and around Taiwan by employing a range of pressure tactics: maintaining a naval presence around Taiwan, increasing crossings into Taiwan’s self-declared centerline and air defence identification zone (ADIZ), and conducting highly publicised major military exercises near Taiwan.
Developments in Taiwan’s Ability to Deter the Mainland. Geopolitical events in 2023 continued to accelerate Taiwan’s development of asymmetric concepts and capabilities to counter the PRC’s improving capabilities. Taiwan seeks to balance these asymmetric capabilities with conventional ones that are useful for defending against PRC grey-zone operations in and around its airspace and waters. In 2023, Taiwan continued to improve defensive resilience through a whole-of-society approach.
Developments in the Security Situation in the South China Sea. Throughout 2023, tensions between the PRC and the Philippines were notably higher, with the PRC maritime forces ramming and boarding Philippine vessels en route to resupply the Second Thomas Shoal. The PRC has deployed PLAN, CCG, CMM, and civilian ships to advance its illegal maritime claims, such as around the Second Thomas Shoal, Scarborough Reef, Sabina Shoal, and Sandy Cay/Thitu Island, as well as in response to oil and gas exploration operations by rival claimants in the PRC’s unlawful dashed-line claim.
PLA Coercive and Risky Operational Behaviour. Since late 2023, the PLA has reduced U.S. platforms’ coercive and risky air intercepts compared to the previous two years, when the PLA engaged in notably increased aggressive activity, particularly in the East and South China Seas. However, the PLA continues to conduct unsafe manoeuvres near allied forces operating in the region.
THE PLA’S GROWING GLOBAL PRESENCE
The PLA’s Evolving Mission and Tasks. PLA concepts and capabilities focus on projecting power far from China’s shores. The PLAN’s evolving focus from “offshore defence” to “open seas protection” and the PLAAF’s interest in becoming a “strategic” air force reflect the PLA’s interest in conducting operations beyond the PRC and its immediate periphery. The PLA has embraced its concept of non-war military activities (NWMA) as an effective way to secure the PRC’s global interests with military force while gaining valuable operational experience.
PLA Overseas Military Activities. Beijing implements its global counterterrorism strategy to develop the PLA’s operational experience, secure greater access to overseas theaters, and prevent terrorist attacks in China and against PRC citizens and economic projects abroad. Citing its counterterrorism mission, since 2008, the PLA has dispatched more than 40 naval escort task forces (NETFs) to the Gulf of Aden, granting PLAN sailors the necessary experience in overseas operations. In 2017, the PLA established an overseas base in Djibouti. The PRC is the largest peacekeeper contributor among the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, having deployed about 50,000 personnel over the last 31 years. The PRC uses international outreach to garner the assistance of partner governments, routinely lobbies foreign partners to extradite alleged Uyghur extremists, and seeks public endorsement of its counterterrorism efforts in multilateral forums.
Military Cooperation. The PRC uses bilateral and multilateral exercises to normalise its overseas presence and deepen defence ties. Beginning in 2014, the PRC has markedly increased participation in bilateral and multilateral exercises. Since then, Beijing has held recurring exercises, including the FALCON STRIKE air exercise with Thailand (2015), the MARITIME SECURITY BELT naval exercise with Russia and Iran (2019), and the BLUE SWORD with Saudi Arabia (2019). The PRC had expanded combined exercises with Russia since 2018 when Beijing first participated in Russia’s VOSTOK capstone exercise.
Overseas Basing and Access. The PRC seeks to expand its overseas logistics and base infrastructure to allow the PLA to project and sustain military power at greater distances. A global PLA logistics network could disrupt U.S. military operations as the PRC’s global military objectives evolve. Beyond the PLA support base in Djibouti, the PRC is likely already considering and planning additional military logistics facilities to support the projection of naval, air, and ground forces.
RESOURCES AND TECHNOLOGY FOR FORCE MODERNISATION
PRC Defence Spending. A survey of multiple models of the PRC’s defence budget estimates that Beijing spends 40% to 90% more than it announces in its public defence budget, which equates to approximately $330 billion–$450 billion in total defence spending for 2024. The consensus among experts is that the PRC’s publicly announced defence spending figure does not contain the entirety of PRC investment in its defence, so alternative approaches are used to assess the total value of this spending.
Developments in the Defence Industry. The PRC’s hypersonic missile technologies have significantly advanced during the past 20 years. Many PRC missile programs are comparable to other international top-tier producers. The PRC is the world’s top ship-producing nation by tonnage. It can produce a wide range of naval combatants, gas turbine and diesel engines, and shipboard weapons and electronic systems, making it nearly self-sufficient for all shipbuilding needs.
Arms Transfers. The PRC uses foreign suppliers to overcome limitations in its domestic production capabilities, particularly for helicopters and aircraft engines. As its aerospace industry improves over the next decade, the PRC will likely decrease its foreign acquisitions to maintain only an import relationship with foreign suppliers positioned to fill niche gaps in the PRC’s inventory quickly. As of 2023, the PRC is the fourth-largest arms supplier in the world and sells nearly every category of conventional military equipment, including unmanned aerial vehicles, man-portable air-defence systems (MANPADS), submarines, naval surface vessels, surface-to-air missile systems, fighter aircraft to customers worldwide.
SPECIAL TOPICS
Impacts of Corruption in the PLA. In 2023, a new wave of corruption-related investigations and removals of senior leaders may have disrupted the PLA’s progress toward stated 2027 modernisation goals. Between July and December 2023, 15 high-ranking military officers and defence industry executives were removed from their posts. Several leaders investigated or removed for corruption oversaw equipment development projects related to modernising China’s ground-based nuclear and conventional missiles. The most prominent removal was that of PRC Minister of National Defence Li Shangfu in late October. Li led the CMC Equipment Development Department from 2017 to 2022, where he would have signed off on all PLA weapons acquisitions.
Political Training in the PLA. The political work system and the political training featured within it have been central parts of the PLA since its founding as the party army of the CCP. A key feature of Xi Jinping’s leadership has been strengthening and revitalising political work and training in the PLA to “fight and win” wars and bolster political control over the military. Efforts to revitalise political work derive from Xi’s concerns regarding political loyalty and corruption in the armed forces.
PRC Views of Comprehensive National Power. For Beijing, “comprehensive national power” (CNP) represents a country’s overall measure of power actualised across multiple domains that it wields in the international system. More than just military strength, it encompasses a country’s full suite of economic, science and technology, diplomatic, political, cultural, natural, people, and other resources, as well as ideational ethos and international influence. The term dates back to at least the 1960s, but in the 1980s, as the PRC developed the Deng Xiaoping Theory, it adopted CNP to measure China’s overall development. The term CNP remains broadly used by PRC officials, strategists, and theorists. CNP is used as an internal measurement of development and a calibrated reference for competition between inimical governance systems—China’s socialist and the West’s capitalist systems. CNP is inexorably tied to military competition as, for the PRC, confrontation on the battlefield represents not just a contest between two countries’ military systems but a systemic confrontation based on the overall strength of each country.
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Summary Courtesy: DoD annual Report to USA Congress.
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