767: JAISH-E-MOHAMMED LAUNCHES “TUFAT AL-MUMINAT”: DIGITAL JIHAD FOR WOMEN’S RADICALISATION

 

Pakistan-based, UN-designated terror group Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) has launched an online jihadist training programme titled Tufat al-Muminat. The initiative targeting women serves as the foundation course for JeM’s newly announced female militant wing (Jamat ul-Muminat). The course is reportedly led by Sadiya and Samaira Azhar, sisters of JeM founder Masood Azhar, and Afreera Farooq, wife of Umar Farooq, one of the terrorists behind the April 2025 Pahalgam attack in Jammu and Kashmir.

 

According to news reports, the online sessions are scheduled to begin on 08 Nov 2025. It will be conducted for 40 minutes daily through live video platforms.​ A nominal fee of PKR 500 is being charged to each participant.  The sessions will likely focus on preaching extremist interpretations of Islam, emphasising women’s roles in jihad.

 

In the past, women played a minimal role in JeM’s activities. However, the development of a dedicated female wing and online training programs shows an increasing effort to involve women more actively. This is a significant change in JeM’s approach.  It seems JeM is taking cues from other groups like ISIS, Boko Haram, and Hamas, which have a history of recruiting women for combat and even suicide missions.

 

Digital Jihad

 

In the digital age, warfare has moved beyond physical battlefields, infiltrating the virtual realm where ideas spread faster than bullets. Digital jihad is also called “electronic jihad” or “e-jihad.” It is an online version of jihadist ideology and activities in the cyber domain. The internet, with its enormous, anonymous, and interlinked nature, is being used to disseminate extremist ideologies, attract believers, and form worldwide connections. Digital jihad is practised in the darkness of social media, encrypted applications, and AI-generated content. The process of converting extremism into a digital form is now one of the key factors influencing global terrorism.

 

Evolution of Jihad in the Digital Era. The shift from traditional insurgencies to digital jihad began in the late 1990s when extremist groups recognised the internet’s potential as both an ideological and operational tool. Al-Qaeda led this change, using basic websites for fatwas and recruitment videos after 9/11. As social media grew, this evolved into complex digital systems in which recruitment, propaganda, indoctrination, and training became borderless, efficient, and viral. By the 2010s, ISIS took it further by creating a “virtual caliphate.” Social media gave jihadist organisations—including ISIS and al-Qaeda—the opportunity to connect with a worldwide audience with minimal expenses. ISIS revolutionised digital jihad through its propaganda films, magazines (Dabiq and Rumiyah), published in multiple languages. These publications served as tools for ideological indoctrination. Recent advances include “AI jihad,” where Hamas, al-Qaeda, and ISIS use generative AI for deepfakes and memes.

 

Mechanisms of Digital Jihad. Digital jihad works on several overlapping functions: propaganda, recruitment, training, funding, and coordinating activities. The most obvious one is propaganda, which is conveyed through multimedia messages, videos, GIFs, and memes that praise martyrdom and foster a sense of belonging to the world object. Emotional and ideological vulnerabilities of isolated, susceptible youth are being targeted online for recruitment. Encrypted networks have become the preferred option for jihadists to communicate and plan. They can coordinate across continents anonymously.

 

Ideological Narratives and Online Radicalisation. The ideological axis of digital jihad blends traditional Islamic discourse with modern grievance narratives—claiming to defend the ummah (global Muslim community) against alleged Western aggression. Online preachers and influencers exploit religious symbolism to justify violence morally. Digital content idealises jihad as an empowerment or a commandment of god that builds on the feelings of alienation of most migrants and diasporic young people. This narrative warfare was institutionalised in the media jihad by ISIS, which re-packaged jihad as not only a moral imperative but as an identity of lifestyle.

 

The Role of Technology and AI in Digital Jihad. Emerging artificial intelligence-based technologies have expanded the reach of digital jihad. Extremist content is now more visible than ever before. The extremist echo chambers are self-perpetuating, bombarding people with extremist content. The jihadist groups are utilising video editing software, bot networks, and data encryption to disguise operations within legitimate cyber traffic. The deep web and dark web serve as the extremist underworld—used for secure communications, recruitment screening, and financial transfers via cryptocurrencies. Virtual environments now replace physical training camps, providing tactical and ideological grooming.

 

Countermeasures and Digital Counter-Jihad. So far, the global response to digital jihad has been two-pronged—technological solutions and Counter-ideology campaigns. Technology is being used to develop automated tools to remove extremist content from various platforms. Artificial intelligence is progressively able to identify terrorist “clusters,” connecting pages, posts, and users to map networks and eliminate them. Yet, these roadblocks put up by the authorities and tech companies are not foolproof solutions in themselves. Initiatives for the counter-jihad movements also include online deradicalisation campaigns and educational outreach programs.

 

Ethical, Legal, and Strategic Challenges. Balancing security and freedom of expression remains one of the most controversial issues in countering digital jihad. Since online monitoring prevents threats, it also threatens privacy and civil liberties. In addition to that, the definition of terrorist propaganda is somewhat subjective and can be used as a means to stifle legitimate dissent. Discrepancies in jurisdictional law also threaten international cooperation, as the definition of online extremism varies from country to country. This conflict between private rights and collective security makes it more challenging to regulate the internet.

 

Future Trajectory. Digital jihad is transitioning to decentralised networks of self-governing cells that use encrypted communications rather than a hierarchical command-and-control structure. Cyberspace has taken on the characteristics of the new caliphate—unconfined, unformed, and resilient ideologically. The rapid development of artificial intelligence, deepfakes, and virtual reality will encourage the use of these technologies by digital jihad for recruitment and psychological operations. Consequently, governments need to consider the internet as an ever-changing battlefield that requires constant, flexible, and cooperative strategies among all state and non-state actors.

 

Conclusion

“Digital jihad” refers to the use of digital technologies and cyberspace by extremist groups to further their agenda. Dealing with digital jihad requires finding a delicate balance between using technology and applying legal measures, without infringing on human rights. The victory over digital jihad will be achieved through the application of more technologies and also through combating the causes of radicalisation worldwide that globalisation has brought about.

 

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References: –

  1. India Today, “Pakistan terror hypocrisy exposed again: Jaish-e-Mohammed launches online jihad course for women in Islamabad”, 22 Sep 25. https://www.indiatoday.in/world/story/jaish-e-mohammed-online-course-launch-for-women-recruitment-pakistan-terror-masood-azhar-2806662-2025-10-22
  1. Tom O’Connor, “Generating jihad: How ISIS could use AI to plan its next attack”, Newsweek, 19m Sep 2025. https://www.newsweek.com/isis-ai-terrorism-al-qaeda-attack-2132143
  1. Soumya Awasthi, “Jihadi use of artificial intelligence: A growing threat in the digital age”, Observer Research Foundation, 18 Aug 2025. https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/jihadi-use-of-artificial-intelligence-a-growing-threat-in-the-digital-age
  1. Ben Makuch, “AI-Generated Extremism: How Terror Groups Exploit New Tech” The Guardian, 08 July 2024.
  1. Lakomy M, “In Mapping Digital Jihad: Understanding the Structure and Evolution of al-Qaeda’s Information Ecosystem on the Surface Web”, Perspectives on Terrorism, 18(2), 82–99, 2024.
  1. Siegel D, “AI jihad: Deciphering Hamas, Al-Qaeda and Islamic State’s generative AI digital arsenal”, Global Network on Extremism and Technology (GNET), 2024.
  1. Foreign Affairs, “The Cyber Caliphate Lives On”, Foreign Affairs, March 2024.
  1. Montasari R, “Analysing ethical, legal, technical and operational challenges of the application of machine learning in countering cyber terrorism”, (pp. 123–145), Springer, 2024.
  1. Siegel D & Chandra B, “The digital weaponry of radicalisation: AI and the recruitment nexus”, Global Network on Extremism and Technology (GNET), 2024.

766: THE “WOODPECKER” STRATEGY AND ITS RELEVANCE IN CONTEMPORARY WARFARE

 

The “Woodpecker” strategy, born in the crucible of Japan’s Sengoku period, is a striking example of tactical ingenuity: deception, provocation, and surprise combined to turn an opponent’s rigidity into a decisive liability. Attributed in many accounts to a strategist, Yamamoto Kansuke, the strategy is named for the woodpecker’s habit of tapping repeatedly at a single spot until an insect is flushed out. That simple image captures a rich operational logic: apply deliberate, repeated pressure at a chosen point to elicit a reaction, then exploit the enemy’s response. Although the original form of the tactic dates back to pre-modern warfare, its principles (probing, shaping, timed exploitation, and psychological manipulation) apply similarly to the multi-domain battlefields of the twenty-first century.

 

Woodpecker Strategy

Historical origins: Sengoku Context. The Sengoku period (mid-15th to early 17th century) was an era of near-constant conflict among feudal lords in Japan. Commanders who could outthink opponents often did more to secure victory than those who outgunned them. Yamamoto Kansuke, a figure known for both brilliance and mystery, devised the Woodpecker Strategy to break battle stalemates. Accounts of the Fourth Battle of Kawanakajima (1561) retain the clearest illustration: Kansuke allegedly conceived a plan in which a smaller, visible force would engage and harass the enemy upfront—deliberately provoking and frustrating them—while a second, hidden force manoeuvred to strike the enemy’s rear at the moment of disarray. The front force’s “pecking” was intended not to win a pitched fight but to shape enemy behaviour; the rear attack was timed to exploit that behaviour.

Mechanism and Tactical Essence. Operationally, the woodpecker approach is two-phased and interdependent. The combined effect leverages psychological pressure and physical encirclement, forcing the enemy into a reactive and vulnerable posture.

Provocation and Engagement at the Front. A compact, mobile unit—armed to harass rather than annihilate—applies repeated pressure: archery volleys, skirmishing, feigned withdrawals, or other measures that irritate and unsettle. The objective is to elicit a predictable response: an impatient assault, a redistribution of forces, a breakdown in formation, or a compelled withdrawal.

Surprise Rear Attack. A concealed reserve—often cavalry or mobile infantry in historical settings—performs a covert approach, ideally under cover of darkness or terrain, and strikes when the enemy is out of balance. The two axes produce a pincer effect: psychological pressure from the front and physical shock from the rear. Success depends on coordination, timing, and the enemy’s failure to detect or anticipate the concealed element.

Tactical Complexity and Challenges. The woodpecker strategy is elegant but perilous. It demands disciplined troops who can press an engagement without becoming decisively engaged themselves; it requires scouts, accurate intelligence, and mastery of terrain to enable stealthy movement; and it rests on precise timing so that the rear attack intersects the enemy’s moment of maximal vulnerability. The plan inherently gambles on maintaining secrecy. If the adversary uncovers the manoeuvre—through counterintelligence, better scouting, or sheer luck—the attacker faces a catastrophic reversal: isolated forward units can be overwhelmed, or the concealed force can be ambushed.

Legacy and Influence on Military Thought. The woodpecker strategy stands as a pioneering instance of integrated deception and multi-axis manoeuvring in pre-modern warfare. It laid the groundwork for later developments in operational art where misdirection, punishable feints, and pincer attacks became standard. It reflects an essential shift from mere physical confrontation to psychological warfare—manipulating enemy behaviour by provoking rash action and fracturing morale. The emphasis on coordination between units with distinct but complementary roles foreshadows modern combined arms doctrine.

 

Relevance in Contemporary Warfare.

Despite being devised centuries ago, the woodpecker strategy remains conceptually relevant. Modern battlefields are vastly different — technologically advanced, expanded into multi-domain arenas including cyber and space, and characterised by rapid information flow. Yet, its core principles resonate strongly in contemporary military operations. Today’s equivalent “pecks” can be kinetic or non-kinetic, and the domain palette is broader: land, sea, air, cyber, electromagnetic spectrum, and even cognitive/informational spaces.

Deception and Provocation. Modern militaries routinely employ deception operations to mislead adversaries, create false targets, and provoke premature or misdirected responses. Electronic warfare, cyber attacks, and psychological operations have become the new frontlines of provocation, echoing the woodpecker strategy’s intent to destabilise the enemy’s decision-making.

Multi-Directional and Multi-Domain Attacks. The principle of simultaneous pressure from multiple directions is central to manoeuvre warfare, special operations, and hybrid warfare. Instead of relying solely on land forces, today’s forces leverage synchronised actions across the land, air, sea, cyber, and space domains to overwhelm adversaries.

Operational Security and Intelligence. The failure of the woodpecker strategy due to the leak of intentions underscores the eternal importance of operational security. Modern forces deploy sophisticated counter-intelligence, electronic countermeasures, and misinformation to protect plans — necessity amplified by the speed of contemporary ISR capabilities.

Psychological Impact and Cognitive Effects. The cognitive warfare aspect of disrupting enemy command and control mirrors contemporary approaches targeting the enemy’s OODA loop (observe, orient, decide, act). By forcing quick, disorganised, or panic-induced actions, forces gain a tactical edge beyond mere firepower.

Practical Application: Modern Woodpecker Operation. Effective modern applications require three core tasks: identify the node whose disruption triggers cascading effects; design a mix of complementary pecks across modalities; and define clear exploitation triggers with protected reserves. Success indicators should be behavioural (force reallocations), systemic (logistic degradation), and cognitive (declining morale or decision paralysis). Equally important are exit criteria—signs that the tactic is being countered, that escalation thresholds have been approached, or that returns are diminishing. While the literal replication of the woodpecker strategy is unlikely in modern conflicts, its essence permeates many military concepts:-

    • Special Forces raids that strike behind enemy lines while conventional forces hold the front.
    • Cyber operations that disrupt enemy networks and command before kinetic strikes follow.
    • Ambushes, feints, and diversionary attacks that manipulate enemy movements and attention.
    • Combined services operations synchronise force application to create shock and awe.

Advantages and Enduring Utility. A woodpecker-style campaign offers notable benefits: economy of force, persistent intelligence through probing, psychological wear on the enemy, and the capacity to shape political and military thresholds without resorting immediately to all-out escalation. In asymmetric conflicts, weaker actors can impose costs and provoke overreactions; in high-intensity campaigns, shaping reduces the need for costly frontal assaults.

Risks and modern constraints. The technique is not without pitfalls. Predictability invites counters; prolonged attrition can sap resources and morale; non-kinetic attacks risk escalation or legal and ethical blowback—especially if civilian infrastructure is affected. Moreover, satellites, drones, and ubiquitous ISR make surprise harder to achieve, demanding ever more sophisticated deception and coordination.

 

Conclusion

The military woodpecker strategy, although a product of 16th-century Japan, continues to inform and inspire modern military theory and practice. The military woodpecker strategy epitomises the enduring genius required in warfare: the interplay of deception, timing, and psychological manipulation to unbalance and defeat the enemy. Understanding the woodpecker strategy enhances appreciation of military art’s timeless dimensions, bridging historical tactics and futuristic multi-domain operations. It reminds commanders that beyond force of arms, victory often belongs to those who best shape the battle’s cognitive and operational environment—precisely what the “woodpecker” sought to achieve centuries ago.

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References:-

  1. Adachi, Genichi, and Stephen Turnbull. The Battles of Kawanakajima: The Famous Duel Between Takeda Shingen and Uesugi Kenshin. London: Osprey Publishing, 2022.
  2. Chaplin, Danny. Sengoku Jidai: The Age of Warring States. Independently published, 2020.
  3. Conlan, Thomas D. State of War: The Violent Order of Fourteenth-Century Japan. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2003.
  4. Turnbull, Stephen. War in Japan, 1467–1615. Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2002.
  5. Weber, Till. The Samurai of the Sengoku Era. 2 vols. Translated by Alexander W. Bennett. Tokyo: Japan Publications, 2022.
  6. Holt, Thaddeus. The Deceivers: Allied Military Deception in the Second World War. New York: Scribner, 2004.
  7. Osinga, Frans P. B. Science, Strategy and War: The Strategic Theory of John Boyd. London: Routledge, 2007.
  8. George-Ion Toroi. Multi-Domain Deception – Contemporary Operational Requirement. Carol, I, National Defence University, 2024.​
  1. Pikner, J. Leveraging Multi-Domain Military Deception to Expose the Adversary. Military Review, U.S. Army University Press, March-April 2021.​
  2. Konyashin, Sergey. “Infiltration and Deception: How Russia Develops Hybrid Warfare Tactics.” Nexirs Journal, June 2025.​
  3. “Psychological Warfare Tactics: Historical Analysis and Modern Applications.” Psych Breakthrough Blog, 2024.​
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  6. Kautilya. Arthashastra. Translated by R. Shamasastry. Mysore: Government Press, 1915.

765: FROM SUPPORT TO DOMINANCE: EVOLUTION OF CHINA’S PLA AEROSPACE FORCE

 

In modern warfare, space has become the ultimate strategic high ground, where control over information and precision strikes can determine victory. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has transformed its aerospace capabilities from rudimentary support for ground operations in the mid-20th century to a sophisticated force poised for dominance. The establishment of the People’s Liberation Army Aerospace Force (PLAASF) on April 19, 2024, marks the culmination of this journey, shifting from fragmented, support-oriented systems to a centralised arm capable of offensive and defensive orbital operations. Under President Xi Jinping’s vision of a “world-class” military by 2049, the PLAASF integrates space-based command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR), launch infrastructure, and counterspace weapons. This evolution reflects China’s shift toward “informatised” warfare, where space assets enable joint operations across air, sea, land, and cyber domains. Drawing lessons from conflicts like the Russia-Ukraine war, where satellite disruptions proved decisive, Beijing aims for space superiority to safeguard its global interests, from the South China Sea to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). With control over 245+ military satellites and key launch sites, the PLAASF signals China’s ambition to reshape Indo-Pacific security and global power dynamics.

 

Origins and Rationale. China’s military space program began during the Cold War, initially as a symbol of national prestige. In 1956, the PLA’s missile program, spurred by Soviet assistance and Mao Zedong’s ambition to counter U.S. dominance, was housed under the Seventh Ministry of Machine Building. The 1960 launch of China’s first sounding rocket marked early progress, followed by Project 714 in 1967, a clandestine effort to send astronauts into orbit by 1973. The Cultural Revolution stalled these ambitions, but Deng Xiaoping’s 1980s reforms refocused the PLA on modernisation. The 1991 Gulf War, showcasing U.S. precision strikes via GPS-guided munitions, exposed PLA vulnerabilities and spurred the concept of “informatised local wars,” emphasising C4ISR to counter U.S. intervention, particularly over Taiwan.

The 1990s saw bureaucratic struggles, with space assets scattered across the PLA Air Force (PLAAF), Rocket Force (PLARF), General Armament Department, and General Staff Department. The 1999 Shenzhou program, though civilian in appearance, masked military intent, while the 2007 SC-19 anti-satellite (ASAT) test—a kinetic kill of a defunct satellite—demonstrated China’s counterspace resolve. Xi Jinping’s 2015 reforms created the Strategic Support Force (SSF) to consolidate space, cyber, and electronic warfare, but inefficiencies persisted due to overlaps in satellite control and missile warning systems. The SSF’s 2024 dissolution and the PLAASF’s creation under the Central Military Commission (CMC) addressed these issues, elevating space to a dedicated arm. Xi’s vision underscores space as vital for “multidomain operations,” enabling deterrence, power projection, and protection of overseas interests, marking a shift from prestige to warfighting.

 

Organisation and Structure.

The PLAASF, headquartered in Beijing’s Haidian District, reports directly to the CMC, bypassing theater commands for centralised control. Led by a corps deputy-grade commander (likely a lieutenant general) and a political commissar, it integrates the SSF’s Space Systems Department into specialised bureaus for launch, telemetry, tracking, and control (TT&C), and counterspace operations. With an estimated 100,000–150,000 personnel, it blends PLAAF veterans and SSF specialists across six corps-grade operational commands, including satellite control centres and launch facilities.

Key components include the Aerospace Engineering University, training engineers in satellite operations and ASAT tactics, and corps-grade Space Operations Bases for offensive and defensive missions, including ASAT coordination. The PLAASF interfaces with the Information Support Force for network-centric operations and resolves pre-2024 frictions, such as PLAAF-SSF radar overlaps, by centralising ballistic missile defence (BMD) cueing. Theater commands retain liaison officers for joint exercises, ensuring support for regional contingencies like Taiwan. The PLAASF’s CMC-centric design fosters rapid decision-making, mirroring U.S. Space Force models while prioritising Party oversight. Challenges remain, including integrating civilian dual-use assets like BeiDou and resolving PLAAF holdovers like space telescopes.

The Space Bases. The PLAASF’s infrastructure comprises four primary launch centers and a robust TT&C network, supporting 68 launches in 2024 (66 successful, deploying 260 payloads, 26% ISR-capable). Key facilities include:

    • Jiuquan Satellite Launch Center (Base 10). In Inner Mongolia’s Gobi Desert, operational since 1958, it handles Long March rockets for Yaogan reconnaissance satellites and Shenzhou crewed flights, supporting BMD tests.
    • Xichang Satellite Launch Center (Base 27). In Sichuan, it launches BeiDou navigation satellites into geosynchronous orbits, with upgrades for hypersonic tests.

Taiyuan Satellite Launch Center (Base 25). In Shaanxi, it focuses on polar orbits for meteorological and ELINT satellites, with new solid-fuel rocket pads for rapid ASAT deployments.

    • Wenchang Satellite Launch Center (Base 51). In Hainan, operational since 2016, it supports heavy-lift Long March 5 rockets for lunar missions and GEO assets like Queqiao relays.

Supporting these are TT&C bases,  Beijing Aerospace Control Center for mission oversight, Xi’an Satellite Control Center (Base 26) as backup, Luoyang’s Base 33 for metrology, and Lintong’s Base 37 (added 2023) for space domain awareness via phased-array radars. These hardened facilities ensure resilient constellations but face vulnerabilities like single-point tracking failures.

 

Capabilities and Arsenal

The PLAASF commands over 1,060 satellites, with 510+ ISR-capable, featuring optical, radar, and RF sensors for carrier detection and targeting. The BeiDou system, rivalling GPS, supports precision-guided munitions. The Yaogan series provides multispectral imaging, while Jianbing ELINT satellites map enemy emissions. Offensive capabilities include three co-orbital ASAT satellites for grappling or jamming and ground-based SC-19 missiles, coordinated with the PLARF. Jamming units, tested in 2023 South China Sea exercises, disrupt GPS and communication links. BMD systems integrate early-warning satellites with HQ-19 interceptors, cued by Base 37 radars. China’s global-leading launch cadence supports rapid constellation replenishment. Gaps include vulnerability to U.S. ASATs and limited deep-space operations, though 2024’s 260 payloads signal closing parity. Military-civil fusion accelerates innovation, with commercial entities enhancing launch and satellite capabilities.

 

Strategic Implications

The PLAASF strengthens China’s “active defence” doctrine, enabling “Taiwan by 2027” scenarios through space-enabled strikes and GPS denial, deterring U.S. intervention. It secures BRI assets, projecting power to regions like Djibouti. For adversaries, it escalates the space arms race, with ASAT debris risks prompting U.S. and allied investments in resilient constellations and space domain awareness. The PLAASF’s Party-centric structure risks rigidity in crises, but its centralised command enhances strike precision and information dominance. Globally, it challenges Western space norms, demanding diplomatic efforts to prevent conflict and ensure stability in a multipolar space order.

 

Conclusion

The PLAASF’s evolution from a support role to a strategic force underscores China’s ambition to dominate the orbital domain. By centralising command, professionalising space careers, and integrating launch, satellite, and counterspace capabilities, it positions China as a peer competitor to the U.S. in space. The PLAASF’s ability to conduct enabling and denial operations reshapes Indo-Pacific deterrence and global security. As it matures, its doctrine and signalling will determine whether it fosters stability or heightens escalation risks, necessitating cooperative norms to govern space behaviour.

 

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References:-

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