ORCHESTRATING AIR CAMPAIGN: THUMB RULES

 

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War is the most complex of human endeavours. It is baffling and intriguing. It is complex, demanding, and requires careful thought and cool execution.

 

The compelling task of the commander is to translate national war objectives into tactical plans at the operational level.

 

Four levels of war:-

    • Grand Strategic level.
    • Strategic level.
    • Operational level.
    • Tactical Level.

(As you go up the ladder, the ambiguity increases).

 

Mastery of the operational level strategy is a key to winning wars.

 

An air force inferior in numbers must fight better and smarter.

 

It is an art to identify the enemy’s Centre of Gravity (COG – a point where the enemy is vulnerable and where the application of force is most decisive).

 

Offensive Approach.

    • The initiative is retained.
    • Pressure is on the enemy.
    • War is taken to enemy territory.
    • All assets are used.
    • Yields positive results if successful.

 

Defensive Approach.

    • The initiative is with the enemy.
    • Some assets may lie idle.
    • At best yields neutral results.

 

Adopted approach

 

The approach to be adopted depends upon factors like political will, objectives, doctrinal guidance, own vis-à-vis enemy capability, and the force disparity (numerical and qualitative superiority are major factors).

 

Anticipate and predict enemy reactions and plans. Study the enemy psyche and categorise it (rational, irrational, fanatic, rigid, flexible, independent, innovative, determined etc.).

 

Enemy SWOT analysis and intelligence analysis are important to decide on the approach (Consider factors like Aircraft numbers and quality, weapons, training, network, combat support platforms, sensors, ability to absorb losses, vulnerabilities etc.).

 

A periodic review is required to decide on the continuation of the approach.

 

If enemy AD is strong – avoid it till you can punch holes in it and create blind zones.

 

If air combat capability is better than draw the enemy out.

 

Keep in mind

 

    • Air assets are always scarce – It is not possible to defend everything.

 

    • Scarce air resources are optimally utilised when shared and not kept idle on the ground – under command tendency should be avoided.

 

    • Scarce air resources cannot be everywhere and cannot precede every surface operation.

 

    • Operational commanders should stay away from tactical decisions – have faith in executors and concentrate on operational orchestration.

 

    • Air operations are conducted over a greater expanse of space and time as compared to surface operations.

 

    • Air power should not be seen as subordinate (supporting arm) to surface operations. The air element of surface forces should be used according to the tenets of the surface operations. Unambiguous and thorough doctrinal understating is essential.

 

    • It is difficult to predict the duration and intensity of war. The intensity of war generally depends on the value and interest of the side in what they are fighting for.

 

Planning considerations

 

    • Audacity does not lead to positive results every time – avoid the tendency to plunge into any and every fray.

 

    • The loss ratio is a function of the force ratio.

 

    • Concentration of forces, mass, numbers, weight of attack and force structure are important for inflicting prohibitive damage to the enemy.

 

    • Bad weather can be a spoilsport – choose the campaign/operational window carefully (it is also true for the enemy).

 

    • Fog of war, uncertainty in war and friction of war are realities to be dealt with.

 

    • An asset not used is an asset wasted – a sortie not flown is a sortie wasted. At the same time, a sortie saved is worth more than a sortie rashly flown.

 

    • War effort comes in surges and spurts. Accordingly, the approach could be to continuously engage in a war of attrition or to hit unexpectedly and wait.

 

    • Airpower can carry out parallel operations (campaigns). It is essential to decide the percentage of effort allotted to each campaign and to dynamically review it periodically depending upon the changing situation.

 

    • Deception (mystify and mislead) is very important to achieve surprise.

 

Air Superiority

 

It is a necessity. Air or Ground campaigns cannot succeed unless a certain degree of air superiority is achieved.

 

Air superiority by itself doesn’t guarantee victory.

 

Destroying the enemy aircraft is not the only way of achieving it.

 

Destroying enemy aircraft in the air is the most difficult and costly approach (it is easier to destroy them on the ground).

 

It can also be achieved by attacking the enemy bases – heavyweight of attack and revisits are required.

 

It can be achieved by targeting resources like fuel, and human resources (crew and pilots).

 

It can also be achieved by attacking production houses and supply chains.

 

Enemy command and control centres are also possible targets towards this aim.

 

Interdiction / Battlefield Strikes

 

Interdiction is as old and important as war itself – Airpower has added a new dimension to it.

 

It is a powerful, important and effective tool in the hands of commanders and planners.

 

Airpower should not be seen as airborne artillery – Airpower should generally be used for targets beyond the range of ground weapons (artillery).

 

Art is to decide what to and where to interdict between the source and the destination.

 

    • Distant Interdiction – most decisive but effective with a time lag,
    • Intermediate Interdiction – effective with a lesser time lag.
    • Close Interdiction – effective immediately and necessary during crises.

 

Choice of the platform depends on the degree of air control and enemy air defence capability and weapons – the vulnerability of fixed-wing combat support aircraft, helicopters and unmanned platforms (Drones) is high in contested airspace.

 

Suggestions and value additions are most welcome

 

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References and credits

The Air Campaign: Planning for Combat by John A Warden III, 1988, National Defense University Press, Washington DC.

To all the online sites and channels.

 

Disclaimer:

Information and data included in the blog are for educational & non-commercial purposes only and have been carefully adapted, excerpted, or edited from sources deemed reliable and accurate. All copyrighted material belongs to respective owners and is provided only for purposes of wider dissemination.