Tag: strategic coercion

Posted on

756: HYBRID WAR IN THE BALTICS: AT RISK – CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE

 

Article Published in the Oct 25 Issue of The News Analytics Journal.

 

 

Hybrid operations, unlike traditional warfare, bridge martial coercion with non-military measures like sabotage, cyberattack, disinformation, interference in elections, energy blackmail, and weaponised migration. These processes are intentionally vague, cheap but high-impact, allowing state / non-state actors to destabilise their competitors without crossing transparent thresholds.

The Russian hybrid war strategy has been a security concern for the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. They are improperly exposed to geography, population, and history relative to Russia. But the danger does not end there in the Baltics: Poland, Finland, and Germany are also at risk from shared energy and digital infrastructure, political interdependence, and disinformation.

Critical infrastructure, notably submarine cables, energy supplies, and digital networks, has also been a key target. With an assault upon such an asset requiring minimal effort but with the ripple effect containing security, economic, and psychological consequences, at least 11 North and Baltic Sea underwater cables have been severed since 2023, both demonstrating the technical possibility and the deniable nature of such an act. This article examines hybrid war strategy across the Baltic states, quantifying regional resiliency and defining policy measures to be taken in defence of their infrastructure.

 

 

Hybrid Threats and Activities

Hybrid war threatens Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania seriously, attacking the cohesion of society, infrastructure, and democratic procedures using methods of sabotage, cyberattacks, disinformation, and disruptions of energy supplies. These are intended to destabilise the Baltic States without triggering traditional war, exploiting vulnerabilities in linked systems.

Information Warfare and Propaganda. Disinformation works extremely well in hybrid warfare, often used through AI-generated content, deepfakes, and tailored social media campaigns on Telegram, TikTok, and local networks. All are designed to produce narratives around specific strategic interests, and linguistic or cultural minorities are the target to be manipulated into divisions. For example, messages can utilise themes of discrimination, nostalgia for the past, or suspicion of international coalition-building. Cultural projects, including patronage of institutions that advance other narratives, can build dual information spaces that undermine social cohesion. Classic cases such as the 2003 Lithuanian presidential foreign-linked funding scandal illustrate how external actors exploit political weaknesses. Current disinformation operations are more likely to derogate support for active conflicts, destabilise international partnership trust, and amplify societal fault lines.

Subversion and Sabotage. Low-tech sabotage can be thoroughly debilitating to social cohesion and infrastructure. For example, the 2024 arson assault on a Vilnius storage facility disclosed weakness in key logistics networks. Likewise, the demolition of historic monuments across regions has been utilised as a means of stirring ethnic or cultural tensions. Deployment of incendiary devices transported through logistics networks in attacks also demonstrates the capabilities for covert disruption. Attacks on key infrastructure, e.g., submarine cables carrying transatlantic communications, financial transactions, and military communications, are conventionally attributed to an accident but cause concern about intentional sabotage. These attacks highlight the asymmetric benefits pursued through precision disruption, taking advantage of vulnerabilities in interdependent systems.

Cyberattacks. Cyber war is a key component of a hybrid strategy, and organisations often conduct distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks on government buildings, energy organisations, and public services. For instance, in 2022, a cyberattack on a Baltic energy organisation disconnected thousands of customers’ services. In showpiece events, as for the 2023 Vilnius NATO Summit, cyberattacks were conducted on public websites and ministries to cause embarrassment and instability.

Espionage. Espionage is used to support these activities, with nationals being said to be recruited to collect intelligence or conduct minor sabotage operations. These activities are intended to erode confidence and destabilise institutions by taking advantage of insider access or local dissatisfaction.

Energy Security Risks. Energy infrastructure is the main target in hybrid warfare as well, and physical and cyberattacks are employed to discredit confidence in alternative energy sources. Diversification policies like Baltic connection to the EU power grid in 2024 or construction of LNG terminals and pipelines have mitigated these risks. Nevertheless, ongoing attacks on critical infrastructure are employed to point towards the long-term problem of safeguarding energy networks against hybrid methods.

Organised Migration. Organised waves of migration, such as the 2021 EU border crisis, demonstrate that humanitarian crises can be manipulated for strategic motives. Migrants from war-torn areas were redirected to border areas, swamping indigenous governments and challenging regional security responses. Such crises are intended to challenge global coalitions and politicise public discussion of migration and security, exerting pressure on governments and societies.

Military Intimidation and Amplification of Support for Hybrid Operations. A display of military strength in strategic regions can serve to enhance hybrid strategies by providing the context of a credible threat. Mass movements, mimicking rapid penetrations into extensive areas of terrain or clandestine activities in border regions, increase tensions and augment the impact of clandestine operations. They capitalise on geographical proximity and cultural ties to vulnerable areas, thereby enhancing the perceived threat of escalation.

Election Interference. Election interference is a popular hybrid method that employs cyberattacks, the leakage of sensitive information, and disinformation as tools to influence public opinion. Social media mobilisation campaigns predicated on the amplification of controversial issues—whether nationalist feelings or ethnic grievances—can influence closely fought elections. They seek to de-legitimise the democratic institutions and undermine those governments amenable to confronting strategic interests.

 

 

Preparedness and Reactions of the Baltic States

Despite the seriousness of the threat, the Baltic States have largely been resilient. They have come a long way in countering such vulnerabilities with modernisation, social integration, and neighbourhood cooperation. Investments in energy diversification, for instance, Lithuania’s terminal for liquefied natural gas and Baltic disconnection of old energy grids in 2024, have been curtailing reliance on the outside world. Nevertheless, critical infrastructure such as underwater cables, energy networks, and democratic systems is an attractive target for low-cost, deniable assaults.

Societal and Institutional Resilience. The NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE) is hosted by Estonia. Cyber defence and information warfare coordination are instead functions of Lithuania’s National Cyber Security Centre and Latvia’s Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence. Civil defence institutions—such as Estonia’s 15,000-strong National Guard—facilitate rapid mobilisation in times of crisis.

Energy Independence. Integration of the Baltic States’ power grid with European grids, the Świnoujście terminal in Poland, and the Klaipėda LNG terminal are achievements of energy security. These steps limit Moscow’s influence and bolster NATO’s strategic depth.

Integration of Russian speakers. Rights of citizenship have been granted, investments made in learning the Russian language, and the recognition of cultural identities. These steps reduce alienation, but existing tensions between policies of integration and nationalist explanations that emphasise linguistic homogeneity.

Interagency Coordination. Interagency coordination is weak. Border control, crisis management, and intelligence exchange often do not operate in a coordinated manner. Latvia’s border guards, for example, have been criticised compared to more advanced Estonian and Nordic counterparts. NATO and American surveillance capabilities compensate to some extent, but reform at the national level remains to be accomplished.

 

 

Strengthening Baltic Defences against Hybrid Threats

Strengthening Baltic defences against hybrid threats involves building inclusive integration, establishing a Comprehensive Resilience Ecosystem (CORE), protecting critical infrastructure, modernising electricity laws, enhancing transparency, and strengthening regional and international cooperation. The following are recommendations:

Facilitate Inclusive Integration. Enlarge programmes to provide equal civic, economic, and political opportunities to cultural and language minorities to build national unity in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.

Envision a Comprehensive Resilience Ecosystem (CORE). Design an integrated system among the defence, cybersecurity, energy, and communications sectors to develop national resilience in the context of hybrid threats, tailored to Baltic priorities and imperatives.

Guard Critical Infrastructure. Prioritise the protection of submarine communications cables and offshore energy installations, taking advantage of regional cooperation in protecting these critical networks.

Modernise Legal Frameworks. Encourage the modernisation of international treaties, such as the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), to counter hybrid threats to maritime and critical infrastructure, with the Baltic States coordinating regional action.

Increase Transparency in Deployments. Clearly inform Baltic citizens of regional defence measures to reassure them while dissuading potential aggressors, highlighting national sovereignty.

Upgrade Specialised Forces. Upgrade the Baltic special forces and civilian defence units with assistance from premier intelligence and surveillance capabilities in cooperation with allied countries.

Upgrade Regional Exercises. Regularly conduct exercises such as BALTOPS and Baltic Sentry, which include cyber, maritime, and information warfare exercises, to attain greater readiness and interoperability of the Baltic forces.

Launch Multilingual Campaigns. Develop multiple-language communication strategies to address different communities, counter fake information, and foster social cohesion across Baltic communities.

Enhance Monitoring and Reaction. Collaborate with national cyber units and regional allies to track disinformation in real-time, quickly discredit fakes, and possess a Baltic-led reaction.

Enhance Intelligence Sharing. Enhance Baltic States and European and Indo-Pacific partner cooperation to enhance early warning and reaction to hybrid threats.

Advance Global Norms. Advance global norms to safeguard crucial infrastructure such as submarine cables and cyberspace, and make the Baltic States leaders in securing the global commons.

 

Conclusion

Defending Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania against hybrid war is not a regional security problem, but ensuring democratic nations and preserving resilience in a conflict-filled environment that insinuates informational, digital, and physical space. By investing in societal cohesion, infrastructure security, and regional cooperation, the Baltic States can put the solution to hybrid threats and ensure long-term stability.

 

Please Add Value to the write-up with your views on the subject.

 

1879
Default rating

Please give a thumbs up if you  like The Post?

 

For regular updates, please register your email here:-

Subscribe

 

 

References and credits

To all the online sites and channels.

Pics Courtesy: Internet

Disclaimer:

Information and data included in the blog are for educational & non-commercial purposes only and have been carefully adapted, excerpted, or edited from reliable and accurate sources. All copyrighted material belongs to respective owners and is provided only for wider dissemination.

 

 

References:-

  1. Financial Times, “Russia’s Hybrid Playbook Targets NATO’s Weak Spots”, Dec 2024.
  2. Financial Times, “Why Underwater Cables in the Baltic Sea Are Vital and Vulnerable”, Jun 2025.
  3. Reuters, “Baltic Governments Strengthen Cyber Defence Amid Hybrid Threats”, Apr 2025.
  4. Chivvis C. S, “Understanding Russian Hybrid Warfare and What Can Be Done About It”, Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2017.
  5. European Council on Foreign Relations, “Russian Influence and Hybrid Strategies in the Baltic Sea Region”, Policy Brief, 2023.
  6. Kasekamp A, “Baltic Security Strategy Report”, Tallinn: International Centre for Defence and Security (ICDS), 2019.
  7. Åtland K, “Russia’s Hybrid Warfare and the Baltic States: An Assessment of Threats and Responses”, Journal of Slavic Military Studies, 36(2), 123–145, 2023.
  8. Bērziņa I, “The Baltic States’ Response to Russian Hybrid Threats”, Defence Studies, 22(3), 345–367, 2022.
  9. Berzins J, “The Baltic Security Dilemma: Hybrid Threats and NATO’s Response”, Riga: Latvian Institute of International Affairs, 2024.
  10. Clark, D. & Hakala, E, “Submarine Cable Security in the Baltic Sea: Vulnerabilities and NATO’s Role”, NATO Review, 15(4), 1–12, 2023.
  11. Galeotti M, “Hybrid War and Little Green Men: How It Works and How to Counter It,” The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, 29(3), 401–423, 2016.
  12. Kofman M. & Rojansky M, “Russia’s Hybrid Warfare Toolkit: Lessons from the Baltics and Ukraine”, Foreign Affairs, 102(5), 78–90, 2023.
  13. Pynnöniemi K. & Saari S, “Russia’s Information Warfare in the Baltic States: Actors, Tools, and Impacts”, Helsinki: Finnish Institute of International Affairs, 2022.airs, 2022.

 

 

Posted on

559: CYBER POSTURING AND CYBER STRATEGIC COERCION

 

 

My article published on the Indus International Research Foundation Website on 16 Dec 24

 

In the 21st century, the digital realm has become an essential arena for national power and international influence. Among the most potent strategies in cyberspace are cyber posturing and cyber strategic coercion. These techniques, though related, serve distinct purposes in the broader context of geopolitical competition. Cyber posturing is the demonstration of cyber capabilities to deter or influence adversaries. In contrast, cyber strategic coercion uses cyber tools to compel an adversary to change behaviour, often causing economic, social, or political disruption.

 

Cyber Posturing: Signalling Strength and Intent

 

Cyber posturing refers to the strategic actions and signals a country, organisation, or actor sends regarding its capabilities, intentions, and readiness in cyber security. It can involve various activities, from public statements and demonstrations of cyber capabilities to developing and deploying advanced cyber tools. Cyber posturing typically aims to achieve multiple objectives, such as deterrence, signalling intent, or shaping perceptions among adversaries and allies.

 

Defining Cyber Posturing. Cyber posturing refers to a state or actor’s strategic actions to protect its cyber capabilities, either in preparation for conflict or as a demonstration of power. Just as a nation might showcase its military hardware or nuclear arsenal during tension, cyber posturing involves actions or public signals designed to communicate resolve, strength, or deterrence in the digital domain. Cyber posturing includes various activities, from showcasing offensive cyber tools in public forums to conducting limited cyber operations to signal resolve. It can be overt—such as publicly revealing cyber capabilities—and covert, involving more subtle actions meant to project power without confrontation. According to Cyber security expert Herbert Lin, cyber posturing is a form of “strategic ambiguity,” where a state’s true capabilities and intentions are not fully clear, keeping adversaries on edge and uncertain of the consequences of escalation. This uncertainty can help maintain a balance of power, as adversaries may be deterred from acting out of fear of unknown retaliation.

 

Purposes of Cyber Posturing.  Cyber posturing is often difficult to measure directly because it involves ambiguity and strategic ambiguity; the true intent behind cyber actions can be hard to decipher, creating uncertainty among adversaries and possibly preventing miscalculations.

 

      • Deterrence. The primary goal of cyber posturing is to deter adversaries by demonstrating a credible cyber retaliation capability. For example, the United States National Cyber Strategy emphasises the importance of using cyber capabilities to defend its national interests and to deter hostile cyber actors. U.S. actions, such as publicly attributing cyber attacks to foreign adversaries, are part of a broader cyber posturing strategy to make clear that cyber aggression will provoke a significant response. A nation or group may seek to deter potential adversaries from attacking or engaging in malicious cyber activities by demonstrating advanced cyber capabilities. The idea is to make the cost of an attack seem higher than any potential benefit, much like nuclear deterrence during the Cold War.

 

      • Signalling Capability. By demonstrating advanced cyber capabilities, countries signal their technical prowess and ability to shape international norms. Nations may engage in cyber posturing to align themselves with global cyber security standards, shaping the perception of their role in international cyber governance. Countries might use cyber posturing to signal their strength or preparedness in the cyber domain. This can include publicising or testing offensive cyber tools or defending against high-profile attacks to showcase resilience.

 

      • Coercion or Influence. A nation may use cyber means to coerce or influence another country through direct attacks or create an impression of vulnerability that pressures the other side to act in a certain way. This could involve denial-of-service attacks, data breaches, or other disruptive cyber actions.

 

      • Demonstration of Intent. By engaging in cyber posturing, actors might communicate specific geopolitical intentions. For example, if a country wants to demonstrate support for an ally, it may engage in cyber defence collaboration or publicly disclose its cyber capabilities.

 

      • Cyber Warfare Preparation. Nations may posture in cyberspace to prepare for future cyber warfare, either to gain an advantage or to ensure readiness in a cyber conflict.

 

Examples of Cyber Posturing. Russia has frequently engaged in cyber posturing to reinforce its global influence and project power over adversaries. The 2007 cyber attack on Estonia disrupted government and banking operations and is one of the earliest instances of cyber posturing. Though Russia denied involvement, the attack sent a clear message about the power of cyber operations. David S. Alberts, a U.S. defence strategist, noted that the attack illustrated how cyber operations could be used to “exhibit the coercive power of digital tools” without resorting to kinetic military force. China has also engaged in cyber posturing, particularly in the South China Sea, to project its military capabilities and deter other nations from challenging territorial claims. Chinese cyber activities, such as the alleged theft of intellectual property from foreign companies, demonstrate cyber prowess meant to deter international interference.

 

Cyber Strategic Coercion: The Power to Influence Behaviour

 

While cyber posturing is about signalling strength, cyber strategic coercion involves using cyber tools to directly influence an adversary’s behaviour, often through the threat or execution of disruptive cyber actions. In this context, coercion is aimed at forcing an adversary to change its political, military, or economic behaviour, usually in the face of an ongoing crisis or negotiation. This form of coercion can be employed in various ways, from targeted cyberattacks that disrupt infrastructure or cause economic damage to more subtle tactics such as cyber espionage or manipulating public perception through disinformation campaigns.

 

Defining Cyber Strategic Coercion. Cyber strategic coercion operates on the principle of using threats, punishment, or the disruption of an adversary’s infrastructure to force a change in its behaviour. This is often done through cyber attacks that disrupt critical systems, steal sensitive information, or manipulate public perception. Thomas Rid, a leading scholar on cyber security, argues that cyber coercion is effective when it exploits the adversary’s vulnerabilities, pushing them into a position where they either concede to demands or risk escalating the conflict.

 

Methods of Cyber Strategic Coercion. Cyber attacks that cripple a nation’s economy or infrastructure are a potent form of coercion. Denial of Service (DoS) and ransomware attacks often damage the adversary economically, forcing them to the negotiating table. One of the most notable examples is the WannaCry ransomware attack in 2017, attributed to North Korea, which crippled hospitals, businesses, and government agencies globally. Cyber strategic coercion can also disrupt political processes. The most well-known instance of this was Russia’s interference in the 2016 U.S. presidential election, which involved cyber attacks, disinformation campaigns, and the hacking of political parties. The attack on the U.S. political system aimed to destabilise public confidence in the electoral process and influence the election outcome, signalling a new form of cyber-enabled strategic coercion.

 

Examples of Cyber Strategic Coercion. Russia has employed cyber strategic coercion in its ongoing conflict with Ukraine. This includes cyberattacks aimed at destabilising the Ukrainian government, such as the 2015 and 2016 attacks on Ukraine’s power grid. These attacks were designed not only to cause direct harm but also to demonstrate Russia’s ability to disrupt critical infrastructure, coercing Ukraine to comply with Russian geopolitical goals. Iran has used cyberattacks as a form of strategic coercion, particularly against the West. In 2012, Iran’s Cyber Army launched a massive distributed denial of service (DDoS) campaign against Saudi Aramco, the state-owned oil company of Saudi Arabia, causing significant disruption. This attack, part of a broader cyber deterrence strategy, was seen as a retaliatory move following the imposition of international sanctions on Iran.  North Korea has increasingly used cyberattacks to finance its regime, with operations such as the Bangladesh Bank cyber heist in 2016, which netted North Korean hackers over $81 million. This type of cyber strategic coercion is not just about inflicting damage on adversaries but also about coercing economic change by undermining the financial infrastructure of global institutions.

 

Key Elements of Cyber Strategic Coercion

 

      • Threats and Demonstrations of Capability. States or actors may use cyber operations to demonstrate their ability to inflict significant damage without using traditional military force. This can include publicising capabilities or engaging in limited cyber-attacks meant to signal intent and influence adversaries’ decision-making. For example, a country might conduct a cyberattack against a minor target to send a message about its capabilities, thus deterring an adversary from escalating a conflict or behaving in a manner the attacker disapproves of.

 

      • Disruption and Denial. Cyber strategic coercion can disrupt critical infrastructure or services, creating economic or social pressure on a target. For instance, a nation might use a cyberattack to disrupt transportation, energy grids, or financial institutions, forcing an adversary to negotiate or comply with demands. A notable example of this tactic is the 2007 cyberattacks on Estonia, which disrupted government and banking services, ostensibly responding to a political dispute.

 

      • Economic and Political Leverage. Cyber operations can also be used to influence the political or economic landscape of a nation. Cyber actors can weaken the target’s internal stability or manipulate public opinion by compromising data, spreading disinformation, or interfering in political processes. For example, the use of disinformation campaigns, such as those seen during the 2016 U.S. presidential election, can be considered a form of cyber coercion, aiming to sway public opinion or disrupt the political process in a way that benefits the actor behind the campaign.

 

      • Coercive Diplomacy. Cyber operations can be used to exert pressure in diplomatic negotiations. By threatening or carrying out cyberattacks, an actor can force a country to the table or push for concessions. This form of coercion often leverages the uncertainty surrounding the attribution of cyberattacks to pressure adversaries into compliance without needing to escalate to kinetic warfare.

 

      • Limited Engagement and Escalation Control. Unlike traditional military force, cyberattacks are often more ambiguous in attribution, allowing states to engage in coercion while maintaining a level of plausible deniability. This provides the attacker with the ability to escalate or de-escalate as needed. This ambiguity can be advantageous for coercion, as it leaves the targeted state uncertain about the full scale of potential retaliation, which might lead them to make concessions to avoid further escalation.

 

      • Challenges and Considerations. One of the critical challenges in cyber strategic coercion is the difficulty of attributing attacks to specific actors. This ambiguity can complicate retaliatory measures, but it also means that the target may need help to assess the nature or scale of the threat entirely. While cyber coercion is often seen as a way to avoid full-scale military conflict, it still carries the risk of escalating tensions. A cyberattack might provoke a traditional military response or lead to unforeseen consequences, making it a double-edged sword. Cyber coercion can also test the limits of international law and norms. Many international agreements and conventions were written before the rise of cyber capabilities and the line.

 

Analysis: The Role of Cyber Warfare in Modern Geopolitics. Both cyber posturing and cyber strategic coercion have reshaped the nature of conflict and statecraft in the digital age. While the physical world constrains traditional warfare, cyber operations have no such boundaries, making it easier for states to influence global power dynamics. Cyberattacks are faster, cheaper, and often more ambiguous than traditional military operations, providing states with new tools for shaping international relations. The strategic ambiguity inherent in cyber operations—where attribution is usually unclear—gives states an advantage in using cyber posturing and coercion. The lack of clear attribution makes it difficult for adversaries to respond proportionally, potentially leading to heightened tensions and escalation risks. However, this very ambiguity also complicates the enforcement of international norms and laws governing cyber warfare. George Washington University’s Bruce Schneier states, “Cyber weapons exist in a grey zone where international law and traditional military rules do not apply with clarity.” This uncertainty will likely persist as cyber operations evolve, posing challenges to the global order.

 

Conclusion. Cyber posturing and cyber strategic coercion represent a new frontier in geopolitical power projection. By using the digital realm to signal strength or coerce adversaries, states can achieve their objectives without resorting to traditional forms of warfare. As demonstrated by the actions of nations like Russia, Iran, and North Korea, cyber operations have become integral tools in the arsenal of modern statecraft. Cyber posturing and strategic coercion are powerful tools for statecraft, enabling actors to achieve their geopolitical objectives through non-kinetic means. However, it requires careful calculation, as it can lead to unintended escalation or miscalculation due to the ambiguity and complexity of the cyber domain. The growing reliance on cyber tools for coercion highlights the need for robust international agreements on cyber conduct. As the world becomes increasingly interconnected, it is clear that the next stage in warfare will not only be fought on land, air, or sea but also in the cyber domain.

 

Your valuable comments are most welcome.

 

1879
Default rating

Please give a thumbs up if you  like The Post?

 

Link to the paper on the website:

Cyber Posturing And Cyber Strategic Coercion (Air Marshal Anil Khosla)

 

 

For regular updates, please register your email here:-

Subscribe

 

 

References and credits

To all the online sites and channels.

References:-

  1. Lin, H, “Cybersecurity and Cyberwar: What Everyone Needs to Know”, Oxford University Press, 2020.
  1. Rid, T, “Cyber War Will Not Take Place”, Oxford University Press, 2013.
  1. Schneier, B, “Data and Goliath: The Hidden Battles to Collect Your Data and Control Your World”, W. W. Norton & Company, 2015.
  1. Alberts, D. S, “The Influence of Information on Military Operations”, Journal of Strategic Studies, 2008.
  1. Chon, G, “North Korea’s Cyber Heists and the Global Financial System.” The Financial Times, 2016.
  1. Gartenstein-Ross, D, “Iran’s Cyber Strategy: A Framework for Analysis.” International Security Program, The Atlantic Council, 2014.
  1. Mueller, R, “Report on Russian Interference in the 2016 Presidential Election”. United States Department of Justice, 2019.
  1. FBI. “WannaCry Ransomware.” Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2017.

Disclaimer:

Information and data included in the blog are for educational & non-commercial purposes only and have been carefully adapted, excerpted, or edited from reliable and accurate sources. All copyrighted material belongs to respective owners and is provided only for wider dissemination.

English हिंदी