Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) is an independent international institute researching conflict, armaments, arms control, and disarmament. Established in 1966, SIPRI provides data, analysis and recommendations, based on open sources, to policymakers, researchers, media and the interested public. Based in Stockholm, SIPRI is regularly ranked among the most respected think tanks worldwide.
SIPRI publishes a yearbook recognised as an authoritative source for policymakers, researchers, and the public. The 56th edition of the SIPRI Yearbook 2025, published recently, provides a comprehensive overview of global developments in armaments, disarmament, and international security for 2024.
Key Findings
Global Security. Global security continued to decline in 2024, marked by major armed conflicts in regions such as Gaza, Myanmar, Sudan, and Ukraine. These conflicts contributed to heightened geopolitical tensions and increased military activities worldwide.
Military Expenditure. Global military spending reached an all-time high in 2024, marking the ninth consecutive year of increases. Ongoing conflicts like the Russia-Ukraine war and geopolitical tensions drove this rise.
Armed Conflicts and Conflict Management. The Yearbook covers global and regional developments in armed conflicts, peace processes, and peace operations. Specific focus areas include the role of Russian private military and security companies, food insecurity, and climate-related peace and security risks in Yemen. Tensions between India and Pakistan escalated into a brief armed conflict in early 2025, highlighting ongoing regional instability.
Arms Production and Trade. International arms transfers and production saw significant developments, influenced by the Russia-Ukraine war and geopolitical rivalries. The Yearbook notes the continued dominance of major arms suppliers like the United States, Russia, France, Germany, and China.
Emerging Technologies and Security The Yearbook examines the international governance of artificial intelligence, cyberspace, and space security, with a focus on autonomous weapon systems. Developments in dual-use and arms trade controls were noted, including updates to the Arms Trade Treaty and multilateral arms embargoes.
Environmental and Humanitarian Concerns. The report highlights the impact of ecological imbalances and climate-related risks, noting that 2023 was the hottest year in 174 years. These factors exacerbate security challenges, particularly in conflict-affected regions like Yemen.
Nuclear Weapons and Risks
All nine nuclear-armed states (the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France, China, India, Pakistan, North Korea, and Israel) continued modernising their nuclear arsenals, with some expanding their stockpiles.
The global inventory of nuclear warheads is estimated at approximately 12,121, with 9,585 in military stockpiles for potential use. Around 3,904 warheads are deployed on missiles and aircraft, a slight increase from 2023.
China’s nuclear arsenal grew significantly, from 410 warheads in January 2023 to 500 in January 2024, the fastest expansion among nuclear-armed states. For the first time, China is believed to have some warheads on high operational alert during peacetime.
India expanded its nuclear arsenal to 172 warheads in 2024, surpassing Pakistan (170 warheads) for the first time. Both countries continued developing new delivery systems, with India focusing on longer-range weapons to target China.
North Korea is estimated to have around 50 assembled warheads, with the potential to produce up to 90, and conducted tests of nuclear-capable missiles in 2023.
The decline in global nuclear warhead numbers has slowed, with operational warheads increasing due to modernisation and expansion programs, signalling a potential new arms race.
Arms Control and Non-Proliferation.
Nuclear arms control efforts faced challenges, with limited progress in dialogues involving China, Russia, and the United States. Concerns were raised about Iran’s nuclear program and attacks on Ukrainian nuclear power plants.
Conventional arms control weakened, with the collapse of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe and the proliferation of explosive weapons in conflicts like Russia-Ukraine and Israel-Hamas.
Chemical and biological security threats were addressed, including investigations into alleged weapon use and updates to international legal frameworks.
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My Article published on “The EurasianTimes” website on 17 Jun 25.
On June 13, 2025, Israel launched Operation Rising Lion, a bold and sophisticated military campaign targeting Iran’s nuclear facilities, missile bases, and key military personnel. The operation, which struck sites like Natanz, Fordow, and Arak, and killed high-ranking figures such as IRGC Commander-in-Chief Hossein Salami, was a direct application of the Begin Doctrine—Israel’s strategic policy of pre-emptively denying adversaries the ability to acquire nuclear weapons. Named after Prime Minister Menachem Begin, who authorised the 1981 strike on Iraq’s Osirak reactor, the doctrine has shaped Israel’s approach to regional threats for over four decades. This article examines Operation Rising Lion as a continuation of the Begin Doctrine, tracing its evolution from Osirak to Natanz, analysing its strategic execution, and exploring its implications for Israel’s security and regional stability.
The Begin Doctrine
The Begin Doctrine is a cornerstone of Israeli strategic policy, centered on the pre-emptive prevention of adversaries, particularly in the Middle East, from acquiring nuclear weapons that could pose an existential threat to Israel. Named after former Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin, the doctrine emerged following Israel’s airstrike on Iraq’s Osirak nuclear reactor on June 7, 1981, known as Operation Opera. It reflects Israel’s commitment to ensuring its survival in a region surrounded by hostile states, some of which have historically pursued nuclear capabilities.
Key Principles of the Begin Doctrine include the following:-
Pre-emptive Action. Israel reserves the right to use military force to prevent any hostile state or non-state actor from developing nuclear weapons.
Existential Threat Mitigation. The doctrine prioritises neutralising capabilities that could enable adversaries to produce weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), notably nuclear weapons.
Unilateral Action. Israel will act independently if necessary, even without international approval or coordination, to safeguard its security.
Deterrence and Regional Dominance. By demonstrating its willingness and ability to strike pre-emptively, Israel reinforces its military superiority and deters adversaries. Historical Context and Application.
Historical Precedents: Osirak and Orchard
Operation Opera (1981). On June 7, 1981, eight Israeli F-16s, escorted by F-15s, flew 1,100 kilometers to destroy Iraq’s Osirak reactor, a French-built facility suspected of producing plutonium for nuclear weapons. The strike was meticulously planned, relying on intelligence from Mossad and defectors. Despite international outrage, including a UN Security Council resolution condemning Israel, the operation delayed Iraq’s nuclear program significantly. It established the Begin Doctrine as a proactive strategy, emphasising Israel’s willingness to act alone to ensure its survival.
Operation Orchard (2007). On September 6, 2007, Israel struck Syria’s Al-Kibar nuclear reactor in Deir ez-Zor, believed to be a North Korean-designed plutonium facility. The operation, kept secret for months, involved precision airstrikes by F-16s and F-15s, supported by cyberwarfare and Mossad intelligence. Unlike Osirak, Orchard faced minimal international backlash, partly due to Syria’s secrecy and the operation’s surgical nature. It reinforced the Begin Doctrine’s adaptability, incorporating advanced technology and covert tactics to neutralise emerging threats.
Both operations demonstrated Israel’s ability to combine intelligence, air superiority, and strategic surprise, setting the stage for Operation Rising Lion’s complexity.
Operation Rising Lion: A Modern Application
Launched on June 13, 2025, Operation Rising Lion targeted Iran’s nuclear and military infrastructure, reflecting the Begin Doctrine’s evolution in scale, technology, and geopolitical context. Iran’s nuclear program, by 2025, posed an unprecedented challenge, with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reporting enough enriched uranium for up to 15 nuclear bombs. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu framed the operation as a “12th-hour” necessity to prevent a “nuclear holocaust,” echoing Begin’s rhetoric from 1981.
Strategic Execution. Operation Rising Lion was a multi-domain assault, integrating air, cyber, and covert operations. Over 200 Israeli aircraft, including F-35s, struck key nuclear sites, the Natanz Enrichment Complex, the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant, the Arak Heavy Water Facility and the Isfahan Uranium Conversion Facility. Missile bases like Asfajaabad, IRGC command centers, and air defence systems were hit. Mossad-activated drones and smuggled munitions neutralised launchers and radars, ensuring air superiority. The operation killed key figures, including IRGC leaders Hossein Salami, Mohammad Bagheri, and Amir Ali Hajizadeh, and nuclear scientists like Fereydoon Abbasi and Mohammad Mehdi Tehranchi, crippling Iran’s command and expertise. Mossad’s covert operations, including a secret drone base near Tehran and disinformation about diplomatic rifts, misled Iran’s leadership into underestimating the attack.
Scale and Impact. Operation Rising Lion was unprecedented in scope, targeting over 100 sites with 330 munitions. Iran reported 78–128 deaths, including 20 children, and over 320 injuries, particularly in Tehran’s residential areas, sparking international criticism. The IAEA confirmed no radiation leaks, indicating precise strikes. The operation delayed Iran’s nuclear program, damaged its military infrastructure, and disrupted its chain of command, reinforcing Israel’s regional dominance.
Iran’s Response: Operation True Promise III. Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei vowed “severe punishment,” describing Israel’s actions as a “doomed aggression based on a grave miscalculation.” Iran retaliated with Operation True Promise III (Persian: Va’de-ye Sādeq III), which began on the evening of June 13, 2025, approximately 18 hours after Israel’s initial strikes. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) led the operation, supported by Iran’s armed forces and possibly proxy groups like Hezbollah, the Houthis, and the Islamic Resistance in Iraq. Iran fired “dozens” to “hundreds” of ballistic missiles and drones, targeting Israeli military centres, airbases, and strategic sites, including the Kirya military headquarters in Tel Aviv. Specific targets included Nevatim, Hatzerim, and Tel Nof airbases, which house advanced Israeli fighter jets like F-35s and F-15s. The operation involved waves of attacks, with ballistic missiles and kamikaze drones aimed at overwhelming Israel’s multilayered air defences, including the Iron Dome and Arrow missile defence systems. While Israel’s Iron Dome and Arrow systems, aided by U.S., British, and French forces, intercepted most projectiles, some strikes caused damage in Tel Aviv, injuring 21–95 people. Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, called the strikes a “crushing response”.
Analytical Perspectives
Continuity and Evolution of the Begin Doctrine. Operation Rising Lion reflects the Begin Doctrine’s continuity and evolution. Like Osirak and Orchard, Rising Lion was a unilateral, preemptive strike to deny an adversary nuclear capability. Israel acted without U.S. involvement, prioritising national security over international approval, and justified the operation as existential. The operation’s scale—over 200 aircraft and 100 targets—dwarfs previous strikes. It integrated advanced technologies (AI-assisted targeting, drones, cyberwarfare) and Mossad’s covert infrastructure, showcasing Israel’s technological edge. Unlike Osirak’s single-target focus or Orchard’s secrecy, Rising Lion was a broad assault on nuclear, military, and leadership targets, reflecting the complexity of Iran’s threat.
Strategic and Ethical Challenges. The Begin Doctrine’s application in Operation Rising Lion raises significant issues.
Strategic Success. The operation delayed Iran’s nuclear program, possibly by years, and weakened its military leadership and missile capabilities. It reinforced Israel’s deterrence, signalling to adversaries like Hezbollah and the Houthis that escalation would be costly.
Escalation Risks. Though limited, Iran’s Operation True Promise III underscores the potential for a broader conflict. The Houthis’ missile strike on Hebron and possible proxy involvement from Iraq and Syria highlight the regional ripple effects.
Ethical Concerns. Civilian casualties, including 20 children in Tehran, drew condemnation from the UN, Saudi Arabia, and Russia. Critics argue the doctrine’s preemptive nature risks disproportionate harm, complicating Israel’s international standing.
Limitations. Deeply buried facilities like Fordow remain resistant to conventional strikes, suggesting the doctrine’s reliance on airpower may need adaptation for future threats.
Geopolitical Impact. Operation Rising Lion has transformed the Middle East’s strategic landscape. By eliminating key Iranian leaders and damaging critical infrastructure, Israel has significantly weakened Iran’s regional influence, though its proxy groups, such as Hezbollah and the Houthis, remain active. Global oil prices have surged 8% amid fears of supply disruptions, sending ripples through international markets. The United States backed Israel’s defensive measures but called for restraint, while Russia offered to mediate and Saudi Arabia adopted a cautious approach, highlighting the region’s complex dynamics. The breakdown of scheduled U.S.-Iran nuclear talks in Oman underscores the diplomatic fallout of Israel’s Begin Doctrine.
Israel’s Strategic Blind Spot: Pakistan’s Nuclear Program. Israel’s Begin Doctrine prioritises pre-emptive strikes against adversaries developing nuclear weapons, yet Pakistan’s nuclear program, successful by 1998, never prompted Israeli action. This stems from geopolitical and strategic factors. Unlike Iraq, Syria, or Iran, Pakistan lies outside Israel’s immediate Middle Eastern sphere of influence, reducing its perceived threat. Pakistan’s nuclear ambitions were primarily driven by rivalry with India, not hostility toward Israel. Diplomatic relations, though limited, existed indirectly, and Pakistan’s leadership, including Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and Pervez Musharraf, avoided framing Israel as a primary enemy. Israel’s intelligence, via Mossad, likely assessed Pakistan’s program as India-focused, not aimed at Tel Aviv. Additionally, U.S. influence, a mutual ally, restrained escalation, as Pakistan’s nuclear development was tacitly accepted to counter India. Thus, Israel conserved resources for proximate threats like Iran, aligning with the Begin Doctrine’s focus on existential risks.
Conclusion
From Osirak to Natanz, the Begin Doctrine has guided Israel’s strategy to prevent nuclear proliferation among its adversaries. With its unprecedented scale and technological sophistication, Operation Rising Lion represents the doctrine’s most ambitious application yet. By targeting Iran’s nuclear facilities, missile bases, and leadership, Israel reaffirmed its commitment to existential security, even at the cost of regional escalation and international criticism. However, the operation’s success in delaying Iran’s nuclear ambitions comes with challenges: fortified sites like Fordow, retaliatory risks, and ethical questions about civilian casualties. As of this date, the Israel-Iran conflict remains volatile, with the Begin Doctrine both a shield for Israel’s survival and a catalyst for regional tensions. The doctrine’s future will depend on Israel’s ability to adapt its pre-emptive strategy to an increasingly complex geopolitical landscape.
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Information and data included in the blog are for educational & non-commercial purposes only and have been carefully adapted, excerpted, or edited from reliable and accurate sources. All copyrighted material belongs to respective owners and is provided only for wider dissemination.
References:-
International Atomic Energy Agency. (2025, June 12). Report on Iran’s Nuclear Program Compliance. Vienna: IAEA.
United Nations. (2025, June 13). Statement by Secretary-General António Guterres on Israeli Airstrikes in Iran. New York: United Nations Press Office.
Al Jazeera. (2025, June 14). “Iran Vows ‘Harsh Response’ After Israeli Strikes on Nuclear Sites.” Al Jazeera English.
BBC News. (2025, June 13). “Israel Launches Operation Rising Lion: What We Know About the Strikes on Iran.” BBC World Service.
Reuters. (2025, June 15). “Oil Prices Surge as Israel-Iran Tensions Escalate After Operation Rising Lion.” Reuters.
The Jerusalem Post. (2025, June 13). “Netanyahu: Operation Rising Lion Prevented Nuclear Holocaust.” The Jerusalem Post.
The New York Times. (2025, June 14). “Mossad’s Covert Role in Israel’s Strike on Iran Revealed.” The New York Times.
Center for Strategic and International Studies. (2025, June 14). Operation Rising Lion: Assessing Israel’s Strike on Iran’s Nuclear Program. Washington, DC: CSIS.
Institute for National Security Studies. (2025, June 15). The Geopolitical Fallout of Operation Rising Lion. Tel Aviv: INSS.
Israel Defence Forces. (2025, June 13). Official Statement on Operation Rising Lion. Jerusalem: IDF Press Office.
U.S. Department of State. (2025, June 13). Press Briefing by Secretary of State Marco Rubio on Israel-Iran Conflict. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State.
Bergman, Ronen. (2018). Rise and Kill First: The Secret History of Israel’s Targeted Assassinations. New York: Random House.
Pollack, Kenneth M. (2021). The Persian Puzzle: Iran’s Strategic Challenge. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.
The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) released its highly anticipated 55th edition of the SIPRI Yearbook 2024 on 17 June 24. This comprehensive yearbook, a cornerstone in the field, presents the institute’s annual evaluation of the state of armaments, disarmament, and international security, with a specific focus on nuclear threats and challenges.
Key findings of the SIPRI Yearbook 2024 are that the number and types of nuclear weapons in development have increased as states deepen their reliance on nuclear deterrence.
Relevant Excerpts
The nine nuclear-armed states are the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France, China, India, Pakistan, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea) and Israel. The nuclear countries continued modernising their nuclear arsenals, and several deployed new nuclear-armed or nuclear-capable weapon systems in 2023.
Of the total global inventory of an estimated 12,121 warheads in January 2024, about 9585 are in military stockpiles for potential use. An estimated 3904 of those warheads are deployed with missiles and aircraft; the rest are in central storage. Around 2100 deployed warheads are kept in a high operational alert on ballistic missiles. Nearly all of these warheads belonged to Russia or the USA, but for the first time, China is believed to have some warheads on high operational alert.
While the global total of nuclear warheads continues to fall as Cold War-era weapons are gradually dismantled, regrettably, there is a year-on-year increase in the number of operational nuclear warheads.
India, Pakistan, and North Korea are all pursuing the capability to deploy multiple warheads on ballistic missiles, something Russia, France, the UK, the USA and—more recently—China already have.
Russia and the USA together possess almost 90 percent of all nuclear weapons. The sizes of their respective military stockpiles (i.e., useable warheads) seem to have remained relatively stable in 2023. In addition to their military stockpiles, Russia and the USA each hold more than 1200 warheads previously retired from military service, which they are gradually dismantling.
Russia. Russia is estimated to have deployed around 36 more warheads with operational forces than in January 2023. Transparency regarding nuclear forces has declined, and debates around nuclear-sharing arrangements have increased in saliency. Notably, there were several public claims made in 2023 that Russia had deployed nuclear weapons on Belarusian territory. However, there is no conclusive visual evidence that the actual deployment of warheads has taken place.
China. SIPRI’s estimate of the size of China’s nuclear arsenal increased from 410 warheads in January 2023 to 500 in January 2024, and it is expected to keep growing. For the first time, China may also now be deploying a small number of warheads on missiles during peacetime. Depending on how it decides to structure its forces, China could potentially have at least as many intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) as either Russia or the USA by the turn of the decade. However, its stockpile of nuclear warheads is still expected to remain much smaller than the stockpiles of either of those two countries.
United Kingdom. Although the UK is not thought to have increased its nuclear weapon arsenal in 2023, its warhead stockpile is expected to grow in the future due to the British government’s announcement in 2021 that it was raising its limit from 225 to 260 warheads. The government also said it would no longer publicly disclose its quantities of nuclear weapons, deployed warheads or deployed missiles.
France. In 2023, France continued its programmes to develop a third-generation nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) and a new air-launched cruise missile and refurbish and upgrade existing systems.
India. In 2023, India slightly expanded its nuclear arsenal and continued developing new nuclear delivery systems. India appears to be placing growing emphasis on longer-range weapons, including those capable of reaching targets throughout China.
North Korea. North Korea continues to prioritise its military nuclear programme as a central element of its national security strategy. SIPRI estimates that the country has now assembled around 50 warheads and possesses enough fissile material to reach a total of up to 90 warheads, both significant increases over the estimates for January 2023. While North Korea conducted no nuclear test explosions in 2023, it appears to have carried out its first test of a short-range ballistic missile from a rudimentary silo. It also completed the development of at least two types of land-attack cruise missiles (LACM) designed to deliver nuclear weapons.
Israel. Israel does not publicly acknowledge possessing nuclear weapons. It seems to be modernising its nuclear arsenal and upgrading its plutonium production reactor site at Dimona.
Global Security and Stability in Peril
The impacts of the wars in Ukraine and Gaza are visible in almost every aspect of the issues connected to nuclear, armaments, disarmament and international security.
Increasing Reliance on Nuclear Deterrence. Russia has continued to make threats regarding the use of nuclear weapons in the context of Western support for Ukraine. In May 2024, Russia carried out tactical nuclear weapon drills close to the Ukrainian border.
Setback to Nuclear Arms Control and Disarmament. Nuclear diplomacy suffered more significant setbacks in 2023.
In February 2023, Russia announced it was suspending its participation in the 2010 Treaty on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (New START)—the last remaining nuclear arms control treaty limiting Russian and US strategic nuclear forces. The USA also suspended the sharing and publication of treaty data as a countermeasure.
In November, Russia withdrew its ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), citing ‘an imbalance’ with the USA, which has failed to ratify the treaty since it opened for signature in 1996. However, Russia confirmed it would remain a signatory and continue participating in the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) work.
An informal agreement reached between Iran and the USA in June 2023 seemed to temporarily de-escalate tensions between the two countries, which had intensified over Iran’s military support to Russian forces in Ukraine. However, the start of the Israel–Hamas war in October upended the agreement, with proxy attacks by Iran-backed groups on US forces in Iraq and Syria ending Iranian–US diplomatic efforts.
The war also undermined efforts to engage Israel in the Conference on the Establishment of a Middle East Zone Free of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction.
Comments
While global nuclear destructive power is stable (if not decreasing) for the time being, the increase in the number of warheads on high op alert is a cause of concern. The number of warheads deployed on missiles and aircraft shows an upward trend.
The capability to deploy multiple warheads on missiles would enable a rapid potential increase in deployed warheads, as well as the possibility for nuclear-armed countries to threaten the destruction of significantly more targets.
Several nuclear-armed states are putting new emphasis on developing their arsenal of tactical nuclear weapons. The concern is about the early use of these weapons in a conflict.
Given that the USA and Russia possess 90% of the total global nukes, the Ukraine conflict (Russia – NATO/West conflict in a broader sense) is not safe. Reduction in their stockpile will make the world safer.
China is expanding its nuclear arsenal faster than any other country. China deploying nuclear warheads on missiles on op alert indicates a strategic shift and a possible change in its nuclear policy.
Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal has shown no change in numbers. However, Pakistan, too, has advanced its nuclear delivery systems. Considering its internal conditions and prevailing geo-political situation, fear of its nuclear weapons falling into the wrong hands remains.
The gradual reductions in nuclear stockpiles that characterised the post-Cold War period are over, and the world is sliding back into nuclear competition and arms race.
Cold War II has enhanced nuclear capabilities, reduced nuclear transparency, and increased reliance on nuclear deterrence.
The world is slowly moving one step closer to the speedier initiation of a nuclear exchange.
Launch due to accidental firing, miscalculation, or foolhardiness is worrisome. Mutually acceptable safety measures need to be implemented on priority.
Adequate security measures must be instituted to avoid these launch-ready weapons falling into the hands of non-state actors.
Nuclear weapons are once again (like in the Cold War era) playing a prominent role in international relations. Despite two years back, leaders of the five largest nuclear-armed states jointly reaffirmed that “a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought”.
Recent developments demonstrate the fragile nature of Nuclear Arms Control and Disarmament treaties. Fresh impetus is required to maintain the relevance of measures taken for Nuclear Disarmament:-
Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons 2017 prohibits the development, testing, production, acquisition, possession, or use of nuclear weapons.
The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) 1968 aims to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, promote cooperation in peaceful uses of nuclear energy and achieve nuclear disarmament.
Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), 1996, prohibits nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, outer space, and underwater.
The world is now in one of the most dangerous periods. Numerous sources of instability (political rivalries, economic inequalities, and ecological disruption) encourage and accelerate an arms race.
It is time for the nuclear powers and the multi-lateral organisations to step back and reflect together.
Addendum
India’s Nuclear Policy. India has adhered to a nuclear no-first-use (NFU) policy since 1999. The country’s stated doctrine from January 2003 includes a pledge not to use nuclear weapons first but with a significant caveat that nuclear weapons could be used if Indian forces are attacked with biological or chemical weapons. India reaffirmed in 2018 that it could also use nuclear forces to retaliate against attacks by non-nuclear weapons of mass destruction (WMD).
Recent Developments. In November 2019, India formally declared the operationalisation of its nuclear triad after the country’s first SSBN, INS Arihant, completed its first deterrence patrol. In March 2024, India successfully conducted “Mission Divyastra” by launching Agni-V with multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicle (MIRV) technology. This placed India into a club of the few countries capable of delivering multiple nuclear warheads using a single missile.
Information and data included in the blog are for educational & non-commercial purposes only and have been carefully adapted, excerpted, or edited from reliable and accurate sources. All copyrighted material belongs to respective owners and is provided only for broader dissemination.
