491: PRACHAND: THE HIMALAYAN GRIFFIN

My Article published on the Chanakya Forum

In mid-June, news channels and strategic community circles were abuzz with the news that the Ministry of Defence, Government of India, had issued an RFP for the procurement of 156 Light Combat Helicopters (90 for the Indian Army and 66 for the Indian Air Force). LCH is the first indigenous Multi-Role Combat Helicopter designed and manufactured by Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL). “Prachand” (which means “fierce” in Hindi), the name given to India’s LCH, reflects the helicopter’s aggressive and powerful capabilities. It stands out with its ground attack and aerial combat capability, setting it apart from other helicopters in the market. Other attack helicopters and armed helicopters (held in the Indian armed forces inventory) are severely limited in operating at high altitudes and are best suited for operations in lower terrains.

HAL has thus far manufactured 15 limited-series Prachand helicopters (10 for the IAF and 5 for the IA), already in service from 2021 onwards. The new procurement order will enhance the operational capability of the Indian defence forces and further boost India’s drive for self-reliance. Reviewing the aircraft (features, performance, capabilities, and roles) and the project (development, production capabilities, Indigenous content, etc.) will be worthwhile.

Development Project. The need for such a helicopter was felt by the Indian armed forces during the Kargil conflict in 1999 when they were required to dislodge intruding Pakistani forces entrenched at altitudes around 18,000 feet. HAL started developing the LCH in the early 2000s, unveiling its plan to build the LCH in 2006. The Indian government sanctioned the project in the same year. The first flight on a prototype on 29 March 2010 was followed by an extensive test programme on four prototypes. The LCH became the first attack helicopter to land in Siachen at altitudes as high as 15,800 feet (4,815 metres). The LCH received a certificate of basic configuration in October 2015 and achieved initial operational clearance in August 2017.

Induction. The LCH was developed to meet the requirements of the Indian Air Force and the Indian Army. In August 2017, limited-series production began for 15 aircraft. In January 2019, after completing all weapon integration tests, HAL declared the LCH ready for operational induction. On November 19, 2021, the LCH was formally handed over to IAF, starting the process of full-scale induction. On October 03, 2022, the LCH was formally inducted into the IAF and was officially named ‘Prachand’. By November 2022, the IA had begun receiving its LCH. The Ministry of Defence (MoD) has now given preliminary approval to acquire 156 more Light Combat Helicopters.

Features. The LCH, an attack helicopter derived from a weaponised version of the HAL-manufactured Dhruv helicopter ‘Rudra’, is a light and agile machine with a unique feature that sets it apart from any other combat helicopter in the world: its ability to operate at high altitudes. This is a significant advantage, as it allows the LCH to operate effectively in the mountainous terrain of the Himalayas, a crucial area for India’s defence strategy. The helicopter possesses modern stealth characteristics, robust armour protection, advanced weapon systems, and electronic warfare systems. Its performance characteristics and features are as follows, showcasing its unique and impressive capabilities:

- Performance. The LCH is designed for high-altitude operations, with a service ceiling of about 6,500 meters (21,300 feet), the highest among all attack helicopters worldwide. It has a maximum Take-off Weight of around 5,800 kg and can carry 700 kg of payload. The helicopter can cruise at 260km/h and achieve a maximum speed of 268km/h. With a range of 550 km with weapons, it can fly for about 3 hours, showcasing its impressive performance capabilities.

- Armament. The LCH has a chin-mounted and twin-barrel M621 20mm cannon on a Nexter THL-20 turret, integrated with the Helmet Mounted Sighting System. Its modular design allows it to be armed with various weapons, including air-to-air and air-to-ground missiles, rocket pods, iron bombs, cluster bombs, and grenade launchers. This versatility in carrying different weapons makes the LCH suitable for various missions, from air-to-air combat to ground attack. It has four hardpoints capable of carrying a combination of multiple weapons. It is also equipped with a Forges de Zeebrugge-built FZ231 rocket launcher capable of carrying 70mm rockets, MBDA air-to-air, air-to-surface, anti-radiation missiles, and Helina anti-tank guided missiles (Dhruvastra).

- Engine: The helicopter is powered by two HAL/Turbomeca Shakti turboshaft engines, each of which can generate approximately 1000kW and has a Full Authority Digital Electronic Control system (FADEC). The French Turbomeca and HAL jointly developed the Shakti engine, which was also fitted on the Dhruv and Rudra helicopters.

- Advanced Technology (Sensors and Avionics): The helicopter features a glass cockpit, a composite airframe structure, and a state-of-the-art sensor suite, enhancing operational efficiency and durability. The glass cockpit accommodates two crew members in tandem. It has an Integrated Avionics Display System (IADS), multi-function displays, a target acquisition and designation system (TADS) with FLIR (laser range finder and a designator), a helmet-mounted sight and a digital video recorder to capture battlefield footage for debriefing. The sensors fitted on the helicopter include a charge-coupled device camera, a forward-looking infrared camera and a laser designator. The two cameras capture the enemy’s location and position. The targeting system features an electro-optical pod, helmet-mounted sight display (HMSD), and a laser range finder and designator for precise targeting and engagement. The LCH is also equipped with a data link for network-centric operations.

- Survivability: The helicopter has numerous features to increase its survivability, including stealth features to reduce radar and infrared signatures. It has systems like Radar warning receivers (RWR), missile approach warning systems, laser warning systems, and chaff and flare dispensers for self-protection. The helicopter also has engine exhaust Infra-Red Suppression Systems (IRSS). The IRSS enhances aircraft resilience against IR-guided missiles by diminishing the missile lock-on distance and facilitating the superior functioning of IR jammers and flares. It has several other protection features, such as armour protection, self-sealing fuel tanks, a digital camouflage system, and crashworthy landing gear to enhance its survivability in hostile environments. The pressurised cabin of the helicopter offers protection from Nuclear, Biological and Chemical (NBC) attacks.

- Versatility and Agility: The features above allow LCH to perform numerous roles under all weather and day-night conditions. Its narrow fuselage and advanced aerodynamics provide high agility, making it difficult to detect and target. The specially designed hinge-less rotor makes it highly agile due to its immediate response to flight control commands.

Roles and Tasks. The LCH meets the requirements of modern warfare and has the capability parameters to operate under varied conditions. Equipped with advanced systems and various weapons, it can perform multiple combat and support roles. In attack roles, it can undertake missions like the destruction of enemy air defence (DEAD), anti-tank warfare, battlefield air support, interdiction, and counter-surface force operations. It is capable of battlefield reconnaissance and target acquisition. It can also be used to escort convoys and provide aerial coverage. The LCH can track and attack slow-moving aerial targets and remotely piloted aircraft. It is also effective in counter-insurgency operations in jungle and urban environments.

Capability Enhancement. The LCH’s versatility and offensive potential are at par or better than most attack helicopters operating globally. Its presence itself deters adversaries. The induction of the Light Combat Helicopter adds unique capability to India’s combat potential. The LCH is noted for its capability to operate at high altitudes up to 6,500 meters, making it particularly suitable for operations in mountainous regions like the Himalayas along India’s northern and northeastern borders. This versatility, along with advanced avionics and weaponry, makes the LCH a force multiplier, significantly enhancing the combat capabilities of the Indian armed forces. It is a potent platform with day and night ground attack and aerial combat capability. It is a game changer, reflecting its multiple capabilities and strategic importance. It offers strategic flexibility through rapid deployment, allowing quick responses to emerging threats. The helicopter’s data link will mesh into the IAF’s networked environment.

Self-reliance and Challenges. Being an Indigenous platform developed by Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL), the LCH reduces reliance on foreign military technology and supports India’s defence industry. With the Indian thrust on indigenisation, the LCH is being developed under a public-private partnership model, with the active participation of the private sector. There is still much left to be achieved regarding self-reliance. The LCH reportedly has an indigenous content of 45% by value, which is likely to progressively increase to more than 55%. The development of indigenous engines is the foremost challenge. Developing an aircraft engine is tough and expensive; it requires considerable investment in R&D and sustained effort over many years. These helicopters are on one of the government’s positive indigenisation lists. The list bans importing weapons, systems, and ammunition. Integration of Indigenous Anti-Tank Guided Missiles is another challenge. Helina/Dhruvastra, a helicopter version of the Nag missile, has already been tested on ALH (Rudra) and is in the process of integration with LCH. Next on the list is the challenge of production rate. The new order of 156 LCH aircraft will likely take 5 to 6 years to complete.

The induction of an additional 156 LCH is a significant development. The LCH’s high-altitude operational capability, advanced avionics, versatile armament, and Indigenous development make it a crucial asset for India’s defence forces. Its ability to operate in challenging terrains and perform multiple combat roles effectively positions it as a game changer in modern warfare, particularly in India’s unique geographic and strategic challenges.

Suggestions and value additions are most welcome.

Link to the article on Chanakya website: -https://chanakyaforum.com/prachand-the-himalayan-griffin/

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References and credits

To all the online sites and channels.

References:-

Air Chief Marshal Fali H Major (retd), “Why India’s Light Combat Helicopter could be a game changer”, DailyO, 28 Feb 2020.

Air Marshal Anil Chopra (Retd), “Rotary Wing Platforms: India’s Great Indigenisation Story”, Indian Defence Review, Issue Vol. 38.1, Jan-Mar 2023, 13 Apr 2023.

“Ten reasons why indigenously-built Light Combat Helicopter is a game changer for the Indian Air Force”, India News Network, 04 Apr 2022.

Rahul Singh, “Govt to buy 156 light combat helicopters from HAL at ₹50k-cr”, Hindustan Times, 18 Jun 2024.

D Raghunandan, “India’s Combat Helicopter: Re-discovering Self-reliance?”, NEWSclick, 14 Oct 2022.

Lt Gen (Retd) BS Pawar, “Induction of ‘Prachand’ Light Combat Helicopter: Impact on Operations At High Altitudes”, Bharat Shakti, 13 Jan 2024.

“HAL Light Combat Helicopter (LCH)”, Air Force Technology, 18 Apr 2024.

Ministry of Defence, “Indigenously Designed and Developed Light Combat Helicopter (LCH) inducted into Indian Air Force”, Press Release, 03 OCT 2022.

Gordon Arthur, “India advances light attack helicopter program with large tender”, Air Warfare, 21 Jun 2024.

Huma Siddiqui, “MoD Issues RFP for 156 Prachand Helicopters to HAL for IAF and Army”, Financial Express, 20 Jun 2024.

Disclaimer:

Information and data included in the blog are for educational & non-commercial purposes only and have been carefully adapted, excerpted, or edited from reliable and accurate sources. All copyrighted material belongs to respective owners and is provided only for wider dissemination.

June 26, 2024January 4, 2025

489: COMBAT AVIATION: MOST ESSENTIAL, LEAST UNDERSTOOD

My Article published in the Indus International Research Foundation Year Book 2024.

“Air power is not only a fascinating subject, but its theory and practice also constitute a very demanding profession, and even a lifetime’s study and devotion is inadequate to unravel its mystique or fully understand its imperatives.”

– Air Cmde Jasjit Singh

Air power is a revolutionary force that transformed the fundamental nature of war in less than a century. The concept of air power is often considered one of the most essential elements in modern military operations, but it can also be the least understood aspect for various reasons. Aviation technology advances open up many new possibilities for air power applications. Developing, maintaining, and operating a modern air force is resource-intensive. Balancing budget constraints with the need for cutting-edge technology and capabilities is a complex task. The effective integration of air power with surface forces can be challenging. Joint operations require seamless communication, coordination, and a shared understanding of each other’s roles, tasks, and core competencies. These complexities make it challenging to understand the potential of air power and the nuances of its application for both the practitioners of air power and those affected directly or indirectly by it. Douhet, Mitchell, and Trenchard, the three airpower prophets from military aviation’s earliest years, articulated their airpower theories that shaped military aviation for decades. While it is good always to remember the basics, it is worthwhile to revisit and review them, especially with the ongoing and urgent debate about proposed organisational changes.

Continue reading “489: COMBAT AVIATION: MOST ESSENTIAL, LEAST UNDERSTOOD”

June 1, 2024January 4, 2025

483: Ritu’s Column: When Eagles Kept Falcons at Bay

Ritu Sharma is a journalist, with a Master’s Degree in Conflict Studies and Management of Peace from the University of Erfurt, Germany. Her areas of interest include Asia-Pacific, the South China Sea, and Aviation history. She has been writing on subjects related to defence, foreign affairs, and nuclear technology for the last 15 years. She has written for PTI, IANS and The New Indian Express. Presently she is writing for the EurAsian Times.

Her article on Kargil Operations (Op Safed Sagar) was published on 01 Jun 2024 on “The EurAsian Times”.

(Besides the two quotes, the views of the author are her own)

When Eagles Kept Falcons At Bay – How IAF’s MiG-29 Fighters Triumphed Pakistan’s F-16s At 18,000 Feet

By Ritu Sharma – 01 Jun 2024

On May 26, the Indian Air Force (IAF) launched Operation Safed Sagar, which saw the deployment of air power at 18,000 feet. As the intruders, backed by the Pakistan Army, entrenched themselves on the treacherous heights of the Kargil sector, the IAF deployed its entire fleet, and the pounding continued for the next 60 days.

On May 21, the IAF launched a Canberra PR57 to conduct a reconnaissance of the Kargil area to assess the extent of intrusion. The aircraft descended to 22,000 feet, just two miles from the LoC, and was just 4,000 feet above the highest Himalayan points. The Canberra sustained a hit on its right engine by what was later determined to have been a Chinese-made Anza infrared surface-to-air missile. This called for a change in tactics by the IAF.

The Indian government had given the green light for the use of air power, albeit with one caveat – the Indian fighter jets were not allowed to cross the border with Pakistan. India began the air bombing on May 26 with MiG-21, MiG-23, and MiG-27 fighters carrying out six attacks against intruder camps, materiel dumps, and supply routes.

On the second day, the force lost two fighter jets—a MiG-27 and a MiG-21. The Pakistan-backed insurgents were using Stinger, a Man-Portable Air Defence System (MANPADS) that operates as an infrared-homing surface-to-air missile (SAM). The IAF MiG-21 piloted by Squadron Leader Ajay Ahuja, tasked with photo reconnaissance during the Kargil conflict, was shot down by ground-fired missiles over Batalik along the Line of Control in Ladakh. He ejected in time but parachuted down into Pakistan-occupied Kashmir and was later executed by the Pakistan forces in contravention of the Geneva Convention. On the third day of air operations, an IAF Mi-17 helicopter was downed again by an enemy shoulder-fired Stinger surface-to-air missile while conducting a low-level attack. After this, the IAF stopped using all slow-moving air assets in the conflict.

India had pressed its fleet of MiG-21s, MiG-23s, MiG-25s, MiG-27s, MiG-29 Fulcrums, Jaguars, and Mirage-2000s into the attack of the enemy positions within a small target area of just 5-12 km from the Line of Control (LoC). These fighters flew at 30,000 feet to avoid Pakistan missiles. The Pakistan and Indian Air Forces did not have dogfights. But, the Indian MiG-29s called ‘Baaz’ (or Eagle) did have whoever blinks first games with Pakistan’s F-16 ‘Falcons.’

“While PAF fighters did fly Combat Air Patrols (CAP) during the conflict, they stayed well within Pakistani air space. On occasions, IAF MiG-29s armed with the deadly R-77 BVR Air-to-Air missiles could lock on to PAF F-16s, forcing the latter to disengage. In the absence of a PAF threat, the IAF was able to deliver numerous devastating strikes on intruder positions and supply dumps,” a Strategy Page report said in the aftermath of the conflict. During the Kargil War, the PAF’s director of operations later reported isolated instances of IAF and PAF fighters locking on to each other with their onboard fire control radars.

The IAF pilots carried out 6,500 sorties, including strikes, reconnaissance, evacuation, transportation, and logistic support. In a 2012 report by Benjamin Lambeth of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace titled “Airpower at 18,000 feet: The Indian Air Force in the Kargil War” explained how the IAF pummelled the Pakistan Army and the PAF: “Throughout the campaign, whenever IAF reconnaissance or ground attack operations were underway in the immediate combat zone, Western Air Command ensured that MiG-29s or other air-to-air fighters were also airborne on combat air patrol stations over the ground fighting on India’s side of the LoC to provide top cover against any attempt by the PAF to enter the fray in a ground attack role.”

The result was that PAF F-16s maintained a safe distance of 10 to 20 miles on the Pakistani side of the border. The report quotes Air Marshal (retired) Vinod Patney, the then head of Western Air Command: “I think my insistence on mounting CAPs across the (command’s entire area of responsibility) at different heights and times to give the message that we were ready and angling for an enlarged conflict helped. It was akin to throwing a glove, but it was not picked up.” Then IAF Chief AY Tipnis later recalled that he had “authorised the escorting fighter pilots to chase away Pakistani aircraft further back across the LoC.”

Talking to the EurAsian Times, Air Marshal Anil Khosla (retired) said: “Mig-29 and Mig-21 aircraft played an important role in local area air dominance by preventing enemy aircraft from interfering with our air and ground operations.” “The effort these aircraft put into air defence escorts and Combat Air Patrolling by day and night proved an effective deterrent, ensuring local air superiority. At times, PAF F-16s, orbiting on their side of the LOC, were kept at bay by our air defence fighters flying a protective pattern above the strike,” Khosla added.

MiG-23 and MiG-27 fighter jets had to manually dive to bomb the targets as they lacked modern equipment to locate them. However, this tactic did not work well in the rarefied atmosphere of the Himalayas. Hence, the IAF introduced the French Mirage 2000H equipped with day—and night laser-guided bomb delivery pods. On June 24, the IAF’s two Mirage 2000Hs dropped the first-ever laser-guided bombs of the force in a combat mission and destroyed the Northern Light Infantry’s command and control bunkers. The IAF reported at the end of 1999 that it resulted in as many as 300 enemy casualties within just minutes.

Air Marshal Khosla said: “Interdiction proved effective (Attack on NLI’s (Northern Light Infantry of Pakistan) command headquarters at Tiger Hill and supply dumps at Muntho Dhalo).” However, he adds, “helicopters and fixed-wing combat support aircraft are vulnerable in confined and contested air space”. This holds even in today’s battleground. Air Marshal Khosla underscores that airpower needs to be applied innovatively with ingenuity. The challenges during the Kargil conflict were manifold, including the high-altitude terrain (10,000 to 18,000 ft), low air density, strong winds, small camouflaged targets, and self-imposed restrictions like not crossing the border.

The IAF’s MiG-21s operated without modern navigation equipment, and pilots navigated with handheld GPS gadgets. The Indian Air Force integrated the 1000-kg bombs with laser-guided weapon pods. The IAF selected weapon impact points that would snowball into landslides or avalanches.

The IAF also deployed its ‘Super Spy’ MiG-25 Foxbat for reconnaissance missions. With an operational flight of over 70,000 feet and a speed of Mach 2.5, the fighter jet had regularly flown reconnaissance missions. Such was the clarity of the camera fitted in the belly of the aircraft, which allowed it to click photos of humans on a Pakistani tarmac. The Foxbat would create a sonic boom and escape before PAF could scramble its interceptors. In 1999, however, its mission parameters were different—it was to fly low and slow to map the targets on the Pakistani side for the Mirage-2000s bombing. The aircraft flew at a lower height, which was never envisaged, and there were no Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) laid down. Also, it needed to maintain a velocity and height ratio for the camera to click clear photographs. At the given height, the aircraft was well beyond the range of the surface-to-air missiles, but the only threat was from aerial interception. To overcome that, the aircraft was escorted by Mirage-2000s during the mission.