559: CYBER POSTURING AND CYBER STRATEGIC COERCION

 

 

My article published on the Indus International Research Foundation Website on 16 Dec 24

 

In the 21st century, the digital realm has become an essential arena for national power and international influence. Among the most potent strategies in cyberspace are cyber posturing and cyber strategic coercion. These techniques, though related, serve distinct purposes in the broader context of geopolitical competition. Cyber posturing is the demonstration of cyber capabilities to deter or influence adversaries. In contrast, cyber strategic coercion uses cyber tools to compel an adversary to change behaviour, often causing economic, social, or political disruption.

 

Cyber Posturing: Signalling Strength and Intent

 

Cyber posturing refers to the strategic actions and signals a country, organisation, or actor sends regarding its capabilities, intentions, and readiness in cyber security. It can involve various activities, from public statements and demonstrations of cyber capabilities to developing and deploying advanced cyber tools. Cyber posturing typically aims to achieve multiple objectives, such as deterrence, signalling intent, or shaping perceptions among adversaries and allies.

 

Defining Cyber Posturing. Cyber posturing refers to a state or actor’s strategic actions to protect its cyber capabilities, either in preparation for conflict or as a demonstration of power. Just as a nation might showcase its military hardware or nuclear arsenal during tension, cyber posturing involves actions or public signals designed to communicate resolve, strength, or deterrence in the digital domain. Cyber posturing includes various activities, from showcasing offensive cyber tools in public forums to conducting limited cyber operations to signal resolve. It can be overt—such as publicly revealing cyber capabilities—and covert, involving more subtle actions meant to project power without confrontation. According to Cyber security expert Herbert Lin, cyber posturing is a form of “strategic ambiguity,” where a state’s true capabilities and intentions are not fully clear, keeping adversaries on edge and uncertain of the consequences of escalation. This uncertainty can help maintain a balance of power, as adversaries may be deterred from acting out of fear of unknown retaliation.

 

Purposes of Cyber Posturing.  Cyber posturing is often difficult to measure directly because it involves ambiguity and strategic ambiguity; the true intent behind cyber actions can be hard to decipher, creating uncertainty among adversaries and possibly preventing miscalculations.

 

      • Deterrence. The primary goal of cyber posturing is to deter adversaries by demonstrating a credible cyber retaliation capability. For example, the United States National Cyber Strategy emphasises the importance of using cyber capabilities to defend its national interests and to deter hostile cyber actors. U.S. actions, such as publicly attributing cyber attacks to foreign adversaries, are part of a broader cyber posturing strategy to make clear that cyber aggression will provoke a significant response. A nation or group may seek to deter potential adversaries from attacking or engaging in malicious cyber activities by demonstrating advanced cyber capabilities. The idea is to make the cost of an attack seem higher than any potential benefit, much like nuclear deterrence during the Cold War.

 

      • Signalling Capability. By demonstrating advanced cyber capabilities, countries signal their technical prowess and ability to shape international norms. Nations may engage in cyber posturing to align themselves with global cyber security standards, shaping the perception of their role in international cyber governance. Countries might use cyber posturing to signal their strength or preparedness in the cyber domain. This can include publicising or testing offensive cyber tools or defending against high-profile attacks to showcase resilience.

 

      • Coercion or Influence. A nation may use cyber means to coerce or influence another country through direct attacks or create an impression of vulnerability that pressures the other side to act in a certain way. This could involve denial-of-service attacks, data breaches, or other disruptive cyber actions.

 

      • Demonstration of Intent. By engaging in cyber posturing, actors might communicate specific geopolitical intentions. For example, if a country wants to demonstrate support for an ally, it may engage in cyber defence collaboration or publicly disclose its cyber capabilities.

 

      • Cyber Warfare Preparation. Nations may posture in cyberspace to prepare for future cyber warfare, either to gain an advantage or to ensure readiness in a cyber conflict.

 

Examples of Cyber Posturing. Russia has frequently engaged in cyber posturing to reinforce its global influence and project power over adversaries. The 2007 cyber attack on Estonia disrupted government and banking operations and is one of the earliest instances of cyber posturing. Though Russia denied involvement, the attack sent a clear message about the power of cyber operations. David S. Alberts, a U.S. defence strategist, noted that the attack illustrated how cyber operations could be used to “exhibit the coercive power of digital tools” without resorting to kinetic military force. China has also engaged in cyber posturing, particularly in the South China Sea, to project its military capabilities and deter other nations from challenging territorial claims. Chinese cyber activities, such as the alleged theft of intellectual property from foreign companies, demonstrate cyber prowess meant to deter international interference.

 

Cyber Strategic Coercion: The Power to Influence Behaviour

 

While cyber posturing is about signalling strength, cyber strategic coercion involves using cyber tools to directly influence an adversary’s behaviour, often through the threat or execution of disruptive cyber actions. In this context, coercion is aimed at forcing an adversary to change its political, military, or economic behaviour, usually in the face of an ongoing crisis or negotiation. This form of coercion can be employed in various ways, from targeted cyberattacks that disrupt infrastructure or cause economic damage to more subtle tactics such as cyber espionage or manipulating public perception through disinformation campaigns.

 

Defining Cyber Strategic Coercion. Cyber strategic coercion operates on the principle of using threats, punishment, or the disruption of an adversary’s infrastructure to force a change in its behaviour. This is often done through cyber attacks that disrupt critical systems, steal sensitive information, or manipulate public perception. Thomas Rid, a leading scholar on cyber security, argues that cyber coercion is effective when it exploits the adversary’s vulnerabilities, pushing them into a position where they either concede to demands or risk escalating the conflict.

 

Methods of Cyber Strategic Coercion. Cyber attacks that cripple a nation’s economy or infrastructure are a potent form of coercion. Denial of Service (DoS) and ransomware attacks often damage the adversary economically, forcing them to the negotiating table. One of the most notable examples is the WannaCry ransomware attack in 2017, attributed to North Korea, which crippled hospitals, businesses, and government agencies globally. Cyber strategic coercion can also disrupt political processes. The most well-known instance of this was Russia’s interference in the 2016 U.S. presidential election, which involved cyber attacks, disinformation campaigns, and the hacking of political parties. The attack on the U.S. political system aimed to destabilise public confidence in the electoral process and influence the election outcome, signalling a new form of cyber-enabled strategic coercion.

 

Examples of Cyber Strategic Coercion. Russia has employed cyber strategic coercion in its ongoing conflict with Ukraine. This includes cyberattacks aimed at destabilising the Ukrainian government, such as the 2015 and 2016 attacks on Ukraine’s power grid. These attacks were designed not only to cause direct harm but also to demonstrate Russia’s ability to disrupt critical infrastructure, coercing Ukraine to comply with Russian geopolitical goals. Iran has used cyberattacks as a form of strategic coercion, particularly against the West. In 2012, Iran’s Cyber Army launched a massive distributed denial of service (DDoS) campaign against Saudi Aramco, the state-owned oil company of Saudi Arabia, causing significant disruption. This attack, part of a broader cyber deterrence strategy, was seen as a retaliatory move following the imposition of international sanctions on Iran.  North Korea has increasingly used cyberattacks to finance its regime, with operations such as the Bangladesh Bank cyber heist in 2016, which netted North Korean hackers over $81 million. This type of cyber strategic coercion is not just about inflicting damage on adversaries but also about coercing economic change by undermining the financial infrastructure of global institutions.

 

Key Elements of Cyber Strategic Coercion

 

      • Threats and Demonstrations of Capability. States or actors may use cyber operations to demonstrate their ability to inflict significant damage without using traditional military force. This can include publicising capabilities or engaging in limited cyber-attacks meant to signal intent and influence adversaries’ decision-making. For example, a country might conduct a cyberattack against a minor target to send a message about its capabilities, thus deterring an adversary from escalating a conflict or behaving in a manner the attacker disapproves of.

 

      • Disruption and Denial. Cyber strategic coercion can disrupt critical infrastructure or services, creating economic or social pressure on a target. For instance, a nation might use a cyberattack to disrupt transportation, energy grids, or financial institutions, forcing an adversary to negotiate or comply with demands. A notable example of this tactic is the 2007 cyberattacks on Estonia, which disrupted government and banking services, ostensibly responding to a political dispute.

 

      • Economic and Political Leverage. Cyber operations can also be used to influence the political or economic landscape of a nation. Cyber actors can weaken the target’s internal stability or manipulate public opinion by compromising data, spreading disinformation, or interfering in political processes. For example, the use of disinformation campaigns, such as those seen during the 2016 U.S. presidential election, can be considered a form of cyber coercion, aiming to sway public opinion or disrupt the political process in a way that benefits the actor behind the campaign.

 

      • Coercive Diplomacy. Cyber operations can be used to exert pressure in diplomatic negotiations. By threatening or carrying out cyberattacks, an actor can force a country to the table or push for concessions. This form of coercion often leverages the uncertainty surrounding the attribution of cyberattacks to pressure adversaries into compliance without needing to escalate to kinetic warfare.

 

      • Limited Engagement and Escalation Control. Unlike traditional military force, cyberattacks are often more ambiguous in attribution, allowing states to engage in coercion while maintaining a level of plausible deniability. This provides the attacker with the ability to escalate or de-escalate as needed. This ambiguity can be advantageous for coercion, as it leaves the targeted state uncertain about the full scale of potential retaliation, which might lead them to make concessions to avoid further escalation.

 

      • Challenges and Considerations. One of the critical challenges in cyber strategic coercion is the difficulty of attributing attacks to specific actors. This ambiguity can complicate retaliatory measures, but it also means that the target may need help to assess the nature or scale of the threat entirely. While cyber coercion is often seen as a way to avoid full-scale military conflict, it still carries the risk of escalating tensions. A cyberattack might provoke a traditional military response or lead to unforeseen consequences, making it a double-edged sword. Cyber coercion can also test the limits of international law and norms. Many international agreements and conventions were written before the rise of cyber capabilities and the line.

 

Analysis: The Role of Cyber Warfare in Modern Geopolitics. Both cyber posturing and cyber strategic coercion have reshaped the nature of conflict and statecraft in the digital age. While the physical world constrains traditional warfare, cyber operations have no such boundaries, making it easier for states to influence global power dynamics. Cyberattacks are faster, cheaper, and often more ambiguous than traditional military operations, providing states with new tools for shaping international relations. The strategic ambiguity inherent in cyber operations—where attribution is usually unclear—gives states an advantage in using cyber posturing and coercion. The lack of clear attribution makes it difficult for adversaries to respond proportionally, potentially leading to heightened tensions and escalation risks. However, this very ambiguity also complicates the enforcement of international norms and laws governing cyber warfare. George Washington University’s Bruce Schneier states, “Cyber weapons exist in a grey zone where international law and traditional military rules do not apply with clarity.” This uncertainty will likely persist as cyber operations evolve, posing challenges to the global order.

 

Conclusion. Cyber posturing and cyber strategic coercion represent a new frontier in geopolitical power projection. By using the digital realm to signal strength or coerce adversaries, states can achieve their objectives without resorting to traditional forms of warfare. As demonstrated by the actions of nations like Russia, Iran, and North Korea, cyber operations have become integral tools in the arsenal of modern statecraft. Cyber posturing and strategic coercion are powerful tools for statecraft, enabling actors to achieve their geopolitical objectives through non-kinetic means. However, it requires careful calculation, as it can lead to unintended escalation or miscalculation due to the ambiguity and complexity of the cyber domain. The growing reliance on cyber tools for coercion highlights the need for robust international agreements on cyber conduct. As the world becomes increasingly interconnected, it is clear that the next stage in warfare will not only be fought on land, air, or sea but also in the cyber domain.

 

Your valuable comments are most welcome.

 

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Cyber Posturing And Cyber Strategic Coercion (Air Marshal Anil Khosla)

 

 

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References and credits

To all the online sites and channels.

References:-

  1. Lin, H, “Cybersecurity and Cyberwar: What Everyone Needs to Know”, Oxford University Press, 2020.
  1. Rid, T, “Cyber War Will Not Take Place”, Oxford University Press, 2013.
  1. Schneier, B, “Data and Goliath: The Hidden Battles to Collect Your Data and Control Your World”, W. W. Norton & Company, 2015.
  1. Alberts, D. S, “The Influence of Information on Military Operations”, Journal of Strategic Studies, 2008.
  1. Chon, G, “North Korea’s Cyber Heists and the Global Financial System.” The Financial Times, 2016.
  1. Gartenstein-Ross, D, “Iran’s Cyber Strategy: A Framework for Analysis.” International Security Program, The Atlantic Council, 2014.
  1. Mueller, R, “Report on Russian Interference in the 2016 Presidential Election”. United States Department of Justice, 2019.
  1. FBI. “WannaCry Ransomware.” Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2017.

Disclaimer:

Information and data included in the blog are for educational & non-commercial purposes only and have been carefully adapted, excerpted, or edited from reliable and accurate sources. All copyrighted material belongs to respective owners and is provided only for wider dissemination.

497: CHINA’S MILITARY REORGANISATION: A STORY OF EVOLUTION AND REVERSION  

 

 

My Article published in the Newsanalytics journal

 

China’s military modernisation has been a critical focus for the Chinese government over the past few decades. This process involves significant investments in technology, equipment, training, and organisational reforms to transform the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) into a world-class military force. China has a set target of 2027, the year of its centenary, to achieve its modernisation goals, paving the way for it to become a “world-class” military power by 2049.

 

China’s military reorganisation is crucial to its broader modernisation efforts to transform the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) into a more efficient, capable, and flexible force. The process involved several vital reforms and structural changes, including the establishment of the Joint Staff Department, the creation of the Central Military Commission (CMC), the formation of Theatre Commands, and the reorganisation of Military Services and Branches. The reforms have implications for regional security dynamics and are closely watched by other countries.

 

Reorganisation. Significant military and state security apparatus reforms have been implemented under the leadership of Xi Jinping, who assumed China’s presidency on 14 March 2013. Xi’s military restructuring has been guided by the long-term strategic purpose of national rejuvenation and the need to respond to the conflicts of the 21st century. The reorganisation began in 2015 and included renaming the Second Artillery the Rocket Force, creating a Joint Logistics Force, and establishing the Strategic Support Force (SSF). All of these measures were intended towards the approach that “The CMC governs, services train and equip, and the theatres fight.”

 

Strategic Support Force. The China Joint Strategic Support Force (SSF) was established on December 31, 2015, as part of the broader military reforms to modernise and integrate various aspects of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). Creating the Strategic Support Force (SSF) was a unique and innovative move that showcased China’s strategic thinking. It was designed as a cross-discipline, multi-domain warfare force, a concept that had no equivalent in any other military. The SSF was intended to consolidate space, cyber, electronic, and psychological warfare capabilities under one umbrella, making it a crucial and formidable component of China’s military strategy.

 

Reversion. On 19 April 2024, the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) Central Military Commission (CMC) announced the end of the PLA’s Strategic Support Force (SSF), the creation of a new Information Support Force (ISF), and the re-designation of The SSF’s Aerospace Systems and Network Systems departments as the Aerospace Force (ASF) and Cyberspace Force (CSF) respectively. These forces can be considered PLA equivalents to US functional combatant commands, non-geographically defined joint-force structures intended to support services and military theatres by providing critical capabilities and operations in strategic domains of warfare. These three organisations will manage offensive and defensive PLA information capabilities, including communications networks, global and space-based ISR capabilities, and offensive and defensive cyber and electronic warfare. They will operate alongside the Joint Logistics Support Force, established in 2016, and report directly to the PLA’s CMC, making the new “4+4″ military structure directly subordinate to the Central Military Commission. The CMC, headed by Xi, is the top party organ in charge of China’s military and paramilitary forces.

 

Possible Reasons. While the exact reasons behind this significant reshuffle remain a mystery, it’s clear that a complex interplay of factors related to military capability and political control influenced this decision. The potential reasons for this change are numerous and open to speculative interpretation, underscoring the significant impact of this event and its potential to reshape the military landscape.

 

    • CMC’s dissatisfaction with the SSF’s performance is a possible reason. The SSF had become a bloated organisation due to the integration of various departments. Even after eight years, the SSF’s elements could not be integrated and operated as separate entities.

 

    • Political considerations may also have led to the organisational change. As the information and space domains (and related capability development) intersect with areas of political sensitivity and China’s foreign affairs, a desire to gain greater control may have been the reason for the restructure. By removing the layers of bureaucracy between the CMC and the ASF, CSF and ISF, Xi gains greater oversight of the strategic force.

 

    • Speculation on motive includes the possibility of corruption at the highest levels. Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption campaign has regularly targeted commanders and generals. The disappearance from public view of the former SSF commander, General Ju Qiansheng, and the former SSF Deputy Commander, Lieutenant General Shang Hong (responsible for the former SSF Aerospace Systems Department), has led to speculation of corruption in the SSF akin to the Rocket Force.

 

    • Recent ongoing wars between Russia and Ukraine and between Israel and Hamas have demonstrated the importance of shaping the public perception of a conflict and flexibility in the release and use of resources in cyber, space, information and electronic domains. Strategic Support Force was an unnecessary layer in the command and control chain.

 

Information Support Force (ISF). The People’s Liberation Army’s Information Support Force (ISF) replaced the former Strategic Support Force (SSF). This restructuring is part of a broader effort to enhance the PLA’s capabilities in information warfare and streamline its command structure. The ISF has been assigned the functions of the former Information Communication Base (ICB) and elevated from a corps-grade organisation to a deputy theatre-grade organisation. The ISF and the other three arms are now one grade lower than the PLA’s five theatre commands and each of the four services. The ISF would be crucial in integrating and coordinating various information systems across the PLA, ensuring it operates efficiently in modern, informatised warfare.

 

Implications. The creation of the ISF underscores the importance the Chinese leadership places on information operations and cyber warfare. PLA no longer sees information warfare as a tactical or operational resource but as a strategic outcome. The restructuring reflects an ongoing adaptation to modern military needs, particularly in the cyber, space, and information security domains, which are increasingly critical in contemporary multi-domain conflicts. Xi Jinping, the CMC, and the PLA are unwavering in their pursuit of dominance in information warfare. This strategic goal will remain a key focus, regardless of the challenges and changes that may arise, even if it entails slippage in the 2027 deadline for PLA to be fully modernised.

 

Improved Efficiency. The ISF, along with the newly formed Cyberspace Force and Aerospace Force, will be under the direct control of the Central Military Commission (CMC). The CMC has restructured the PLA’s overall hierarchy, directly overseeing four services, five joint-force military theatres, and four joint support forces. This reorganisation, aimed at streamlining command and reducing management layers, will ensure more direct oversight and quicker decision-making, enhancing China’s military efficiency.

 

Indian Perspective. China’s military modernisation and evolving reorganisation present a complex array of strategic challenges and implications for India. In the future, India, like other countries, will face confronting situations and be compelled to respond. China’s focus on these warfare domains signals a shift towards newer forms of warfare, where information, cyber, and space operations could become essential elements of military strategy. The rapid growth of the PLA’s military capabilities and the belligerent attitude of China necessitates enhancing India’s military capabilities on priority. India needs to reorient and reorganise to develop a warfare capability in the strategic domains of space, cyber, electromagnetic, and information.

 

It is too soon to predict the effect of recent developments on the PLA’s ability to fight and win wars. Notwithstanding, the PLA’s restructuring is a significant development that will have far-reaching implications for China’s military capabilities and strategic posture. It reflects China’s growing emphasis on modernising its military and developing advanced cyber and space warfare capabilities. It reflects a clear shift in China’s military strategy and doctrine. The PLA’s new structure will enable it to operate more effectively in a rapidly changing global security environment and enhance China’s ability to project its power and influence beyond its borders. The evolutionary process may provide additional time for the affected countries to take appropriate measures to face future challenges.

 

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References and credits

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References:-

  1. Matt Bruzzese and Peter W. Singer “Farewell to China’s Strategic Support Force”, Defenseone, 28 Apr 2024.
  1. Dean Cheng, “Why Xi created a new Information Support Force, and why now”, Breaking Defense Indo-Pacific, 29 Apr 2024.
  1. Kartik Bommakanti, “China removes the PLASSF and establishes ISF: Implications for India”, Observer Research Foundation, 15 May 2024.
  1. Joe McReynolds and John Costello, “Planned Obsolescence: The Strategic Support Force In Memoriam (2015-2024)”, The Jamestown Foundation, 26 Apr 2024.
  1. Tenzin Younten, “China’s Latest Military Reorganization Terminates the PLA SSF & launches Three New Arm Forces based on it: Strategic implications of the PLA’s latest Reforms and Structural Changes”, 26 Apr 2024.
  1. Joe Keary, “Four services and four arms lifts CCP control over information warfare”, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 24 May 2024.
  1. Kalpit A Mankar and Satyam Singh, “Tracking China’s moves on information warfare”, Observer Research Foundation, 22 May 2024.
  1. Amber Wang, “New force for China’s PLA eyes modern warfare information support”, South China Morning Post, 23 Apr 2024.
  1. Lindsay Maizland, “China’s Modernizing Military”, Council on Foreign Relations, 05 Feb 2020.

Disclaimer:

Information and data included in the blog are for educational & non-commercial purposes only and have been carefully adapted, excerpted, or edited from reliable and accurate sources. All copyrighted material belongs to respective owners and is provided only for wider dissemination.

US REPORT ON CHINA: EXCERPTS OTHER DOMAINS

ADVANCING TOWARDS AN INFORMATIZED MILITARY

 

  • The PLA considers information operations (IO) as a means of achieving information dominance early in a conflict and continues to expand the scope and frequency of IO in military.

 

  • The PLA is pursuing next-generation combat capabilities based on its vision of future conflict, which it calls “intelligentized warfare,” defined by the expanded use of AI and other advanced technologies at every level of warfare.

 

  • The PRC is advancing its cyberspace attack capabilities and has the ability to launch cyberspace attacks—such as disruption of a natural gas pipeline for days to weeks—in the United States.

 

SPACE AND COUNTERSPACE CAPABILITIES

 

 

  • The PLA views space superiority, the ability to control the space-enabled information sphere and to deny adversaries their own space-based information gathering and communication capabilities, as critical components to conduct modern “informatized warfare.”

 

  • The PLA continues to invest in improving its capabilities in space-based intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), satellite communication, satellite navigation, and meteorology, as well as human spaceflight and robotic space exploration.

 

  • The PLA continues to acquire and develop a range of counterspace capabilities and related technologies, including kinetic-kill missiles, ground-based lasers, and orbiting space robots, as well as expanding space surveillance capabilities, which can monitor objects in space within their field of view and enable counterspace actions.

 

NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES

 

 

  • Over the next decade, the PRC will continue to rapidly modernize, diversify, and expand its nuclear forces. Compared to the PLA’s nuclear modernization efforts a decade ago, current efforts dwarf previous attempts in both scale and complexity.

 

  • The PRC is expanding the number of its land-, sea-, and air-based nuclear delivery platforms while investing in and constructing the infrastructure necessary to support further expansion of its nuclear forces.

 

  • In 2022, Beijing continued its rapid nuclear expansion, and DoD estimates that the PRC possessed more than 500 operational nuclear warheads as of May 2023—on track to exceed previous projections.

 

  • DoD estimates that the PRC will probably have over 1,000 operational nuclear warheads by 2030, much of which will be deployed at higher readiness levels and will continue growing its force to 2035 in line with its goal of ensuring PLA modernization is “basically complete” that year, which serves as an important milestone on the road to Xi’s goal of a “world class” military by 2049.

 

  • The PRC probably will use its new fast breeder reactors and reprocessing facilities to produce plutonium for its nuclear weapons program, despite publicly maintaining these technologies are intended for peaceful purposes.

 

  • The PRC probably completed the construction of its three new solid-propellant silo fields in 2022, which consists of at least 300 new ICBM silos, and has loaded at least some ICBMs into these silos. This project and the expansion of China’s liquid-propellant silo force is meant to increase the peacetime readiness of its nuclear force by moving to a launch-on-warning (LOW).

 

  • The PRC is fielding the DF-5C, a silo-based liquid-fueled ICBM armed with a nuclear warhead with a multi-megaton yield. The PRC is fielding the longer-range JL-3 SLBMs on its current JIN class SSBN, rendering them capable of ranging the continental United States from PRC littoral waters.

 

CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL RESEARCH

 

 

  • The PRC continues to engage in biological activities with dual-use applications, which raise oncerns regarding its compliance with the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). This includes studies at PRC military medical institutions on potent toxins with dual-use.

 

  • The PRC likely possesses capabilities relevant to chemical and biological warfare that pose a threat to U.S., Allied, and partner forces, military operations, and civilian populations.

 

  • The United States cannot certify that the PRC has met its obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) due to concerns regarding the PRC’s research on pharmaceutical-based agents (PBAs) and toxins with potential dual-use applications.

 

OPERATIONAL STRUCTURE AND ACTIVITIES ON CHINA’S PERIPHERY

 

 

  • The PRC continues to refine military reforms associated with the establishment of the Eastern, Southern, Western, Northern, and Central Theater Commands, which are organized based on the PRC’s perception of peripheral threats.

 

  • Under the direction of the CMC, each Theater Command has operational authority over the PLA conventional forces within the theater.

 

  • In August 2022, the PLA carried out large-scale joint military exercises aimed at pressuring Taiwan. The exercises included firing ballistic missiles over Taiwan’s main island, over a dozen naval patrols, and hundreds of flights into Taiwan’s claimed ADIZ.

 

DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SECURITY SITUATION IN THE SCS

 

  • The PRC states that international military presence within the SCS is a challenge to its sovereignty.

 

  • Throughout 2022, the PRC deployed PLAN, CCG, and civilian ships to maintain a presence in disputed areas, such as near Scarborough Reef and Thitu Island, as well as in response to oil and gas exploration operations by rival claimants within the PRC’s claimed “nine-dash line.”

 

  • During 2022, the PRC conducted multiple coercive actions against the Philippines in the SCS, including cutting the tow line of a Philippine Navy vessel, executing dangerous maneuvers in close proximity to Philippine vessels; and reportedly reclaiming several unoccupied land features in the SCS, which the Philippines noted contravenes the Declaration of Conduct on the South China Sea’s undertaking on self-restraint and the 2016 Arbitral Award.

 

DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SECURITY SITUATION IN THE TAIWAN STRAIT

 

  • In 2022, the PRC amplified diplomatic, political, and military pressure against Taiwan. The PLA’s increased provocative and destabilizing actions in and around the Taiwan Strait included ballistic missile overflights of Taiwan, sharply increased flights into Taiwan’s self- declared ADIZ and a series of major military exercises near Taiwan.

 

  • At the 20th Party Congress in 2022, Xi Jinping repeated the CCP’s longstanding public position that China seeks peaceful unification with Taiwan but would never renounce the use of force as an option.

 

  • The PLA practiced elements of each of its military courses of action against Taiwan during its August 2022 large-scale military exercise aimed at pressuring Taiwan, and again in April 2023 in response to Taiwan president Tsai Ing-wen’s transit of the United States.

 

PLA COERCIVE AND RISKY OPERATIONAL BEHAVIOR

 

  • Between the fall of 2021 and fall of 2023, the United States has documented over 180 instances of PLA coercive and risky air intercepts against U.S. aircraft in the region – more in the past two years than in the previous decade. Over the same period, the PLA has conducted around 100 instances of coercive and risky operational behavior against U.S. Allies and partners, in an effort to deter both the United States and others from conducting lawful operations in the region.

 

  • Examples of the PRC’s coercive and risky operational behavior against S. and Allied aircraft have included lasing; reckless maneuvers; close approaches in the air or at sea; high rates of closure; discharging chaff or flares in front of, or in close proximity to, aircraft; and other actions.

 

  • The PLA’s behavior contravenes flight safety protocols and the international maritime rules of the road, and increases the risk of a major accident, incident, or crisis, including the potential for loss of life.

THE PLA’S GROWING GLOBAL PRESENCE

 

  • CCP leaders view the PLA’s growing global presence as an essential part of the PRC’s international activities to create an international environment conducive to China’s national rejuvenation.

 

  • The CCP has tasked the PLA to develop the capability to project power outside China’s borders and immediate periphery to secure the PRC’s growing overseas interests and advance its foreign policy This has led to the PRC’s greater willingness to use military coercion— and inducements—to advance its global security and development interests.

 

  • In 2022, the PLA continued to normalize its presence overseas through participation UN peacekeeping operations and anti-piracy escorts in the Gulf of Aden and waters off Somalia. The also PLA restarted in-person military diplomacy in 2022 that was suspended due to COVID-19.

PLA OVERSEAS BASING AND ACCESS

 

  • The PRC is seeking to expand its overseas logistics and basing infrastructure to allow the PLA to project and sustain military power at greater distances. If realized, a global PLA military logistics network could disrupt S. military operations as the PRC’s global military objectives evolve.

 

  • Beyond the PLA support base in Djibouti, the PRC is very likely already considering and planning for additional military logistics facilities to support naval, air, and ground forces projection.

 

  • In June 2022, a PRC official confirmed that the PLA would have access to parts of Cambodia’s Ream Naval The PRC probably also has considered other countries as locations for PLA military logistics facilities, including Burma, Thailand, Indonesia, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, United Arab Emirates, Kenya, Equatorial Guinea, Seychelles, Tanzania, Angola, Nigeria, Namibia, Mozambique, Bangladesh, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, and Tajikistan.

 

  • The SSF operates tracking, telemetry, and command stations in Namibia, Pakistan, Argentina, and The SSF also has a handful of Yuan-wang space support ships to track satellite and ICBM launches.

 

LESSONS LEARNED FROM RUSSIA’S WAR ON UKRAINE

 

  • The PRC almost certainly is learning lessons from the Russian war of aggression in Ukraine that are most applicable to the PRC’s goal of strengthening its whole-of-government approach to countering a perceived U.S.-led containment strategy.

 

  • Western sanctions against Russia almost certainly have amplified the PRC’s push for defense and technological self-sufficiency and financial resilience.

 

RESOURCES AND TECHNOLOGY FOR FORCE MODERNIZATION

 

  • The PRC’s long-term goal is to create an entirely self-reliant defense-industrial sector—fused with a strong civilian industrial and technology sector—that can meet the PLA’s needs for modern military capabilities.

 

  • The PRC has mobilized vast resources in support of its defense modernization, including through its Military-Civil Fusion (MCF) Development Strategy, as well as espionage activities to acquire sensitive, dual-use, and military-grade equipment.

 

  • In 2022, the PRC announced its official annual military budget would increase by 1 percent, continuing more than 20 years of annual defense spending increases and sustaining its position as the second-largest military spender in the world.

 

DEVELOPMENTS AND TRENDS IN ITS DEFENSE INDUSTRY

 

  • China’s hypersonic missile technologies have greatly advanced during the past 20 years and many of the PRC’s missile programs are comparable to other international top-tier producers.

 

  • China is developing beyond-visual-range air-to-air missiles and exploring missile capabilities that improve target-selection and make the missiles more resistant to countermeasures.

 

  • In 2022, China launched its first domestically designed and manufactured aircraft carrier, featuring an electromagnetic catapult launch and arresting devices. The carrier will be able to deploy up to 70 aircraft, including J-15 fighters and Z-9C anti-submarine helicopters.

 

ESPIONAGE ACTIVITIES SUPPORTING CHINA’S MILITARY MODERNIZATION

 

  • The PRC presents a sophisticated, persistent cyber-enabled espionage and attack threat to military and critical infrastructure systems through its efforts to develop, acquire, or gain access to information and advanced technologies.

 

  • There have also been multiple U.S. criminal indictments since 2015 involving espionage by PRC nationals, naturalized S. citizens or permanent resident aliens from the PRC, as well as U.S. citizens, for their efforts to illegally acquire information and technology to advance PLA modernization.

DEFENSE CONTACTS AND EXCHANGES IN 2022

 

  • In 2022, the PLA largely denied, cancelled, and ignored recurring bilateral engagements and DoD requests for communication. The PLA’s refusal to engage with DoD has largely continued in 2023.

 

  • The PLA’s refusal to engage in military-to-military communications with the United States, combined with the PLA’s increasingly coercive and risky operational behavior, raises the risk of an operational incident or miscalculation spiraling into crisis or conflict.

 

  • DoD is committed to re-opening lines of communication with the PRC to ensure competition does not veer into conflict. DoD’s objectives in opening lines of communication include ensuring crisis communications channels, reducing strategic and operational risk, and avoiding misperceptions.

 

COMING UP: DETAILED ANALYSIS WITH INDIAN PERSPECTIVE

 

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Information and data included in the blog are for educational & non-commercial purposes only and have been carefully adapted, excerpted, or edited from sources deemed reliable and accurate. All copyrighted material belongs to respective owners and is provided only for purposes of wider dissemination.