Tag: ASAT

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765: FROM SUPPORT TO DOMINANCE: EVOLUTION OF CHINA’S PLA AEROSPACE FORCE

 

In modern warfare, space has become the ultimate strategic high ground, where control over information and precision strikes can determine victory. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has transformed its aerospace capabilities from rudimentary support for ground operations in the mid-20th century to a sophisticated force poised for dominance. The establishment of the People’s Liberation Army Aerospace Force (PLAASF) on April 19, 2024, marks the culmination of this journey, shifting from fragmented, support-oriented systems to a centralised arm capable of offensive and defensive orbital operations. Under President Xi Jinping’s vision of a “world-class” military by 2049, the PLAASF integrates space-based command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR), launch infrastructure, and counterspace weapons. This evolution reflects China’s shift toward “informatised” warfare, where space assets enable joint operations across air, sea, land, and cyber domains. Drawing lessons from conflicts like the Russia-Ukraine war, where satellite disruptions proved decisive, Beijing aims for space superiority to safeguard its global interests, from the South China Sea to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). With control over 245+ military satellites and key launch sites, the PLAASF signals China’s ambition to reshape Indo-Pacific security and global power dynamics.

 

Origins and Rationale. China’s military space program began during the Cold War, initially as a symbol of national prestige. In 1956, the PLA’s missile program, spurred by Soviet assistance and Mao Zedong’s ambition to counter U.S. dominance, was housed under the Seventh Ministry of Machine Building. The 1960 launch of China’s first sounding rocket marked early progress, followed by Project 714 in 1967, a clandestine effort to send astronauts into orbit by 1973. The Cultural Revolution stalled these ambitions, but Deng Xiaoping’s 1980s reforms refocused the PLA on modernisation. The 1991 Gulf War, showcasing U.S. precision strikes via GPS-guided munitions, exposed PLA vulnerabilities and spurred the concept of “informatised local wars,” emphasising C4ISR to counter U.S. intervention, particularly over Taiwan.

The 1990s saw bureaucratic struggles, with space assets scattered across the PLA Air Force (PLAAF), Rocket Force (PLARF), General Armament Department, and General Staff Department. The 1999 Shenzhou program, though civilian in appearance, masked military intent, while the 2007 SC-19 anti-satellite (ASAT) test—a kinetic kill of a defunct satellite—demonstrated China’s counterspace resolve. Xi Jinping’s 2015 reforms created the Strategic Support Force (SSF) to consolidate space, cyber, and electronic warfare, but inefficiencies persisted due to overlaps in satellite control and missile warning systems. The SSF’s 2024 dissolution and the PLAASF’s creation under the Central Military Commission (CMC) addressed these issues, elevating space to a dedicated arm. Xi’s vision underscores space as vital for “multidomain operations,” enabling deterrence, power projection, and protection of overseas interests, marking a shift from prestige to warfighting.

 

Organisation and Structure.

The PLAASF, headquartered in Beijing’s Haidian District, reports directly to the CMC, bypassing theater commands for centralised control. Led by a corps deputy-grade commander (likely a lieutenant general) and a political commissar, it integrates the SSF’s Space Systems Department into specialised bureaus for launch, telemetry, tracking, and control (TT&C), and counterspace operations. With an estimated 100,000–150,000 personnel, it blends PLAAF veterans and SSF specialists across six corps-grade operational commands, including satellite control centres and launch facilities.

Key components include the Aerospace Engineering University, training engineers in satellite operations and ASAT tactics, and corps-grade Space Operations Bases for offensive and defensive missions, including ASAT coordination. The PLAASF interfaces with the Information Support Force for network-centric operations and resolves pre-2024 frictions, such as PLAAF-SSF radar overlaps, by centralising ballistic missile defence (BMD) cueing. Theater commands retain liaison officers for joint exercises, ensuring support for regional contingencies like Taiwan. The PLAASF’s CMC-centric design fosters rapid decision-making, mirroring U.S. Space Force models while prioritising Party oversight. Challenges remain, including integrating civilian dual-use assets like BeiDou and resolving PLAAF holdovers like space telescopes.

The Space Bases. The PLAASF’s infrastructure comprises four primary launch centers and a robust TT&C network, supporting 68 launches in 2024 (66 successful, deploying 260 payloads, 26% ISR-capable). Key facilities include:

    • Jiuquan Satellite Launch Center (Base 10). In Inner Mongolia’s Gobi Desert, operational since 1958, it handles Long March rockets for Yaogan reconnaissance satellites and Shenzhou crewed flights, supporting BMD tests.
    • Xichang Satellite Launch Center (Base 27). In Sichuan, it launches BeiDou navigation satellites into geosynchronous orbits, with upgrades for hypersonic tests.

Taiyuan Satellite Launch Center (Base 25). In Shaanxi, it focuses on polar orbits for meteorological and ELINT satellites, with new solid-fuel rocket pads for rapid ASAT deployments.

    • Wenchang Satellite Launch Center (Base 51). In Hainan, operational since 2016, it supports heavy-lift Long March 5 rockets for lunar missions and GEO assets like Queqiao relays.

Supporting these are TT&C bases,  Beijing Aerospace Control Center for mission oversight, Xi’an Satellite Control Center (Base 26) as backup, Luoyang’s Base 33 for metrology, and Lintong’s Base 37 (added 2023) for space domain awareness via phased-array radars. These hardened facilities ensure resilient constellations but face vulnerabilities like single-point tracking failures.

 

Capabilities and Arsenal

The PLAASF commands over 1,060 satellites, with 510+ ISR-capable, featuring optical, radar, and RF sensors for carrier detection and targeting. The BeiDou system, rivalling GPS, supports precision-guided munitions. The Yaogan series provides multispectral imaging, while Jianbing ELINT satellites map enemy emissions. Offensive capabilities include three co-orbital ASAT satellites for grappling or jamming and ground-based SC-19 missiles, coordinated with the PLARF. Jamming units, tested in 2023 South China Sea exercises, disrupt GPS and communication links. BMD systems integrate early-warning satellites with HQ-19 interceptors, cued by Base 37 radars. China’s global-leading launch cadence supports rapid constellation replenishment. Gaps include vulnerability to U.S. ASATs and limited deep-space operations, though 2024’s 260 payloads signal closing parity. Military-civil fusion accelerates innovation, with commercial entities enhancing launch and satellite capabilities.

 

Strategic Implications

The PLAASF strengthens China’s “active defence” doctrine, enabling “Taiwan by 2027” scenarios through space-enabled strikes and GPS denial, deterring U.S. intervention. It secures BRI assets, projecting power to regions like Djibouti. For adversaries, it escalates the space arms race, with ASAT debris risks prompting U.S. and allied investments in resilient constellations and space domain awareness. The PLAASF’s Party-centric structure risks rigidity in crises, but its centralised command enhances strike precision and information dominance. Globally, it challenges Western space norms, demanding diplomatic efforts to prevent conflict and ensure stability in a multipolar space order.

 

Conclusion

The PLAASF’s evolution from a support role to a strategic force underscores China’s ambition to dominate the orbital domain. By centralising command, professionalising space careers, and integrating launch, satellite, and counterspace capabilities, it positions China as a peer competitor to the U.S. in space. The PLAASF’s ability to conduct enabling and denial operations reshapes Indo-Pacific deterrence and global security. As it matures, its doctrine and signalling will determine whether it fosters stability or heightens escalation risks, necessitating cooperative norms to govern space behaviour.

 

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Information and data included in the blog are for educational & non-commercial purposes only and have been carefully adapted, excerpted, or edited from reliable and accurate sources. All copyrighted material belongs to respective owners and is provided only for wider dissemination.

 

 

References:-

  1. Garretson, Peter A., and Namrata Goswami. China’s Space Ambitions: The PLA Aerospace Force and Global Implications. Air University Press, 2025.
  1. Office of the Secretary of Defence. Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2024. U.S. Department of Defence, 2024.
  1. McClintock, Brian, et al. China’s Space Strategy and Policy Evolution. Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), August 2024.
  1. “China’s 2024 Space Launch Schedule and PLAASF Capabilities.” SpaceNews, December 2024.
  1. Pollpeter, Kevin L., et al. China’s Space Enterprise: A New Domain for Military Competition. National Bureau of Asian Research, 2023.
  1. Johnson-Freese, Joan. “China’s Space Program: From Mao to Xi.” The National Interest, June 15, 2023.
  1. Burke, Kristin, and Matthew Irvine. “China’s Counterspace Capabilities and the Implications for U.S. Space Policy.” Air & Space Power Journal, vol. 34, no. 3, Fall 2020, pp. 22–38.
  1. Kania, Elsa B. “China’s Strategic Support Force and the Future of Space Operations.” Jamestown Foundation China Brief, vol. 20, no. 11, June 2020.
  1. Heginbotham, Eric, et al. “China’s Evolving Military Strategy: The PLA’s Approach to Space and Cyber Operations.” The China Quarterly, vol. 238, June 2019, pp. 447–469.
  1. Pollpeter, Kevin L., et al. “China’s Space Program: A New Tool for PRC ‘Soft Power’ in International Relations.” Journal of Strategic Studies, vol. 38, no. 4, 2015, pp. 440–466.
  1. Stokes, Mark A., and Dean Cheng. China’s Evolving Space Capabilities: Implications for U.S. Interests. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2012.
  1. Saunders, Phillip C., and Joel Wuthnow, eds. China’s Military Reforms and Modernization: Implications for the United States. National Defense University Press, 2020.

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718: INDIA’S HUMAN SPACEFLIGHT REVIVAL: A STRATEGIC LEAP IN THE GLOBAL SPACE RACE

 

Article Published in the Aug 25 edition of

the “News Analytics” Journal.

 

On June 25, 2025, India marked a historic milestone in its space exploration journey when Group Captain Shubhanshu Shukla, a distinguished Indian Air Force (IAF) test pilot, soared into orbit aboard the Axiom-4 (Ax-4) mission. As the second Indian astronaut to reach space and the first to visit the International Space Station (ISS), Shukla’s achievement, 41 years after Wing Commander Rakesh Sharma’s 1984 flight aboard a Soviet Soyuz, signifies India’s triumphant return to human spaceflight. The Ax-4 mission, a collaborative effort involving NASA, the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO), the European Space Agency (ESA), and Axiom Space, underscores India’s ambition to become a global space power. This milestone is a pivotal step for the Gaganyaan program, India’s first indigenous human spaceflight initiative, and reflects its broader strategic vision in a rapidly evolving space race.

 

Shubhanshu Shukla: A National Icon. Born on October 10, 1985, in Lucknow, Group Captain Shukla is a seasoned IAF test pilot with over 2,000 hours of flight experience on aircraft like the Su-30 MKI, MiG-21, and Jaguar. Commissioned in 2006 after graduating from the National Defence Academy with a Bachelor’s in computer science, he later earned a Master’s in aerospace engineering from the Indian Institute of Science. As the mission pilot for Ax-4, launched on a SpaceX Falcon 9, Shukla monitored flight systems, supported docking, and ensured crew safety during the 28-hour journey to the ISS.

Axiom-4: A Landmark in Collaboration. Launched from NASA’s Kennedy Space Centre, Ax-4, led by veteran astronaut Peggy Whitson, included mission specialists from Poland and Hungary, marking their return to human spaceflight after decades. The 14 – to 21-day mission involves over 60 experiments from 31 countries. India’s seven experiments focus on microgravity plant growth (fenugreek and green gram), microbial behaviour, muscle regeneration, and tardigrade resilience, advancing space agriculture, biotechnology, and health sciences for long-duration missions and Earth applications. The mission reflects a shift toward commercial spaceflight. A 2024 U.S.-India agreement allocated a NASA seat to ISRO, enabling NASA to prioritise deep-space missions while Axiom Space manages low Earth orbit operations. For India, Ax-4 provides operational experience, de-risking Gaganyaan and enhancing ISRO’s capabilities.

 

The New Space Race: A Multipolar Frontier

The 21st century has transformed space from a realm of scientific exploration into a strategic arena of geopolitical rivalry, commercial opportunity, and national interest. Once dominated by superpowers vying for prestige through moon landings, space is now a multipolar landscape where the United States, China, Russia, India, and private entities compete for influence, profit, and security. The stakes are high, encompassing military capabilities, resource extraction, and technological supremacy, as nations and companies race not just to explore but to shape the future.

Military Stakes: The Weaponisation. Space is increasingly militarised, with nations developing anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons, directed energy systems, and cyber tools to disrupt critical assets like GPS, reconnaissance, and communication satellites. The U.S., China, and Russia have tested ASAT capabilities, while India demonstrated its prowess with a 2019 ASAT test. The doctrine of “space deterrence” is now integral to defence strategies, with satellite resilience and redundancy becoming priorities. Orbital debris from such tests poses a threat to commercial satellites and international cooperation, yet the absence of binding global norms heightens the risk of escalation.

Long-Term Gains: Technology, Resources, and Influence. Space exploration drives innovation in AI, robotics, materials science, and propulsion, bolstering national competitiveness. Breakthroughs in hypersonics, nuclear propulsion, and in-situ resource utilisation (ISRU) could revolutionise defence and interplanetary travel, with civilian applications enhancing industrial leadership. Resources like lunar helium-3, a potential fusion fuel, and asteroid metals critical for electronics offer economic promise. Diplomatically, space power translates to geopolitical influence. Navigation systems like GPS, Galileo, and BeiDou confer strategic leverage.

Commercial Momentum: A New Gold Rush. The commercialisation of space is a transformative trend. Companies like SpaceX, Blue Origin, Virgin Galactic, and OneWeb are pioneering technologies that redefine access to orbit. Reusable rockets have slashed launch costs, satellite mega-constellations like Starlink provide resilient communication, and space tourism is becoming a reality. Lunar and asteroid mining, although still in its early stages, promises access to resources such as helium-3 and rare metals, potentially reshaping the global economy. The 2015 U.S. Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act, allowing private entities to claim celestial resources, has sparked debates over international space treaties, raising concerns about monopolisation and governance.

 

Global Players in the Space Race

United States: Sustained Dominance. The United States has maintained its space superiority since the Apollo era. However, its focus has shifted from symbolic missions to systemic control in recent years. NASA’s Artemis program, which aims to return astronauts to the Moon and eventually launch a mission to Mars, reflects scientific ambition and a strategic desire to secure permanent infrastructure beyond Earth. At the same time, the U.S. Space Force, established in 2019 as the sixth branch of the U.S. military, demonstrates an explicit acknowledgement that space is now a warfighting domain. Beyond governmental initiatives, U.S. strategy heavily relies on public-private collaboration. SpaceX, in particular, has revolutionised launch technology with reusable rockets, significantly reducing costs and increasing launch frequency. These capabilities not only benefit commercial goals but also provide logistical and tactical advantages in a military context. The deployment of Starlink,  A satellite internet constellation, offers dual-use utility, with the potential to provide secure communications during terrestrial conflicts, as seen in Ukraine.

China: The Strategic Challenger. China has emerged as the most formidable challenger to U.S. dominance in space. With the Chinese Communist Party’s state-backed, long-term strategic planning, space is central to China’s ambitions to become a global superpower. The China National Space Administration (CNSA) has launched missions to the Moon (Chang’e series), Mars (Tianwen-1), and built its space station, Tiangong, in low Earth orbit. China’s doctrine emphasises “civil-military fusion,” integrating civilian scientific missions with military readiness. The BeiDou satellite navigation system is a clear example, providing independence from U.S.-controlled GPS and enhancing the precision of China’s missile systems. China has also demonstrated anti-satellite (ASAT) capabilities, raising concerns about the weaponisation of space. In 2007, its successful ASAT test against one of its satellites marked a turning point in the strategic perception of space conflict.

Russia: Resilient Legacy. Russia’s space program, led by Roscosmos, builds on its Soviet-era legacy with reliable Soyuz rockets and extensive experience in crewed missions. The Luna-25 mission, though unsuccessful in 2023, reflects ongoing lunar ambitions, while partnerships with China on the International Lunar Research Station signal strategic alignment. Russia’s anti-satellite (ASAT) capabilities and GLONASS navigation system underscore its focus on maintaining military and technological influence in space.

 

India: The Cost-Effective Contender

India has become a rising space power through its cost-effective and technologically ambitious missions. The Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) has demonstrated its capacity with landmark missions such as Chandrayaan (Moon), Mangalyaan (Mars), and most recently, Chandrayaan-3, which made India the first country to land on the Moon’s South Pole. With its 2019 Mission Shakti ASAT test, India joined the exclusive club of nations capable of disabling satellites in orbit, underscoring its intention not only to explore space but also to defend its national interests there. As India plans its first crewed mission (Gaganyaan), its space ambitions are increasingly aligned with long-term geopolitical calculus.

Gaganyaan: India’s Indigenous Leap. Scheduled for 2027, Gaganyaan aims to send three astronauts to a 400-kilometer orbit for three days, showcasing India’s independent human spaceflight capability. Shukla, alongside Group Captains Prasanth Balakrishnan Nair, Ajit Krishnan, and Angad Prathap, trained in Russia and Bengaluru. ISRO’s development of a human-rated launch vehicle (HLVM3), life support systems, and precursor missions, such as the Space Docking Experiment (SpaDeX) and PS4-Orbital Experiment Module (POEM-4), ensures readiness. Shukla’s Ax-4 docking experience will refine Gaganyaan’s operations.

Strategic Vision and Global Impact. Gaganyaan is a cornerstone of India’s ambitions, including the establishment of the Bharatiya Antariksh Station (BAS) by 2035, with its first module launching in 2028, and a lunar mission by 2040. Engaging over 500 Micro, Small, and Medium Enterprises (MSMEs), ISRO aims to capture 8% of the global space market by 2033, building a $44 billion space economy and positioning India among elite spacefaring nations. Ax-4 reflects India’s strategy of balancing indigenous development with international collaboration. The mission’s hands-on experience prepares ISRO for BAS and lunar goals while elevating India’s global standing.

 

Conclusion

Space is no longer a remote frontier of science fiction; it is the ultimate high ground in a multipolar world. Whether through state actors racing to establish dominance, private companies transforming exploration into enterprise, or militaries securing orbital advantage, the dynamics of space are shaping the 21st-century balance of power. Group Captain Shubhanshu Shukla’s Ax-4 mission marks a new chapter in India’s space journey. By carrying the Indian flag to the ISS, he paves the way for Gaganyaan, BAS, and lunar ambitions. Rooted in global collaboration and strategic vision, the mission positions India as a rising space power. As Shukla declared, “This is the beginning of India’s human spaceflight,” a call to action for a nation poised to touch the stars with glory.

 

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Disclaimer:

Information and data included in the blog are for educational & non-commercial purposes only and have been carefully adapted, excerpted, or edited from reliable and accurate sources. All copyrighted material belongs to respective owners and is provided only for wider dissemination.

 

 

References:-

 

  1. Johnson, M. (2024, August 15). NASA and ISRO Announce Joint Collaboration on Axiom-4 Mission. NASA Press Release.

 

  1. Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO). (2025). Gaganyaan Programme: Human Spaceflight Mission.

 

  1. Press Trust of India. (2025, June 26). Group Captain Shubhanshu Shukla Becomes Second Indian in Space Aboard Ax-4 Mission—The Times of India.

 

  1. European Space Agency (ESA). (2025). Ax-4 Mission: International Collaboration and Scientific Experiments.

 

  1. The Hindu. (2025, June 25). Shukla’s Space Journey: From Lucknow to the ISS.

 

  1. SpaceX. (2025). Falcon 9 and Dragon: Axe-4 Mission Profile and Falcon 9 and Dragon spacecraft: Technical specifications.

 

  1. Indian Institute of Science (IISc). (2025). Microgravity Experiments for Ax-4 Mission.

 

  1. Press Information Bureau, Government of India. “Cabinet Approves India’s First Human Space Flight Programme Gaganyaan.” Press Release, December 28, 2018.

 

  1. Prasad, N. (2025, June 27). Group Captain Shukla’s Ax-4 mission: A milestone for India’s Gaganyaan. The Hindu.

 

  1. Kumar, S. (2025, June 26). Shubhanshu Shukla’s historic flight: India’s return to human spaceflight. The Times of India.

 

  1. Economic Times. “ISRO Gearing Up for Gaganyaan, Conducts Successful Tests of Crew Module Systems.” ETTech, February 2024.

 

  1. NDTV Science. “Gaganyaan Mission to be Launched in 2025, Says ISRO Chief.” NDTV.com, January 2025.

 

  1. United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs (UNOOSA). “International Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space: India’s Contributions.” UNOOSA Annual Report, 2023.

 

  1. Xinhua News Agency. (2024, December 10). China’s space ambitions: Tiangong and beyond.

 

  1. Aliberti, M., & Tugnoli, M. (2016). The Chinese space programme in the public and private spheres. European Space Policy Institute.

 

  1. Lele, A. (2020). India’s evolving space strategy: From technology demonstration to strategic autonomy. Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs, 7(2), 145–162.

 

  1. Bharadwaj, A. (2023). India’s rise as a space power: Strategy and symbolism. Observer Research Foundation.
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712: EYES IN THE SKY: OPERATION SINDOOR SPURS INDIA’S SPACE DEFENCE SURGE

 

My Article was published in the “Life of Soldier”  Journal, Aug 25.

 

In the wake of Operation Sindoor, conducted from May 7 to 10, 2025, India has launched an ambitious mission to enhance its space-based defence capabilities. The operation, a retaliatory strike against terror camps in Pakistan following the devastating Pahalgam attack on April 22, 2025, underscored the critical need for “deep” and “persistent” surveillance over adversarial territories. This necessity has prompted India to accelerate the deployment of 52 dedicated defence satellites under the Space-Based Surveillance (SBS) Phase-3 programme, which was approved in October 2024 with a budget of Rs 26,968 crore. Coupled with the finalisation of a comprehensive military space doctrine, India is poised to transform its strategic surveillance and defence framework, reducing reliance on foreign assets.

 

The Catalyst: Operation Sindoor

Operation Sindoor was a pivotal moment in India’s defence strategy, highlighting both the strengths and limitations of its current surveillance capabilities. The operation targeted terror infrastructure in Pakistan-occupied territories, relying on satellite imagery from foreign providers. While these assets provided critical intelligence, the operation exposed India’s dependence on external sources for real-time, high-resolution imagery. This dependency posed risks, including delayed access to data and potential vulnerabilities in data security, especially during high-stakes military engagements.

The Pahalgam attack, which killed 29 people, including civilians and security personnel, revealed gaps in India’s ability to monitor cross-border activities with the granularity and persistence required for pre-emptive or retaliatory actions. The subsequent success of Operation Sindoor, while a tactical victory, emphasised the need for an indigenous, robust, and self-reliant space-based surveillance system. The operation’s reliance on foreign satellites underscored the urgency to develop a dedicated constellation capable of providing continuous, high-resolution coverage of strategic areas, including Pakistan, China, and the Indian Ocean Region (IOR).

 

The Space-Based Surveillance (SBS) Phase-3 Programme

The Indian government had approved the SBS Phase-3 programme in October 2024, allocating Rs 26,968 crore to deploy 52 defence satellites. This ambitious initiative, led by the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) in collaboration with private industry, aims to establish a comprehensive space-based intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) network by 2029. The programme is structured to leverage both public and private sector expertise, with ISRO tasked with launching 21 satellites and three private companies deploying the remaining 31. Key Features of the Programme are as follows:-

 

Satellite Constellation. The 52 satellites will operate in a mix of low Earth orbit (LEO) and geostationary orbit (GEO). LEO satellites, positioned at altitudes between 500 and 900 km, will provide high-resolution imagery (up to 0.3 meters), ideal for detailed monitoring of military installations, troop movements, and infrastructure. GEO satellites, stationed at 36,000 km, will provide continuous wide-area coverage, which is critical for tracking maritime activities in the IOR and monitoring large-scale developments along India’s borders.

 

Technological Capabilities. The satellites will be equipped with advanced synthetic aperture radar (SAR) and electro-optical sensors, enabling all-weather, day-and-night imaging. SAR systems are exceptionally vital for penetrating cloud cover and monitoring during adverse weather conditions, a frequent challenge in regions like the Himalayas. The constellation will also incorporate secure communication links to ensure real-time data transmission to ground stations and military command centers.

 

Public-Private Partnership. The involvement of private companies marks a significant shift in India’s space strategy. Companies like Tata Advanced Systems, Larsen & Toubro, and startups such as Pixxel and Skyroot Aerospace are expected to contribute to satellite manufacturing and launch services. This collaboration aims to accelerate deployment, reduce costs, and foster innovation in India’s burgeoning private space sector.

 

Timeline and Deployment.  The first satellite launch is scheduled for April 2026, with the entire constellation expected to be operational by 2029. The phased rollout will prioritise coverage of high-threat areas, including the Line of Actual Control (LAC) with China and the Line of Control (LoC) with Pakistan, before expanding to broader regional surveillance.

 

Strategic Imperatives

The SBS Phase-3 programme is driven by India’s need to counter growing regional security challenges. China’s expansive space program, with over 1,000 satellites, including advanced ISR and anti-satellite (ASAT) capabilities, poses a significant threat. Beijing’s ability to disrupt or destroy satellites, demonstrated by its 2007 ASAT test, underscores the need for India to develop resilient and redundant space assets. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has integrated space-based ISR into its military doctrine, enabling precise targeting and real-time battlefield awareness, as seen in its activities along the LAC.

Pakistan, while less advanced in space technology, relies on Chinese support for its satellite capabilities, including the Pakistan Remote Sensing Satellite (PRSS-1). The growing China-Pakistan nexus necessitates enhanced surveillance to monitor joint military exercises, infrastructure development (e.g., the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor), and potential terror activities emanating from Pakistani territory.

The IOR, a critical maritime domain, is another focus area. With China’s increasing naval presence and the strategic importance of chokepoints like the Malacca Strait, India requires persistent surveillance to safeguard its maritime interests and counter piracy, smuggling, and hostile naval operations.

 

Complementary Initiatives: HAPS and Beyond

In addition to the satellite programme, the Indian Air Force (IAF) is pursuing three high-altitude platform systems (HAPS) aircraft to complement space-based ISR. These solar-powered, unmanned platforms, operating at altitudes of 18-20 km, can remain airborne for weeks, providing persistent surveillance over specific areas. HAPS aircraft are particularly suited for monitoring border regions and can serve as a cost-effective alternative to satellites for localised ISR missions.

The IAF is also exploring the integration of artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning (ML) to process vast amounts of satellite data. AI-driven analytics can identify patterns, detect anomalies, and provide actionable intelligence in real time, enhancing India’s ability to respond to threats swiftly.

 

Challenges and Opportunities

While the SBS Phase-3 programme and the military space doctrine represent a significant leap forward, challenges remain. The ambitious timeline requires seamless coordination between ISRO, private companies, and the military, which could face delays due to technical complexities or funding constraints. The private sector’s relative inexperience in defence-grade satellite manufacturing may also pose risks to quality and reliability.

Moreover, the global space environment is increasingly contested, with space debris and ASAT threats complicating satellite operations. India must invest in space situational awareness (SSA) capabilities to monitor and mitigate these risks. International norms on space militarisation, which are still in their infancy, could also impact India’s plans, necessitating diplomatic efforts to safeguard its interests.

On the opportunity front, the programme positions India as a significant space power, fostering technological innovation and economic growth through the private space sector. The public-private partnership model could serve as a blueprint for future defence projects, reducing costs and enhancing efficiency. Additionally, the doctrine’s focus on international cooperation opens avenues for technology transfers and strategic alliances, strengthening India’s geopolitical standing.

 

Conclusion

Operation Sindoor served as a wake-up call for India, highlighting the indispensable role of space-based surveillance in modern warfare. The SBS Phase-3 programme, with its 52 dedicated defence satellites, and the forthcoming military space doctrine mark a transformative step toward self-reliance and strategic dominance in the space domain. By addressing regional threats, leveraging public-private partnerships, and integrating advanced technologies like HAPS and AI, India is poised to secure its borders, maritime interests, and national security.

 

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Disclaimer:

Information and data included in the blog are for educational & non-commercial purposes only and have been carefully adapted, excerpted, or edited from reliable and accurate sources. All copyrighted material belongs to respective owners and is provided only for wider dissemination.

 

 

References:-

 

  1. Times of India (ToI). (2025). “India to Fast-Track 52 Defence Satellites After Operation Sindoor.”
  2. Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO). (2024). “Space-Based Surveillance Phase-3 Programme Overview
  3. Ministry of Defence, Government of India. (2024). “Approval of Rs 26,968 Crore for Defence Satellite Programme.” Press Release, October 2024.
  4. Defence Space Agency (DSA). (2019). “Mission Shakti and India’s Anti-Satellite Capabilities.” Government of India.
  5. Jane’s Defence Weekly. (2025). “India’s High-Altitude Platform System (HAPS) Acquisition for ISR Missions.”
  6. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). (2024). “China’s Space Programme and Anti-Satellite Capabilities.” SIPRI Yearbook 2024.
  7. Observer Research Foundation (ORF). (2025). “India’s Military Space Doctrine: A Strategic Roadmap.”
  8. The Hindu. (2025). “Operation Sindoor: India’s Response to Pahalgam Attack.” May 12, 2025.
  9. SpaceNews. (2024). “India’s Private Space Sector: Emerging Players in Defence Satellite Manufacturing.”
  10. Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). (2024). “Space Situational Awareness and the Contested Space Environment.”
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