Tag: airwar

Posted on

GIULIO DOUHET – RELEVANCE TODAY

Disegno tratto da “La figura e l’opera di Giulio Douhet. Atti, Caserta 1988”

Pic Courtesy: Internet

 

Giulio Doheut was born into a military family in Italy in 1869. He served as a professional artillery officer and was never trained as a pilot but he was an innovator and had the quality of stirring things up. He was appointed as the commander of Italy’s first aviation battalion before World War I. During the War, his impolitic criticism of his military and civilian superiors resulted in him being court-martialled and imprisoned for one year. However, the war (Battle of Caporetto) demonstrated that he was correct and was later exonerated. Soon after the war, Douhet was given a place of honour, but he left the service and passed his remaining years writing and speaking about airpower. He brought forth his Command of the Air in 1921 as an official publication. Douhet died in 1930.

 

Douhet’s Thoughts/Beliefs with Comments

 

The Main gist of Douhet’s theory was that airpower can make the war end quickly, thus making it comparatively more humane (lesser death and destruction).

 

Effect of an Early Air Attack. Douhet argued that an early air attack on the enemy’s vital centres could win a humane victory, while surface forces could contain the enemy.

“Mercifully, the decision will be quick in this kind of war, since the decisive blows will be directed at civilians, that element of the countries at war least able to sustain them. These future wars may yet prove to be more humane than wars in the past, because they may in the long run shed less blood”.

 

Comments

 

    • His thought (about humane victory) was that due to the use of air power, the conflict termination would be faster and overall death and destruction would be comparatively lesser.
    • War itself can never be humane. The death and destruction is the process and purpose of war.
    • Mankind has gone on to develop weapons of mass destruction.
    • Although the trend these days is for reduced tolerance to the loss of human life.
    • Warfare is changing wherein resorting to terror is becoming a norm, and terror strives on the loss of human life not only during hostilities but even during peacetime.
    • An early attack on the enemy’s vital centres to commence hostilities has become a norm but for the reason of creating destruction, disruption, chaos and confusion.

 

About Targeting and Orchestrating Air War. “The selection of objectives, the grouping of [attack] zones, and determining the order in which they are to be destroyed is the most difficult and delicate task in aerial warfare, constituting what may be defined as aerial strategy. The truth of the [targeting] matter is that no hard and fast rules can be laid down on this aspect of aerial warfare. It is impossible even to outline general standards because the choice of enemy targets will depend upon several circumstances, material, moral, and psychological, the importance of which, though real, is not easily estimated. It is just here, in grasping these imponderables, in choosing enemy targets, that future commanders of Independent Air Forces will show their ability”.

 

Comments.

 

    • Many scholars feel that he was vague on this matter, but he was right in that the use of air power and orchestrating air war is a complex subject not easily comprehensible.

 

    • The factors to be considered and imponderables are many, and laying down hard and fast rules is not possible. However, over the years some guidelines have been articulated.

 

    • His remarks leave an impression of sequential warfare, whereas airpower capability development allows parallel operations, conducting various campaigns simultaneously.

 

    • Orchestrating an air war has become both a science and an art.

 

    • Commanders (of both independent air forces and joint forces) have to decide on the allocation of percentages of air effort towards different campaigns being run concurrently. Also, dynamically change these depending on the developing situations.

 

On Air Superiority. Douhet argued that the first step in war—gaining command of the air—is achieved best by attacking the enemy’s airpower on the ground, at the airfields, and in the factories. He also believed that the bomber would always get through.

 

Comments.

    • Command/Control of the air is still a very relevant strategy/theory.
    • However, the degree of achievement (air supremacy, air superiority and favourable air situation) varies depending upon the disparity between the opposing forces.
    • Attaining air superiority by attacking the enemy’s airpower on the ground itself is the most desirable method, however, alternative means have evolved over the years for its achievement (attack on aircraft on the ground, operating surfaces, attack on storage facilities and supply chain of crucial aviation enabling supplies and reliance on AD weapons etc.).
    • Commencement of surface operations has been delinked from the earlier concept of sequential warfare, wherein, surface operations commenced after the dedicated air superiority counter-air campaign.
    • The survivability of bombers in contested airspace is doubtful. It needs a certain degree of air superiority and fighter protection with under coverage of AWACS/AEWC aircraft.

 

Air Exploitation. Douhet argued that the achievement of the command of the air itself would increase the enemy’s vulnerability to such a high level that their leaders would realise and capitulate. Otherwise, the next step would be to exploit that advantage immediately by attacking the cities and other vital targets to break the will of the people, forcing the government to relent. Douhet asserted that independent airpower would speed up the achievement of the objectives without much surface struggles, therefore the surface forces would only be required to defend.

 

Comments.

 

    • Achieving air superiority has a lot of advantages but does not assure a victory. It has to be exploited to gain the victory.

 

    • Human will has lots of resilience and is not easy to break. History is replete with examples wherein the attacks to break the will have instead strengthened it further.

 

    • Each force has its defined roles, tasks and core competencies. Warfare has evolved into a complex activity wherein no service alone can achieve national or military objectives. It has to jointly coordinate efforts with a proper understanding and utilisation of their respective strengths.

 

    • The warfare is no longer restricted to the domain of the military. It needs a coordinated effort by all the means of statecraft. The military-civil fusion has become extremely important.

 

Organisation Adaptation and Force Structure. Douhet propagated that to bring about victory over the enemy would require organising airpower under a separate air force. He argued that the humane short war could not be brought about under traditional military organisations with surface forces controlling and using the air assets for tactical victories. Douhet stressed on the development of an independent strategic air force, applying the economy of force principle on the surface forces, keeping in mind the country’s geography, existing threat perception and affordability.

 

Comments

 

    • He was right on the count that the airpower had and has a lot of potential beyond tactical employment.

 

    • Airpower has a role in both, tactical utilisation in a support role as well as independent operations (in coordination with surface forces) towards national security and objectives.

 

    • Ideally, the surface forces should have their air arm (equipped to their requirement) for utilisation according to the tenets of surface operations.

 

    • This would be an ideal situation (e.g. USA has four air arms, USAF, US Army aviation, US Navy air arm, and, the air arm of US Marines). However, it is not achievable by all due to affordability (air assets are costly to procure and maintain). The next best solution therefore is centralised placing and operation of air assets with joint planning and execution.

 

    • Specialist aircraft (fixed wing and helicopters) for close air support to the surface forces were in use for some time. However, with the proliferation of shoulder-fired AD weapons their efficacy has become doubtful. Secondly, the trend is to develop and maintain a fleet of multi-role aircraft.

 

Suggestions and value additions are most welcome

 

256
Default rating

Did you like This Post?

 

For regular updates, please register here:-

Subscribe

 

 

References and credits

David R. Mets, “The Air Campaign John Warden and the Classical Airpower Theorists” , Air University Press Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama

To all the online sites and channels.

 

Disclaimer:

Information and data included in the blog are for educational & non-commercial purposes only and have been carefully adapted, excerpted, or edited from sources deemed reliable and accurate. All copyrighted material belongs to respective owners and is provided only for purposes of wider dissemination.

 

Posted on

ORCHESTRATING AIR CAMPAIGN: THUMB RULES

 

Pic : Courtesy Internet

 

War is the most complex of human endeavours. It is baffling and intriguing. It is complex, demanding, and requires careful thought and cool execution.

 

The compelling task of the commander is to translate national war objectives into tactical plans at the operational level.

 

Four levels of war:-

    • Grand Strategic level.
    • Strategic level.
    • Operational level.
    • Tactical Level.

(As you go up the ladder, the ambiguity increases).

 

Mastery of the operational level strategy is a key to winning wars.

 

An air force inferior in numbers must fight better and smarter.

 

It is an art to identify the enemy’s Centre of Gravity (COG – a point where the enemy is vulnerable and where the application of force is most decisive).

 

Offensive Approach.

    • The initiative is retained.
    • Pressure is on the enemy.
    • War is taken to enemy territory.
    • All assets are used.
    • Yields positive results if successful.

 

Defensive Approach.

    • The initiative is with the enemy.
    • Some assets may lie idle.
    • At best yields neutral results.

 

Adopted approach

 

The approach to be adopted depends upon factors like political will, objectives, doctrinal guidance, own vis-à-vis enemy capability, and the force disparity (numerical and qualitative superiority are major factors).

 

Anticipate and predict enemy reactions and plans. Study the enemy psyche and categorise it (rational, irrational, fanatic, rigid, flexible, independent, innovative, determined etc.).

 

Enemy SWOT analysis and intelligence analysis are important to decide on the approach (Consider factors like Aircraft numbers and quality, weapons, training, network, combat support platforms, sensors, ability to absorb losses, vulnerabilities etc.).

 

A periodic review is required to decide on the continuation of the approach.

 

If enemy AD is strong – avoid it till you can punch holes in it and create blind zones.

 

If air combat capability is better than draw the enemy out.

 

Keep in mind

 

    • Air assets are always scarce – It is not possible to defend everything.

 

    • Scarce air resources are optimally utilised when shared and not kept idle on the ground – under command tendency should be avoided.

 

    • Scarce air resources cannot be everywhere and cannot precede every surface operation.

 

    • Operational commanders should stay away from tactical decisions – have faith in executors and concentrate on operational orchestration.

 

    • Air operations are conducted over a greater expanse of space and time as compared to surface operations.

 

    • Air power should not be seen as subordinate (supporting arm) to surface operations. The air element of surface forces should be used according to the tenets of the surface operations. Unambiguous and thorough doctrinal understating is essential.

 

    • It is difficult to predict the duration and intensity of war. The intensity of war generally depends on the value and interest of the side in what they are fighting for.

 

Planning considerations

 

    • Audacity does not lead to positive results every time – avoid the tendency to plunge into any and every fray.

 

    • The loss ratio is a function of the force ratio.

 

    • Concentration of forces, mass, numbers, weight of attack and force structure are important for inflicting prohibitive damage to the enemy.

 

    • Bad weather can be a spoilsport – choose the campaign/operational window carefully (it is also true for the enemy).

 

    • Fog of war, uncertainty in war and friction of war are realities to be dealt with.

 

    • An asset not used is an asset wasted – a sortie not flown is a sortie wasted. At the same time, a sortie saved is worth more than a sortie rashly flown.

 

    • War effort comes in surges and spurts. Accordingly, the approach could be to continuously engage in a war of attrition or to hit unexpectedly and wait.

 

    • Airpower can carry out parallel operations (campaigns). It is essential to decide the percentage of effort allotted to each campaign and to dynamically review it periodically depending upon the changing situation.

 

    • Deception (mystify and mislead) is very important to achieve surprise.

 

Air Superiority

 

It is a necessity. Air or Ground campaigns cannot succeed unless a certain degree of air superiority is achieved.

 

Air superiority by itself doesn’t guarantee victory.

 

Destroying the enemy aircraft is not the only way of achieving it.

 

Destroying enemy aircraft in the air is the most difficult and costly approach (it is easier to destroy them on the ground).

 

It can also be achieved by attacking the enemy bases – heavyweight of attack and revisits are required.

 

It can be achieved by targeting resources like fuel, and human resources (crew and pilots).

 

It can also be achieved by attacking production houses and supply chains.

 

Enemy command and control centres are also possible targets towards this aim.

 

Interdiction / Battlefield Strikes

 

Interdiction is as old and important as war itself – Airpower has added a new dimension to it.

 

It is a powerful, important and effective tool in the hands of commanders and planners.

 

Airpower should not be seen as airborne artillery – Airpower should generally be used for targets beyond the range of ground weapons (artillery).

 

Art is to decide what to and where to interdict between the source and the destination.

 

    • Distant Interdiction – most decisive but effective with a time lag,
    • Intermediate Interdiction – effective with a lesser time lag.
    • Close Interdiction – effective immediately and necessary during crises.

 

Choice of the platform depends on the degree of air control and enemy air defence capability and weapons – the vulnerability of fixed-wing combat support aircraft, helicopters and unmanned platforms (Drones) is high in contested airspace.

 

Suggestions and value additions are most welcome

 

For regular updates, please register here:-

Subscribe

 

 

References and credits

The Air Campaign: Planning for Combat by John A Warden III, 1988, National Defense University Press, Washington DC.

To all the online sites and channels.

 

Disclaimer:

Information and data included in the blog are for educational & non-commercial purposes only and have been carefully adapted, excerpted, or edited from sources deemed reliable and accurate. All copyrighted material belongs to respective owners and is provided only for purposes of wider dissemination.