810: PAKISTAN’S WAR OF ITS OWN MAKING: AFGHAN POLICY COMES FULL CIRCLE

 

In the early hours of February 27, 2026, explosions shook the Afghan capital Kabul. Pakistani jets streaked across the night sky, striking Taliban government defence facilities, ammunition depots, and military sites in Kabul, Kandahar, and the southeastern province of Paktia. Pakistan had done something almost unthinkable just a few years ago. It bombed the capital of a neighbouring country and declared that it was now in a state of “open war.” This was not an impulsive act but the result of years of deteriorating relations. The situation had been building since the Taliban returned to power in Afghanistan in 2021.

 

A Historical Overview of The Broken Brotherhood

Pakistan and Afghanistan share a relationship that defies easy description. The South Asian neighbours are both Muslim-majority states and share a 2,611-kilometer border.  For decades, Pakistan was among the most important backers of the Afghan Taliban, supporting the movement ideologically, financially, and logistically through its powerful Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) directorate. When the Taliban swept back into Kabul in August 2021 following the withdrawal of American and NATO forces, Pakistan initially welcomed the development as a strategic gain. Pakistan thought a friendly government in Kabul might counter Indian influence and give Islamabad so-called “strategic depth.”

That calculation unravelled almost immediately. The Taliban government in Kabul was not interested in being a client state of Islamabad. Far from reining in anti-Pakistan militant groups operating from Afghan soil, the Taliban appeared unwilling to do so. The Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) started using Afghan territory as a base from which to launch increasingly devastating attacks on Pakistan. Pakistan’s frontier provinces bordering Afghanistan (Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan) bore the brunt. Suicide bombings, ambushes on security forces, and targeted assassinations increased. A particularly devastating attack struck a Shia Mosque in Islamabad, killing at least 40 people and claimed by the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP), adding another militant dimension to Pakistan’s security nightmare.

At the same time, the Durand Line (the colonial-era boundary drawn by the British in 1893) remained a festering point of contention. Afghanistan has never formally recognised this border as legitimate, viewing it as an arbitrary demarcation that divides the Pashtun ethnic group between two states. The Taliban government maintained that position firmly, resisting Pakistan’s attempts to fence the border and frequently allowing its fighters to interfere with construction efforts. It is estimated that there had been at least 75 recorded clashes between Afghan and Pakistani forces along the Durand Line between 2021 and 2026, a frequency that made some form of major escalation almost inevitable.

 

The Military Balance

The difference in military strength between Pakistan and Afghanistan is stark. Pakistan, a nuclear-armed country, has a considerable military force with 660,000 active personnel (560,000 soldiers in the army, 70,000 in the air force, and 30,000 in the navy). Pakistan also boasts of 465 combat aircraft, over 260 helicopters, more than 6,000 armoured fighting vehicles, and over 4,600 artillery pieces.

The Afghan Taliban, by contrast, commands approximately 172,000 active military personnel. When the Taliban returned to power in 2021, it inherited a substantial inventory of US-supplied military equipment left behind by the former Afghan National Army, including armoured vehicles, artillery, and aircraft. But without international recognition, without access to spare parts, and without functioning military training institutions, much of that equipment became unusable. Afghanistan has no functioning air force to speak of: at most six aircraft, some of Soviet vintage, and 23 helicopters, the airworthiness of an unknown number of which remained in doubt.

On paper, Pakistan could crush the Taliban’s conventional military capacity with relative ease. Yet history has shown repeatedly that wars in Afghanistan are not won on paper. It is called the “Graveyard of Empires” for a reason. The Taliban’s fighters are combat-hardened veterans of a 20-year insurgency against the most powerful military alliance in history. They know their terrain intimately. And Islamabad should know better than most that guerrilla warfare in the mountains of Khost and Kunar can render any conventional military advantage irrelevant.

 

Collapse of the October 2025 Ceasefire

The crisis did not erupt without prior warning. In October 2025, Afghanistan and Pakistan had already fought a week of fierce and deadly clashes along their contested frontier. More than 70 people were killed on both sides in what at the time represented the worst bout of open fighting between the two neighbours in recent memory. The violence was enough to prompt international intervention. Qatar and Turkey brokered an emergency ceasefire in Doha, and for a few months, the shooting largely stopped.

But the ceasefire was always fragile. Sporadic violations continued, and none of the underlying causes had been addressed. Pakistan still wanted the Taliban to crack down on the TTP. The Taliban still refused to recognise the Durand Line. Militant attacks inside Pakistan continued. Border crossings, including the key Torkham and Chaman crossings, remained largely shut, causing severe economic strain on both sides and enormous suffering for Afghan refugees and returnees caught between two hostile states. Several rounds of negotiations followed the October ceasefire, reportedly involving Qatar and Turkey as mediators, but no lasting agreement emerged.

 

The February 2026 Skirmish

Pakistan launched airstrikes targeting what it described as militant camps belonging to the TTP and ISKP in Afghan provinces (Nangarhar, Paktika, and Khost). Islamabad claimed that the strikes had killed at least 70 terrorists. The Taliban government and independent observers had a different story. The UN mission in Afghanistan reported that at least 13 civilians had been killed in those initial Pakistani strikes. Taliban spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid said the attacks had “killed and wounded dozens, including women and children.” A provincial director of the Afghan Red Crescent Society said 18 people were killed and many more wounded in Nangarhar alone. These were not terrorists on a training ground, but residents of border villages.

Afghanistan issued a stern warning, which Pakistan dismissed. On the night of February 26, Afghan forces launched a large-scale offensive operation against Pakistan.  They targeted Pakistani military installations along the Durand Line.

Pakistan responded by launching Operation Ghazab lil Haq (Righteous Fury) on 27 Feb 26. It involved combined air and ground strikes against Taliban posts, headquarters, and ammunition depots.

According to Pakistan’s Information Minister Attaullah Tarar, the operation killed at least 133 Afghan Taliban fighters and wounded more than 200. Pakistan also claimed that 27 Taliban posts had been destroyed and nine captured, along with over 80 tanks, artillery pieces, and armoured personnel carriers. The Taliban gave a starkly different account: eight of its fighters killed and eleven wounded, and 55 Pakistani soldiers killed, with 19 posts seized. Neither set of figures could be independently verified by the time news organisations were reporting from the ground.

The conflict quickly introduced new dimensions of warfare. Afghanistan claimed its forces had “successfully conducted” drone strikes hitting military targets inside Pakistan. Pakistan’s Information Minister said the drone attempts had been intercepted by anti-drone systems in the cities of Abbottabad, Swabi, and Nowshera, with no damage to life.

The Torkham crossing remained one of the most dangerous and symbolically loaded flashpoints. It had been kept partially open for Afghans returning en masse from Pakistan. Now those returnees found themselves trapped between two armies.

 

Regional and Global Reactions

The international response to the outbreak of open war was swift and almost uniformly alarmed. The United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres was among the first to respond. He called for both parties to de-escalate immediately and continue to seek to resolve the differences through diplomacy.

India condemned Pakistan’s airstrikes. It described the strikes as “another attempt by Pakistan to externalise its internal failures”. It also affirmed India’s support for Afghanistan’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, and independence. Pakistan’s Foreign Office rejected India’s comments and alleged that the Taliban had become a proxy for India.

Iran has borders with both countries and has long positioned itself as a bridge between them. It called on both governments to resolve their differences within the framework of good neighbourliness. Iran also offered mediation and readiness to assist in facilitating dialogue.

China maintains close ties with both Pakistan and the Taliban government in Kabul. It expressed deep concern and conveyed Beijing’s willingness to play a constructive role in cooling the situation. Russia called on both parties to immediately halt cross-border attacks and offered to mediate if requested by both sides. Turkey’s Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan held separate calls with his counterparts in Pakistan, Afghanistan, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia to coordinate diplomatic pressure. Saudi Arabia’s Foreign Minister Faisal bin Farhan spoke with Pakistan’s Ishaq Dar to discuss “ways to reduce tensions.”

Former Afghan President Hamid Karzai, though holding no official position, issued a public statement. Pakistan cannot free itself from the self-created problems of violence and bombings. Still, it must change its own policy and choose the path of good neighbourliness, respect, and civilised relations with Afghanistan.

 

What Drives This War

The hostility between Pakistan and Afghanistan is the product of an irreconcilable contradiction. Pakistan created, supported, and enabled the Taliban as a strategic instrument for more than two decades. It sheltered the Taliban’s senior leadership during the years of US occupation. It allowed recruitment and fundraising on Pakistani soil. It lobbied internationally for international recognition of Taliban governance. Pakistan expected gratitude and compliance from the Taliban’s return to power in 2021.

What it got instead was a sovereign government that pursued its own interests. It refused to recognise the Durand Line, declined to crack down on the TTP, and increasingly viewed Islamabad as a threat rather than a patron. The Pakistani analyst Mariam Solaimankhil, a member of Afghanistan’s Parliament in Exile, framed it bluntly in a television interview during the crisis: “Pakistan is fighting the monster it helped create.” She argued that the TTP’s roots, the Afghan Taliban’s ideology, and the networks of militant groups were all products of Pakistani state policy over decades, and that the civilians now dying in Pashtun villages on both sides of the border, in Balochistan, in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, were paying the price for choices made in Rawalpindi’s military headquarters.

 

Where It Might Lead

Where the conflict goes from here remains deeply uncertain. The military balance favours Pakistan overwhelmingly in conventional terms, but history suggests that Afghanistan defeats its invaders not by winning battles but by outlasting occupiers. Pakistan has no stated intention of occupying Afghanistan. Still, each round of airstrikes radicalises new fighters, destroys what little infrastructure the Taliban government has, and strengthens the hand of hardliners on both sides.

The international community (China, Russia, Iran, Turkey, and the UN)  has called for de-escalation, but none of these actors has the leverage or the will to impose a solution. The United States, which spent 20 years and trillions of dollars trying to stabilise Afghanistan and failed, is unlikely to re-engage substantively. Qatar and Turkey, who brokered the October 2025 ceasefire that lasted barely four months, again tried to mediate, but without addressing the root causes. In this scenario, any ceasefire will be temporary.

The Durand Line was drawn by a British diplomat in 1893 to serve imperial interests. More than 130 years later, it remains a wound that neither side can agree to close. Until it is resolved, the cycle of violence that has defined this relationship will continue to grind on—one airstrike, one ceasefire, and one broken promise at a time.

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Disclaimer:

Information and data included in the blog are for educational & non-commercial purposes only and have been carefully adapted, excerpted, or edited from reliable and accurate sources. All copyrighted material belongs to the respective owners and is provided only for wider dissemination.

 

 

References:

Ahmed, R. (2000). “Taliban: Militant Islam, oil and fundamentalism in Central Asia”. Yale University Press.

Bijan Omrani, B. (2009). “The Durand Line: History and problems of the Afghan-Pakistan border”. Asian Affairs, 40(2), 177–195.

Center for Strategic and International Studies. (2021–2026). “Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan and regional militancy reports”. https://www.csis.org

Chatham House. (2021–2026). “Afghanistan post-2021 political and security analysis”. https://www.chathamhouse.org

Council on Foreign Relations. (2021–2026). “Backgrounders on Afghanistan, Taliban, and regional geopolitics”. https://www.cfr.org

International Crisis Group. (2021–2026). “Pakistan-Afghanistan border tensions and militancy reports”. https://www.crisisgroup.org

International Institute for Strategic Studies. (2025). “The military balance 2025”. Routledge.

Reuters. (2025–2026). “Coverage of Pakistan-Afghanistan conflict and regional tensions”. https://www.reuters.com

Rubin, B. R. (2002). “The fragmentation of Afghanistan: State formation and collapse in the international system” (2nd ed.). Yale University Press.

809: BOOK REVIEW – CONGRUENCE OF GANDHI’S PHILOSOPHY AND LEADERSHIP IN CONTEMPORARY INDIA

 

CONGRUENCE OF GANDHI’S PHILOSOPHY AND LEADERSHIP IN CONTEMPORARY INDIA

 

Dr M.R. Pattabhiram Published: May 2025

 

Gandhi never claimed to be a philosopher. He said: “All my philosophy, if it may be called that pretentious name, is contained in what I have said.” Yet decades after his assassination, scholars continue to mine his life for answers to questions. Dr M.R. Pattabhiram’s latest work joins that tradition, and does so from a perspective that is refreshingly practical rather than purely academic.

 

Dr M.R. Pattabhiram is a founder-trustee of the M.S. Ramaiah Foundation and leader of management, law, and degree education institutions in Bengaluru. His practitioner’s eye gives the book a grounded quality that purely academic works on Gandhi often lack.

 

The book’s core thesis is direct and timely.  It seeks to answer the question: Does Gandhi’s philosophy of Satya, Ahimsa, Satyagraha, Swaraj, Sarvodaya, and Antyodaya find genuine expression in contemporary Indian leadership? Pattabhiram’s honest answer is measured. There is partial congruence in parts of civil society, grassroots activism, and ethically led institutions. But there is divergence in practice. The electoral politics is driven by power rather than principle. In public life, it has drifted toward materialism.

 

Three arguments run through the book, each worth engaging with seriously. The first is Gandhi’s model of servant leadership (leading from behind, empowering the last person in the line, living the message before preaching it) as a corrective to the ego-driven and transactional leadership styles that dominate Indian politics and corporate life today. In a polarised contemporary India, Pattabhiram argues, this model is not a nostalgic ideal. It is a practical necessity.

 

The second is Sarvodaya, presented as a way to strengthen our national security and governance. Leadership that overlooks Antyodaya (the well-being of the last person) can cause uncontrollable instabilities.  A country’s unity is built from the ground up, not just from the top.

 

The third is the link between the erstwhile Swadeshi movement and today’s push for Aatmanirbharta. Pattabhiram beautifully highlights that real self-reliance goes beyond just boosting manufacturing or replacing imports. He connects Gandhian ideals from the 19th century with the urgent policy needs of the 21st century. This is truly what makes the book stand out.

 

The book’s greatest strength is its timeliness and relevance. Released in 2025, it addresses pressing questions about political corruption, communal polarisation, a widening trust deficit in institutions, sustainability, and the character of youth leadership. These are not real concerns of daily governance. Pattabhiram is right to insist that Gandhian views are useful for each of them.

 

Most significantly, the book appears to weigh the leader’s internal character (the ethical and spiritual dimensions) heavily, while underweighting the external mechanics of leadership in complex modern systems. Modern India operates within the constraints of competitive electoral politics, a globalised economy, professional bureaucracy, multi-domain national security challenges, and the relentless pressure of economic liberalisation. How Gandhian non-violence and moral politics function within those constraints is the question that most needs answering.

 

The practical orientation is a second, significant strength. Many academic works on Gandhian philosophy remain confined to theory. This book benefits visibly from the author’s experience of running real institutions under practical constraints. The insights are actionable.  The book is best suited for students and practitioners of political science, leadership development, public administration, education, and management. It is also relevant for anyone seeking to ground their professional practice in indigenous ethical traditions rather than imported management theory.

 

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808: REASSESSING COMPREHENSIVE NATIONAL POWER IN THE INDIAN CONTEXT

 

Article published on the “Chakra Dialogues Foundation” website on 02 May 26. 

 

In the lexicon of contemporary statecraft, few concepts have generated as much analytical attention and strategic utility as Comprehensive National Power (CNP). As the twenty-first century has complicated the relationship between coercion and cooperation, between hard and soft instruments of statecraft, CNP has become the preferred analytical lens of strategic planners. CNP offers a multidimensional framework for assessing a state’s capacity to pursue its interests, shape its environment, and sustain its influence over time.

India today is navigating an increasingly uncertain global environment. The real challenge lies in building a broad and balanced base of national power that matches its ambitions and security needs. Doing so calls for a fresh, all-encompassing look at how the country approaches Comprehensive National Power (CNP).

 

Comprehensive National Power: Concept

Evolution. The intellectual genealogy of CNP stretches back through the classical traditions of strategic thought. Kautilya’s Arthashastra enumerated the elements of state power as territory, treasury, army, and allies. Over the years, several theorists have tried to codify the components of CNP. Some of these components included geography, natural resources, industrial capacity, military preparedness, population, national character, and diplomacy. Chinese scholars and strategic planners in the 1980s developed systematic models for calculating CNP. They assigned numerical weightage to economic output, military capability, technological advancement, educational level, and international influence. The concept also gained currency in Western strategic studies in the late 1980s. Joseph Nye introduced the distinction between hard power and soft power.

Methodologies of Measuring CNP. Multiple methodologies have been developed to numerically measure the CNP. Each has its own assumptions and limitations. Chinese academic models (a formula developed by Huang Shuofeng) assign weightage to components such as economic strength, military capability, scientific and technological capacity, education, and resource endowments. The RAND Corporation, the IISS, and various academic institutions have developed variant frameworks that emphasise different components or measurement approaches. There are several challenges associated with measuring CNP. Many dimensions are difficult to quantify numerically. Soft power and cultural influence are difficult to measure quantitatively. Even harder components, such as military power, are not straightforwardly comparable.

 

Components of Comprehensive National Power

Economic Power. The economic dimension has a direct bearing on the national power. Economic power is not defined by the state’s GDP alone. It also includes factors such as economic structure, fiscal depth, trade relationships, and financial system resilience. These factors collectively determine a nation’s ability to invest in modernising its military, maintain diplomatic relations, support technological advancements, and withstand external shocks.

Military Power. Military capability remains the ultimate instrument of statecraft. It includes the capacity for power projection beyond borders and a deterrent capacity to prevent conflicts. Nuclear deterrence is also part of military power and the CNP.

Technological Power. In the modern era, technology has become the most dynamic component of national power. The contest for technological primacy is part of the great-power competition of the present century. Those who lead in modern technologies such as artificial intelligence, quantum computing, biotechnology, space, and advanced manufacturing will shape the strategic landscape of the coming decades.

Diplomatic Power. Diplomatic power is the capacity to shape the international environment through persuasion, coalition-building, and norm-setting. It encompasses factors such as the reach and depth of its relationships, standing in multilateral institutions, and say in global governance. States with high diplomatic power can often achieve their strategic objectives without using their instruments of hard power. Diplomatic power is closely related to, but distinct from, soft power. While soft power operates through attraction, diplomatic power operates through strategic engagements. The two are mutually reinforcing. A state with high soft power finds diplomatic engagement easier.

Cultural Power. Of all the components of national power, cultural power is the most underestimated. Military strength can be matched. Economic advantages can be eroded. But the influence of the country’s values, arts, language, and way of life cannot be neutralised. Cultural power works quietly, across generations, shaping how a country is perceived.  

Hard-Soft-Smart Power Triad. The synthesis of these components into an effective strategy requires smart power. Smart power is the ability to choose the right mix of hard and soft instruments for a given strategic context. It also involves their coherent integration and precise deployment. Smart power recognises that hard and soft instruments are not substitutes but complements. Military credibility enhances diplomatic leverage. Cultural attractiveness amplifies economic ties. Technological leadership feeds back into all other domains. States that achieve this integration multiply their effective power well beyond the sum of its components.

 

Cross-Cutting Themes and Dimensions

Energy Security and Resource Control. Control over energy resources and critical minerals is a basic element of national power.  Energy-secure states enjoy freedom of strategic action. The weaponisation of energy supply in the Iran war and China’s consolidation of rare earth mineral supply chains demonstrate how control of these resources translates directly into geopolitical leverage. India’s dependence on hydrocarbons from the Gulf is a significant CNP vulnerability. Addressing it is a strategic priority.

Demographics and Human Capital. Population size and structure are fundamental parameters of national power, but their relationship is not linear. A large, young, educated, and healthy population is a CNP asset of the first order, providing the labour force for economic growth, the military manpower for national defence, and the talent base for technological innovation. A large but poorly educated, unhealthy, or rapidly ageing population can instead be a drag on national resources. India’s demographic dividend (the largest working-age population on the planet through the 2040s) is simultaneously its greatest potential national power asset and, if insufficiently invested in, its most consequential risk. The quality of education, healthcare, and employment opportunities available to this population will determine whether the dividend is realised or squandered.

Media, Information Warfare, and Narrative Control. The information domain has emerged as a new battleground. In this domain, the capability is measured by the capacity to shape narratives, manage perceptions, and counter adversarial propaganda. Information warfare involves both offensive and defensive operations. The offensive operations comprise disinformation campaigns, cyber-enabled influence operations, and strategic communication. The defensive operations include media literacy,  information resilience and credible public communication. States with sophisticated information management systems can shape how their actions are perceived internationally.

Non-State Actors and Their Impact. The assumption that national power is exclusively a property of states has been progressively eroded. Non-state actors include transnational corporations, international NGOs, terrorist and insurgent organisations, diaspora communities, and global media platforms. They can amplify, constrain, or subvert national power in many ways. A state’s ability to harness the power of its non-state actors while managing or countering hostile non-state forces is itself a dimension of CNP. Pakistan’s use of non-state militant proxies as instruments of state policy, and the Indian diaspora’s contribution to India’s soft power and economic connectivity, are both illustrations of this dynamic.

 

India’s Trajectory in Building Comprehensive National Power

India’s CNP trajectory is one of the most consequential stories in contemporary international relations. Its democratic political system, however imperfect, confers legitimacy in a global environment. Its constitutional pluralism (the capacity of a state with dozens of languages, hundreds of communities, and multiple religions to function as a coherent democracy) is itself a form of soft power. India has demonstrated that development and diversity are compatible.

Strengths and Structural Assets. India’s strategic geography is a substantial asset. Its peninsular position at the centre of the Indian Ocean, flanked by the Arabian Sea to the west and the Bay of Bengal to the east, gives it a natural role as the dominant maritime power of the world’s most commercially important ocean. The Indo-Pacific strategic construct is one in which India occupies a structural position of centrality that no amount of diplomatic effort could manufacture. Geography has delivered a strategic endowment that India must now develop the naval and air power, the port infrastructure, and the diplomatic networks to exploit fully.

Weaknesses and Structural Constraints. India’s CNP has structural weaknesses that are as significant as its assets. The quality of public institutions (in education, healthcare, and justice delivery) has improved but remains below the desired level. Poverty and malnutrition, although declining, continue to limit human capital development. Urban infrastructure is lagging behind the pace of urbanisation. It is causing congestion, pollution, and productivity losses.

Strategic Autonomy. India’s traditional policy preference for freedom from binding alliances has been a source of diplomatic flexibility but also of strategic ambiguity. In a world where great-power competition is sharpening the demand for alignment, India’s insistence on engaging multiple power centers simultaneously is increasingly difficult to sustain without incurring costs.

Make in India and the Industrial Power Imperative. The Make in India initiative is India’s most ambitious attempt to address the structural dependency that has historically constrained its national power.  A nation that cannot manufacture its own aircraft engines, semiconductors, precision munitions, or advanced electronics is perpetually dependent on the strategic choices of foreign suppliers. The encouragement of Make in India in the defence sector is as much a CNP investment as an industrial one. Self-reliance in defence production does not merely save foreign exchange. It removes a class of strategic vulnerabilities and creates an indigenous capability. Beyond defence, Make in India’s ambition to develop world-class manufacturing in electronics, pharmaceuticals, renewable energy, and semiconductors directly addresses the economic dimension of CNP. India’s Production-Linked Incentive (PLI) schemes have begun to shift economic structures in a favourable direction.

India’s Soft Power: Diaspora, Culture, and Democracy. India’s soft power resources are among the richest in the world, though their strategic mobilisation has been uneven. The Indian diaspora is over thirty million strong and distributed across every major economy, with particular concentrations of extraordinary influence in the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, and the Gulf. It is a soft power asset without parallel. This diaspora creates interpersonal networks, economic investment flows, and cultural bridges. It, in turn, multiplies India’s global presence far beyond what its diplomatic budget could achieve. Culturally, India’s reach is extraordinary. Indian cinema has an enormous audience across Africa, Asia and the Middle East.

 

The Way Ahead

Developing India’s CNP requires deliberate action across every domain. Economically, India needs to expand its manufacturing base, reduce critical import dependencies, and become a vital player in global supply chains. Militarily, the focus must be on modernisation backed by indigenisation.  Technologically, investments in AI, quantum computing, and space should be seen as essential national security priorities. Diplomatically, India can draw on its credibility as a democracy that resonates with both the Global South and developed nations. India’s demographic advantage will only deliver results if it is backed by serious social reforms. None of these priorities can be tackled in isolation; they need to be addressed holistically.

 

Concluding Thoughts

Comprehensive National Power is not a possession but a process.  It has to be continuously built, maintained, and adapted to a changing strategic environment. The states that have wielded the greatest influence in international affairs have not been those with the largest armies or the most abundant resources. Greatest Influencers are those who successfully integrated their economic, military, technological, diplomatic, and cultural assets into coherent strategies sustained over time.

India stands at a strategic inflexion point. It has all the ingredients (geography, demography, democratic legitimacy, and civilisational depth) for great-power status. Converting these endowments into an effective national power is the central challenge for India. It requires industrial transformation, military modernisation, institutional reform, and above all, strategic imagination. The measure of success is not a country’s rank on any index. It is measured by its ability to influence the international environment in a favourable way to its security, prosperity, and values. That, ultimately, is what Comprehensive National Power is really about.

 

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Information and data included in the blog are for educational & non-commercial purposes only and have been carefully adapted, excerpted, or edited from reliable and accurate sources. All copyrighted material belongs to the respective owners and is provided only for wider dissemination.

 

 

References:

  1. Huang Shuofeng, “Comprehensive National Power Theory”, China Social Sciences Press, 1992.
  1. Cline, Ray S, “World Power Assessment: A Calculus of Strategic Drift”, Washington DC: Georgetown University/CSIS, 1975.
  1. Singh, P.K., Gera, Y.K., and Dewan, Sandeep, “Comprehensive National Power: A Model for India”, New Delhi: United Service Institution of India, 2013.
  1. Nye, Joseph S., Jr. “Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics”, New York: PublicAffairs, 2004.
  1. Nye, Joseph S., Jr. “Get Smart: Combining Hard and Soft Power,” Foreign Affairs, July/August 2009.
  1. Klare, Michael T. “Resource Wars: The New Landscape of Global Conflict”, New York: Metropolitan Books, 2001.
  1. Singer, P.W. and Brooking, Emerson T. “LikeWar: The Weaponisation of Social Media”, New York: Eamon Dolan/Houghton Mifflin, 2018.
  1. Bloom, David E. and Williamson, Jeffrey G. “Demographic Transitions and Economic Miracles in Emerging Asia,” World Bank Economic Review, Vol. 12, No. 3, 1998.
  1. Government of India, “Production Linked Incentive (PLI) Scheme Reports”, Ministry of Commerce and Industry, various years.

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