Air Marshal's Perspective – Page 11 – CANDID AND TO THE POINT / काम की बात

March 1, 2026

789: SECURITY PERSPECTIVE OF INDIA’S DRAFT SPACE SITUATIONAL AWARENESS RULES

Article published in the Mar 26 edition of “The News Analytics Journal”.

Outer space is rapidly undergoing a profound transformation. This is being driven by technological advancement, commercial participation, and strategic competition. Mega-constellations, dual-use technologies, and the accumulation of space debris now characterise the orbital environment. These developments have heightened the necessity of Space Situational Awareness (SSA). SSA is defined as the capability to detect, track, and characterise space objects. It also assesses potential threats or collisions.

India is reportedly drafting a comprehensive Space Situational Awareness (SSA) policy. The document aims to regulate the management of satellites and other objects in Earth’s orbit by tracking and monitoring them. It indicates India is moving from a space developmental program to an integrated space governance framework. With this institutionalised approach, India places itself as both a responsible space actor and an emerging rule-shaper in global space governance.

India’s Draft SSA Rules

Space Situational Awareness enables safe space operations in a crowded environment. Tracking of satellites, space debris, and threats is essential. The Indian Space Policy 2023 advocated the development of SSA capabilities. It had assigned the Indian National Space Promotion and Authorisation Centre (IN-SPACe) as the key promoter for this task. IN-SPACe has now circulated India’s draft guidelines for industry feedback. The draft document mandates SSA compliance for mission authorisation. It also covers collision avoidance, debris mitigation, tracking, data sharing, cybersecurity, and audits throughout the space mission lifecycle. These rules mandate separate authorisations for space-based, ground-based, and platform sensors. They also mandate strict data governance, including encryption. They include a provision for government access for security purposes. Industry groups have urged a phased rollout, risk-based security, and dialogue to balance innovation and compliance.

Key Components of India’s SSA Framework. Key components of the SSA include the following: –

- IS4OM (ISRO System for Safe and Sustainable Space Operations Management). Launched in 2022, it serves as a comprehensive centre for managing space traffic, mitigating debris, and monitoring potential collision threats.
- NETRA (Network for Space Object Tracking and Analysis). A dedicated project for building a network of radar and optical telescopes to track space objects, including debris and asteroids.
- Collision Avoidance and Mitigation. The policy mandates Collision Avoidance Analysis (COLA) for all launch vehicles and active satellites to prevent collisions with debris or other operational assets.
- Data Sharing and Security. The framework emphasises sharing tracking data to enhance close-approach analysis, while introducing strict data governance, security, and logging requirements.
- Regulatory Compliance and Audits. The policy introduces authorisation for operating SSA platforms and includes audits to ensure safety standards are met, allowing the government to take control of infrastructure if needed for national security.
- Debris-Free Space Mission (DFSM). A targeted initiative aiming for debris-free missions by 2030, aligning with global sustainability efforts.

Implications of SSA on India’s Military Space Deterrence.

National Security Imperative. Space Situational Awareness (SSA) would be the backbone of India’s military space deterrence. It would enable early threat detection, asset protection, and credible signalling to rivals. SSA is vital for protecting India’s 100+ satellites from collisions and adversarial actions. The Defence Space Agency (DSA) integrates tri-service efforts in space warfare strategy, SIGINT, and asset protection, with plans to deploy reportedly 52 military satellites by 2029. It would strengthen deterrence in cross-domain conflicts.

Deterrence Enhancement. Robust SSA would enhance deterrence primarily through a strategy of denial. It would discourage kinetic ASAT attacks due to the threat and risk of escalation. India has strategically shifted towards integrating its space surveillance and defence capabilities. This gradual shift has followed the successful anti-satellite (ASAT) test in 2019 (Mission Shakti). It has been done through the Defence Space Agency (DSA) and Project NETRA (Network for Space Objects Tracking and Analysis). This integration aims to address China’s significant space-based advantages by focusing on space situational awareness (SSA) and non-offensive defensive measures.

Mitigation of Strategic Vulnerabilities. Without SSA parity, India risks asymmetric coercion from adversaries. Enhanced SSA would provide security against electronic/cyberattacks, as well as kinetic attacks. It would enable proportionate retaliation if needed.

Cross-Domain Implications. SSA also integrates with terrestrial military deterrence. Protected PNT (positioning, navigation, timing) sustains precision strikes, and ISR feeds IADS (integrated air defence systems). Both systems and capabilities are essential for contemporary warfare. India’s SSA maturation would shift its reactive posture to a proactive one. It would deter militarisation of space while aligning with global norms.

Tackling Congestion and Militarisation. Over 36,000 debris objects threaten space operations. India’s rules mandate mitigation, aligning with the Debris-Free Space Mission (DFSM). These guidelines mandate 99% post-mission disposal. The militarisation of space worsens the problem due to anti-satellite tests and the proliferation of surveillance satellites. SSA distinguishes between benign and suspicious activities. India’s first commercial SSA observatory would supplement global networks, closing data gaps.

Strategic Ambiguity. SSA must balance civilian safety with military strategy. Tracking and characterising objects in space orbit is necessary for collision avoidance. But it can also be used for targeting. This duality reflects a broader dilemma in space governance. India’s approach is in sync with global norm-building efforts. The UN Group of Governmental Experts on Transparency and Confidence-Building Measures (TCBMs) had recommended voluntary information-sharing. This was to reduce the risk of escalation due to misperceptions. By framing SSA primarily as a safety measure, India positions itself as a mature and responsible actor while preserving strategic autonomy.

Militarisation / Weaponisation. The space arena is witnessing increasing militarisation, but so far the weaponisation has been limited. At present, there is no global treaty to ban weapons in space. General norms of restraint are evolving through soft laws. India’s SSA framework would contribute to this process as it advocates civilian governance rather than overt military dominance.

Comparative Analysis

US Frameworks for Space Traffic Management. The United States employs a decentralised, technology-driven Space Traffic Management (STM) framework. Multiple stakeholders (FAA, NASA, DoD, and the private sector) are guided by Space Policy Directive-3 (SPD-3). They collaborate through initiatives like SIMS and xTM, without a single mandatory regulator.

EU Model. The European Union adopts a collaborative, operational model led by the European Commission, European Space Agency (ESA), and European Union Agency for the Space Programme (EUSPA). It features the EU Space Surveillance and Tracking (SST) network for sensor data processing and risk assessment services. A 10-point action plan for sustainability integrates stakeholders through policy fora and Horizon Europe funding. The focus is on multinational coordination rather than unilateral mandates.

While all three frameworks (US, EU, and India) align on international standards such as ISO 24113 and UN debris mitigation guidelines, they all aim to combat orbital congestion. India’s nascent draft prioritises domestic security over private compliance. It differs from the US’s innovation-friendly decentralisation and the EU’s emphasis on shared sensor infrastructure and cross-border services.

Chinese Advantage. India lags China in Space Situational Awareness (SSA) capabilities. India’s space systems, long-range radars, and space telescopes are at a nascent stage. Moreover, their focus is still limited to the region. India also lacks a dedicated SSA constellation. Reliance is placed on multi-role ISRO satellites, which have limited real-time ISR capabilities. In contrast, China operates a multi-layered space infrastructure that has matured over time. China has deployed advanced assets for optical/SAR reconnaissance and high-resolution imaging. It even has the capabilities related to ELINT/SIGINT, and debris/space weather monitoring. These space assets enable all-weather coverage, autonomous collision avoidance, and integrated real-time battlefield awareness. China also maintains a self-reliant catalogue of space objects in LEO/GEO orbits.

Way Forward and Conclusion.

SSA rules secure India’s space endeavours, while deterring militarised escalation. They ultimately ensure a resilient space posture to deal with 21st-century challenges. Phased implementation will ensure competitiveness without compromising security. The role of private players is vital. An innovative approach is required to provide resilient services and capabilities.

Drafting of SSA rules by India is an inflexion point in space governance. The emphasis on transparency and deterrence in these rules ensures a balance between global space governance and strategic autonomy. The rules integrate safety, security, and commercial policy within a single regulatory framework. They also address issues such as space congestion and collision risk. These aspects thereby align India with emerging international norms. India can draft suggested global standards for data sharing and debris control.

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Information and data included in the blog are for educational & non-commercial purposes only and have been carefully adapted, excerpted, or edited from reliable and accurate sources. All copyrighted material belongs to respective owners and is provided only for wider dissemination.

References: –

“Reforms in the space sector and the establishment of IN-SPACE”, Department of Space, Government of India, 2020.

“Statement on Mission Shakti”, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 2019.

“The emerging role of the Indian space sector”, ICWA, 2024, https://www.icwa.in/show_content.php?lang=1&level=3&ls_id=11107&lid=7045

“Space debris environment report”, Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee (IADC), 2023.

“Indian Space Policy – 2023”, ISRO, 2023, https://www.isro.gov.in/media_isro/pdf/IndianSpacePolicy2023.pdf

Jakhu, R., & Singh, K, “Space security and global cooperation”, McGill University Press, 2019.

Kessler, D. J., & Cour-Palais, B. G, “Collision frequency of artificial satellites: The creation of a debris belt”, Journal of Geophysical Research, 83(A6), 2637–2646.

“Relevance of space situational awareness”, Neuroquantology https://www.neuroquantology.com/media/article_pdfs/2223-2229.pdf

Outer Space Treaty, Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies. (1967).

Tronchetti, F., & Jakhu, R. Commercial spaceflight and international law. Journal of Space Law, 45(2), 305–332. (2021).

Guidelines for the long-term sustainability of outer space activities. (2019).

United Nations Group of Governmental Experts (GGE). Report on transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space activities (A/68/189). (2013).

Weeden, B., & Samson, V. Global counterspace capabilities. Secure World Foundation. (2019).

World Economic Forum. (2026). Clear orbit, secure future. https://www.weforum.org/publications/clear-orbit-secure-future-a-call-to-action-on-space-debris/

February 27, 2026

788: Indo-Israel Defence Cooperation

Had an interesting chat with Shiv Aroor on NDTV about Indo-Israel Defence Cooperation.

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February 24, 2026February 24, 2026

787: MYANMAR’S ELECTIONS: DEMOCRATIC PROCESS OR EXERCISE TO LEGITIMISE MILITARY RULE

Myanmar’s military junta has conducted the long-awaited elections. This is the first general election since the military seized power in February 2021. The multi-phase ballot is intended to pave the way for a new civilian administration in 2026. However, domestic opponents and international observers have dismissed the exercise as a political façade. They feel it is designed to legitimise continued military rule rather than restore democracy.

Background. The military overthrew the elected government led by Aung San Suu Kyi on 1 February 2021. The coup triggered mass protests and a nationwide civil disobedience movement. Thousands were killed, and millions were displaced in the following crackdown. The military junta finally announced a staggered three-phase election following repeated postponements. The ballot covers only 265 of Myanmar’s 330 townships. It excludes areas largely under the control of resistance forces. This selective polling undermines any claim to a representative mandate.

Three-Phase Election. Phase one of the election took place on Dec. 28 in 102 townships. The second phase of voting took place on 11 January 2026 in around 100 townships (across Sagaing, Mandalay, Tanintharyi, Shan, Kachin, Kayah and Kayin states). The final phase was concluded in 63 townships across the country on 25 Jan. The junta claimed that turnout was about 52-55 per cent. Opposition groups and civil society organisations dispute this figure. According to them, the participation was low because many voters feared violence or coercion. Human rights groups have highlighted the impact of the junta’s new “Election Protection Law,” which criminalises criticism of the polls with penalties ranging from three years to life imprisonment. More than 300 people have reportedly been arrested for comments deemed hostile to the vote, reinforcing claims that participation has been driven by fear rather than political choice.

Fixed Results. Preliminary count shows a sweeping victory for the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP). This is a military-aligned party dominated by retired generals and former military officials. According to reported figures, the USDP has secured 232 of 263 contested seats in the Pyithu Hluttaw (lower house) and 109 of 157 announced seats in the Amyotha Hluttaw (upper house). Smaller ethnic parties have captured a handful of constituencies, but only six parties contested nationwide out of the 57 formally registered. The opposition National League for Democracy (NLD) was dissolved as it refused to re-register under restrictive new party laws. Aung San Suu Kyi remains imprisoned under politically motivated sentences. Myanmar’s 2008 constitution reserves 25 per cent of parliamentary seats for serving military officers. This strengthens the military hold. Combined with USDP victories, this arrangement gives the junta and its proxies a dominant supermajority regardless of popular support.

Legitimacy Challenged. Domestic opposition groups and international organisations have denounced the polls as neither free nor fair. The United Nations has warned that elections held amid mass arrests, censorship and the exclusion of millions of voters cannot be considered credible. UN human rights experts have described the process as an attempt to “manufacture legitimacy” for military rule. Human Rights Watch has called the ballot a “fraudulent claim for credibility,” citing voter intimidation, the absence of independent monitoring and the disenfranchisement of more than six million people living in conflict zones. The International Crisis Group has noted that the USDP benefits from structural advantages created by bans on rivals and by emergency laws that suppress dissent. Western governments, including members of the European Union, have said they will not recognise any administration formed through what they regard as a sham process. ASEAN, the regional bloc of which Myanmar is a member, has declined to send official observers.

Regional Reactions. Regional responses have not been that critical. China and Russia have sent observers to the polls. They prefer stability over political reform. For neighbouring Thailand, Bangladesh and India, the continuation of conflict raises fears of renewed refugee surges and cross-border instability. India has adopted a cautious approach, reiterating its support for a democratic transition. At the same time, it is engaging with the junta to address border security, refugee flows, and concerns over Chinese influence.

What Next. Under the junta’s roadmap, the newly elected parliament is due to convene in March 2026 to choose a president. The new government is expected to take office in April. Senior General Min Aung Hlaing has already passed legislation creating a consultative body that would allow him to retain influence even after a formal handover to a civilian cabinet. Analysts are sceptical that these steps will reduce violence. Resistance forces, including the PDFs and various ethnic armed organisations, are believed to control or contest large parts of the countryside and have vowed to continue fighting what they view as an illegitimate regime.

Analytical View. The elections may internally legitimise the junta’s claim to national coverage. It does not change international perceptions. The process lacks the core ingredients of a genuine democratic transition. This is because of the exclusion of major opposition parties, disenfranchisement of millions of citizens, and participation shaped by fear. The polls do not seem to resolve Myanmar’s political crisis. They appear to formalise a divided reality: a military-controlled political center with a resistant periphery. Post-elections, the hope of a return to civilian rule remains remote. The election symbolises the depth of derailment of Myanmar’s democratic experiment.

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