797: HYPERSONIC WEAPONS AND MISSILE DEFENCE 2.0: NEW STRATEGIC CALCULUS

Paper published in the April 2026 edition of “The News Analytics” Journal

Hypersonic weapons are weapons capable of sustained flight at Mach 5 or higher. Existing missile defence systems do not cater for this new threat. Their speed and manoeuvrability demand a new approach to early warning and subsequent neutralisation. These weapons are emerging as highly valued systems for militaries worldwide. Their rapid development marks a turning point in military technology and strategic thought. These weapons are giving a new meaning to deterrence and stability.

Hypersonic Weapons. Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) can also reach hypersonic speeds. However, they travel through space in a predictable parabolic arc. Their trajectory becomes predictable, and long-range radars can track them. On the other hand, the characteristics of hypersonic weapons include sustained high speed, increased manoeuvrability, and a high-altitude trajectory (in the upper atmosphere – higher than cruise missiles but lower than the apogee of ballistic missiles). These attributes of hypersonic weapons are blurring the line between ballistic and cruise missiles. Hypersonic weapons are classified into two categories: hypersonic glide vehicles (HGVs) and hypersonic cruise missiles (HCMs). HGVs are carried and launched from ballistic missiles. Post-separation, they glide through the upper atmosphere at extreme speeds following a controllable trajectory. HCMs sustain hypersonic flight within the atmosphere using advanced scramjet engines. Hypersonic weapons can alter their trajectory. This adds to the complexity of detecting, tracking, and intercepting them. High speed also compresses decision-making time. It shortens the window for assessing the threat and making a decision on counteraction.

Speed and Manoeuvrability: A Strategic Game-Changer. Hypersonic missiles are commonly depicted as a “game changer and the unprecedented capabilities of these weapons portend a revolution in missile warfare. It is considered that the speed, accuracy, and manoeuvrability of hypersonic boost-glide weapons will fundamentally change the character of warfare. Developments in hypersonic propulsion will revolutionise warfare by enabling faster strikes. With unmatched speed, these weapons will likely hit over-the-horizon targets in a fraction of the time. This claimed speed advantage is ostensibly accompanied by near-immunity to detection, rendering hypersonic weapons “nearly invisible” to existing early warning systems. Together, these capabilities will significantly compress decision and response times.

Missile Defence 2.0: Adapting to the Hypersonic Age

Missile Defence in the Pre-Hypersonic Era. Existing defences are primarily designed to counter ballistic missiles. They rely on layered architectures that include early-warning launch detection, long-range radar-based trajectory tracking, and interception. The destruction could occur during the boost, midcourse, or terminal phases. These systems operate on the logic of predictability. However, these systems are not optimised for low-flying targets that manoeuvre frequently and have little warning time.

Hypersonic Threat Mitigation. A comprehensive missile defence strategy is required to provide an integrated and practical capability to counter ballistic, cruise, and hypersonic missile threats. The speed of hypersonic weapons leaves little time to compute a fire-control solution, communicate with command authorities, and complete an engagement to intercept them actively. Anti-Hypersonic defence would require a combination of disruptive data links and sensors, space-based tracking sensors, and innovative interception methods. Some passive defensive measures against traditional missiles are also effective against hypersonic weapons; these include deception, dispersal, hardening, concealment, etc.

Missile Defence 2.0. To counter hypersonic threats, defence developers are exploring what might be called Missile Defence 2.0. This concept emphasises integration, speed, and adaptability. One key area is sensor networks. Future defences rely on constellations of space-based infrared and tracking satellites that can track hypersonic weapons throughout their flight. Methods of interception also need to evolve. Instead of relying solely on kinetic weapons, multiple new interceptors may be required to neutralise the threat. Artificial intelligence would be essential for data fusion from multiple sensors. Another element of Missile Defence 2.0 is layered resilience rather than perfect protection, recognising that no defence will be impenetrable.

Hypersonic Race

The United States, China, and Russia are competing to develop these weapons. They would be fielding a wide array of hypersonic systems in the coming decades. The development of short-, medium-, and long-range variants of these weapons by major powers is resulting in an arms race. These technologies are changing the nature of warfare, and they have the potential to destabilise the global security environment.

USA. The U.S. has pursued both hypersonic weapons technologies since the early 2000s. It has sought to develop longer-range systems capable of reaching deep into an adversary’s territory to attack defended, hardened, and time-urgent targets. The Department of Defence (DOD) is developing hypersonic weapons under the Navy’s Conventional Prompt Strike program and through several Air Force, Army, and DARPA programs.

Russia. Russia is reportedly the first nation to deploy a hypersonic missile. It characterises these weapons as a centrepiece of its security strategy and has extensively tested at least three distinct hypersonic systems. Russia’s HGV, known as Avangard, is equipped with a nuclear warhead and deployed on SS-19 long-range land-based ballistic missiles. Avangards reportedly feature onboard countermeasures and can manoeuvre in flight to evade ballistic missile defences. Russia has successfully fielded the Zircon and Kinzhal hypersonic weapons, and it has launched the air-launched Kinzhal hypersonic missiles (with a speed of Mach 10 and a payload of 480kg) against Ukraine.

China. China has made a significant effort to match Russian and U.S. capabilities. It has invested heavily in the hypersonic research, development, test, and evaluation programs in the past decade. China is also investing heavily in hypersonic development infrastructure and weapon systems, reportedly outpacing the United States in testing these technologies. China has developed an HGV known as the DF-ZF, previously referred to as the WU-14. China is also developing the DF-41 long-range intercontinental ballistic missile, which could carry a nuclear hypersonic glide vehicle.

India. India has been investing in hypersonic weapon development. In Sep 2020, India successfully tested the Hypersonic Technology Demonstrator Vehicle (HSTDV). HSTDV is a hypersonic unmanned scramjet demonstration aircraft. In addition to the HSTDV program, India is continuing its research and development efforts across various aspects of hypersonic technology (propulsion systems, materials science, and guidance systems). In July 2025, India reportedly conducted a successful test of a hypersonic cruise missile capable of reaching Mach 8 under Project Vishnu. Reportedly, the project aims to develop the Extended Trajectory-Long Duration Hypersonic Cruise Missile (ET-LDHCM), a weapon system that will fundamentally enhance India’s strategic capabilities.

Great Power Competition and Technological Asymmetry. The development of hypersonic weapons has the potential to create a new form of asymmetry. In technologically advanced states, having these weapons gives them an edge in overcoming opponents’ defences. On the other hand, smaller or less tech-savvy states find it difficult to keep up. This creates a growing divide between the “haves” and the “have-nots.” This asymmetry is reshaping the strategic calculus. Major powers may become aggressive, while weaker states may double down on asymmetric strategies such as cyber operations or unconventional warfare.

Implications for Deterrence Stability. The most concerning aspect of hypersonics is their impact on deterrence stability. During the Cold War, stability was based on the philosophy of “Mutually Assured Destruction”. However, now with reduced reaction time, the risk of miscalculation has increased dramatically. The shift is taking place from ‘Launch on Warning’ to ‘Launch on Uncertainty’. States may get tempted to launch their own weapons at the first sign of a perceived threat. This “crisis instability” is compounded by Strategic Ambiguity: most hypersonic vehicles can carry either a conventional or nuclear payload, leaving an adversary to guess the stakes of an incoming strike.

Conclusion

Technology is a good gadget, but a destructive weapon. Hypersonic weapons signify a significant advancement in military technology. These weapons are even more powerful than traditional ballistic ones because of their incredible speed and agility. Many countries are actively working on developing and testing them. At the same time, Missile Defence 2.0 is evolving to counter this new threat. It includes advanced sensors, smarter interceptors, and a robust architecture to provide better protection. The proliferation of hypersonic weapons could have significant implications for the global security landscape. Their speed and manoeuvrability could reduce decision-making time in crises, increasing the risk of miscalculation. The development of hypersonic weapons is also starting a new arms race, as countries seek to maintain or gain military superiority in this field.

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References:-

“Hypersonic missiles: What are they and can they be stopped?”, Partyard Defence, May 10, 2019. https://partyardmilitary.com/hypersonic-missiles-what-are-they-and-can-they-be-stopped/

“Hypersonic Technology”, Drishti IAS, 10 Oct 21. https://www.drishtiias.com/daily-updates/daily-news-analysis/hypersonic-technology-2

“Russia, China, the U.S.: Who Will Win the Hypersonic Arms”, IEEE Spectrum, Dec 2020. https://spectrum.ieee.org/russia-china-the-us-who-will-win-the-hypersonic-arms-race

Air Marshal Anil Khosla, “Hypersonic Long Range Weapons”, Air Marshals’ Perspective, 10 Nov 2021. https://55nda.com/blogs/anil-khosla/2021/11/10/hypersonic-long-range-weapons/

Air Marshal Anil Khosla, “Countering Hypersonic Weapon Threat: A Difficult But Manageable Problem”, Air Marshals’ Perspective, 07 Jun 2024. https://55nda.com/blogs/anil-khosla/2024/06/07/countering-hypersonic-weapon-threat-a-difficult-but-manageable-problem/

Tom Karako and Masao Dahlgren, “Complex Air Defence Countering the Hypersonic Missile Threat”, A Report of the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) Missile Defence Project, February 2022.

Rylie White, “An Emerging Threat: The Impact of Hypersonic Weapons on National Security, Crisis Instability, and Deterrence Strategy”, Potomac Institute for Policy Studies.

David Roza, “Why Hypersonic Missiles’ Greatest Strength Also Makes Them Vulnerable”, Air and Space Forces Magazine, Dec 2023.

Col Mandeep Singh, “Countering Hypersonics”, Indian Defence Review, Jan 2024.

Economic Times. (2025, July 16). Why India’s new hypersonic missile may outrun Israel’s Iron Dome and Russia’s S-500 and shift the balance in Asia.

Aroor, Shiv. “India’s Hypersonic Missile Ambitions: DRDO’s Project Vishnu and the Road Ahead.” India Today.

March 22, 2026March 21, 2026

793: IRAN WAR: MANY QUESTIONS, DIVERSE PERCEPTIONS (PART 3)

The answers are collated from open sources. Information warfare and propaganda are generally active, as in any other war. Bias in the answers cannot be ruled out.

GEOPOLITICAL & STRATEGIC

How did the conflict affect US relations with Gulf Arab states?

Iran’s decision to strike across nine countries — including previously neutral Gulf states such as Oman and Qatar — has had the paradoxical effect of pushing Gulf governments into closer alignment with the US-Israeli security architecture, even as they publicly demand restraint. Iran’s widening of attacks to encompass all GCC states has demonstrated that passive neutrality offers no protection, underscoring that regional threats are better countered collectively. Intelligence-sharing and covert security cooperation between Israel and Gulf neighbours would deepen.

Did the conflict accelerate or derail Israel-Saudi normalisation?

The conflict has deepened covert alignment but left formal normalisation frozen. The Palestinian issue — dramatically amplified in the Arab public sphere by the Gaza war — remains a fundamental political obstacle that shared threat perception of Iran cannot simply override. Arab governments already obtain meaningful security benefits from covert cooperation with Israel without assuming the domestic political risk of formal recognition. US officials, including Senator Graham, have publicly framed the post-war period as a “historic opportunity” to revive normalisation once Iranian pressure recedes, but the structural obstacles remain formidable.

DIPLOMACY & CEASEFIRE

What diplomatic efforts were made to prevent full-scale war, and why did they fail?

Oman led indirect nuclear negotiations in Geneva in February 2026, with Iran reportedly agreeing to forgo stockpiling enriched uranium and accept permanent, full IAEA verification — significant concessions that represented a near-breakthrough. Oman’s Foreign Minister publicly declared peace “within reach.” The US and Israel launched Operation Epic Fury regardless, with Oman’s mediator expressing he was “dismayed” that active negotiations had been overridden by military action. The deeper failure of diplomacy traces to accumulated mistrust, Iran’s reconstitution of its programme after the 2025 setback, the IAEA’s discovery of hidden HEU in February 2026, and an Israeli/US assessment that a narrow preemption window was closing.

What were the terms of any ceasefire agreements, and what role did mediators play?

The June 2025 Twelve-Day War ended in a US-brokered ceasefire on 24 June 2025. No comparable agreement has been reached in the ongoing 2026 conflict. Khamenei’s assassination has shattered the established rules of engagement, leaving the conflict without clear diplomatic off-ramps and deepening into a war of attrition. Oman served as the primary channel for both the 2025 ceasefire and the aborted 2026 nuclear talks. Qatar hosted US military assets while simultaneously coming under Iranian attack — a contradictory position that constrained its mediating role. Egypt maintained a relative distance. China is positioning itself as the primary post-conflict stabiliser, dispatching diplomatic envoys while warning publicly against spreading “flames of war.”

CONSEQUENCES & LONG-TERM OUTLOOK

How significantly has Iran’s military capability been degraded?

Severely. Israel claims approximately 60–90% of Iran’s estimated 500 ballistic missile launchers have been destroyed or disabled. Over 100 air defence systems and 120 detection systems were eliminated in the opening 24 hours. More than 1,700 military industrial assets have been struck, with the campaign working systematically through Iran’s missile production chain. Over 50 naval vessels have been destroyed, effectively decimating Iran’s navy. Nuclear infrastructure is severely damaged. IRGC command nodes and leadership have been targeted. Iran retains core enrichment knowledge, some dispersed material, and the institutional will to reconstitute — but its conventional military power has been fundamentally degraded.

What is the long-term trajectory of Iran-Israel relations?

Persistent, entrenched hostility is the most probable outcome. Iran perceives the conflict as existential and has shown no interest in an off-ramp, calculating that a prolonged war of attrition may eventually favour it. The appointment of Mojtaba Khamenei — widely described as more hardline than his father and closely tied to the IRGC — signals continuity of confrontational posture rather than moderation. The most dangerous near-term risks are an Iranian nuclear dash to weaponise as the ultimate deterrent, or asymmetric revenge operations through reconstituted proxy networks or cyber means. A long-term “new normal” of uneasy, diminished-Iran deterrence is possible if the regime survives in weakened form; outright regime collapse would open a different and highly unpredictable set of outcomes.

Has the conflict changed the doctrine of deterrence in the Middle East?

Profoundly. The killing of a sitting Supreme Leader has shattered red lines that were previously considered inviolable, signalling that no leader or asset is beyond reach for a sufficiently capable and determined adversary. The conflict has validated the superiority of offensive preemption combined with layered defence over passive deterrence-by-denial, and has demonstrated that proxy networks are unreliable against determined state-on-state military action. The perverse global signal, noted by RAND analysts, is that states without nuclear weapons remain existentially vulnerable to decapitation strikes, which may accelerate proliferation among states watching the outcome and drawing their own conclusions.

What are the military lessons for nations like India from this conflict?

The conflict carries direct and urgent lessons for Mission Sudarshan Chakra and India’s broader defence doctrine. First, layered, integrated air defence, combining short-, medium-, and long-range systems with real-time intelligence, is essential against mixed salvos of ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and drones — validating India’s multi-layered architecture. Second, interceptor stockpile depth is as critical as interception technology itself; saturation rapidly depletes inventories, making directed-energy weapons an operational necessity for economically defeating cheap drone swarms. Third, offensive counter-strikes on launcher and C2 infrastructure are force multipliers — pure defence is strategically and financially unsustainable against a determined adversary, validating the offensive-defensive integration at the heart of Mission Sudarshan Chakra. Fourth, space-based early warning and AI-driven command and control are now operational necessities, not aspirational future capabilities. Fifth, allied interoperability — the US-Israeli model — multiplies system effectiveness in ways that no single national architecture can replicate, underscoring the importance of India deepening defence technology partnerships with the US and Israel in particular.

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March 21, 2026

792: IRAN WAR: MANY QUESTIONS, DIVERSE PERCEPTIONS (PART 2)

The answers are collated from open sources. Information warfare and propaganda are generally active, as in any other war. Bias in the answers cannot be ruled out.

MILITARY OPERATIONS

What were the major Iranian missile and drone attacks on Israel, and how effective were they?

Iran launched multiple large-scale barrages across 2024–2026. The June 2025 Twelve-Day War saw Iran fire over 550 ballistic missiles and more than 1,000 suicide drones. In the ongoing 2026 campaign, Iran has shifted to wider but smaller barrages targeting Israel, US bases, and infrastructure across Gulf states simultaneously. Israeli forces claim that their overall effectiveness has been low: the vast majority of strikes were intercepted, and physical damage and casualties were limited relative to the scale of launches. Saturation tactics strained interceptor inventories but failed to overwhelm allied defences due to Israeli pre-emptive strikes on launchers and continuous US augmentation.

What was the nature and scale of Israel’s retaliatory strikes inside Iran?

Israel’s retaliatory campaign has been the largest operation in IAF history. On day one alone, approximately 1,200 strike sorties were flown. Israel has struck over 1,700 military industrial assets across Iran, with thousands more remaining on target lists. The campaign has systematically worked through Iran’s entire missile production chain — from large IRGC-linked assembly facilities to smaller component manufacturers — alongside nuclear sites, air defence infrastructure, naval assets, and leadership targets, including Khamenei himself. Israel claims to have destroyed or disabled approximately 60–90% of Iran’s ballistic missile launchers and has achieved air superiority over most of Iran’s airspace within 24 hours of operations beginning.

What role did the US military play?

The US played a dual role — defensive and offensive. On the defensive side, US THAAD and Patriot batteries across Israel and Gulf states, alongside Aegis-equipped destroyers in the region, provided critical intercept capacity that prevented Israeli systems from being overwhelmed by volume. On the offensive side, the US struck three Iranian nuclear sites on 22 June 2025 and launched over 900 strikes in the opening phase of Operation Epic Fury on 28 February 2026. US tanker and intelligence support were essential enablers of Israel’s deep-strike campaign inside Iranian airspace.

What damage did Israeli strikes inflict on Iran’s air defence and nuclear infrastructure?

Reportedly, in the 2026 campaign, over 100 air defence systems and 120 detection systems were taken out within the first 24 hours, giving Israel air superiority over much of Iranian territory. Nuclear facilities at Natanz, Fordow, Isfahan, and the covert Minzadehei site have all sustained significant damage, with key facilities rendered inoperable; survivable elements remain, but reconstitution capacity is being systematically targeted.

AIR DEFENCE: TECHNOLOGY & LESSONS

What does the conflict reveal about large-scale ballistic missile attacks against layered air defence?

Several clear lessons have emerged. First, layered integration with ally support is highly effective but extraordinarily expensive — interceptor depletion is a genuine strategic vulnerability against an adversary willing to launch at scale. Second, offensive counter-strikes against launchers and command infrastructure are force multipliers that reduce the volume of incoming strikes more efficiently than additional interceptors alone. Third, early warning and space-based detection are operationally decisive — the side that detects first wins the intercept race. Fourth, directed energy weapons are now operationally necessary to address cheap drone swarms economically, as engaging low-cost drones with high-cost interceptors at scale is financially unsustainable.

How did Israel’s multi-layered air defence system perform against Iranian strikes?

As claimed by Israel, the performance has been outstanding by any historical standard — the combined system achieved interception rates of approximately 80–95% across successive Iranian barrages. The Arrow system engaged ballistic missiles at high altitudes, David’s Sling handled medium-range threats, including MRBMs, at the edge of its design envelope, and the Iron Dome addressed shorter-range rockets and drones. Both David’s Sling and Arrow exceeded their design parameters in operational performance. Some ballistic missiles and drones penetrated — causing fatalities, including in Beit Shemesh — but damage and casualties were dramatically lower than the volume of attacks would suggest. The critical vulnerability exposed is not interception technology but the depth of the interceptor stockpile: Iran’s ambition to grow its ballistic missile inventory from approximately 2,000 to 10,000 poses a potential saturation threat that no allied interceptor stockpile can sustainably address without directed-energy alternatives.

How did the Iron Dome, David’s Sling, and Arrow systems perform, and what role did US THAAD and Patriot play?

All three Israeli systems performed well against the threat categories they were designed for, collectively achieving approximately 95% interception rates under sustained multi-wave attack. David’s Sling and Arrow both operated at or beyond their design envelopes against Iranian MRBMs. US THAAD and Patriot systems provided essential additional intercept depth; THAAD alone is reported to have expended approximately 25% of its available stockpile in the 2025 phase, continuing heavy use in 2026. Without US augmentation, Israeli interceptor inventories would have been depleted far more rapidly.

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