On January 3, 2026, U.S. military forces launched a coordinated operation called Operation Absolute Resolve to capture Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro and his wife, Cilia Flores. Maduro was taken to the U.S. to face charges.
The following video is doing the rounds on social media.
Comments:
Reportedly, in this operation, traditional kinetic force was used.
The operation involved airstrikes and bombardments to suppress Venezuelan military sites and air defences around Caracas. Multiple military platforms (aircraft, helicopters) were used.
Cyber operations contributed to the environment. A reported cyberattack caused a city-wide blackout in Caracas ahead of the raid, according to U.S. officials cited by The New York Times.
There were casualties and resistance. Venezuelan and allied (including Cuban) personnel were killed or injured resisting the operation, and there was expected and real military resistance at some sites.
There is no evidence of exotic non-kinetic incapacitation weapons (incapacitation without visible wounds, by some directed-energy or neurological weapon). There is no credible public reporting or official confirmation supporting this. All documented effects — fatalities, injuries, resistance suppression — align with standard kinetic military operations (airstrikes, bombardment, special forces engagement).
There is no authoritative claim of a new invisible weapon
While non-kinetic capabilities (cyber, electronic warfare) are real areas of military investment globally, there is no verified evidence released by the Pentagon or independent analysts indicating that a new directed-energy or sensory deprivation weapon was deployed in this operation.
Speculation about “acoustic neurological disruption” or “invisible battle space dominance” belongs more to future-tech scenarios than confirmed battlefield reality.
Electronic Warfare (EW): (“Killed radar,” “Blocked comms”) – Highly Likely. The US military excels at SEAD (Suppression of Enemy Air Defences) and jamming signals. This is standard modern doctrine.
Directed Energy Weapons (DEW): (“Incapacitated without bullets”) -Experimental. High-energy lasers or microwaves exist, but using them to cause specific neurological failure at scale is currently in the realm of high-level R&D.
While pulsed radiofrequency energy is studied, its use as a reliable battlefield “paralyser” is not yet publicly documented.
Frey Effect
The Frey Effect, or microwave auditory effect, is the perception of sounds, clicks, or hisses directly in the head from pulsed or modulated microwave radiation, without external devices, caused by rapid heating and expansion of brain tissue, creating thermoacoustic waves that stimulate the cochlea. First described by Allan Frey in the 1960s, it occurs when microwaves are absorbed by tissues, creating pressure waves that the brain interprets as sound, leading to speculation about its use in directed-energy weapons or links to unexplained health issues like Havana Syndrome.
How it works
Energy Absorption: Brief, intense microwave pulses are absorbed by the head, particularly the tissues near the inner ear.
Thermoelastic Expansion: This absorption causes rapid, localised heating and tissue expansion.
Acoustic Wave Generation: The rapid expansion generates a thermoelastic pressure wave (sound).
Auditory Perception: This pressure wave travels to the cochlea and auditory nerve, triggering the sensation of sound (clicks, buzzes, etc.).
Key aspects
Origin: First studied by neurophysiologist Allan Frey in 1961-1962, though early reports date back to WWII radar operators.
Nature: Sounds are perceived inside the head, not through the ears, and are unique to the exposed individual.
Weaponisation: The effect’s mechanism raises questions about its potential to create non-lethal weapons or contribute to unexplained symptoms, though practical application is debated.
Other Effects: The underlying principle of RF energy converting to sound is studied across various applications, from communication to health.
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Victory belongs to the side that converges fastest and most effectively.
Hybrid threats are the new normal: No clear distinction between peace and war—conflict today spans land, sea, air, cyber, space, and the cognitive/information domain.
Recent global and regional conflicts show that economic pressure, cyberattacks, disinformation, and proxy actors can be as decisive as kinetic force.
For India, the challenge is amplified by:
Long borders, contested domains, and grey-zone competition
Rapid digitisation and dependence on networks
Aatmanirbharta is not just about weapons—it’s about resilience across domains.
Multi-Domain Hybrid Threats
These threats exploit gaps between institutions, systems, and policies—not just military weaknesses.
Uniqueness of Multi-Domain Hybrid Threats:
Simultaneous use of military and non-military tools
Ambiguity in attribution and intent
Designed to stay below traditional thresholds of war
Domains involved:
Physical: land, maritime, air & space
Virtual: cyber
Cognitive: information warfare, perception management, narrative control
The Core Challenge: Lack of Convergence
Without convergence, even advanced systems remain reactive instead of proactive.
Compatibility Issues: Using disparate foreign systems makes it difficult to “talk” to one another (interoperability).
Dependency Risks: Dependence on foreign Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs) for software updates or critical components creates a “kill switch” risk during a hybrid conflict.
Hybrid threats demand:
Speed of response
Shared situational awareness
Joint decision-making
Achieving Convergence
Convergence is not only jointness, but also the deliberate orchestration and synchronisation of capabilities across domains to create effects greater than the sum of parts, imposing multiple simultaneous dilemmas on the adversary.
Without convergence, the responses are fragmented, allowing the adversary to exploit seams between domains.
Convergence creates windows of advantage, collapses adversary decision cycles, and maintains superiority even against numerically/ technologically superior foes.
It is integration across four layers.
Strategic & Institutional Convergence
Whole-of-government and whole-of-nation approach
Seamless coordination between:
Armed Forces
Intelligence agencies
Ministries, regulators, and strategic industries.
Indigenous ecosystems must align with national security priorities, not just commercial success.
Operational Convergence
True multi-domain operations:
Real-time data sharing across services and agencies
Common operational picture integrating sensors, platforms, and cyber inputs
Indigenous command-and-control, ISR, and decision-support systems are critical.
Technological Convergence
Indigenous development must focus on systems-of-systems, not standalone platforms.
Priority areas:
AI-enabled analytics
Cyber-secure networks
Space-based surveillance and communications
Avoiding vendor lock-in and foreign black boxes is a strategic imperative.
Cognitive & Information Convergence
Hybrid warfare targets public perception, morale, and trust.
Defence preparedness today includes cognitive security.
Indigenous capabilities in:
Information monitoring
Narrative analysis
Strategic communication
Role of Indigenous Defence Ecosystems
Indigenous ecosystem: It enables trusted integration across domains (critical for convergence).
Aatmanirbharta is not a luxury; it is a strategic necessity. It ensures:
Sovereign control over design, development, upgradation, and maintenance.
Rapid customisation to the Indian threat environment.
Unmanned & autonomous systems: Swarm drones, UUVs, loitering munitions — all indigenously designed for multi-domain synergy.
Cultivate the Ecosystem
Plug-and-Play Architecture: Encourage the development of “Open Standards” so a startup’s AI algorithm can easily integrate with a major defence platform.
Civil-Military Fusion: Leverage India’s private sector IT prowess to build defensive cyber-moats.
Testing and Iteration: Create “Sandboxes” where indigenous tech can be tested against simulated hybrid threats in real-time.
Prioritise indigenous tech in acquisition.
Invest heavily in R&D ecosystems: Deep tech fund, long-term loans, tax incentives for startups.
Build resilience & redundancy: Multiple indigenous sources for critical components.
Foster international partnerships: Only where they complement (not substitute) indigenous capability.
Measure success not by import substitution alone, but by operational effectiveness in contested, multi-domain scenarios.
Closing Thought
Hybrid threats are designed to exploit disunity and delay.
Convergence is the force multiplier, and Aatmanirbharta is the necessary enabler.
Building indigenous defence capability is ultimately about: Ensuring India can think, decide, and act independently across all domains—at the speed of modern conflict.
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The intensifying geopolitical rivalry across East Asia has transformed the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea into the world’s most scrutinised maritime flashpoints, where national strategy, maritime coercion, and asymmetric defence doctrines converge in a tense and unpredictable theatre. At the centre of this emerging contest are two contrasting strategic frameworks. These strategies encapsulate the broader tussle between a rising power (seeking territorial unification) and a smaller democratic state (fighting for autonomy and survival). On one side, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is employing the “Cabbage Strategy”. This strategy aims to establish a de facto quarantine to strangle Taiwan slowly. Countering this systematic encroachment is Taiwan’s “Porcupine Strategy”. This strategy aims to significantly raise the cost of invasion. This article examines how these concepts operate in theory and practice, and how these may define the future balance of power, regional stability, and the fate of cross-strait relations.
China’s “Cabbage Strategy”: Layered Encroachment
The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) employs a sophisticated grey-zone tactic known as the “cabbage strategy” to assert control over disputed islands and reefs. It is a vivid metaphor coined in 2013 by PLA Navy Rear Admiral Zhang Zhaozhong. It was used to describe a tactic of enveloping a target island in successive layers of maritime forces to seize control without firing a single shot. This strategy aims to isolate the island, establish de facto control, and gradually escalate pressure.
The Anatomy of the Blockade. The core philosophy of the strategy is simple: surround a disputed island or reef, cut off all logistics and support, and wait for the defending force to surrender due to starvation or a lack of supplies. To achieve this, China deploys three distinct “leaves” or layers that wrap tightly around the target.
The Inner Layer (The Maritime Militia). The innermost layer, closest to the island, consists of hundreds of fishing boats crewed by the maritime militia. However, these are not ordinary civilians; they are members of the People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia. These civilian vessels are state-subsidised, trained by the PLA, and equipped with reinforced hulls, water cannons, and satellite navigation. They act as a “human shield,” harassing adversary vessels and preventing access, knowing that foreign navies are hesitant to fire upon what appear to be civilian ships.
The Middle Layer (China Coast Guard). Just behind the fishing boats, patrolling, are the ships of the China Coast Guard (CCG). These ships are often larger and better armed than many regional navies. They are the primary enforcers. They utilise water cannons, high-intensity lasers, and blocking manoeuvres to physically stop resupply missions.
The Outer Layer (PLA Navy). Looming in the distance, “over the horizon,” are the warships of the PLA Navy. They rarely engage directly but serve as a menacing deterrent. Their presence signals that any attempt by a foreign military to break the inner blockade with force will be met with overwhelming conventional military power.
Winning without Fighting. The Cabbage Strategy is a prime example of “Grey Zone” warfare. The tri-layered formation effectively blocks access, prevents resupply, and creates a fait accompli situation. The strategy is characterised by its ambiguity, deniability, and control over escalation. This makes it difficult for opponents to justify a military response without appearing to be the aggressor. The cumulative effect is a gradual salami-slicing of maritime space until control becomes irreversible.
Previous Applications. The most successful employment of this strategy was at Scarborough Shoal in 2012. Following a standoff with the Philippines, Chinese vessels swarmed the area. The layers tightened, forcing the Philippines to withdraw. China established permanent control, effectively seizing the territory. Chinese forces have also used this approach at Whitsun Reef (2021), Sabina Shoal (2024), and Sandy Cay, where Chinese vessels have repeatedly surrounded Philippine-claimed features.
Slow Strangulation of Taiwan
The “cabbage strategy” offers a blueprint for China’s non-military pressure on Taiwan. It translates into a mechanism for establishing de facto control and compelling unification. Instead of an invasion, the strategy would manifest as a suffocating blockade of Taiwan. It would isolate the island and crush its economy. The goal will not be a rapid conquest but prolonged exhaustion and acceptance of the Chinese presence. Each day the cabbage layers remain in place, the fait accompli would harden. By avoiding military escalation, Beijing would attempt to portray the situation as an internal matter rather than an interstate conflict. This would complicate the international mobilisation in support of Taiwan. Additionally, the blockade would test Taipei’s crisis-management capacity and morale. The aim would be to prove that Taipei is isolated and that the U.S. is unable to help. In turn, indicating that “peaceful reunification” is the only possible solution.
“You can’t stop the predator from attacking —, but you can make it regret trying.”
In an era defined by great-power rivalry, the “Porcupine Strategy” has emerged as a viable defence doctrine for smaller states facing existential threats from larger adversaries. William S. Murray of the U.S. Naval War College coined the concept in 2008. It postulates that a defender need not defeat an aggressor outright. Instead, they must make an invasion so costly, protracted, and painful that the predator is deterred from attacking in the first place. For Taiwan, a democratic island facing the immense military capabilities of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), this strategy represents a shift from conventional parity to asymmetric denial.
Core Philosophy: Deterrence by Denial. The strategy acknowledges that Taiwan cannot match China’s military spending or sheer volume of ships and aircraft. Instead, Taiwan focuses on deterrence by denial, i.e. preventing the enemy from securing objectives rather than seeking a decisive battlefield victory. The goal is to transform the island into a “porcupine”: a target that is difficult to swallow and impossible to digest.
Tactical Implementation: The “Quills”. To implement this, analysts urge Taiwan to pivot away from high-value, “prestige” platforms—such as large battleships or advanced fighter jets, which are easily targeted by Chinese missiles—toward resilient, low-cost, and distributed systems. Key Asymmetric Capabilities include:-
Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD). This makes it difficult for PLA forces to reach, land on, and operate from Taiwan. Utilising vast numbers of mobile coastal defence cruise missiles (such as the indigenous Hsiung Feng and US-made Harpoon systems) to target amphibious landing fleets.
Mobile Air Defence. Deploying portable systems like Stingers and Sky Sword units to deny air superiority without relying on vulnerable airfields.
Drone Swarms & Mines. Using unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and naval mines to complicate the crossing of the Taiwan Strait.
Decentralisation. Moving away from centralised command structures that a first strike can decapitate. Small, autonomous units ensure resistance continues even if communication with headquarters is severed.
Whole-of-Society Defence. A crucial pillar of the Porcupine Strategy is Civil-Military Integration. As seen in comparative examples like Ukraine and Finland, military hardware alone is insufficient.
Resilience. Hardening infrastructure, stockpiling ammunition, and creating redundant logistics networks.
Civilian Mobilisation. Integrating the population into national defence through reserve forces, cyber defence volunteers, and urban warfare preparation. This signals that even if a landing succeeds, the occupation will face a hostile, mobilised citizenry capable of prolonged guerrilla resistance.
The Porcupine Strategy effectively turns Taiwan into a strategic death-trap for the PRC. Taiwan aims to convince Beijing that the economic, military, and political costs of any misadventure would be unacceptably high. The Porcupine Strategy seeks four outcomes. It aims to persuade China that victory is uncertain and costly, to delay and grind any invasion force, to ensure continued Taiwanese resistance, and to shape global perceptions to mobilise international support.
Conclusion
The “Cabbage” and the “Porcupine” strategy epitomise the essence of 21st-century conflict. The Cabbage Strategy essentially employs the grey-zone tactics. On the other hand, the Porcupine Strategy tests the ability of small countries to resist overwhelming powers. In the contest between seize and the sting, success isn’t just about firepower, but about persistence.
In the Taiwan Strait, the outcome will depend upon the efficiency with which China and Taiwan implement their respective strategies. The future of the Taiwan Strait depends on three critical factors. Firstly, China’s capability to sustain pressure without inciting international intervention. Secondly, Taiwan’s ability to maintain internal unity and credibility in its resistance. Lastly, the international community’s response.
Please Add Value to the write-up with your views on the subject.
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Information and data included in the blog are for educational & non-commercial purposes only and have been carefully adapted, excerpted, or edited from reliable and accurate sources. All copyrighted material belongs to respective owners and is provided only for wider dissemination.
References:-
Zhang Zhaozhong, CCTV Military Commentary, 2013.
Erickson, Andrew S., & Kennedy, Conor M, “China’s Maritime Militia.” Naval War College Review, Vol. 69, No. 1 (2016).
Erickson, Andrew S, “China’s Maritime Grey Zone Operations”, U.S. Naval War College, 2019.
Hayton, Bill, “The South China Sea: The Struggle for Power in Asia”, Yale University Press, 2014.
Shattuck, Thomas J A Chinese Blockade of Taiwan.” Orbis, Vol. 64, No. 2 (2020).
Murray, William S, Revisiting Taiwan’s Defence Strategy.” Naval War College Review, Vol. 61, No. 3 (2008).
