663: ROLE OF AMERICA’S F-47 SIXTH-GENERATION FIGHTER JET  IN A SHIFTING DEFENCE LANDSCAPE

 

My Article was published in the  May edition of the “Life of Soldier” journal.

 

The evolution of military aviation has reached a revolutionary moment with the advent of sixth-generation fighter jets. These jets, representing a transformative leap in military aviation, are set to redefine air combat with their revolutionary technologies like advanced stealth, artificial intelligence (AI), hypersonic speeds, and networked warfare capabilities. As nations like the United States and China race to develop these next-generation platforms, the global balance of power is shifting, with significant implications for countries like India. This article explores what constitutes a sixth-generation fighter, delves into the specifics of the US’s Next Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) platform, compares it to the existing F-22, and assesses its potential to transform US defence. It also examines the intensifying US-China defence rivalry and India’s current standing amidst these global developments.

 

Sixth-Generation Fighter Jet

A sixth-generation fighter jet is the next evolutionary step beyond the current fifth-generation aircraft, such as the U.S.’s F-22 Raptor and F-35 Lightning II, the Russian SU-57 and the Chinese J-20. While fifth-generation jets introduced advanced stealth, supercruise (sustained supersonic flight without afterburners), and integrated sensor systems, sixth-generation fighters aim to push the boundaries further. Their defining features include:-

Enhanced Stealth. These jets will have an even lower radar cross-section than their predecessors, using advanced materials, coatings, and aerodynamic designs to become nearly invisible to enemy detection systems.

Artificial Intelligence (AI). AI will be deeply integrated, enabling real-time decision-making, autonomous operations, and coordination with unmanned systems, such as drones acting as “loyal wingmen.”

Hypersonic Speeds. Capable of exceeding Mach 5, these aircraft could drastically reduce response times and enhance their ability to penetrate contested airspace.

Directed-Energy Weapons. Innovations like laser systems could provide precise, cost-effective means to neutralise threats like missiles or enemy aircraft.

Advanced Networking. Sixth-generation jets will operate as nodes in a vast battlefield network, sharing data with satellites, ground stations, and other platforms to achieve total situational awareness.

Advanced Avionics and Sensors. They would incorporate superior sensor fusion for unparalleled situational awareness.

Optionally Manned Capabilities. These fighters will be flexible enough to operate with or without a pilot, adapting to mission requirements.

These capabilities mark a shift from traditional air combat to multi-domain warfare, a concept in which air, space, cyber, and electronic domains are seamlessly integrated. This integration allows for a more comprehensive approach to warfare, focusing on dominating future conflicts through technological superiority and adaptability.

 

Speciality of the U.S.’s “F-47” Fighter Jets & Differences from the Existing F-22.

The F-22 Raptor, operational since 2005, is a fifth-generation stealth air superiority fighter renowned for its agility, stealth, and advanced avionics. However, after two decades, it faces limitations in an evolving threat era. The NGAD is envisioned as a “family of systems” rather than a single aircraft, comprising a manned fighter and supporting unmanned drones.  It will differ significantly. The NGAD (F-47) fighter’s specialities would include:-

Next-Level Stealth. The F-22’s stealth is exceptional, but the NGAD will likely use next-generation materials and designs to achieve even greater invisibility, including against emerging radar technologies. Building on the F-22’s stealth technology, the NGAD will likely incorporate broadband stealth, reducing detectability across a broader range of radar frequencies.

AI and Autonomy. The F-22 relies on human pilots for all decisions, whereas the NGAD will integrate AI to handle complex tasks, potentially reducing pilot workload or enabling autonomous missions. The jet may feature AI systems that manage flight, combat, and coordination with unmanned drones, potentially allowing for unmanned variants.

Hypersonic Capability. The F-22 can supercruise at Mach 1.5, but the NGAD may reach hypersonic speeds (Mach 5+), vastly improving its ability to strike and evade. While specifics are classified, the NGAD could achieve speeds far exceeding the F-22’s Mach 1.5 supercruise, possibly entering the hypersonic realm.

System Integration. The F-22 has limited data-sharing capabilities compared to the NGAD, which will operate within a highly networked environment, linking with other assets for real-time battlefield awareness. The NGAD is not just a standalone aircraft but part of a broader “family of systems,” including drones, advanced sensors, and cyber tools, all working together to dominate the battlespace. The NGAD could control or be supported by unmanned drones, expanding its operational flexibility.

Range, Endurance and Payload. The F-22 has a range of approximately 1,850 miles with external tanks, whereas NGAD is engineered for greater range, endurance and potentially larger weapon capacity. It will be designed for long-range missions critical for operations in expansive regions like the Indo-Pacific.

Flexible Architecture. Its modular design could enable rapid upgrades and mission-specific configurations, ensuring longevity and adaptability. The NGAD is a forward-looking platform designed for future warfare, while the F-22, though formidable, reflects the priorities of an earlier era. These features position the NGAD as a revolutionary platform designed to address the challenges of modern warfare against technologically advanced adversaries.

 

Likely Game Changer for U.S. Defence

The Next-Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) program can redefine U.S. defence strategy, ushering in a new era of air superiority, enhanced deterrence, and reinforced multi-domain integration. The anticipation and excitement surrounding this potential transformation are palpable.

Air Superiority. The NGAD is designed to outperform near-peer adversaries like China’s J-20 and Russia’s Su-57. Its cutting-edge stealth, enhanced range, and AI-driven capabilities will allow the U.S. to dominate contested airspaces, even in heavily defended environments.

Deterrence. A formidable leap in air combat technology, the NGAD will discourage potential adversaries from challenging U.S. air dominance. Knowing they face a next-generation fighter capable of overwhelming their defences, adversaries may be deterred from aggressive actions.

Multi-Domain Dominance. The NGAD is not just a fighter but a networked system that integrates with space, cyber, and land-based forces. This interconnectivity allows it to act as a force multiplier, relaying battlefield intelligence and coordinating attacks with other assets, thus extending its impact far beyond traditional air combat.

Air Dominance. Successfully fielding the NGAD will ensure U.S. air dominance and reaffirm the nation’s position as the global leader in military innovation. Its advancements in AI, unmanned teaming, and next-gen propulsion could have spillover benefits for civilian aerospace, cyber warfare, and autonomous systems, instilling a sense of pride and confidence in the audience.

Despite its promise, the NGAD faces significant hurdles, including a projected per-unit cost of hundreds of millions of dollars and the challenge of integrating multiple breakthrough technologies. However, if these obstacles are overcome, the NGAD will shape the future of U.S. airpower for decades, ensuring its dominance in a rapidly evolving strategic landscape.

 

China’s Sixth-Generation Stealth Fighter and U.S.-China Competition.

China is also advancing its sixth-generation stealth fighter, with reports of prototypes being sighted. China’s program remains shrouded in secrecy, and the details are limited. The recent flying of sixth-generation prototypes suggests it is committed to matching or surpassing U.S. capabilities. This development coincides with the U.S. Pentagon’s NGAD efforts, highlighting fierce competition between these two powers.

Both nations are pouring resources into AI, hypersonics, and stealth, aiming to deploy sixth-generation fighters first and gain a strategic edge. A sixth-generation jet would enhance China’s influence in the Asia-Pacific, particularly in disputed areas like the South China Sea and near Taiwan. The U.S.-China rivalry extends beyond military hardware, shaping economic and diplomatic alignments worldwide. This competition drives rapid innovation and escalates tensions, with both nations seeking to outpace each other in defence technology. This close contest shapes global defence dynamics, influencing nations like India.

 

Impact on India

The US-China rivalry in sixth-generation fighters has significant implications for India, which faces opportunities and challenges. India faces threats from China and Pakistan, both of which are modernising their air forces. A Chinese sixth-generation fighter could tip the balance in regional conflicts, pressuring India to modernise its air force. India must counter Beijing’s growing military strength. India balances ties with the US and Russia while pursuing indigenous programs.

India’s airpower combines legacy and modern systems, reflecting its multi-source procurement strategy. It includes Russian Su-30MKI, MiG-29, French Mirage-2000, Rafale and indigenous Tejas fighters. The AMCA aims to deliver fifth-generation capabilities, though it’s still years from operational service. India’s fleet is smaller and comparatively less advanced, lacking operational fifth-generation fighters. It trails in AI, stealth, and hypersonic research. India is modernising through foreign purchases (Rafale), indigenous efforts (Tejas Mk2, AMCA), and partnerships with the U.S., France, and Israel. Limited resources spread across multiple programs hinder rapid progress. However, it must accelerate to keep pace with its rivals.

India’s reliance on Russian aircraft and systems risks U.S. sanctions, straining its ties with Washington despite a growing partnership. India must diversify its defence suppliers to reduce foreign dependence while boosting indigenous programs like the Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA). The U.S.-China race underscores the urgency for India to enhance its technological and military capabilities to safeguard its interests.

India has defence deals with the U.S., but has not purchased U.S. fighter jets. Discussions about acquiring the F-35 Lightning II, a fifth-generation stealth fighter, are being speculated. The F-35 could bolster its air force, but its expense and restrictions might divert resources from the AMCA, India’s fifth-generation fighter in development. With China advancing rapidly, India cannot afford delays but needs a cost-effective, strategically aligned solution.

The NGAD, however, remains a U.S.-exclusive program, a highly classified initiative focused on developing a sixth-generation fighter for the U.S. Air Force. Its sensitive technologies and strategic importance make it unlikely to be shared with foreign partners soon.

 

Conclusion

As exemplified by the U.S.’s NGAD and China’s emerging platform, sixth-generation fighter jets are set to redefine air combat with unprecedented technology. For the U.S., the NGAD will ensure air dominance, while China’s efforts signal its rise as a military superpower. India, caught between these giants, faces a complex path. It lacks direct involvement with NGAD but must leverage U.S. ties, navigate CAATSA, and decide on deals like the F-35, all while pushing indigenous development.

India’s air power is at a crossroads in a world of rapid geopolitical and technological change. Modernisation is underway, but closing the gap with China will require strategic focus, investment, and innovation. The sixth-generation race is not just about jets—it’s about the future of warfare, and India must position itself to thrive in this new era.

 

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References and credits

To all the online sites and channels.

Pics Courtesy: Internet

Disclaimer:

Information and data included in the blog are for educational & non-commercial purposes only and have been carefully adapted, excerpted, or edited from reliable and accurate sources. All copyrighted material belongs to the respective owners and is provided only for wider dissemination.

 

References:-

  1. Krepinevich, Andrew. The Evolution of Air Dominance: Sixth-Generation Fighters and the Future of Air Combat. Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2023.
  1. Gunzinger, Mark, and Bryan Clark. The Role of NGAD in Sustaining U.S. Air Superiority in the Pacific. Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2024.
  1. RAND Corporation. Next-Generation Fighter Aircraft: Strategic Considerations for the U.S. Air Force. RAND, 2023.
  1. Mehta, Aaron. U.S. Airpower in the Indo-Pacific: The NGAD’s Role in Detering China. Atlantic Council, 2024.
  1. Callaghan, John. “Sixth-Generation Fighter Jets and the Shift in U.S. Defence Strategy.” Journal of Strategic Studies 47, no. 1 (2024): 33-58.
  1. Holbrook, Sarah. “AI and Human-Machine Teaming in Next-Gen Fighters: Tactical Advantages and Challenges.” Air & Space Power Journal 38, no. 2 (2023): 45-70.
  1. Miller, James. “The Role of NGAD in Joint All-Domain Operations (JADO).” Military Review 104, no. 3 (2023): 22-41.
  1. Roberts, Ethan. “Geopolitical Implications of America’s Next Fighter Jet in the Indo-Pacific.” Defence and Security Analysis 40, no. 4 (2024): 90-112.
  1. Boeing Defence. Stealth, AI, and the Future of Sixth-Generation Fighters. Chicago, IL: Boeing Corporation, 2024.
  1. Northrop Grumman. Multi-Domain Warfare and NGAD: A Defence Industry Perspective. Falls Church, VA: Northrop Grumman, 2024.
  1. Jane’s Defence Weekly. Sixth-Generation Fighters: Key Developments and Program Milestones. London: Jane’s Information Group, 2024.
  1. Trevithick, Joseph. “What We Know About the U.S. Air Force’s Secret Sixth-Gen Fighter.” The War Zone (The Drive), January 18, 2024.
  1. Insinna, Valerie. “America’s NGAD Program and the Future of Air Superiority.” Defence News, February 7, 2024.
  1. Mizokami, Kyle. “The Air Force’s Future Fighter Jet: How the F-47 Will Change U.S. Airpower.” Popular Mechanics, March 5, 2024.
  1. Axe, David. “The Cost and Strategy Behind NGAD.” Forbes Defence, April 12, 2024.
  1. Thompson, Loren. The Aerospace Revolution: How Next-Generation Fighters Will Change Warfare. Washington, D.C.: Lexington Institute, 2023.

659: INPUTS TO THE QUESTIONNAIRE ON CHINESE AIRFIELDS.

China has been expanding its aviation infrastructure near the India-China border, constructing new airfields in strategic locations. These airfields are primarily located in the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) and Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR), with strategic significance due to their proximity to sensitive border areas, including India, Nepal, and Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK).

Detailed overview of the new Chinese airfields at Tingri, Lhunze, Burang, Yutian, and Yarkantir (based on available open source information) is as follows:-

 

  1. Shigatse Tingri Airport (Tingri, Tibet)
    • Location: Tingri County, Shigatse Prefecture, Tibet Autonomous Region, China.
    • Opened: December 24, 2022
    • Type: Dual-use (civilian and military)
    • Elevation: Approximately 4,300 meters (14,108 feet) above sea level.
    • Runway: 4,500 meters
    • Proximity to India: Approximately 60 km from the Indian border
    • Infra: Supports dual-use (military and civilian) operations, potentially for troop deployment and logistics near the Line of Actual Control (LAC) with India. Designed to handle high-altitude operations, likely with a runway suitable for small to medium aircraft and helicopters.
    • Strategic Significance: Supports China’s broader strategy to bolster infrastructure near disputed borders. Located across the Himalayas from Kathmandu, Nepal, and near the Indian border. Part of China’s “3+1” airport construction plan aimed to boost air connectivity in the region, enhancing civilian access and military logistics near the Line of Actual Control (LAC). Fills a gap between Burang (west) and Shigatse (east), enhancing China’s military and civilian aviation network in southern Tibet.

 

  1. Lhunze Airport/Shannan Longzi Airport(Lhunze County, Tibet).
    • Location: Longzi County, Shannan (Lhokha) Prefecture, Tibet Autonomous Region, China.
    • Elevation: 3,980 meters (13,060 feet) above sea level.
    • Features a 4,500-meter (14,800-foot) Class 4C runway with seven parking stands.
    • Operational since January 12, 2023, following construction that began in April 2021.
    • Type: Planned as a dual-use facility.
    • Designed to handle 180,000 passengers annually by 2030.
    • Equipped for high-altitude operations, likely supporting fighter jets and transport aircraft.
    • Proximity to India: Close to Arunachal Pradesh, India
    • Strategic Significance: Dual-use military and civilian airport, enhancing China’s ability to project power near the LAC. Aims to improve connectivity in remote border areas, facilitating civilian travel and military operations. ​Located approximately 45 km from the disputed border with Arunachal Pradesh, India, and opposite the Upper Subansiri district. Lhunze’s airfield strengthens China’s military presence in a contested region, with the potential to support operations against India. Part of a broader network of airfields and SAM (surface-to-air missile) emplacements near Arunachal Pradesh.

 

  1. Ngari Burang Airport/ Ali Pulan Airport (Burang County, Tibet)
    • Location: Burang County, Ngari Prefecture, Tibet Autonomous Region, China.
    • Opened: December 27, 2023
    • Type: Dual-use (civilian and military)
    • Elevation: 4,250 meters (13,940 feet) above sea level.
    • Runway: 4,500 meters.
    • Status: Operational since December 27, 2023, with construction approved in April 2021.
    • Designed for 150,000 passengers and 600 tons of cargo annually.
    • Runway and facilities support dual-use operations, including military aircraft and helicopters.
    • Proximity to India: Near the India-Tibet-Nepal tri-junction.
    • Strategic Significance: It enhances China’s ability to project power and provide logistical support in the western sector of the LAC. It is located near the trijunction of Tibet, Nepal, and India’s Uttarakhand state, approximately 400 km from New Delhi. It is positioned close to Mount Kailash and Lake Manasarovar and is touted as a feeder strip for pilgrims, but has clear military applications. It supports the Ngari-Gunsa airfield, located 220 km away, and enhances China’s control over the southwestern border.

 

  1. Yutian Wanfang Airport (Yutian County, Xinjiang)
    • Location: Yutian County, Hotan Prefecture, Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, China.
    • Elevation: Approximately 1,400 meters (4,600 feet) above sea level (lower than Tibetan airfields).
    • Runway: 3,200 meters, capable of handling medium-sized commercial and military transport aircraft.
    • Opened: December 26, 2020
    • Type: Primarily a civilian airport but with potential dual-use capabilities.
    • Annual Capacity: Designed to handle 180,000 passengers and 400 tons of cargo
    • Strategic Significance: This will improve connectivity in southern Xinjiang, which is strategically important due to its proximity to the western sector of the LAC. ​Situated in south Xinjiang, between Hotan and Qiemo airbases, along the Karakoram Highway. Enhances connectivity in Xinjiang, supporting China’s Belt and Road Initiative and military logistics near the borders with Pakistan and India. Strategically located near the Aksai Chin region, a disputed area with India. Yutian’s airfield supports China’s control over Xinjiang and its borders with India and Pakistan-occupied Kashmir. Likely used for surveillance and logistics, given its proximity to sensitive regions.

 

  1. Yarkantir/Yarkant/ShacheAirport (Xinjiang)
    • Location: Likely refers to Shache (Yarkant) County, Kashgar Prefecture, Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, China.
    • Elevation: Approximately 1,200–1,500 meters (3,900–4,900 feet) above sea level.
    • Shache Airport has a runway suitable for small to medium aircraft, with facilities for civilian and potential military use.
    • Status: Specific details about a new airfield in Yarkand are limited. However, the region has seen infrastructure enhancements, including upgrades to airbases like Hotan, approximately 240 km from the LAC.
    • Strategic Significance: Shache Airport (IATA: QSZ, ICAO: ZWSC) is an existing dual-use airport in Yarkant County. It is operational for civilian flights but has military potential. Located in a restive part of Xinjiang, near the Tajik Autonomous County and the Wakhan Corridor, it is close to Pakistan-occupied Kashmir and Afghanistan. It supports China’s internal security operations in Xinjiang and external defence along its western borders. Enhances China’s ability to project power in Central Asia and monitor borders with Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Tajikistan. Part of a broader network of airfields in Xinjiang, including Tashkurgan, which is under construction and strategically located near PoK.

 

Chinese Aviation Infrastructure Strategy.

Regional Strategy. The airfields in Tingri, Lhunze, and Burang are part of China’s efforts to strengthen its military presence along the LAC with India, particularly after the 2020 Galwan clash. Yutian and Shache (Yarkant) airfields support China’s control over Xinjiang, securing its western borders and facilitating connectivity with Central Asia.

Chinese Narrative. Official Chinese sources often frame these airfields as civilian projects to boost tourism (e.g., Burang for Mount Kailash pilgrims) or regional development. However, their proximity to sensitive borders and dual-use capabilities suggests a primary military purpose, which is downplayed in state media.

Geopolitical Implications.  These airfields enhance China’s ability to rapidly deploy troops, conduct surveillance, and support air operations in contested regions, posing a challenge to India, Nepal, and other neighbours.

 

Inputs to the Queries on Chinese Bases

(Based on the open sources on the net)

Q1. As reflected in the imagery, does the construction and upgrade of new Chinese airbases represent a serious threat to India?

The construction and upgrade of Chinese airbases in Tibet and adjacent areas do represent a serious strategic threat to India, mainly when analysed in the context of recent geopolitical tensions, evolving Chinese military capabilities, and infrastructural patterns since the 2020 Galwan clashes.

Airbases like Tingri, Lhunze, and Burang are located close to the Line of Actual Control (LAC), within 50–150 km. This proximity allows for the quick deployment of PLA Air Force (PLAAF) assets to forward positions and shorter response times in case of a border escalation. These airfields enable coverage of Indian positions in Arunachal Pradesh, Sikkim, Uttarakhand, and Ladakh.

Upgrades to dual-use airfields include extended and hardened runways to support heavier fighters and transport aircraft, and new hardened aircraft shelters (HAS) to protect valuable assets. Advanced radar stations and SAM sites will provide protection. Fuel and ammunition storage facilities reflect a long-term war readiness. These changes reflect a move from rudimentary forward airstrips to permanent, fully capable air combat hubs.

These bases offer greater depth, logistics, and density. The PLAAF can now rotate fighter squadrons and drones rapidly into forward bases.

The network of airbases (e.g., Burang supporting Ngari Gunsa, Tingri filling gaps between Shigatse and Burang) creates strike capability, mutual support, and redundancy.

Bases like Burang (near Nepal) and Tingri (near Bhutan) could pressure India’s neighbours, complicating India’s regional influence. The proximity to the Siliguri Corridor amplifies strategic risks.

Bases like Yutian and Yarkantir in Xinjiang would complement Western Theater Command operations and are positioned to project power toward India. This reflects China’s “strategic envelopment” doctrine, which increases pressure on India along a much broader front.

These Chinese airbases’ construction and systematic upgrading represent a serious and growing threat to India’s strategic posture, particularly by reducing warning time, enabling force concentration, and improving the PLA’s offensive and defensive air operations.

While it does not signal imminent war, it tilts the regional balance and compels India to accelerate military infrastructure development, deepen surveillance, and maintain credible deterrence across the Himalayas.

 

Q2. Do these new airbases and the consolidation and upgrade of existing ones in Tibet substantially balance out the IAF’s traditional advantage along the India-China frontier?

China’s construction of new airbases and the systematic upgrading of existing ones in Tibet and Xinjiang significantly narrows down, though not entirely erases, the traditional airpower advantage long held by the Indian Air Force (IAF) along the India-China frontier.

 

The establishment/modernisation of Tingri, Lhunze, Burang (near central and eastern sectors) and Yutian, Yarkantir (in Xinjiang) allows PLAAF aircraft to deploy closer to the LAC, reducing response time and extending their ability to hold Indian targets at risk.

While Tibet’s altitude still limits PLAAF aircraft (lower payloads, reduced engine efficiency), China is trying to mitigate this with more powerful engines and heavy reliance on drones, loitering munitions, airborne early warning aircraft (KJ-500), tankers, and ECM assets based in the rear (e.g., Hotan) but linked with forward bases.

China’s concept of “airbase clusters” means that even if one is targeted (say Lhasa-Gonggar), others nearby (e.g., Shigatse, Pangta) can support operations, enhancing tactical flexibility, survivability, and redundancy.

China’s new and upgraded airbases improve PLAAF’s forward reach, resilience, and responsiveness, mitigating the payload disadvantage of high-altitude operations. Bases like Lhunze and Tingri challenge the IAF’s dominance in the eastern LAC sector by enabling faster, more credible PLAAF operations.

While the IAF continues to enjoy certain operational advantages, China’s new airbases and upgrades in Tibet now provide the PLAAF with a more credible and resilient offensive and defensive posture along the LAC. The earlier asymmetry that favoured India is now more balanced, especially in terms of response time, reach, and multi-layered defences.

 

Q3. Does the construction of the Burang airbase represent a new and specific threat to airspace over Uttarakhand?

The central sector of the Line of Actual Control (LAC) has historically seen less militarisation compared to the eastern and western sectors (partly due to the rugged terrain and lower perceived threat).

However, the construction of the Burang airbase represents a new and specific potential threat to Uttarakhand’s airspace due to its proximity to the LAC (~60 km), ability to host fighters and drones, and support from nearby SAM systems.

It enhances China’s surveillance, deterrence, and limited power projection over Pithoragarh and Chamoli, particularly near the Lipulekh Pass and Barahoti.

Burang is located near the tri-junction of India, Nepal, and Tibet, directly facing India’s Uttarakhand sector, especially Barahoti, which has witnessed Chinese transgressions in recent years.

The base is less than 100 km from the Indian border, giving PLAAF aircraft and drones a very short flight time to Indian airspace, especially toward sensitive regions like Joshimath, Dharchula, the Kailash-Mansarovar route, and the central Sector’s critical valleys and passes (e.g., Lipulekh, Niti, Mana).

Establishing a permanent airbase at Burang shifts that balance, opening up the possibility of tactical surprise or probing manoeuvres and providing quick-reaction air support for PLA ground units, surveillance, and drones. Deploying long-range air Defence systems could threaten IAF aircraft operating from bases like Bareilly or Gorakhpur.

While the altitude (4250 mtrs) limits the payload of fighters at Burang (as with other Tibetan airbases), the proximity compensates by enabling shorter-range missions with lighter payloads, persistent ISR coverage through drones, and strike options with long-range PGMs even from short-runway-capable aircraft.

Burang can also serve as a forward operating base (FOB) or logistics/surveillance hub, rotating aircraft from rear bases like Shigatse or Lhasa.

This airfield increases airspace monitoring pressure on India, especially as it tries to improve the region’s border infrastructure and patrol routes.

It also forces India to extend air defence coverage into the central sector, possibly stretching resources from already active eastern and western sectors.

 

Please Add Value to the write-up with your views on the subject.

 

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References and credits

To all the online sites and channels.

Pics Courtesy: Internet

Disclaimer:

Information and data included in the blog are for educational & non-commercial purposes only and have been carefully adapted, excerpted, or edited from reliable and accurate sources. All copyrighted material belongs to respective owners and is provided only for wider dissemination.

 

References:-

  1. Lin, Christina. “China’s Strategic Airfields and the BRI: The New Logistics Backbone”, Asia Times / Comparative Strategy, 2023.
  1. Chellaney, Brahma. “China’s Infrastructure Strategy in Tibet and the Implications for India”, Indian Defence Review, 2022.
  1. Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Report example: “PLA Air Force Operations in Tibet and Xinjiang”.
  1. Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA), New Delhi, Reports on border infrastructure and PLA’s posture across the LAC.
  1. South China Morning Post (SCMP), Occasional reporting on PLA activities and airport developments in Tibet/Xinjiang.
  1. India Today / ANI / Times Now, Reports on satellite imagery and Indian assessments of Chinese activity post-Galwan.
  1. Air Power Asia, an Indian think tank with detailed airbase and aerial warfare assessments.
  1. Military Balance 2024, by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), Technical information on PLAAF deployment capacities and base hierarchy.
  1. Civil Aviation Administration of China (CAAC), official press releases on new airports and infrastructure development in Tibet and Xinjiang.

658: RARE EARTH AS RARE WEAPON: INDIA’S OPPORTUNITY, AND CHALLENGE

 

My Article was published on the Eurasian Times website

on 21 Apr 25.

 

On 04 April 2025, China imposed export controls on seven REEs (samarium, gadolinium, terbium, dysprosium, lutetium, scandium, and yttrium) and rare earth magnets, requiring special export licenses. This move, a retaliation to U.S. tariffs as high as 145%, has halted shipments from Chinese ports, severely impacting U.S. industries like defence, electric vehicles, and medical technology.

The U.S. relies heavily on China for REEs, with over 50% of its critical minerals sourced there. China’s restrictions threaten U.S. defence (F-35 jets, missiles), tech (smartphones, AI chips), and healthcare (MRI machines, cancer treatments). Analysts warn of shortages, price hikes, and delays, with some companies facing permanent supply cuts.

Rare earth elements (REEs), a group of 17 chemically similar elements including scandium, yttrium, and the 15 lanthanides, are critical to modern technology. Often dubbed the “vitamins of modern industry,” REEs are indispensable, from smartphones and electric vehicle batteries to advanced military systems and renewable energy infrastructure. However, their supply chain is heavily concentrated, with China dominating global production and processing. This dominance has transformed rare earths into a potent geopolitical tool, particularly in trade wars, most notably between the United States and China.

For India, a country rich in rare earth potential but limited in production and processing capacity, this presents an urgent strategic opportunity and a daunting set of challenges. As the global balance of power shifts, New Delhi must rethink its resource security strategy, especially in the context of the U.S.-China rivalry and the growing importance of resilient supply chains.

 

Rare Earths: Strategic Importance

Rare earth elements comprise a group of 17 chemically similar metals: the 15 lanthanides, scandium, and yttrium. Despite their name, these elements are relatively abundant in the Earth’s crust but rarely found in concentrated forms economically viable to mine. Their unique magnetic, luminescent, and electrochemical properties make them indispensable to various high-tech applications.

    • Neodymium is essential for high-performance magnets in electric motors, drones, and wind turbines.
    • Europium and terbium are used in fluorescent and LED lighting.
    • Lanthanum is used in camera lenses and hybrid vehicle batteries.
    • Yttrium finds applications in radar and superconductors.
    • Gadolinium and terbium are critical for military sensors, sonar systems, and advanced imaging technologies.
    • Cerium and lanthanum are used in catalysts for refining petroleum.

The global demand for REEs has surged with the rise of green technologies and digital economies. The International Energy Agency projects that demand for specific REEs, like neodymium, could increase tenfold by 2040 to meet net-zero emissions goals. As of 2022, the global rare earth market was valued at approximately USD 3.9 billion, and is expected to reach USD 9.6 billion by 2030, growing at a CAGR of over 10% annually due to rising demand from clean energy and defence sectors (Fortune Business Insights, 2023).

 

China’s Dominance in the Global Rare Earth Chain

China’s strategic approach to rare earths began in the 1980s. Offering low prices and absorbing environmental costs drove many competitors out of the market, especially in the U.S., Australia, and India. 1992 Deng Xiaoping famously stated, “The Middle East has oil. China has rare earths.” This foresight has translated into geopolitical leverage.

According to the U.S. Geological Survey, in 2022, China accounted for approximately 70% of global rare earth mining, over 90% of refining and processing, and 90% of rare earth permanent magnet manufacturing (International Energy Agency, 2021). This concentration gives China significant leverage in international trade disputes.

 

Rare Earths in Trade War

The U.S.-China trade war, which escalated in 2018 under the Trump administration, saw tariffs, export controls, and technological decoupling dominate bilateral relations. Rare earths quickly emerged as a flashpoint. In 2010, China briefly restricted rare earth exports to Japan during a territorial dispute, causing global prices to spike and exposing the risks of supply chain dependence. This incident foreshadowed China’s willingness to use REEs as a bargaining chip.

In 2019, amid escalating trade tensions, Chinese state media hinted at curbing rare earth exports to the United States. President Xi Jinping’s visit to a rare earth processing facility in Jiangxi province was widely interpreted to signal China’s readiness to leverage its dominance. The U.S., heavily reliant on Chinese REEs for commercial and military applications, faced a stark vulnerability. For example, the F-35 fighter jet program depends on rare earth magnets, and any disruption could halt production.

China’s control extends beyond raw materials to the processing and manufacturing of REE-based components. Even if other countries mine rare earths, they often send them to China for refining due to its advanced infrastructure and lower costs. This creates a choke point that China can exploit during trade disputes. In 2023, China introduced export controls on certain rare earth technologies, further tightening its grip and prompting concerns about supply chain security. On April 4, 2025, China imposed new export restrictions on seven critical medium and heavy rare earth elements.

 

Economic and Geopolitical Implications

The weaponisation of rare earths has far-reaching consequences. For importing nations, supply disruptions can cripple industries, inflate costs, and delay technological advancements. In 2010, Japan’s automotive and electronics sectors faced production delays due to China’s export restrictions. Similarly, a sustained cut off to the U.S. could disrupt everything from consumer electronics to defence manufacturing.

For China, rare earths are a double-edged sword. While they provide leverage, overusing this tool risks alienating trading partners and accelerating efforts to diversify supply chains. China’s domestic demand for REEs is also rising, particularly for its electric vehicle and renewable energy sectors, which could limit its ability to restrict exports without harming its economy.

Globally, the rare earth trade war underscores the fragility of critical mineral supply chains. Countries like Australia, Canada, and the European Union have recognised the need for resilience, but building alternative supply chains requires significant investment and time. Environmental regulations and high capital costs further complicate efforts to scale up mining and processing outside China.

 

India’s Untapped Potential

India is not immune to this dynamic. Although it holds the fifth-largest rare earth reserves in the world, estimated at 6.9 million tonnes (USGS, 2023), India contributes only around 1% of global rare earth production. This is due to regulatory, environmental, and infrastructure barriers.

Opportunities for India. The U.S. and its allies actively seek to reduce their reliance on China for REEs. This allows India to become an alternative supplier, particularly in downstream value chains like magnets, batteries, and high-end components. A robust rare earth industry could enhance India’s economic security and bargaining power in international diplomacy. It can also reduce import dependency for key sectors such as defence and renewable energy. Developing a domestic rare earth value chain can create high-skilled jobs and foster innovation in materials science, metallurgy, and green technologies, which are critical for India’s future economic growth. India’s monazite deposits are rich in thorium, a potential future fuel for nuclear reactors. While radiological concerns complicate extraction, if thorium-based reactors become viable, they could offer a strategic advantage.

India’s Approach. India’s rare earth sector is primarily led by Indian Rare Earths Limited (IREL), a public sector entity under the Department of Atomic Energy. The National Critical Minerals Mission, launched in 2024, aims to bolster domestic production. IREL plans to quadruple its mining capacity to 50 million tonnes annually by 2032, increasing REE output from 5,000 to 15,000 tonnes. Investments in processing and separation facilities aim to address India’s lag in midstream capabilities, though technical expertise remains a bottleneck.

    • Policy Reforms and Liberalisation. In 2023, India initiated policy changes to attract private players into critical mineral exploration. The Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Amendment Act now allows private companies to bid to explore critical minerals, including REEs (Ministry of Mines, 2023). This is a significant shift from the earlier state-dominated regime.
    • Bilateral and Multilateral Cooperation. India has begun forging rare earth supply chain partnerships with like-minded democracies. Under the India-Australia Critical Minerals Investment Partnership, India has committed to co-invest in Australian REE projects. It also explores partnerships with the U.S., Japan, and the EU under the Mineral Security Partnership (MSP).
    • Research and Development. India has stepped up R&D through institutions like the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC) and the Council of Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) to develop indigenous REE extraction and separation technologies. Still, the gap in advanced metallurgy and processing know-how remains wide.
    • Strategic Stockpiling. India is considering creating strategic reserves for critical minerals similar to those for crude oil. This would buffer supply disruptions, although implementation remains in the early stages.

Challenges Ahead. REE extraction is environmentally damaging and involves toxic waste. India lacks the robust regulatory and technological frameworks to mitigate these hazards, especially given the proximity of mineral-rich areas to ecologically sensitive zones. While mining is a start, the real value lies in processing and manufacturing advanced REE products like permanent magnets. India currently lacks world-class facilities and expertise in this area. Despite recent reforms, bureaucratic red tape, conflicting regulations, and slow implementation continue to plague India’s mining sector. A coherent, industry-friendly policy framework is essential. India’s non-aligned posture and cautious diplomacy can sometimes limit its ability to align with Western-led initiatives fully. Balancing its strategic autonomy while engaging in rare earth diplomacy will be delicate.

 

Recommendations

Establish a National Critical Minerals Mission, modelled on the success of the Solar Mission, which can bring together ministries, PSUS, private firms, and academia to develop a holistic roadmap.

Encourage joint ventures and public-private partnerships with technologically advanced nations, which can help overcome India’s processing deficiencies.

Incentivise Green Mining and Processing, to ensure sustainability, the use of cleaner technologies and strict environmental guidelines must be incentivised.

Invest in specialised training for mineral extraction, metallurgy, and environmental management to create a workforce for the REE sector.

Prioritise Mining and Processing, focusing on developing mining and midstream capabilities before investing in magnet production and leveraging international partnerships for technology.

Incentivise Private Investment by offering tax breaks and subsidies to attract private capital, addressing IREL’s monopoly legacy.

Expand Strategic Reserves and increase REE stockpiles to buffer against supply disruptions, learning from China’s 2024 embargo.

 

Conclusion

Rare earths are no longer just a matter of economic competitiveness but a pillar of strategic autonomy.  They have become a powerful weapon in the U.S.-China trade war, reflecting the broader struggle for technological and financial supremacy. China’s dominance in the REE supply chain gives it significant leverage but also exposes the vulnerabilities of importing nations. Diversifying, recycling, and innovating are critical to reducing this dependence; however, they require time, investment, and international cooperation. As the world transitions to a greener, tech-driven future, securing a stable supply of rare earths will remain a geopolitical priority. The outcome of this struggle will shape trade relations and the global race for technological leadership.

For China, rare earths are a weapon; for the United States, a vulnerability; and for India, an opportunity. By seizing this moment, India can transform its rare earth sector from a dormant asset into a force multiplier, positioning itself as a consumer and a producer of the materials that will define the 21st century. India’s rare earth diplomacy and trade warfare strategy hinge on leveraging its vast reserves, forging international partnerships, and navigating geopolitical complexities. Opportunities to reduce global reliance on China, boost economic growth, and advance technology are significant, but technical, environmental, and financial challenges persist. By prioritising mining and processing, incentivising private investment, and deepening global alliances, India can establish itself as a pivotal player in the REE supply chain, aligning with its ambition to become a developed nation by 2047.

 

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Rare Earth As Rare Weapon! Amid US-China ‘Nasty’ Trade War, How Can India Use It’s ‘Dormant Asset’ To Assert Dominance

 

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References:-

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