Author: Anil Khosla

Posted on

660: YOUTH POWER AND NATIONAL VISION: INDIA’S ROAD TO 2047

 

Made youth aware of India’s Vision @2047 and their role in its achievement.

At the Chatra Sansad, Gujarat 2025.

 

India Vision 2047 (also referred to as Viksit Bharat @2047) is a strategic blueprint initiated by the Indian government, led by NITI Aayog, to transform India into a developed nation with a USD 30 trillion economy and a per capita income of USD 18,000–20,000 by 2047, marking the centenary of India’s independence. The vision aims to ensure sustainable, inclusive growth while avoiding the middle-income trap that has stalled progress in other nations.

The youth of India, constituting over 40% of the population under 25 years and a significant portion of the 1.12 billion working-age population by 2047, are pivotal to realising India Vision 2047 (Viksit Bharat @2047). Their energy, innovation, and demographic dividend position them as key drivers in transforming India.

 

India Vision 2047: Key Objectives

Developed India

  • Transition from a developing to a developed nation.
  • Targeting a $30 trillion economy, up from $3.7 trillion in 2025.
  • Strong manufacturing base under Make in India, with high-tech
  • Global leadership in IT, space, green energy, and AI sectors.

Inclusive and Equitable Growth

  • Universal access to quality education, healthcare, housing, and digital connectivity.
  • Bridging rural-urban divides and reducing income inequality.
  • Empowering women and marginalised communities.

Technological Leadership

  • AI, quantum computing, 6G, biotech, and cyber defence.
  • Indigenous R&D with global patents and innovations.
  • National digital infrastructure and digital governance.

Strategic and Geopolitical Leadership

  • Stronger military capabilities (e.g., modernisation, self-reliance via Atmanirbhar Bharat).
  • Strategic autonomy in foreign policy.
  • Expanded global influence: Permanent UN Security Council seat, active G20 leadership, South-South cooperation.

 

Vision Targets

Economic Growth

  • Achieve a USD 30 trillion economy, making India one of the world’s largest economies (potentially surpassing Japan and Germany by 2030).
  • Sustain an annual GDP growth rate of approximately 7–9% from 2030 to 2047, with projections of 9.2% (2030–2040) and 8.8% (2040–2047).
  • Increase per capita income from USD 2,392 (2023) to USD 18,000–20,000 by 2047.
  • Boost exports to USD 8.67 trillion and imports to USD 12.12 trillion by 2047.
  • Expand the middle class from 50 million (2023) to over 500 million by 2050, driving domestic demand.

Infrastructure Development

  • Build world-class infrastructure in urban and rural areas, ensuring equitable access to clean water, electricity, and healthcare.
  • Prepare urban systems for nearly 50% of the city population by 2047, with improved services and balanced regional development.
  • Develop “future-ready” urban spaces and modernise rural infrastructure, including micro-irrigation and organic farming in agriculture.

Social Development

  • Raise average life expectancy to 71.8 (from 67.2 in 2021) and achieve a literacy rate of 89.8% (from 77.8% in 2021).
  • Aim for universal literacy (100%) and significantly reduce infant mortality by 2047.
  • Increase female labour force participation from 37% to over 70%.
  • Leverage India’s demographic dividend, with over 40% of the population below 25 years and a working-age population of approximately 1.12 billion by 2047.

Sustainability and Climate Resilience

  • Reduce carbon emission intensity by 55% from 2005 to 2047, aligning with India’s net-zero target by 2070.
  • Promote green technologies, renewable energy, and climate-resilient agriculture to ensure sustainable development.
  • Enhance weather-readiness and climate resilience through inter-ministerial collaboration, AI-driven predictions, and digital twins for disaster management.

Governance and Global Engagement

  • Minimise government interference in citizens’ lives and streamline processes through re-engineering and digital transformation.
  • Position India as a global leader in trade, investment, technology, and innovation. Indian firms dominate sectors like IT, pharmaceuticals, and manufacturing.
  • Foster global champions by restructuring public sector enterprises and creating 3–4 major players in key sectors (e.g., banking, oil, semiconductors).
  • Strengthen geopolitical influence, positioning India as a “peacemaker of last resort” and a hub for friend-sourcing trade.

 

Core Strategies

Demography, Democracy, Diversity. Leverage India’s young population, vibrant democracy, and cultural diversity as foundational pillars for growth.

Sectoral Focus. Prioritise 10 key sectors: agriculture, infrastructure, technology, governance, health, education, commerce, industry, security, and foreign affairs.

Avoiding the Middle-Income Trap. To ensure sustained growth, implement structural reforms, enhance competitiveness, and address regional disparities.

Human Capital Development. To create a skilled workforce, education and skilling must be aligned with global demands (e.g., nursing, IT, Industry 4.0 technologies).

Inclusive Growth. Ensure balanced development across regions, focusing on lagging areas in the East and North, and empower women through workforce participation.

Industry and Innovation. Increase manufacturing’s GDP share from 15% to 25%, localise innovation, and aim for a 12% global manufacturing share (from 3.1%).

Participative Governance. Promote “Sabka Saath, Sabka Vikas, Sabka Vishwas, Sabka Prayas” (Together with all, Development for all, Trust of all, Efforts of all) to foster collective action.

 

Implementation Framework

Timeline. The plan outlines milestones for 2030 (short-term) and 2047 (long-term), with actionable reforms and outcomes.

Stakeholder Collaboration. Involves ministries, states, the private sector, research institutions, and global experts.

Role of States. States like Gujarat, Andhra Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh, and Tamil Nadu are aligning their vision documents with the national plan.

Sectoral Groups of Secretaries (SGoS). Ten groups were formed in December 2021 to create roadmaps for key sectors, with targets set for this decade as the foundation for 2047 goals.

Monitoring and Evaluation. Regular reviews, gap analysis, and stress testing to ensure progress and resilience, especially in disaster management.

 

Challenges

  • Tackling unemployment and skilling for future jobs.
  • Navigating global economic uncertainties.
  • Federal coordination across states and central agencies.
  • Balancing growth with environmental commitments.

Economic Hurdles

  • Sustaining high growth amidst global economic uncertainties and a projected trade deficit of over USD 3 trillion by 2047.
  • Managing the rupee-dollar exchange rate, which impacts GDP in dollar terms.
  • Balancing fiscal consolidation with high capital expenditure to avoid restricting government interventions.

 Sectoral Stagnation

  • Revitalising agriculture (17% of GDP, employs 50% of workforce) and manufacturing (15% of GDP) to boost productivity and employment.
  • Addressing supply chain vulnerabilities and reducing reliance on imports through Production-Linked Incentives (PLI) schemes.
  • Regional Disparities. Bridging the development gap between the West/South and East/North to ensure inclusive growth.
  • Geopolitical Risks. Navigating tensions with neighbours (e.g., China, Pakistan) and global trade restrictions, such as U.S. tariffs.
  • Climate Vulnerabilities. Managing climate impacts on agriculture, water resources, and coastal ecosystems is challenging, as over 60% of farmers depend on rain.
  • Scepticism on Execution. Some critics highlight a gap between ambitious goals and ground-level implementation, with concerns about persistent poverty and inequality.

 

Driving Change: Youth as Architects of India’s Vision 2047

The youth of India, constituting over 40% of the population under 25 years and a significant portion of the 1.12 billion working-age population by 2047, are pivotal to realising India Vision 2047 (Viksit Bharat @2047). Their energy, innovation, and demographic dividend position them as key drivers in transforming India. Suggestions for youth participation are as follows:-

  • Pursue STEM education, vocational training, and entrepreneurial ventures; advocate for gender equality in workplaces; engage in gig and digital economies to enhance productivity.
  • Participate in hackathons, research fellowships, and tech incubators; develop sustainability-focused startups; collaborate with global institutions to innovate in high-tech sectors.
  • Volunteer in literacy and health outreach programs; use social media to raise awareness about equity; mentor underprivileged peers to access education and opportunities.
  • Join environmental NGOs; adopt sustainable practices (e.g., reducing waste, using public transport); innovate in green tech startups or research climate solutions.
  • Participate in youth parliaments, policy forums, and online consultations; use platforms like X to discuss governance issues; volunteer in community governance projects.
  • Represent India in international forums, create content showcasing Indian culture, and network with global Indian communities to foster trade and innovation.
  • Demand policy reforms for job creation; support peers from underserved communities; engage in geopolitical studies to understand global dynamics.

 

Conclusion

India Vision 2047 is an ambitious roadmap to transform India into a global powerhouse by its 100th year of independence. Anchored in economic growth, sustainability, and inclusive development, it leverages India’s demographic, democratic, and diverse strengths. While the vision is comprehensive, its success hinges on execution. However, overcoming structural challenges, ensuring effective implementation, and adapting to global uncertainties will be key to realising this vision.

The youth are the torchbearers of India Vision 2047, driving economic growth, innovation, sustainability, and social progress. By leveraging their skills, creativity, and global outlook, they can transform India into a developed, inclusive, and influential nation by 2047. Their active participation in education, entrepreneurship, governance, and climate action, supported by government and private initiatives, will determine the vision’s success.

 

Please Add Value to the write-up with your views on the subject.

 

1282
Default rating

Please give a thumbs up if you  like The Post?

 

For regular updates, please register your email here:-

Subscribe

References and credits

To all the online sites and channels.

Pics Courtesy: Internet

Disclaimer:

Information and data included in the blog are for educational & non-commercial purposes only and have been carefully adapted, excerpted, or edited from reliable and accurate sources. All copyrighted material belongs to the respective owners and is provided only for wider dissemination.

Bibliography

  1. Chavan, P. (2024). Viksit Bharat @2047: Pathways to a developed India. ResearchGate.
  1. Drishti IAS. (2025, January 23). Vision India@2047: Transforming the nation’s future. Drishti IAS.
  1. Government of India. (2023, December 11). PM launches ‘Viksit Bharat @2047: Voice of Youth’. Press Information Bureau.
  1. Grant Thornton Bharat. (2024, September 23). Towards a Viksit Bharat: Building inclusive and sustainable infrastructure for India’s future. Grant Thornton.
  1. Gupta, S., & Sachdeva, R. (2025). Decoding state growth: India’s path to a developed nation by 2047. Centre for Social and Economic Progress (CSEP).
  1. India. (2024, July 26). Essay on Viksit Bharat: A vision for a developed India. IndiaCSR.
  1. NITI Aayog. (2023). Vision India@2047: Preliminary forecasting results. NITI Aayog.
  1. PWOnlyIAS. (2023, December 28). Vision 2047: A roadmap to a $30 trillion economy. PWOnlyIAS.
  1. REPL. (n.d.). India’s Vision 2047 for sustainable development. REPL Global.
  1. Singh, C. (2025, February 9). How can India rapidly grow to achieve the ‘Viksit Bharat 2047’ goal? Business Standard.
  1. Subrahmanyam, K. V. (2023, October 30). Vision document to make India a $30 trillion economy by 2047 in the final stages. The Indian Express.
  1. Vajiram & Ravi. (2023, October 31). The Vision India@2047: India will become a $30-trillion economy by 2047. Vajiram & Ravi.
Posted on

659: INPUTS TO THE QUESTIONNAIRE ON CHINESE AIRFIELDS.

​

China has been expanding its aviation infrastructure near the India-China border, constructing new airfields in strategic locations. These airfields are primarily located in the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) and Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR), with strategic significance due to their proximity to sensitive border areas, including India, Nepal, and Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK).

Detailed overview of the new Chinese airfields at Tingri, Lhunze, Burang, Yutian, and Yarkantir (based on available open source information) is as follows:-

 

  1. Shigatse Tingri Airport (Tingri, Tibet)
    • Location: Tingri County, Shigatse Prefecture, Tibet Autonomous Region, China.
    • Opened: December 24, 2022
    • Type: Dual-use (civilian and military)
    • Elevation: Approximately 4,300 meters (14,108 feet) above sea level.
    • Runway: 4,500 meters
    • Proximity to India: Approximately 60 km from the Indian border
    • Infra: Supports dual-use (military and civilian) operations, potentially for troop deployment and logistics near the Line of Actual Control (LAC) with India. Designed to handle high-altitude operations, likely with a runway suitable for small to medium aircraft and helicopters.
    • Strategic Significance: Supports China’s broader strategy to bolster infrastructure near disputed borders. Located across the Himalayas from Kathmandu, Nepal, and near the Indian border. Part of China’s “3+1” airport construction plan aimed to boost air connectivity in the region, enhancing civilian access and military logistics near the Line of Actual Control (LAC). Fills a gap between Burang (west) and Shigatse (east), enhancing China’s military and civilian aviation network in southern Tibet.

 

  1. Lhunze Airport/Shannan Longzi Airport(Lhunze County, Tibet).
    • Location: Longzi County, Shannan (Lhokha) Prefecture, Tibet Autonomous Region, China.
    • Elevation: 3,980 meters (13,060 feet) above sea level.
    • Features a 4,500-meter (14,800-foot) Class 4C runway with seven parking stands.
    • Operational since January 12, 2023, following construction that began in April 2021.
    • Type: Planned as a dual-use facility.
    • Designed to handle 180,000 passengers annually by 2030.
    • Equipped for high-altitude operations, likely supporting fighter jets and transport aircraft.
    • Proximity to India: Close to Arunachal Pradesh, India
    • Strategic Significance: Dual-use military and civilian airport, enhancing China’s ability to project power near the LAC. Aims to improve connectivity in remote border areas, facilitating civilian travel and military operations. ​Located approximately 45 km from the disputed border with Arunachal Pradesh, India, and opposite the Upper Subansiri district. Lhunze’s airfield strengthens China’s military presence in a contested region, with the potential to support operations against India. Part of a broader network of airfields and SAM (surface-to-air missile) emplacements near Arunachal Pradesh.

 

  1. Ngari Burang Airport/ Ali Pulan Airport (Burang County, Tibet)
    • Location: Burang County, Ngari Prefecture, Tibet Autonomous Region, China.
    • Opened: December 27, 2023
    • Type: Dual-use (civilian and military)
    • Elevation: 4,250 meters (13,940 feet) above sea level.
    • Runway: 4,500 meters.
    • Status: Operational since December 27, 2023, with construction approved in April 2021.
    • Designed for 150,000 passengers and 600 tons of cargo annually.
    • Runway and facilities support dual-use operations, including military aircraft and helicopters.
    • Proximity to India: Near the India-Tibet-Nepal tri-junction.
    • Strategic Significance: It enhances China’s ability to project power and provide logistical support in the western sector of the LAC. It is located near the trijunction of Tibet, Nepal, and India’s Uttarakhand state, approximately 400 km from New Delhi. It is positioned close to Mount Kailash and Lake Manasarovar and is touted as a feeder strip for pilgrims, but has clear military applications. It supports the Ngari-Gunsa airfield, located 220 km away, and enhances China’s control over the southwestern border.

 

  1. Yutian Wanfang Airport (Yutian County, Xinjiang)
    • Location: Yutian County, Hotan Prefecture, Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, China.
    • Elevation: Approximately 1,400 meters (4,600 feet) above sea level (lower than Tibetan airfields).
    • Runway: 3,200 meters, capable of handling medium-sized commercial and military transport aircraft.
    • Opened: December 26, 2020
    • Type: Primarily a civilian airport but with potential dual-use capabilities.
    • Annual Capacity: Designed to handle 180,000 passengers and 400 tons of cargo
    • Strategic Significance: This will improve connectivity in southern Xinjiang, which is strategically important due to its proximity to the western sector of the LAC. ​Situated in south Xinjiang, between Hotan and Qiemo airbases, along the Karakoram Highway. Enhances connectivity in Xinjiang, supporting China’s Belt and Road Initiative and military logistics near the borders with Pakistan and India. Strategically located near the Aksai Chin region, a disputed area with India. Yutian’s airfield supports China’s control over Xinjiang and its borders with India and Pakistan-occupied Kashmir. Likely used for surveillance and logistics, given its proximity to sensitive regions.

 

  1. Yarkantir/Yarkant/ShacheAirport (Xinjiang)
    • Location: Likely refers to Shache (Yarkant) County, Kashgar Prefecture, Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, China.
    • Elevation: Approximately 1,200–1,500 meters (3,900–4,900 feet) above sea level.
    • Shache Airport has a runway suitable for small to medium aircraft, with facilities for civilian and potential military use.
    • Status: Specific details about a new airfield in Yarkand are limited. However, the region has seen infrastructure enhancements, including upgrades to airbases like Hotan, approximately 240 km from the LAC.
    • Strategic Significance: Shache Airport (IATA: QSZ, ICAO: ZWSC) is an existing dual-use airport in Yarkant County. It is operational for civilian flights but has military potential. Located in a restive part of Xinjiang, near the Tajik Autonomous County and the Wakhan Corridor, it is close to Pakistan-occupied Kashmir and Afghanistan. It supports China’s internal security operations in Xinjiang and external defence along its western borders. Enhances China’s ability to project power in Central Asia and monitor borders with Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Tajikistan. Part of a broader network of airfields in Xinjiang, including Tashkurgan, which is under construction and strategically located near PoK.

 

Chinese Aviation Infrastructure Strategy.

Regional Strategy. The airfields in Tingri, Lhunze, and Burang are part of China’s efforts to strengthen its military presence along the LAC with India, particularly after the 2020 Galwan clash. Yutian and Shache (Yarkant) airfields support China’s control over Xinjiang, securing its western borders and facilitating connectivity with Central Asia.

Chinese Narrative. Official Chinese sources often frame these airfields as civilian projects to boost tourism (e.g., Burang for Mount Kailash pilgrims) or regional development. However, their proximity to sensitive borders and dual-use capabilities suggests a primary military purpose, which is downplayed in state media.

Geopolitical Implications.  These airfields enhance China’s ability to rapidly deploy troops, conduct surveillance, and support air operations in contested regions, posing a challenge to India, Nepal, and other neighbours.

 

Inputs to the Queries on Chinese Bases

(Based on the open sources on the net)

Q1. As reflected in the imagery, does the construction and upgrade of new Chinese airbases represent a serious threat to India?

The construction and upgrade of Chinese airbases in Tibet and adjacent areas do represent a serious strategic threat to India, mainly when analysed in the context of recent geopolitical tensions, evolving Chinese military capabilities, and infrastructural patterns since the 2020 Galwan clashes.

Airbases like Tingri, Lhunze, and Burang are located close to the Line of Actual Control (LAC), within 50–150 km. This proximity allows for the quick deployment of PLA Air Force (PLAAF) assets to forward positions and shorter response times in case of a border escalation. These airfields enable coverage of Indian positions in Arunachal Pradesh, Sikkim, Uttarakhand, and Ladakh.

Upgrades to dual-use airfields include extended and hardened runways to support heavier fighters and transport aircraft, and new hardened aircraft shelters (HAS) to protect valuable assets. Advanced radar stations and SAM sites will provide protection. Fuel and ammunition storage facilities reflect a long-term war readiness. These changes reflect a move from rudimentary forward airstrips to permanent, fully capable air combat hubs.

These bases offer greater depth, logistics, and density. The PLAAF can now rotate fighter squadrons and drones rapidly into forward bases.

The network of airbases (e.g., Burang supporting Ngari Gunsa, Tingri filling gaps between Shigatse and Burang) creates strike capability, mutual support, and redundancy.

Bases like Burang (near Nepal) and Tingri (near Bhutan) could pressure India’s neighbours, complicating India’s regional influence. The proximity to the Siliguri Corridor amplifies strategic risks.

Bases like Yutian and Yarkantir in Xinjiang would complement Western Theater Command operations and are positioned to project power toward India. This reflects China’s “strategic envelopment” doctrine, which increases pressure on India along a much broader front.

These Chinese airbases’ construction and systematic upgrading represent a serious and growing threat to India’s strategic posture, particularly by reducing warning time, enabling force concentration, and improving the PLA’s offensive and defensive air operations.

While it does not signal imminent war, it tilts the regional balance and compels India to accelerate military infrastructure development, deepen surveillance, and maintain credible deterrence across the Himalayas.

 

Q2. Do these new airbases and the consolidation and upgrade of existing ones in Tibet substantially balance out the IAF’s traditional advantage along the India-China frontier?

China’s construction of new airbases and the systematic upgrading of existing ones in Tibet and Xinjiang significantly narrows down, though not entirely erases, the traditional airpower advantage long held by the Indian Air Force (IAF) along the India-China frontier.

 

The establishment/modernisation of Tingri, Lhunze, Burang (near central and eastern sectors) and Yutian, Yarkantir (in Xinjiang) allows PLAAF aircraft to deploy closer to the LAC, reducing response time and extending their ability to hold Indian targets at risk.

While Tibet’s altitude still limits PLAAF aircraft (lower payloads, reduced engine efficiency), China is trying to mitigate this with more powerful engines and heavy reliance on drones, loitering munitions, airborne early warning aircraft (KJ-500), tankers, and ECM assets based in the rear (e.g., Hotan) but linked with forward bases.

China’s concept of “airbase clusters” means that even if one is targeted (say Lhasa-Gonggar), others nearby (e.g., Shigatse, Pangta) can support operations, enhancing tactical flexibility, survivability, and redundancy.

China’s new and upgraded airbases improve PLAAF’s forward reach, resilience, and responsiveness, mitigating the payload disadvantage of high-altitude operations. Bases like Lhunze and Tingri challenge the IAF’s dominance in the eastern LAC sector by enabling faster, more credible PLAAF operations.

While the IAF continues to enjoy certain operational advantages, China’s new airbases and upgrades in Tibet now provide the PLAAF with a more credible and resilient offensive and defensive posture along the LAC. The earlier asymmetry that favoured India is now more balanced, especially in terms of response time, reach, and multi-layered defences.

 

Q3. Does the construction of the Burang airbase represent a new and specific threat to airspace over Uttarakhand?

The central sector of the Line of Actual Control (LAC) has historically seen less militarisation compared to the eastern and western sectors (partly due to the rugged terrain and lower perceived threat).

However, the construction of the Burang airbase represents a new and specific potential threat to Uttarakhand’s airspace due to its proximity to the LAC (~60 km), ability to host fighters and drones, and support from nearby SAM systems.

It enhances China’s surveillance, deterrence, and limited power projection over Pithoragarh and Chamoli, particularly near the Lipulekh Pass and Barahoti.

Burang is located near the tri-junction of India, Nepal, and Tibet, directly facing India’s Uttarakhand sector, especially Barahoti, which has witnessed Chinese transgressions in recent years.

The base is less than 100 km from the Indian border, giving PLAAF aircraft and drones a very short flight time to Indian airspace, especially toward sensitive regions like Joshimath, Dharchula, the Kailash-Mansarovar route, and the central Sector’s critical valleys and passes (e.g., Lipulekh, Niti, Mana).

Establishing a permanent airbase at Burang shifts that balance, opening up the possibility of tactical surprise or probing manoeuvres and providing quick-reaction air support for PLA ground units, surveillance, and drones. Deploying long-range air Defence systems could threaten IAF aircraft operating from bases like Bareilly or Gorakhpur.

While the altitude (4250 mtrs) limits the payload of fighters at Burang (as with other Tibetan airbases), the proximity compensates by enabling shorter-range missions with lighter payloads, persistent ISR coverage through drones, and strike options with long-range PGMs even from short-runway-capable aircraft.

Burang can also serve as a forward operating base (FOB) or logistics/surveillance hub, rotating aircraft from rear bases like Shigatse or Lhasa.

This airfield increases airspace monitoring pressure on India, especially as it tries to improve the region’s border infrastructure and patrol routes.

It also forces India to extend air defence coverage into the central sector, possibly stretching resources from already active eastern and western sectors.

 

Please Add Value to the write-up with your views on the subject.

 

1282
Default rating

Please give a thumbs up if you  like The Post?

 

For regular updates, please register your email here:-

Subscribe

 

 

References and credits

To all the online sites and channels.

Pics Courtesy: Internet

Disclaimer:

Information and data included in the blog are for educational & non-commercial purposes only and have been carefully adapted, excerpted, or edited from reliable and accurate sources. All copyrighted material belongs to respective owners and is provided only for wider dissemination.

 

References:-

  1. Lin, Christina. “China’s Strategic Airfields and the BRI: The New Logistics Backbone”, Asia Times / Comparative Strategy, 2023.
  1. Chellaney, Brahma. “China’s Infrastructure Strategy in Tibet and the Implications for India”, Indian Defence Review, 2022.
  1. Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Report example: “PLA Air Force Operations in Tibet and Xinjiang”.
  1. Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA), New Delhi, Reports on border infrastructure and PLA’s posture across the LAC.
  1. South China Morning Post (SCMP), Occasional reporting on PLA activities and airport developments in Tibet/Xinjiang.
  1. India Today / ANI / Times Now, Reports on satellite imagery and Indian assessments of Chinese activity post-Galwan.
  1. Air Power Asia, an Indian think tank with detailed airbase and aerial warfare assessments.
  1. Military Balance 2024, by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), Technical information on PLAAF deployment capacities and base hierarchy.
  1. Civil Aviation Administration of China (CAAC), official press releases on new airports and infrastructure development in Tibet and Xinjiang.
Posted on

658: RARE EARTH AS RARE WEAPON: INDIA’S OPPORTUNITY, AND CHALLENGE

 

My Article was published on the Eurasian Times website

on 21 Apr 25.

 

On 04 April 2025, China imposed export controls on seven REEs (samarium, gadolinium, terbium, dysprosium, lutetium, scandium, and yttrium) and rare earth magnets, requiring special export licenses. This move, a retaliation to U.S. tariffs as high as 145%, has halted shipments from Chinese ports, severely impacting U.S. industries like defence, electric vehicles, and medical technology.

The U.S. relies heavily on China for REEs, with over 50% of its critical minerals sourced there. China’s restrictions threaten U.S. defence (F-35 jets, missiles), tech (smartphones, AI chips), and healthcare (MRI machines, cancer treatments). Analysts warn of shortages, price hikes, and delays, with some companies facing permanent supply cuts.

Rare earth elements (REEs), a group of 17 chemically similar elements including scandium, yttrium, and the 15 lanthanides, are critical to modern technology. Often dubbed the “vitamins of modern industry,” REEs are indispensable, from smartphones and electric vehicle batteries to advanced military systems and renewable energy infrastructure. However, their supply chain is heavily concentrated, with China dominating global production and processing. This dominance has transformed rare earths into a potent geopolitical tool, particularly in trade wars, most notably between the United States and China.

For India, a country rich in rare earth potential but limited in production and processing capacity, this presents an urgent strategic opportunity and a daunting set of challenges. As the global balance of power shifts, New Delhi must rethink its resource security strategy, especially in the context of the U.S.-China rivalry and the growing importance of resilient supply chains.

 

Rare Earths: Strategic Importance

Rare earth elements comprise a group of 17 chemically similar metals: the 15 lanthanides, scandium, and yttrium. Despite their name, these elements are relatively abundant in the Earth’s crust but rarely found in concentrated forms economically viable to mine. Their unique magnetic, luminescent, and electrochemical properties make them indispensable to various high-tech applications.

    • Neodymium is essential for high-performance magnets in electric motors, drones, and wind turbines.
    • Europium and terbium are used in fluorescent and LED lighting.
    • Lanthanum is used in camera lenses and hybrid vehicle batteries.
    • Yttrium finds applications in radar and superconductors.
    • Gadolinium and terbium are critical for military sensors, sonar systems, and advanced imaging technologies.
    • Cerium and lanthanum are used in catalysts for refining petroleum.

The global demand for REEs has surged with the rise of green technologies and digital economies. The International Energy Agency projects that demand for specific REEs, like neodymium, could increase tenfold by 2040 to meet net-zero emissions goals. As of 2022, the global rare earth market was valued at approximately USD 3.9 billion, and is expected to reach USD 9.6 billion by 2030, growing at a CAGR of over 10% annually due to rising demand from clean energy and defence sectors (Fortune Business Insights, 2023).

 

China’s Dominance in the Global Rare Earth Chain

China’s strategic approach to rare earths began in the 1980s. Offering low prices and absorbing environmental costs drove many competitors out of the market, especially in the U.S., Australia, and India. 1992 Deng Xiaoping famously stated, “The Middle East has oil. China has rare earths.” This foresight has translated into geopolitical leverage.

According to the U.S. Geological Survey, in 2022, China accounted for approximately 70% of global rare earth mining, over 90% of refining and processing, and 90% of rare earth permanent magnet manufacturing (International Energy Agency, 2021). This concentration gives China significant leverage in international trade disputes.

 

Rare Earths in Trade War

The U.S.-China trade war, which escalated in 2018 under the Trump administration, saw tariffs, export controls, and technological decoupling dominate bilateral relations. Rare earths quickly emerged as a flashpoint. In 2010, China briefly restricted rare earth exports to Japan during a territorial dispute, causing global prices to spike and exposing the risks of supply chain dependence. This incident foreshadowed China’s willingness to use REEs as a bargaining chip.

In 2019, amid escalating trade tensions, Chinese state media hinted at curbing rare earth exports to the United States. President Xi Jinping’s visit to a rare earth processing facility in Jiangxi province was widely interpreted to signal China’s readiness to leverage its dominance. The U.S., heavily reliant on Chinese REEs for commercial and military applications, faced a stark vulnerability. For example, the F-35 fighter jet program depends on rare earth magnets, and any disruption could halt production.

China’s control extends beyond raw materials to the processing and manufacturing of REE-based components. Even if other countries mine rare earths, they often send them to China for refining due to its advanced infrastructure and lower costs. This creates a choke point that China can exploit during trade disputes. In 2023, China introduced export controls on certain rare earth technologies, further tightening its grip and prompting concerns about supply chain security. On April 4, 2025, China imposed new export restrictions on seven critical medium and heavy rare earth elements.

 

Economic and Geopolitical Implications

The weaponisation of rare earths has far-reaching consequences. For importing nations, supply disruptions can cripple industries, inflate costs, and delay technological advancements. In 2010, Japan’s automotive and electronics sectors faced production delays due to China’s export restrictions. Similarly, a sustained cut off to the U.S. could disrupt everything from consumer electronics to defence manufacturing.

For China, rare earths are a double-edged sword. While they provide leverage, overusing this tool risks alienating trading partners and accelerating efforts to diversify supply chains. China’s domestic demand for REEs is also rising, particularly for its electric vehicle and renewable energy sectors, which could limit its ability to restrict exports without harming its economy.

Globally, the rare earth trade war underscores the fragility of critical mineral supply chains. Countries like Australia, Canada, and the European Union have recognised the need for resilience, but building alternative supply chains requires significant investment and time. Environmental regulations and high capital costs further complicate efforts to scale up mining and processing outside China.

 

India’s Untapped Potential

India is not immune to this dynamic. Although it holds the fifth-largest rare earth reserves in the world, estimated at 6.9 million tonnes (USGS, 2023), India contributes only around 1% of global rare earth production. This is due to regulatory, environmental, and infrastructure barriers.

Opportunities for India. The U.S. and its allies actively seek to reduce their reliance on China for REEs. This allows India to become an alternative supplier, particularly in downstream value chains like magnets, batteries, and high-end components. A robust rare earth industry could enhance India’s economic security and bargaining power in international diplomacy. It can also reduce import dependency for key sectors such as defence and renewable energy. Developing a domestic rare earth value chain can create high-skilled jobs and foster innovation in materials science, metallurgy, and green technologies, which are critical for India’s future economic growth. India’s monazite deposits are rich in thorium, a potential future fuel for nuclear reactors. While radiological concerns complicate extraction, if thorium-based reactors become viable, they could offer a strategic advantage.

India’s Approach. India’s rare earth sector is primarily led by Indian Rare Earths Limited (IREL), a public sector entity under the Department of Atomic Energy. The National Critical Minerals Mission, launched in 2024, aims to bolster domestic production. IREL plans to quadruple its mining capacity to 50 million tonnes annually by 2032, increasing REE output from 5,000 to 15,000 tonnes. Investments in processing and separation facilities aim to address India’s lag in midstream capabilities, though technical expertise remains a bottleneck.

    • Policy Reforms and Liberalisation. In 2023, India initiated policy changes to attract private players into critical mineral exploration. The Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Amendment Act now allows private companies to bid to explore critical minerals, including REEs (Ministry of Mines, 2023). This is a significant shift from the earlier state-dominated regime.
    • Bilateral and Multilateral Cooperation. India has begun forging rare earth supply chain partnerships with like-minded democracies. Under the India-Australia Critical Minerals Investment Partnership, India has committed to co-invest in Australian REE projects. It also explores partnerships with the U.S., Japan, and the EU under the Mineral Security Partnership (MSP).
    • Research and Development. India has stepped up R&D through institutions like the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC) and the Council of Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) to develop indigenous REE extraction and separation technologies. Still, the gap in advanced metallurgy and processing know-how remains wide.
    • Strategic Stockpiling. India is considering creating strategic reserves for critical minerals similar to those for crude oil. This would buffer supply disruptions, although implementation remains in the early stages.

Challenges Ahead. REE extraction is environmentally damaging and involves toxic waste. India lacks the robust regulatory and technological frameworks to mitigate these hazards, especially given the proximity of mineral-rich areas to ecologically sensitive zones. While mining is a start, the real value lies in processing and manufacturing advanced REE products like permanent magnets. India currently lacks world-class facilities and expertise in this area. Despite recent reforms, bureaucratic red tape, conflicting regulations, and slow implementation continue to plague India’s mining sector. A coherent, industry-friendly policy framework is essential. India’s non-aligned posture and cautious diplomacy can sometimes limit its ability to align with Western-led initiatives fully. Balancing its strategic autonomy while engaging in rare earth diplomacy will be delicate.

 

Recommendations

Establish a National Critical Minerals Mission, modelled on the success of the Solar Mission, which can bring together ministries, PSUS, private firms, and academia to develop a holistic roadmap.

Encourage joint ventures and public-private partnerships with technologically advanced nations, which can help overcome India’s processing deficiencies.

Incentivise Green Mining and Processing, to ensure sustainability, the use of cleaner technologies and strict environmental guidelines must be incentivised.

Invest in specialised training for mineral extraction, metallurgy, and environmental management to create a workforce for the REE sector.

Prioritise Mining and Processing, focusing on developing mining and midstream capabilities before investing in magnet production and leveraging international partnerships for technology.

Incentivise Private Investment by offering tax breaks and subsidies to attract private capital, addressing IREL’s monopoly legacy.

Expand Strategic Reserves and increase REE stockpiles to buffer against supply disruptions, learning from China’s 2024 embargo.

 

Conclusion

Rare earths are no longer just a matter of economic competitiveness but a pillar of strategic autonomy.  They have become a powerful weapon in the U.S.-China trade war, reflecting the broader struggle for technological and financial supremacy. China’s dominance in the REE supply chain gives it significant leverage but also exposes the vulnerabilities of importing nations. Diversifying, recycling, and innovating are critical to reducing this dependence; however, they require time, investment, and international cooperation. As the world transitions to a greener, tech-driven future, securing a stable supply of rare earths will remain a geopolitical priority. The outcome of this struggle will shape trade relations and the global race for technological leadership.

For China, rare earths are a weapon; for the United States, a vulnerability; and for India, an opportunity. By seizing this moment, India can transform its rare earth sector from a dormant asset into a force multiplier, positioning itself as a consumer and a producer of the materials that will define the 21st century. India’s rare earth diplomacy and trade warfare strategy hinge on leveraging its vast reserves, forging international partnerships, and navigating geopolitical complexities. Opportunities to reduce global reliance on China, boost economic growth, and advance technology are significant, but technical, environmental, and financial challenges persist. By prioritising mining and processing, incentivising private investment, and deepening global alliances, India can establish itself as a pivotal player in the REE supply chain, aligning with its ambition to become a developed nation by 2047.

 

Please Add Value to the write-up with your views on the subject.

1282
Default rating

Please give a thumbs up if you  like The Post?

 

For regular updates, please register your email here:-

Subscribe

 

Link to the article on the website:-

Rare Earth As Rare Weapon! Amid US-China ‘Nasty’ Trade War, How Can India Use It’s ‘Dormant Asset’ To Assert Dominance

 

References and credits

To all the online sites and channels.

Pics Courtesy: Internet

Disclaimer:

Information and data included in the blog are for educational & non-commercial purposes only and have been carefully adapted, excerpted, or edited from reliable and accurate sources. All copyrighted material belongs to respective owners and is provided only for wider dissemination.

 

 

References:-

  1. Mancheri, N. A., Sundaresan, L., & Chandrashekar, S. (2019). India’s Rare Earths Industry: Challenges and Opportunities. Institute for South Asian Studies.
  1. Ministry of Mines, Government of India. (2023). Critical Minerals Strategy and MMDR Amendments. https://mines.gov.in
  1. Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC). (2022). Thorium and Rare Earth Research. https://barc.gov.in
  1. Niti Aayog (2021). Strategy on Resource Efficiency in Rare Earths and Critical Minerals.
  1. Mineral Security Partnership (MSP). (2024). Overview of Global Cooperation on Critical Minerals. https://www.state.gov/mineral-security-partnership
  1. Press Information Bureau (2023). Government Notifies Critical Minerals List; Amends Mines and Minerals Act.
  1. Fortune Business Insights (2023). Rare Earth Elements Market Size, Share & Industry Analysis.
  1. International Energy Agency (2021). The Role of Critical Minerals in Clean Energy Transitions.
  1. US Geological Survey. (2023). Mineral Commodity Summaries: Rare Earths. https://pubs.usgs.gov
  1. Global Times (2019). China is ready to weaponise rare earths in a trade war.
  1. U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO). (2020). Defence Industrial Base: DOD Efforts to Assess and Mitigate Rare Earth Risks.
English हिंदी