693: BUNKER BUSTERS: HITTING FAR AND DEEP

 

My Article was published on “The Eurasian Times” website on 02 Jul 25.

In an era where military targets are increasingly buried deep underground, the development and deployment of bunker-busting weapons have become critical to global security strategies. The United States’ GBU-57/A Massive Ordnance Penetrator (MOP) represents cutting-edge solutions to neutralise fortified, subterranean infrastructure. The GBU-57/A saw its first combat use against Iran’s nuclear facilities in 2025. Drawing inspiration from the GBU-57 and driven by India’s regional security requirements, the DRDO has reportedly intensified efforts to develop a bunker-busting weapon based on the Agni-5 missile.

 

The GBU-57/A: America’s Bunker-Buster

The GBU-57/A MOP, developed by Boeing for the U.S. Air Force, is the largest conventional bomb in the U.S. arsenal, weighing 30,000 pounds (13,600 kg) and carrying a 5,300-pound (2,400-kg) explosive warhead. Designed to destroy deeply buried and hardened targets, such as nuclear facilities and command bunkers, the MOP can penetrate up to 60 meters (200 feet) of moderately hard material, like 5,000-psi concrete, or 130 feet of rock before detonating. Its precision is ensured by a GPS and inertial navigation system (INS), coupled with a smart fuse that optimises detonation depth for maximum destruction. The MOP is exclusively deployed by the B-2 Spirit stealth bomber, with each bomber capable of carrying two bombs.

First Combat Use: Operation Midnight Hammer (June 22, 2025). The MOP’s combat debut occurred during Operation Midnight Hammer on June 22, 2025, targeting Iran’s nuclear facilities at Fordow and Natanz. Seven B-2 bombers dropped 14 MOPs, 12 on Fordow, a uranium enrichment facility buried 80–90 meters under a mountain, and two on an underground section of Natanz, located about 20 meters below the surface. The strikes were complemented by 30 Tomahawk cruise missiles launched from a U.S. Navy submarine, targeting surface infrastructure at Isfahan. The operation aimed to degrade Iran’s nuclear program, particularly Fordow, which was designed to withstand conventional attacks. U.S. officials, including General Dan Caine, claimed significant damage, with IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi noting “very significant” destruction to Fordow’s underground infrastructure. However, there are conflicting reports about the extent of damage.

Strategic Implications and Limitations. The MOP’s use against Iran underscored its role as a deterrent against adversaries with deeply buried facilities, such as North Korea and China. However, its limitations are notable. The MOP’s penetration depth is constrained by target composition. The reliance on B-2 bombers also exposes vulnerabilities to advanced air defences, and the risk of nuclear material release from struck facilities raises environmental and geopolitical concerns.

 

India’s Solution: A Missile-Based Bunker Buster

India’s DRDO is developing a bunker-busting missile based on the Agni series of surface-to-surface missiles. Unlike the nuclear-capable Agni-5, which has a range of over 5,000 km, this variant prioritises payload over distance, carrying a 7,500-kg (7.5-tonne) warhead with a reduced range of about 2,500 km. This design compensates for India’s lack of a strategic bomber, such as the B-2, by providing a cost-effective, missile-based solution.

The missile reportedly reaches hypersonic speeds (Mach 8–20), making it highly effective at evading ballistic missile defence systems. Equipped with advanced guidance systems, it achieves exceptional accuracy. Its 7,500-kg warhead, significantly larger than the GBU-57’s 2,400-kg payload, delivers potentially greater destructive power, though penetration depth varies based on warhead design and target material. The warhead can penetrate 80–100 meters of reinforced concrete or soil, targeting fortified underground structures like command centers, missile silos, and nuclear storage facilities.

 

Comparative Analysis: GBU-57/A vs. Agni-5 Variant

Delivery Mechanism. The GBU-57/A is deployed by B-2 stealth bombers, which use stealth technology to infiltrate defended airspace. However, the B-2 can carry only two Massive Ordnance Penetrators (MOPs) and remains vulnerable to advanced air defence systems. In contrast, the Agni-5 missile platform delivers its payload at hypersonic speeds, evading ballistic missile defences (BMD). With a 2,500-km range, it allows stand-off strikes, minimising exposure of manned aircraft to enemy defences.

Payload and Penetration. The GBU-57/A, weighing 30,000 pounds with a 5,300-pound explosive payload, can penetrate up to 60 meters of concrete or 130 feet of rock. However, deeper targets often require multiple strikes, as demonstrated in Operation Midnight Hammer. The Agni-5 Variant, carrying a 7,500-kg warhead, is designed to penetrate 80–100 meters, potentially outperforming the GBU-57 in depth capability. Its larger payload may increase its destructive power, although its performance has yet to be proven in combat.

Strategic Flexibility. The GBU-57/A is combat-proven but constrained by limited stockpiles, high costs, and its dependence on U.S. B-2 bombers, which restrict its use to U.S. operations or allied missions with U.S. support. Conversely, the Agni-5 Variant provides a cost-effective, independent solution. Its dual warhead options and missile-based delivery enhance versatility and resilience against regional BMD systems, offering greater strategic flexibility.

 

Analytical Perspective

Strengthened Deterrence. India’s Agni-5 missile, equipped with bunker-busting capabilities, is tailored to address regional threats. It provides a powerful conventional option to pre-emptively neutralise enemy targets. With the ability to strike deeply fortified underground sites, the Agni-5 helps India effectively counter strategic imbalances.

Controlled Escalation. These conventional deep-strike weapons offer a key advantage: they minimise escalation risks. While delivering destructive power comparable to nuclear strikes, they avoid the political, moral, and strategic consequences of nuclear weapons. This creates a new, intermediate step in the escalation ladder, providing policymakers with flexible response options during conflicts.

Strategic Impact in Modern Warfare. Deep-strike conventional weapons represent a shift in 21st-century warfare. They combine strategic-level impact with tactical precision, enabling deterrence, retaliation, and offensive strikes without the risks associated with nuclear conflict. By blurring the lines between conventional and strategic weaponry, these advancements challenge traditional arms control frameworks. Nations may now face increased pressure to enhance underground defences against non-nuclear threats, potentially sparking a new arms race focused on subterranean resilience.

 

Conclusion

The GBU-57/A MOP and India’s conventional Agni-5 variant represent the pinnacle of bunker-busting technology, designed to neutralise the growing threat of fortified underground facilities. The MOP’s combat use against Iran’s Fordow and Natanz facilities on June 22, 2025, demonstrated its power but also its limitations, as advanced bunker designs and limited stockpile size constrained its impact. India’s Agni-5 variant, with its hypersonic speed, 7,500-kg warhead, and dual configurations, offers a versatile, missile-based alternative, tailored to regional threats.

 

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3X Bigger Payload Than GBU-57, Why India’s “Bunker Buster” Missile Would Do A Better Job Than U.S. B-2 Bombers?

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Information and data included in the blog are for educational & non-commercial purposes only and have been carefully adapted, excerpted, or edited from reliable and accurate sources. All copyrighted material belongs to respective owners and is provided only for wider dissemination.

 

 

References:-

  1. Berbera, A. (2025, June 23). US launches massive strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities with B-2 bombers and MOPs. Defence News.
  2. Boeing. (n.d.). Massive Ordnance Penetrator (MOP). Boeing Defence, Space & Security.
  3. CNN. (2025, June 24). U.S. strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities: What we know. CNN International.
  4. Cordesman, A. H. (2025). The Strategic Implications of U.S. Bunker Buster Strikes on Iran. Center for Strategic and International Studies.
  5. Defence Research and Development Organisation. (2024). Annual report 2024: Advancements in missile technology. DRDO, Ministry of Defence, Government of India.
  6. Hindustan Times. (2025, July 10). DRDO’s new Agni-5 variant: A conventional bunker buster for regional deterrence. Hindustan Times.
  7. International Atomic Energy Agency. (2025, June 25). Statement by Director General Rafael Grossi on U.S. strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities. IAEA.
  8. Janes. (2025). GBU-57/A Massive Ordnance Penetrator: Technical specifications and operational use. Jane’s Defence Equipment & Technology.
  9. Missile Defence Advocacy Alliance. (2024). China’s HQ-19 and regional ballistic missile defence systems. MDAA.
  10. The Times of India. (2025, March 15). Mission Divyastra: India tests Agni-5 with MIRV technology. The Times of India.

692: UNFINISHED RUSSIAN OBJECTIVE: REGIME CHANGE IN UKRAINE

 

My article was published on the Indus International Research Foundation website on June 30, 2025.

 

Since Russia launched its special military operation on February 24, 2022, its primary strategic objective was widely understood to be the overthrow of Ukraine’s government and the installation of a pro-Russian regime. This goal has proven elusive, rooted in Moscow’s desire to reassert influence over its neighbour and prevent Ukraine’s integration with the West. Over three years into the conflict, Russia has not been able to achieve regime change. There are possibly multifaceted reasons behind it, encompassing military, political, economic, societal, and informational dimensions.

 

Analytical Perspective

Strategic Miscalculations: Flawed Assumptions. At the heart of Russia’s failure lies a cascade of flawed assumptions.  Before launching the invasion on 24 February 2022, Moscow wrongly believed that the Ukrainian society was deeply fractured along ethnic and linguistic lines. Secondly, the Zelensky government lacked legitimacy and would collapse under pressure. Lastly, NATO and the West would not intervene decisively. These assumptions led Russia to pursue an audacious plan aimed at rapidly occupying Kyiv, decapitating Ukraine’s leadership, and presenting the world with a fait accompli. However, Russian intelligence had gravely underestimated both the unity and the resilience of Ukrainian society. When the war began, the anticipated internal collapse did not materialise; instead, Ukraine mobilised as a unified nation.

Ukrainian Resilience and National Unity. One of the most critical factors thwarting Russia’s ambitions has been the extraordinary resilience of the Ukrainian people and their government. From the outset, Ukraine’s people displayed unwavering resolve. Ukrainian society mobilised rapidly, with civilians joining territorial defence units, volunteering in humanitarian efforts, and supporting the military. The war has forged a stronger national identity, with polls consistently showing overwhelming support for Zelenskyy’s government and rejection of Russian influence. This societal cohesion has made installing a pro-Russia regime more difficult, as any pro-Russian government would face relentless resistance and lack legitimacy.

Russian Military Miscalculation: Collapse of the Hostomel-Kyiv Blitz. Russia’s regime-change ambitions were staked on the success of a swift airborne operation. Russian forces did seize Hostomel Airport, located just outside Kyiv, to establish an air bridge for further troops. However, Ukrainians were able to repel the assault, destroying incoming aircraft and delaying Russian reinforcements. With the Hostomel plan thwarted, Russian ground forces were left advancing slowly on narrow roads with overstretched supply lines and inadequate logistics. Russians had to change their strategy and the plan at an early stage.

Western Support. The unprecedented scale of Western support for Ukraine has been a pivotal factor. NATO countries, led by the United States, the United Kingdom, and the European Union, have provided Ukraine with billions of dollars in military, financial, and humanitarian aid. Advanced weaponry, including HIMARS rocket systems, ATACMS missiles, Patriot air defences, and Leopard tanks, has enabled Ukraine to counter Russian offensives and launch successful counterattacks. Beyond material support, Western intelligence-sharing and training programs have enhanced Ukraine’s operational effectiveness. On the other hand, sanctions on Russia, targeting its energy exports, financial systems, and military-industrial complex, have dented Moscow’s ability to sustain the tempo of the war.

Geopolitical and Terrain Challenges. Ukraine’s geography has posed significant challenges for Russia’s regime change ambitions. Over 600,000 square kilometers of Ukraine is Europe’s second-largest country, with diverse terrain ranging from open steppes to dense urban centers. Controlling such a vast area requires substantial manpower and resources. Urban warfare, particularly in cities, favours Ukrainian defenders, who benefit from local knowledge and fortified positions. Russia’s territorial gains have been concentrated in eastern and southern regions, such as parts of Donbas, and Crimea, but these areas represent only a fraction of Ukraine. Stretching its forces across multiple fronts has diluted Russia’s ability to consolidate control or advance toward Kyiv, the political heart of Ukraine.

Russian Internal Constraints. Russia’s domestic challenges have further undermined its war effort. The invasion has strained Russia’s economy, with sanctions disrupting trade, freezing foreign reserves, and limiting access to critical technologies. While high energy prices initially cushioned the blow, long-term economic decline and inflation have eroded public support for the war to an large extent. Political dissent, though suppressed, persists among some of Russia’s factions. These internal pressures have constrained Russia’s ability to escalate the war or sustain a long-term occupation of Ukraine.

Alienating the Ukrainian Population. Russia’s offensive and punitive tactics have obliterated any chance of winning Ukrainian support for a pro-Russian regime. Deliberate attacks on infrastructure have fuelled hatred toward Russia and unified Ukrainians against Moscow’s agenda. The Kremlin’s narrative about “denazifaction” of Ukraine has not resonated well with Ukrainians.  The absence of a viable pro-Russian political base in Ukraine has left Russia with no credible allies to prop up a pro-Russian government.

Dominance in the Information War. Ukraine has done well in the information domain, maintaining global sympathy and domestic morale. Russia, by contrast, has maintained a low-key approach to control the narrative. Its state-controlled media dominates domestically but has little sway abroad. This information asymmetry has reinforced Ukraine’s legitimacy while undermining Russia’s ability to justify regime change.

The Evolution of the Conflict. As the war has evolved into a protracted struggle, Russia’s initial goal of regime change has become increasingly unattainable, and Moscow has pivoted to territorial objectives. The limited military operation has evolved into a long-drawn-out slug match, with Ukraine periodically launching counter-offensives and Russia resorting to punitive action with long-range weapons. The prospect of a frozen conflict or negotiated settlement looms, but both sides are sticking to their terms.

 

Conclusion

Russia’s inability to achieve regime change in Ukraine results from a confluence of factors: Ukrainian unity and resolve, Russian strategic miscalculations, continued Western support, geographical challenges, and Moscow’s internal constraints. These elements have transformed the conflict into a grinding stalemate, with Ukraine’s government not only surviving but emerging as a symbol of resistance. As the war continues, Russia’s prospects for overturning Ukraine’s leadership remain dim.

 

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Information and data included in the blog are for educational & non-commercial purposes only and have been carefully adapted, excerpted, or edited from reliable and accurate sources. All copyrighted material belongs to respective owners and is provided only for wider dissemination.

 

Link to the article on the website:-

Unfinished Russian Objective: Regime Change In Ukraine

References:-

  1. Charap, S., & Colton, T. (2022). Everyone loses: The Ukraine crisis and the ruinous contest for post-Soviet Eurasia. Routledge.
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  8. The Economist. (2024, December 12). How sanctions are reshaping Russia’s economy.
  9. SIPRI Yearbook 2025. Armaments, Disarmament and International Security. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, June 2025.
  10. Institute for the Study of War (ISW). Russian Offensive Campaign Assessments, 2022–2025.
  11. RAND Corporation. “The Russian Way of War: Doctrine, Logistics, and Constraints.” RAND Reports, 2023–2024.
  12. BBC News. “Ukraine War: The Battle for Hostomel Airport.” BBC Special Report, March 2022.
  13. European Union External Action Service (EEAS). EU Support to Ukraine: Ukraine Facility and Sanctions Against Russia, 2024–2025.
  14. The Economist. “Why Russia’s Regime Change Strategy in Ukraine Has Failed,” April 2025.
  15. Royal United Services Institute (RUSI). Lessons from the Ukraine War: Air Superiority and ISR, 2023.
  16. New York Times. “Inside Ukraine’s Counteroffensives,” October 2022–June 2025 Special Reports.
  17. Jane’s Defence Weekly. Russia-Ukraine Conflict Technical Assessments, 2022–2025.
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