662:INDIA’S WATER CANNON AGAINST PAKISTAN-SPONSORED TERRORISM: INDUS WATER TREATY

 

My article was published on the “Life of Soldier” website

on 29 Apr 25.

 

 

“Blood and water cannot flow together”

– Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi

 

The Indus Waters Treaty is a water-sharing agreement between India and Pakistan, signed on September 19, 1960, in Karachi by Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and Pakistani President Ayub Khan. The World Bank brokered it and governs the use of the Indus River system, which includes six rivers: Indus, Jhelum, Chenab, Ravi, Beas, and Sutlej. The Indus River system is critical for both countries’ irrigation, hydropower, and drinking water.

India held the Indus Waters Treaty in abeyance on April 23, 2025, following the Pahalgam terrorist attack that killed 26 civilians. India’s decision, citing national security concerns, grants it greater control over the western rivers, potentially impacting Pakistan’s agriculture and water supply. Pakistan condemned the move as an “act of war,” suspending the Simla Agreement and closing the Wagah border. The World Bank, a treaty signatory, has urged dialogue but lacks enforcement power. This development heightens regional instability and raises concerns about future conflicts and diplomatic relations.

 

Key Provisions

Division of Rivers. Western Rivers (Indus, Jhelum, Chenab) are allocated to Pakistan for unrestricted use, except for limited Indian uses (e.g., domestic, non-consumptive, and specified agricultural purposes). Eastern Rivers (Ravi, Beas, Sutlej) are allocated to India for unrestricted use.

Water Sharing. Pakistan receives about 80% of the Indus system’s water (around 135 million acre-feet annually), while India gets 20%.

Infrastructure. India can build run-of-the-river dams on Western Rivers for hydropower, but cannot store water beyond specified limits. Pakistan can object to designs that violate the treaty.

Permanent Indus Commission. A bilateral body with representatives from both countries meets regularly to monitor implementation, share data, and resolve disputes.

 

Context and Significance.

The treaty was necessitated by the 1947 partition, which split the Indus basin, leaving canal headworks in India and irrigated lands in Pakistan. A 1948 standoff, when India briefly cut off water to Pakistan, underscored the need for a formal agreement. It is considered one of the most successful water-sharing treaties globally, surviving three wars.

The Indus system originates in the Himalayas, with major tributaries flowing through Indian-administered Jammu, Kashmir, and Pakistani-occupied Gilgit-Baltistan, making it geopolitically sensitive. In 2016, after a terrorist attack in Uri, India reviewed the treaty. In 2022 and 2023, India issued notices to Pakistan for treaty modification, citing “fundamental changes” like cross-border terrorism and environmental challenges, but no formal revocation has occurred. In 2023, Pakistan sought arbitration over Kishanganga and Ratle, while India challenged the arbitration process, preferring Neutral Expert resolution.

Pakistan, heavily dependent on the Indus for 90% of its water needs, fears reduced flows due to Indian projects or climate change. Delays in its storage infrastructure (e.g., Diamer-Bhasha Dam) exacerbate vulnerabilities. Glacial melt, erratic monsoons, and floods (e.g., 2010, 2022) strain the treaty’s framework, which lacks provisions for climate adaptation.

 

Recent Development

India has officially held the IWT with Pakistan in abeyance, marking a significant shift in bilateral relations. This decision was announced on April 23, 2025, following a terrorist attack in Pahalgam, Jammu and Kashmir. India invoked Article XII(3) of the IWT and sent a formal notice to Pakistan. The Ministry of Jal Shakti cited Pakistan’s alleged support for cross-border terrorism, shifting demographics, and energy demands as reasons the agreement could no longer continue “in good faith.”​

With the treaty placed in abeyance, India is no longer obligated to share information regarding water storage levels or flow in the rivers of the Indus River System with Pakistan.​ India has ceased sharing hydrological data (e.g., water flow, snowmelt, flood updates) with Pakistan, halted technical meetings, and stopped allowing Pakistani inspections of Indian projects. India is no longer bound by treaty restrictions on building storage or hydropower projects on the western rivers (Indus, Jhelum, Chenab).

 

Adverse Impact on Pakistan

India’s suspension of the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) poses significant adverse impacts on Pakistan, particularly in agriculture, water supply, energy, and economic stability.

Agriculture. Pakistan relies on the Indus River system for 80% of its irrigated agriculture, supporting 16 million hectares of farmland. The western rivers (Indus, Jhelum, Chenab) allocated to Pakistan under the IWT provide 93% of its irrigation water. A 10-20% reduction in water availability could lead to significant declines in agricultural output, threatening food security and rural livelihoods. Pakistan’s agriculture sector, which employs 40% of the workforce and contributes 24% to GDP, faces severe risks. While India’s current infrastructure limits immediate large-scale water diversion, future dams or storage projects could reduce water availability, especially during critical sowing seasons (e.g., Rabi and Kharif), reduced flows could lower crop yields for wheat, rice, and cotton—key staples and export crops.

Water Scarcity in Urban Centres. Major cities like Karachi, Lahore, Multan, and Faisalabad depend on the Indus and its tributaries for drinking water and industrial use. Any reduction in river flows, even temporary, could exacerbate existing water scarcity. Pakistan already faces a per capita water availability of ~1,000 cubic meters, close to the “water scarce” threshold. Water rationing, public health crises, and industrial slowdowns could occur, particularly in Punjab and Sindh provinces, which rely heavily on the Indus.

Energy Sector. Pakistan generates significant electricity from hydropower plants like Tarbela (3,478 MW) and Mangla (1,000 MW), which rely on consistent river flows from the Indus and Jhelum. Reduced or irregular water flows could lower power generation, worsening Pakistan’s energy crisis. For example, a 10% reduction in Tarbela’s water inflow could cut its output by hundreds of megawatts, affecting millions of households.

Economic. Energy shortages could disrupt industrial production and increase reliance on costly imported fuels, straining Pakistan’s foreign exchange reserves. A decline in crop production would reduce export revenues (e.g., rice and cotton) and increase food import costs, exacerbating Pakistan’s trade deficit. Reduced agricultural output could lead to job losses in rural areas, driving migration to urban centers and rising social unrest. Higher food and energy prices and potential infrastructure damage from flooding (if India releases water abruptly) could fuel inflation. Pakistan’s external debt (~$130 billion in 2025) limits its ability to fund mitigation measures. A 2023 World Bank study estimated that a 20% reduction in Indus water flows could shave 5-7% off Pakistan’s GDP over a decade.

Social and Political Fallout. Water shortages could spark protests, particularly in Sindh and Punjab, where water allocation disputes between provinces are already contentious. Provinces like Sindh, which rely on downstream flows, may accuse Punjab of hoarding water, exacerbating internal political divides.

 

India’s Justification and Legitimacy.

India’s justification and Legitimacy for holding in abeyance the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) hinges on the principle of a “fundamental change of circumstances,” as outlined in Article 62 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. New Delhi argues that Pakistan’s continued support for cross-border terrorism, especially following incidents like the April 2025 Pahalgam attack, violates the underlying premise of peaceful bilateral relations that formed the basis of the IWT in 1960. India contends that a country facilitating terrorist activity cannot expect continued cooperation on vital issues like water sharing. While the IWT lacks a unilateral withdrawal clause, India maintains that suspension, not withdrawal, can be a legitimate, proportionate response to persistent security threats.

 

Diplomatic and Legal Aspects

Pakistan’s Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif called the suspension an “act of war” and announced retaliatory measures, including suspending the 1972 Simla Agreement and closing the Wagah border.

Pakistan may seek World Bank mediation or international arbitration. The IWT lacks a unilateral exit clause, and India’s suspension may not be easily challenged under international law if framed as a response to terrorism (per Article 62, Vienna Convention). Experts argue India’s suspension is permissible under Article 62 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, citing a “fundamental change of circumstances” due to Pakistan’s alleged terrorism support for terrorism. The World Bank, a treaty signatory, has urged dialogue but cannot enforce compliance.

Pakistan may seek neutral expert mediation or arbitration, but India’s refusal to cooperate could render these mechanisms ineffective. Escalating the issue to the UN or other forums may gain Pakistan sympathy but will unlikely force India to reverse the suspension.

 

The Only Way out for Pakistan.

The only viable way for Pakistan to restore the Indus Waters Treaty is through diplomatic engagement coupled with tangible actions to address India’s core security concerns, particularly those related to cross-border terrorism. India’s decision, justified under the “fundamental change of circumstances” clause in international law, is rooted in accusations of Pakistan’s support for militant activities. Therefore, Pakistan would need to:-

  • Stop escalatory rhetoric (including regular and brash nuclear sabre rattling) and retaliatory actions, as these would only harden India’s stance.
  • Demonstrate a verifiable crackdown on terror infrastructure operating from its territory, especially groups targeting India.
  • Offer security guarantees and confidence-building measures that acknowledge India’s national security concerns to rebuild trust and initiate fresh dialogue.

Ultimately, Pakistan’s path to treaty restoration lies not just in legal appeals but in restructuring the political and security context in which the treaty was suspended. Only by addressing the root causes—especially terrorism—can the IWT be revived in a stable, sustainable way.

 

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Disclaimer:

Information and data included in the blog are for educational & non-commercial purposes only and have been carefully adapted, excerpted, or edited from reliable and accurate sources. All copyrighted material belongs to respective owners and is provided only for wider dissemination.

 

 

References:-

  1. Financial Times. “Undermining the Indus Waters Treaty imperils Indian security.” April 26, 2025.
  1. Reuters. “India suspends Indus Waters Treaty after Pahalgam terror attack.” April 23, 2025.
  1. Al Jazeera. “Pakistan calls Indus Treaty suspension ‘an act of war’.” April 24, 2025.
  1. The Hindu. “India halts hydrological data sharing with Pakistan under Indus Treaty.” April 25, 2025.
  1. BBC. “Water Wars? India wields Indus Treaty amid rising tensions with Pakistan.” April 27, 2025.
  1. Dawn. “Pakistan to seek World Bank mediation on Indus Treaty row with India.” April 28, 2025.
  1. Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA). Indus Treaty as a Strategic Lever: Implications for India’s National Security. Issue Brief, 2023.
  1. Rajagopalan, Rajeswari Pillai. India’s Water Diplomacy: Reclaiming the Strategic Narrative. Observer Research Foundation, 2023.
  1. Observer Research Foundation (ORF). India’s Options under the Indus Waters Treaty: A Strategic Overview. 2022.
  1. United States Institute of Peace (USIP). Resolving India-Pakistan Water Disputes: A Legal and Strategic Perspective. 2020.
  1. International Crisis Group. Water Pressure: Climate Risk and Security in Pakistan. ICG Asia Report No. 297, 2018.
  1. World Bank. Indus Waters Treaty and Current Status of Disputes. [World Bank Briefing Note, 2023].
  1. Wirsing, Robert G. The Indus Waters Treaty: Political Stability and Water Security in South Asia. Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, 2013.
  1. Salman, Salman M.A. The Indus Waters Treaty: A History of a Treaty that has Survived Wars and Disputes. Water International, Vol. 36, No. 4, 2011.

571: THE BOOMERANG EFFECT: WHEN MILITANT GROUPS TURN ON THEIR SPONSORS

 

Pic Courtesy Net

 

My Article Published in the Life of Soldiers (a premier monthly defence magazine) on 30 Dec 24.

 

The Wagner Group, a Russian private military company, played a significant role in the Russia-Ukraine conflict, particularly in the battle for Bakhmut. In May 2023, Wagner forces captured Bakhmut for Russia after intense fighting. In June 2023, tensions between Wagner’s leadership and the Russian military culminated in a brief mutiny led by Yevgeny Prigozhin, Wagner’s chief. The rebellion ended with an agreement brokered by Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko, and charges against Prigozhin were later dropped. Following Prigozhin’s controversial death in a plane crash in August 2023, the future of Wagner became uncertain. By October 2023, elements of the group were integrated into Russia’s National Guard, Rosgvardia, indicating a restructuring under state control.

 

Boomerang Effect.

 

The phenomenon where militant groups turn on their sponsors is often called the “boomerang effect.” This happens when organisations or groups created, funded, or supported by a state or another actor shift their allegiances or use their skills and resources against their former backers. The reasons for this shift can be complex and multifaceted, involving ideological differences, changing power dynamics, or disillusionment with their sponsors’ objectives. Contributing factors are as follows:- 

 

Ideological Divergence. Initially, militant groups are often created with shared goals and objectives aligned with their sponsors. However, as they gain strength and experience, they may develop their agendas. Differences in ideology can lead to clashes, especially if the militants feel their sponsors are manipulating them for geopolitical gain.

 

Loss of Control. Sponsors often lose control over the militants they support. As these groups gain legitimacy and power, they may increasingly act independently, pursuing their objectives, which might not align with those of their sponsors. This can lead to a strategic shift where militants view their sponsors as obstacles rather than allies.

 

Disillusionment and Frustration. Sometimes, militants feel let down by their sponsors. They may believe that their resources or support are inadequate or misdirected. This frustration can lead to losing loyalty, with groups turning against their sponsors.

 

Changing Power Dynamics. As the geopolitical landscape changes, so too can militants’ strategic interests. They may switch sides in pursuit of more favourable conditions, especially when they see greater opportunities to achieve their goals with a different sponsor or on their own.

 

The Wagner Group Story

 

Wagner Group, a Russian private military contractor (PMC), provides a recent example of a sponsored organisation turning against its sponsor. Initially backed by the Russian government, Wagner became a powerful, semi-autonomous entity with ambitions and interests, ultimately leading to a public confrontation with the Russian state.

 

Background. The Wagner Group was founded around 2014 by Dmitry Utkin, a former Russian military officer, and Yevgeny Prigozhin, a businessman with close ties to the Kremlin. It served as a proxy force for Russian interests in global hotspots, allowing Russia to exert influence without direct military involvement or the political risk of deploying official troops. Wagner operated in Syria, Libya, the Central African Republic, and other countries, carrying out missions aligned with Russian geopolitical interests and reportedly receiving support and resources from the Russian state, including training facilities and equipment.

 

Tensions Leading to Conflict. As Wagner’s activities grew, so did its autonomy and influence. Wagner played a significant role in the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, taking on critical combat roles. However, Prigozhin became increasingly outspoken about the Russian military’s failings, explicitly criticising the Ministry of Defence’s handling of the war. Wagner’s leadership grew resentful, accusing Russian military officials of incompetence, neglecting logistical support, and underestimating Wagner’s sacrifices on the front lines.

 

The Wagner Rebellion of 2023. This tension culminated in a dramatic turn in June 2023, when Wagner launched an armed rebellion against the Russian military leadership. Prigozhin led his forces into the Russian city of Rostov-on-Don, seizing an army headquarters, and then began an advance toward Moscow. Prigozhin demanded changes in the Russian military leadership, mainly targeting Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu and General Valery Gerasimov. Although it was ultimately short-lived, this direct challenge to the Kremlin marked a sharp break with their previous sponsor, the Russian state. The rebellion ended after negotiations, reportedly brokered by Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko. Prigozhin agreed to stand down in exchange for a safe passage to Belarus, and Wagner’s forces withdrew. However, the incident exposed significant rifts between Wagner and the Russian government, highlighting how sponsorship of militant or paramilitary organisations can backfire when these groups gain enough power to pursue their agendas.

 

Aftermath and Fallout. The fallout from the rebellion was significant. Prigozhin’s death in a plane crash in August 2023 was widely speculated to have been orchestrated by elements within the Russian state. Wagner’s operations were subsequently restructured, with many members reportedly re-assigned or integrated into other units more directly controlled by the Russian government.

 

Lessons and Analysis. The Wagner Group’s rebellion is a cautionary tale about the risks of using paramilitary organisations for state purposes. Once such groups gain power, resources, and a sense of autonomy, they can become difficult to control, and their interests may diverge from those of their original sponsor. In Wagner’s case, the group’s loyalty to Prigozhin and its operational independence contributed to a volatile situation where, ultimately, Wagner’s ambitions turned against the very state that enabled its rise.

 

Boomerang Effect: Notable Instances

 

Several historical examples exist of militant organisations that initially received sponsorship from governments or other entities but later turned against their sponsors. This phenomenon often results from shifting political dynamics, ideological conflicts, or changes. in militant groups’ objectives.

 

Al-Qaeda and the United States. During the 1980s, the United States, along with Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, provided financial and military support to Afghan mujahideen fighters to combat the Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan. Many of these fighters, including Osama bin Laden, received resources and training indirectly through the CIA’s Operation Cyclone. After the Soviet withdrawal, some of these fighters, including bin Laden, formed Al-Qaeda. Al-Qaeda grew increasingly antagonistic toward the United States, particularly due to its military presence in the Middle East and its support for governments seen as oppressive or contrary to Islamic principles. This hostility culminated in the September 11, 2001 attacks, marking a complete break from their former indirect sponsor.

 

The Taliban and Pakistan. Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) supported the formation of the Taliban in the 1990s, seeing them as a potential ally to ensure a friendly government in Afghanistan, which would provide Pakistan with strategic depth against India. While the Taliban still maintains some ties with Pakistan, there have been periods of tension. Taliban-linked groups, such as the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), have turned against the Pakistani state, conducting attacks within Pakistan. The TTP aims to overthrow the Pakistani government and establish a stricter interpretation of Islamic law, which has led to significant violence and conflict within Pakistan itself.

 

Hamas and Israel. During the early years of the Palestinian resistance, Israel indirectly supported groups that would later form Hamas, aiming to create a counterbalance to the secular Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) led by Yasser Arafat. This was based on the notion that Islamist movements could divide the Palestinian resistance, making it easier to manage. Hamas eventually became a formidable opponent to Israel, adopting a hardline stance and engaging in numerous conflicts with the Israeli state. Today, Hamas is a prominent political and militant force in Gaza and has carried out attacks against Israeli targets, becoming one of Israel’s most persistent adversaries.

 

The Islamic State (ISIS) and the Gulf States. During the Syrian Civil War, several Gulf States, including Qatar and Saudi Arabia, provided funding and weapons to Sunni rebel groups to oppose the Assad regime in Syria. Some of these groups either merged with or evolved into extremist groups like ISIS. Although Gulf States may not have directly funded ISIS, their support for anti-Assad rebels indirectly bolstered ISIS’s power. Once ISIS gained control of territory and declared a caliphate, it posed a threat to all governments in the region, including those in the Gulf. ISIS targeted these governments rhetorically and sometimes directly, seeing them as illegitimate and corrupt.

 

M23 Rebels and Rwanda. The M23 rebel group in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) was reportedly supported by neighbouring Rwanda, which viewed them as a means to secure influence in the DRC and counter the presence of anti-Rwandan Hutu militias. Over time, M23 developed its political ambitions, creating sporadic tensions with Rwanda. Although the relationship between Rwanda and M23 is complex and fluctuates, there have been instances where M23 acted independently, with a leadership not fully aligned with Rwanda’s objectives.

 

Fatah al-Islam and Syria. Syria was alleged to have supported Fatah al-Islam, a militant group in Lebanon, to destabilise the Lebanese government, particularly during times of political tension between Syria and Lebanon. Fatah al-Islam later became a problem for Syria and the broader region. The group’s activities and increasing autonomy led to clashes with the Lebanese government and other regional actors, pushing them further away from Syrian influence.

 

 

Conclusion

These examples illustrate how sponsorship of militant groups is fraught with inherent risks and unintended consequences. Such alliances with unpredictable partners often backfire as these organisations evolve ideologically, gain independence, or shift their focus based on changing political landscapes.  The short-term gains can lead to long-term instability, undermining the sponsor’s original goals and threatening regional and global security. They are stark reminders of the dangers of using militancy as a proxy for power, underscoring the need for more sustainable and ethical approaches to conflict resolution and statecraft.

 

 

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The Boomerang Effect: When Militant Groups Turn On Their Sponsors

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References and credits

To all the online sites and channels.

References:

  1. Byman, Daniel. “Friends Like These: Counterinsurgency and the War on Terrorism.” International Security, vol. 31, no. 2, 2006, pp. 79–115.
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  1. Mamdani, Mahmood. Good Muslim, Bad Muslim: America, the Cold War, and the Roots of Terror. New York: Pantheon Books, 2004.
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  1. Kepel, Gilles. Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002.
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Disclaimer:

Information and data included in the blog are for educational & non-commercial purposes only and have been carefully adapted, excerpted, or edited from reliable and accurate sources. All copyrighted material belongs to respective owners and is provided only for wider dissemination.

365: BOOK REVIEW: THE GAME BEHIND SAFFRON TERROR

 

 

Published by Book review literary Trust

 

BOOK REVIEW

 

THE GAME BEHIND SAFFRON TERROR

By Kanwar Khatana

 

Review by:

Air Marshal Anil Khosla (Retd) PVSM, AVSM, VM

Former Vice Chief of Air Staff, Indian Air Force.

 

The term “Saffron Terror” was coined almost two decades back in 2002 and gained popularity in 2007–2008. At times, terms like Hindu terrorism or Hindutva terror, are also used instead, allegedly to describe acts of violence motivated by Hindu extremist nationalism. In all probability, the term comes from the symbolic use of the saffron colour by most of the temples in India and many Hindu nationalist organisations. However, these organisations consider the term to be a misnomer, and consider the use of the saffron colour as a symbol of religion, asceticism, and sacrifice.

 

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