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541: COLD WAR REDUX: TRAITS AND DRIVERS OF COLD WAR 2.0

 

 

My Article published on the Indus International Research Foundation website on 27 Nov 24.

 

“Cold War 2.0” describes the re-emergence of intense geopolitical competition between major powers, mainly the U.S. and China, and Russia’s increasingly assertive foreign policy. This framework parallels the original Cold War, which saw the United States and the Soviet Union locked in ideological and strategic rivalry. However, the current scenario has distinctive traits shaped by global interconnectedness, economic interdependence, and digital warfare.

 

Economic Interdependence and Competition. Unlike the U.S.-Soviet rivalry, the current era is marked by deep financial ties between rival states. For instance, the U.S. and China have significant trade and investment links, creating a complex relationship between competitors and economic partners. This has led to policies like “decoupling” and “friend-shoring,” where nations look to limit economic dependencies with strategic rivals, especially in critical sectors like technology and energy.

 

Tech and Cyber Dominance. The competition now prominently features digital spaces and technological development. China’s rise in artificial intelligence, 5G networks, and quantum computing has led the U.S. and its allies to push for greater control over digital infrastructure and intellectual property. Cyber security is another battlefield, with accusations of hacking and surveillance shaping security policies and alliances.

 

Military Posturing and Arms Races. The military build-up is also central to Cold War 2.0. While nuclear capabilities remain crucial, the focus has expanded to space warfare, hypersonic missiles, and advanced drone technology. For example, the U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy counters China’s growing military influence in Asia. At the same time, Russia’s recent actions in Ukraine have led NATO to strengthen its military presence on Europe’s eastern flank.

 

Ideological Clashes. While less ideological than the original Cold War, there is a growing divergence between the democratic and authoritarian governance models, particularly as China promotes its model as an alternative to Western liberalism. This has led to ideological contestation in digital governance, human rights, and trade rules, with each power attempting to influence international norms and institutions to reflect its values.

 

Strategic Alliances and Blocs. The current rivalry sees the emergence of new alliances and a revival of older ones, such as NATO and the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) among the U.S., Japan, India, and Australia, which aims to counterbalance China’s influence in the Indo-Pacific. Similarly, China and Russia are strengthening their ties, often working together in the United Nations and other forums to counter Western initiatives.

 

Resource Control and Economic Leverage. Access to resources such as rare earth metals, energy, and food is another area of strategic competition. China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which funds infrastructure projects across Asia, Africa, and Latin America, is seen as expanding its influence by creating economic dependencies. The U.S. counters with its initiatives, such as the Build Back Better World (B3W) program, which offers alternatives for development financing.

 

Impacts on Global Relations. The emergence of Cold War 2.0 has led to shifting alliances, with some nations choosing sides and others attempting a non-aligned approach to maintain autonomy. Middle powers like India, Brazil, and South Africa find themselves balancing between the two giants, shaping new multilateral dynamics. Meanwhile, the increased emphasis on national security in trade and technology policies is reshaping globalisation, potentially leading to more isolated economic blocs.

 

Comparison of Drivers of the Earlier and Current Cold War

 

The drivers of the original Cold War (1947–1991) between the U.S. and the Soviet Union differ from those of today’s “Cold War 2.0,” primarily between the U.S. and China, with Russia playing a significant but secondary role. These geopolitical, ideological, and technological rivalries reveal continuities and marked differences.

 

Sl No Drivers Differences
1 Ideological Rivalry

Earlier Cold War: The U.S. and the Soviet Union were divided by sharply contrasting ideologies: capitalism and democracy versus communism and authoritarianism. Each superpower sought to promote its ideology globally, often through proxy wars, propaganda, and cultural influence campaigns.

Current Cold War: Although there’s still an ideological component, the divide is less rigid. The U.S. advocates liberal democracy, while China’s governance model blends authoritarianism and state-led capitalism. Rather than openly promoting its ideology as a direct alternative, China emphasises economic development and “pragmatic” governance as models for stability and growth. There’s less overt ideological export and more influence through economic interdependence and development projects like the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).
2 Geopolitical Power Struggles

 

Earlier Cold War: The rivalry largely revolved around Europe, with proxy conflicts extending to Asia, Latin America, and Africa. The focus was to prevent either side from gaining influence in these regions, as seen through U.S. and Soviet interventions in Korea, Vietnam, Afghanistan, and other hotspots.

Current Cold War: The U.S. and China focus on the Indo-Pacific region as the primary sphere of influence, with attention to Southeast Asia, Taiwan, and the South China Sea. The U.S. is strengthening alliances with Japan, Australia, India (QUAD), and other Indo-Pacific partners, while China is extending its influence through its BRI and increasing its military presence in disputed territories. Russia, meanwhile, has focused on asserting control in Eastern Europe, as seen in the Ukraine conflict, though this rivalry is more geographically constrained.
3 Economic Rivalry and Interdependence

 

Earlier Cold War: The U.S. and Soviet Union had limited economic interactions, creating two largely independent blocs. Economic influence was exerted through aid programs (like the U.S. Marshall Plan) and political-economic treaties with allied countries. Global trade and economies were less intertwined, allowing for distinct capitalist and socialist economic systems.

Current Cold War: Economic interdependence is a defining factor. China and the U.S. are each other’s largest trading partners, and both economies are deeply embedded in global supply chains. Despite economic competition, each depends heavily on the other. This dynamic has led to “selective decoupling,” where each side aims to reduce dependence on critical technologies and resources without severing all economic ties. This is especially prominent in sectors like semiconductors, 5G, and renewable energy technologies.
4 Technology and Cyber Warfare

 

Earlier Cold War: The technological competition focused on space, nuclear capabilities, and conventional military technology. The “Space Race” and “Arms Race” were significant components, with the Apollo moon landing and arms treaties like SALT (Strategic Arms Limitation Talks) symbolising the intense scientific and military rivalry.

Current Cold War: The focus has shifted to advanced technologies like artificial intelligence (AI), quantum computing, and cyber security. Cyber warfare has become a core area of conflict, with cyber-attacks, espionage, and influence operations playing significant roles. There’s competition for dominance in 5G networks and critical infrastructure control, with concerns about digital sovereignty, surveillance, and influence operations on social media. This “Tech Race” lacks the clear-cut technological “wins” of the Space Race, but it’s arguably more pervasive and impactful on civilian and governmental life worldwide.
5 Military Strategies and Posturing

 

Earlier Cold War: The focus was on nuclear arms buildup and deterrence through Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD), with proxy wars to avoid direct confrontation. NATO and the Warsaw Pact were established, and military posturing often involved nuclear tests, displays of military hardware, and highly symbolic confrontations (e.g., the Cuban Missile Crisis).

Current Cold War: While nuclear deterrence remains, military competition now involves a broader range of strategies, including space militarisation, hypersonic missile development, and significant advancements in drone and cyber warfare. China is focused on expanding its naval capabilities and power projection in the South China Sea, while the U.S. strengthens its presence in the Indo-Pacific. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has led to a renewed focus on NATO’s defensive posture in Europe.
6 Alliances and Proxy Conflicts

 

Earlier Cold War: Alliances like NATO and the Warsaw Pact formalised the division of East and West. Many proxy conflicts emerged, particularly in developing regions, where both superpowers supported opposing sides to prevent ideological shifts. Examples include the Korean and Vietnam Wars and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

Current Cold War: Alliances are less rigid, and there’s an emphasis on “flexible” partnerships. The U.S. builds security frameworks like the Quad and AUKUS (Australia, the U.K., and the U.S.) while strengthening alliances like NATO. China, meanwhile, does not engage in formal military alliances but leverages economic influence through the BRI and diplomatic coalitions like the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). Russia uses its influence in post-Soviet states and controls Eastern Europe and the Middle East.
7 Propaganda and Influence Operations

 

Earlier Cold War: The U.S. and Soviet Union engaged in direct propaganda campaigns, including Radio Free Europe, cultural exchanges, and global information wars to win hearts and minds.

Current Cold War: Information warfare is more complex and digital. Social media platforms have become battlegrounds for influence, with disinformation campaigns, election interference, and social polarisation strategies targeting rivals. China and Russia conduct sophisticated operations, leveraging global media channels, online platforms, and soft power to shape narratives. The U.S., in turn, supports global media initiatives that promote democratic governance and transparency.

 

Cold War 2.0 has introduced new complexities into international relations, where intertwined economies, advanced technology, and a globalised world order shape competition. The drivers of today’s “Cold War 2.0” reflect a multi-dimensional competition that diverges from the earlier Cold War in its deep economic interdependence, technology-centric rivalry, and more fluid alliances. The ideological divide is softer but still significant, with the U.S., China, and Russia vying for global influence. This rivalry unfolds in a digitally connected world where technology and information warfare play unprecedented roles, resulting in a complex geopolitical landscape with intensified tensions and interdependencies. Unlike the bipolar world of the original Cold War, today’s scenario is multipolar, involving several influential states that resist being drawn entirely into either camp. The result is a fluid, high-stakes environment that demands careful diplomacy and strategic restraint.

 

Your valuable comments are most welcome.

 

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References and credits

To all the online sites and channels.

References:

  1. George Takach. “Cold War 2.0: The Battle Between Democracies and Autocracies.” The Diplomat, June 2024.
  1. Ferguson, Niall. “The Rise of Cold War II.” Milken Institute Global Conference, May 2022.
  1. Mayer, Maximilian, and Kavalski, Emilian. “Cold War 2.0 and European Security.” Intereconomics Journal, July 2022.
  1. Traub, James. “A New Non-Aligned Movement in a Divided World.” Foreign Policy, July 2022.
  1. Bishara Marwan. “And so, Cold War II begins”, Al Jazeera, 24 February 2022.
  1. Westad Odd Arne “Has a New Cold War Really Begun?”, Foreign Affair, 09 February 2019.
  1. Smith Nicholas Ross, “A New Cold War: Assessing the Current US-Russia Relationship”, Wayback Machine. Springer, 23 March 2021.
  1. Woodward Jude, “The US Vs China: Asia’s New Cold War? Manchester University Press, 2017.
  1. Zhao Minghao, “Is a New Cold War Inevitable? Chinese Perspectives on US-China Strategic Competition”. The Chinese Journal of International Politics, 2019.
  1. Willy Wo-Lap Lam, “The New Cold War that Threatens to Turn Hot”, The Jamestown Foundation 2023.

Disclaimer:

Information and data included in the blog are for educational & non-commercial purposes only and have been carefully adapted, excerpted, or edited from reliable and accurate sources. All copyrighted material belongs to respective owners and is provided only for wider dissemination.

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515: KURSK INCURSION: TURNING THE TABLES

 

 

My OPED published on the EurAsian Times website on 30 Sep 24.

 

In an unexpected move, On Aug. 6, Ukraine surprised the world by launching a bold pre-emptive offensive attack into Russian territory. Reportedly, over 1000 Ukrainian troops, along with armour, crossed into Kursk Oblast, a Russian region that borders Ukraine to the southeast. Ukraine’s cross-border attack named “Operation Krepost” on Russia’s Kursk region is the most significant incursion by Ukrainian forces into Russian territory since the start of the war. In this operation, Ukraine claims to have seized over 1,000 square kilometres of territory and captured several settlements and hundreds of Russian soldiers. The Kursk attack is distinct in the scale of resources used by Ukraine and its highly secretive nature. The event represents a turning point in the war and global geopolitics, shifting the initiative temporarily from Moscow to Kyiv. It has sparked widespread debate, highlighting the conflict’s potential for escalation and geographical expansion and raising questions about the underlying objectives behind this move and its possible future repercussions.

 

Surprise, Shock and Awe. Any move into Russia required a surprise. The Ukrainian attack on Kursk was a stunning display of surprise in modern warfare. By employing a mix of operational secrecy, deception, and tactical manoeuvring, Ukraine managed to achieve a surprising advantage. Ukraine had been engaging Russian forces in the eastern regions around Toretsk and Pokrovsk, giving an impression that its primary focus remained there and diverting attention away from the northern border with Kursk. Ukraine also exploited the gaps in stretched-out Russian deployment by attacking an area with lesser defences. In contrast to previous minor ones with irregular forces, the sheer magnitude of the incursion misled Russian military planners, leaving them in shock and awe at the audacity of the Ukrainian troops. The plans were kept tightly under wraps, sharing them only with a tight group of generals and security officials. The attack was executed with remarkable speed and efficiency, limiting Russia’s ability to mobilise reserves and respond effectively in the early stages. This swift strike allowed Ukrainian forces to capture territory and establish control over critical areas before a complete Russian response could be coordinated.

 

Intentions and Objectives. Ukraine aimed to shift the momentum of the war by launching an offensive into Russian territory. Strategically, Ukraine aimed to divert Russian forces from other critical fronts, such as the eastern regions of Toretsk and Pokrovsk, where Russia had been advancing. While the complete success of this diversion is debated, Ukraine’s offensive has forced Russia to reassess its deployments and react to the threat. Ukraine’s objectives could also be to weaken Russia’s military capability, capture territory, and disrupt Russian supply lines. Some analysts also speculate that holding Russian territory might give Ukraine better leverage in peace negotiations in future. Besides, Ukraine needed to boost its morale after months of defensive operations. A successful offensive into Russia would showcase Ukrainian capabilities and counter Russian propaganda about an inevitable victory. These factors combined to encourage Ukraine to take the risk of crossing into Russia and launching the most significant cross-border attack of the war.

 

 

Effect on Russia. The Ukrainian attack on Kursk has had a significant effect on Russia, both militarily and politically. It has forced Russia to divert resources, exposed its military vulnerabilities, and increased internal political and psychological pressure. The Kursk Offensive has further stretched the already heavily engaged Russian military on multiple fronts, further complicating ongoing Russian offensive operations. Ukraine’s capture of territory in Kursk, including several settlements, is a blow to Russian morale and undermines the Russian invincibility. However, it has also significantly boosted Ukrainian morale, providing a much-needed psychological advantage. This also posed logistical challenges, as Ukrainian forces targeted vital supply lines and infrastructure. The Kursk attack is a psychological blow to the Russians, raising fears of further incursions and challenging the Kremlin’s portrayal of the war as distant from Russian territory. The shock of the incursion could also erode public support for the ongoing conflict as casualties rise and domestic security is threatened. The attack puts internal pressure on the Russian government.

 

Russian Response. Russian President Vladimir Putin called the incursion “a large-scale provocation” and responded by declaring an emergency, imposing heightened security measures in these areas and launching retaliatory counterattacks. Russia mobilised additional troops, mainly from regions close to Kursk, such as Belgorod and Bryansk, to stabilise the situation and prevent further Ukrainian advances. Russia escalated its aerial bombardments across Ukraine, focusing on critical infrastructure, military installations, and supply lines. These colossal airstrikes aimed to disrupt Ukraine’s operations and cripple its logistics. Several missiles (including Kinzhal, Kh-101 and Iskander missiles) and drones attacked 15 of Ukraine’s 24 regions.  Russia also deployed more drones and missile systems to target Ukrainian cities far from the front lines. Russia organised ground counteroffensives to reclaim the territory lost to Ukrainian forces in the Kursk region. These counterattacks aimed to regain control of settlements captured by Ukraine and reinforce border defences. Alongside traditional military responses, Russia reportedly increased cyber-attacks on Ukrainian infrastructure and government systems, aiming to weaken Ukraine’s command and control capabilities. Diplomatically, Russia described the Ukrainian attack as a significant provocation, with President Putin labelling it as part of Ukraine’s broader strategy to destabilise Russia. The Russian government used the Kursk attack to rally domestic support for the war effort and called on international partners to limit support for Ukraine.

 

Ukraine’s Supporters.  Several nations and organisations provided critical assistance to Ukraine. The U.S. is Ukraine’s most prominent supporter, providing billions in military aid, including advanced weaponry, intelligence, and training. The U.S. has supplied systems like HIMARS and air defence platforms, which are essential to Ukraine’s defence against Russian advances. Most NATO members, particularly those in Eastern Europe, like Poland, the Baltic States, and Romania, have provided substantial military aid, logistical support, and training. The European Union has also contributed financially, providing billions in aid packages. The U.K. has been a critical supporter, delivering advanced weapons systems and training Ukrainian forces. It has also played a significant diplomatic role, pushing for continued Western support for Ukraine. Canada has offered military and financial assistance to Ukraine, providing artillery systems, armoured vehicles, and drones. It has also imposed significant sanctions on Russia and supported diplomatic initiatives against the invasion. Western defence contractors, particularly from the U.S., have supplied Ukraine with essential technology and equipment. Civil society movements and non-governmental organisations in countries supporting Ukraine have also raised funds and provided humanitarian assistance. These state and non-state supporters have enabled Ukraine to continue resisting the Russian invasion, providing a vital backbone of military, economic, and diplomatic support.

 

Behind-the-scenes Support. In this instance, a debate has arisen about the direct or indirect involvement of the behind-the-scenes supporters. Washington says it was not informed about Ukraine’s plans ahead of its Aug. 6 incursion into Kursk. The United States has also said it did not take any part in the operation. Russia claims that the United States’ involvement in Ukraine’s incursion into Russia’s western Kursk region was “an obvious fact.” Russia also asserts that Western weaponry, including British tanks and U.S. rocket systems, have been used by Ukraine in Kursk. Media sources have reported that the United States and Britain have provided Ukraine with satellite imagery and other information about the Kursk region in the days after the Ukrainian attack. The intelligence was aimed at helping Ukraine keep better track of Russian reinforcements that might attack them or cut off their eventual withdrawal back to Ukraine.

 

 

Crystal Gazing. Ukraine’s advance into Kursk would culminate due to a combination of the Russian response, the number of casualties, and extended lines of communication. The Ukrainian army will probably be unable to hold all of the Russian territory it has advanced on. Kyiv is contemplating a longer-term occupation to use the land as a bargaining chip.  This will take a lot of Ukrainian resources, and enforcing a long-term occupation would depend on factors like Ukraine’s priorities, the availability and spare ability of resources, and the severity of the Russian response. The choices include consolidation on the captured terrain and partial or complete withdrawal. Partial withdrawal and consolidation seem to be the logical possibility.

 

The initial successes achieved by Kyiv in The Kursk attack have further intensified the war and raised questions about the future of the conflict. The Ukrainian offensive into Russian territory has had a profound impact on the course of the war. On one hand, it has boosted the morale of the Ukrainian army and sent a strong message to the West about Ukraine’s ability to take the offensive initiative. On the other hand, the offensive has elicited mixed reactions in Russia. The event has far-reaching repercussions on the entire war, further complicating the situation in the coming period. The war in Ukraine is a complex game, with many intertwined factors influencing the course of events. Both sides are undertaking concurrent campaigns that consume enormous resources (manpower, munitions, and supporting systems). Surge operations for short durations are possible, but sustaining them for long durations is doubtful. The future of this war mainly depends on the extent of continued Western military and political support to Ukraine.

 

Link to the Website:

https://www.eurasiantimes.com/operation-krepost-ukraines-awe-inspiring/

 

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References

  1. Basel Haj Jasem, “Kursk: A new chapter in the Ukraine war”, Daily Sabah, 27 Aug 2024.
  1. Anastasiia Lapatina, “Six Observations—and Open Questions—on

Ukraine’s Kursk Operation”, 15 Aug 2024.

  1. Deutsche Welle, “What is behind Ukraine’s Kursk operation in Russia?” The Indian Express, New Delhi, 11 Aug 24.
  1. “Moscow says US involvement in Ukrainian incursion into Russia’s Kursk is ‘an obvious fact’”, By Reuters, 27 Aug 24
  1. Mick Ryan, “The Kursk Offensive Dilemma”, Futura Doctrina, 19 Aug 24.

Credits

To all the online sites and channels.

Disclaimer:

Information and data included in the blog are for educational & non-commercial purposes only and have been carefully adapted, excerpted, or edited from reliable and accurate sources. All copyrighted material belongs to respective owners and is provided only for wider dissemination.

 

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487: RUSSIA-UKRAINE WAR: PHASE OF ENGAGEMENT WITH LONG-RANGE WEAPONS

 

Article published in the inaugural issue of the News Analytics Journal

 

 

 

 

Introduction

The Russia–Ukraine war, now in its third year with no end in sight, has had a profound and complex impact on every aspect of warfare and international engagement. It has brought issues related to the new emerging world order, multilateralism, collective security, nuclear deterrence, economic sanctions, information warfare, and food and energy security to the forefront. Understanding the intricate implications of this war on international relations and military operations is of utmost importance.

 

Several questions are intriguing to the strategic community and military analysts. For instance, there is a debate over whether Russia has deployed its full military might and failed, as the West has criticised it for its lack of capabilities. Alternatively, is Russia adopting a more nuanced approach to using force and the resulting destruction? The war, which is still fiercely ongoing, has reached a phase of engagement with long-range vectors and drones, with Ukraine’s retaliation and Russian punitive action. There seems to be no end in sight for the conflict. Despite these debates, an analysis of geopolitical aspects, international reactions, and the conduct of military operations can yield valuable insights.

 

Genesis

On the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, Ukraine voted in favour of independence from the Soviet Union in a referendum. Russian President Boris Yeltsin accepted the vote, and Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus set up a Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). In December 1994, after the end of the Cold War, Ukraine, Russia, the UK, and the US agreed to respect Ukraine’s independence, sovereignty, and borders in exchange for Ukraine abandoning the nuclear weapons it inherited from the Soviet Union. In May 1997, Russia and Ukraine signed a friendship treaty. It settled a fundamental disagreement and allowed Russia to retain ownership of most ships in the Black Sea fleet (based in Ukraine’s Crimea) in exchange for Moscow paying Kyiv a modest rent to use the port of Sebastopol. Moscow also remained Kyiv’s most important commercial partner, with Ukraine dependent on Russian oil and gas.

 

Ukraine, perceiving the CIS as a potential tool for Moscow’s influence, maintained a cautious stance and showed an apparent inclination towards the West, actively seeking ties with the US-led NATO military alliance. This oscillation between the Eastern and Western blocs was an essential characteristic of Ukraine’s foreign policy. In 2005, Ukraine reiterated its desire to join the EU, along with NATO. In 2008, at a summit in Bucharest, NATO leaders agreed that Ukraine had a future in the alliance, sparking Moscow’s ire. In 2014, Russia sent its Special Forces to take control of strategic sites on Ukraine’s Crimea peninsula. In March 2014, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a treaty absorbing Crimea into Russia. The annexation provoked the worst diplomatic crisis between the West and Russia since the fall of the Soviet Union. In April 2014, a pro-Russian rebellion erupted in Ukraine’s industrial eastern areas. Pro-Russian separatists in Donetsk and Lugansk declare their regions to be independent. Ukraine and its Western allies accused Russia of instigating the uprising and pouring in arms and troops to bolster the self-proclaimed republics. The clashes became a full-blown conflict in May 2014.

 

 

Perspective: Relevant Aspects of Present Conflict

 

On 24 Feb 22, Russia invaded Ukraine, calling it an extraordinary military operation.  The Russian narrative is that “The US-led West (the USA, NATO and EU) is the aggressor, using Ukraine against it as a pawn, not honouring its commitment and expanding the NATO westwards, bringing it to the Russian doorstep, and compelling Russia into taking this drastic action”. On the other hand, the Western narrative is that “Russia is the aggressor, trying to rebuild its lost empire, with Ukraine being the victim, and the West is supporting the democratic rights of the victim country”.

 

Russian Objectives. Officially, Russia stated its objectives of the “special military operation” as “demilitarisation, denazification and assurance about the neutral status of Ukraine (i.e., not joining NATO).” This operation, also known as the ‘Russian-Ukrainian War ‘, was justified by Russia citing a call for help from the Donbas region for its liberation from Ukraine. An undeclared objective is also to consolidate the Russian hold on Crimea.

 

Military Power Comparison. There is a significant disparity between the strength of Russia’s and Ukraine’s defence forces. Russia is the number two military power globally. The Russian Air Force is ranked second, whereas the Ukrainian Air Force is ranked 27th globally. Numerically, the Russian Air Force is about 8 – 10 times the size of the Ukrainian Air Force. The Russian army is 3 to 6 times that of the Ukrainian military compared to the army’s strength and equipment.

 

Orchestration of Operations.  The operations were initiated by Russia with hybrid warfare using disruption (cyber-attacks) and destruction (using surface-to-surface and air-delivered long-range vectors). A fair amount of air superiority was achieved in the initial stages. The surface operations were three-pronged, with attacks from North, East and South. In the North, the advance was towards Kyiv and Kharkiv, intending for regime change at the capital. In the east, advances towards Donbas, Luhansk, Donetsk, and Mariupol were obviously to liberate the Donbas area and create a Russia-friendly corridor. In the south, addressing Kherson, Mykolaiv, Odesa, and Snake Island was to consolidate hold on Crimea and deny sea access to Ukraine.

 

Phase I of The War. In this phase, the Russian intention was to take over the capital with swift action and bring in a regime change. Surface forces advanced towards Kyiv on two axes, with the third axis being by the air domain. The Russian Special Forces took over the Hostomel airport (25 Km from Kyiv) to pump in combatants, equipment and supplies. However, the helicopters and the heavy-lift transport aircraft could not land due to vulnerability from shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missiles, failing the overall plan.

 

Phase II of the War. The Russian forces reorganised a few weeks into the war, and concentration shifted from northern to eastern and southern areas. The operations in this phase were like urban guerrilla warfare, with Russian forces surrounding the cities and Ukrainian forces employing defensive, hit-and-run tactics. What stands out in the entire operation is that the Russians did not utilise the full potential of the airpower despite the significant disparity between the forces of the two countries.

 

Russian Referendum. In late September 2022, Russia held referendums in four areas of Ukraine – Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson and Zaporizhzhia. On 30 September 2022, Russian President Vladimir Putin announced the takeover of Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk and Zaporizhzhia in an address to both houses of the Russian parliament. As far as Russia is concerned, this marked the completion of its special operations in Ukraine.

 

Achievement of Objectives. So far, Russia has been able to create a ‘friendly corridor’ in its eastern region, a term used to describe the areas under Russian control that serve as a buffer zone between Russia and Ukraine. The Russians have considerably reduced the Ukrainian combat potential by destroying most of its military bases and selective defence industry. Russia has also consolidated its hold on Crimea, ending its water and power blockade. In addition, it has stalled the possibility of Ukraine joining NATO for the time being.

 

Application of Military Power. The Russians followed a delicate approach and did not use the full potential of their military power. The Western media criticise them for their poor planning, tactics, and training, poor performance of weapons and equipment and the lack of synergy between defence forces. One of the reasons for the self-imposed restraint could be to avoid too much destruction and collateral damage, keeping in mind the public opinion (domestic and worldwide) and long-term problems of insurgency, revolution, and resistance. For the same reason, Russia has not jumped into information warfare. The second reason could be to conserve its military power for a more significant threat in the future.

 

 

 

Western Aid to Ukraine: Gradually Enhancing its Offensive Capability.

 

Defence and security links between Ukraine, NATO members and other allies and partners started soon after Ukraine’s independence in 1991. They intensified when Russia annexed Crimea in 2014 but primarily took the form of training and the bilateral provision of non-lethal military equipment. After the commencement of the Russia-Ukraine war on 24 February 2022, bilateral military assistance has been significantly stepped up, with many allies supplying lethal weapons to Ukraine. In addition to massive funds, the West gave Ukraine equipment to defend itself. These included anti-tank missiles and drones to stem Russian ground advances. Much more important were the Air Defence systems that prevented the Russian Air Force from using Ukrainian skies with immunity.

 

During the initial part of the war, the U.S. and Western allies were hesitant to provide long-range offensive and more sophisticated weaponry to Ukraine over fears of an escalation of the war. Either Russia would see it as an escalation from NATO, or Ukraine itself could escalate the conflict by striking targets within Russia. As the conflict in Ukraine has evolved, so have the types of weaponry being provided.

 

While maintaining the high priority of air defence and the supply of ammunition, the West has gradually enhanced Ukraine’s long-range strike capabilities. Ukraine has been pleading for weapons that can strike more profoundly and deeper behind the front lines. Initial aid packages had limited-range howitzers for use at the frontline. Later, the High-Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS—with 77km range rockets) was added to the package. This was a significant boost for the Ukrainian military, allowing it to target Russian forward area ammunition dumps and weapons storage facilities. After that, a 150 km range Ground Launched Small Diameter Bomb (GLSDB) was included. It put within reach all of Russia’s supply lines in the east of the country as well as part of Russian-occupied Crimea. Late last year, the U.S. began to supply Ukraine with the older medium-range Army Tactical Missile Systems (ATACMS) armed with wide-spreading cluster munitions that can travel up to 160 Km. Now, the U.S. is leaning toward sending the longer-range version of the missile with a 300 km range.

 

These weapons, along with drones, provide Ukraine with the capabilities to strike deep farther inside the Russian-held territory. Kyiv has already embarked on a drone attack on oil and energy facilities inside mainland Russia and an attack on a Russian military airfield in Crimea. It also struck the province of Tatarstan earlier, marking Ukraine’s most profound attack inside Russia so far. It has also continued its attack on Russia’s fleet in the Black Sea. Russian punitive strikes with long-range missiles and hypersonic weapons follow these attacks.

 

 

Current Phase and the Future Prospects of the War.

 

Overall, the pace of the war has slowed down with periodic fluctuations. Russia is trying to hold onto the so-called liberated territories, while Ukraine is trying counteroffensives. Ukraine cannot sustain the war on its own and needs economic and military aid from the West. Both countries, besides economic suffering, have suffered losses of men, materials and equipment in the two-plus-year-long war. However, they cannot accept backtracking now. Acceptance of the loss of Ukrainian territory would be seen as a defeat for the US-led West (including NATO and EU countries). Loss of occupied territory back to Ukraine would be considered a defeat for Russia. So, the stalemate continues, and there is no honourable exit possibility for either.

 

The prevailing domestic situation in both countries is an aversion to further loss of human life. The West is encouraging Ukraine to continue and is enhancing its offensive capabilities with stand-off weapons. Russia is responding to the Ukrainian counter-offensive attacks with punitive strikes using long-range weapons and missiles. This engagement phase with long-range stand-off weapons, drones, and missiles will be long-drawn. The war is, in the broader sense, between the Eastern and Western blocs. So far, due consideration has been given to the escalation control. However, a miss calculation by either side could be catastrophic for the involved countries, the region, and the world.

 

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Link to the article:-

https://newsanalytics.in/russo-ukraine-war-phase-of-engagement-with-long-range-weapons/

 

References and credits

To all the online sites and channels.

References:-

    1. Claire Mills, “Military assistance to Ukraine since the Russian invasion”, Research Briefing, House of Commons Library, 2 May 2024.
    1. Mike Stone and Max Hunder, “Ukraine’s new weapon will force a Russian shift”, Reuters, February 2, 2023.
    1. Courtney Kube, “Biden administration is leaning toward supplying Ukraine with long-range missiles”, NBC News, Feb. 19, 2024.
    1. “Biden Administration Announces Significant New Security Assistance for Ukraine”, US Department of Defence, Press Release, April 24, 2024.
    1. Sean Boynton, “U.S. is sending Ukraine longer-range weapons with new aid why it Matters”, Global News, April 24, 2024.
    1. Brent M. Eastwood, “Why Hasn’t Russia Unleashed Its Air Power over Ukraine?” Published May 10, 2022.
    1. Tim Robinson, “Air War over Ukraine – the first days”, Royal Aeronautical Society, 2 March 2022.
    1. Davis Winkie, “Ukraine receives more armed drones amid Russian invasion”, Military Times, 04 Mar 2022.
    1. “Understanding the Russo-Ukrainian war: a guide”, from the War on the Rocks Site.
    1. Stephen Crowley, “After a ceasefire, would Russia simply fight again?” commentary, War on the Rocks, Dec 21, 2023.

 

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