598: FROM ALLY TO ADVERSARY: US SANCTIONS HIGHLIGHT PAKISTAN MISSILE THREAT

 

On December 19, 2024, U.S. Deputy National Security Adviser Jon Finer described Pakistan’s missile developments as an “emerging threat,” noting the increasing sophistication of its missile technology and the potential to reach targets beyond South Asia, including the United States. In response, the U.S. has imposed new sanctions on Pakistan’s ballistic missile development, including on the state-run defence agency overseeing the program.  This recent imposition of sanctions by the United States on Pakistan’s missile program has raised significant concerns about the trajectory of their bilateral relationship. Once regarded as a strategic ally in the Cold War and the War on Terror, Pakistan now finds itself under renewed scrutiny as Washington seeks to address emerging security threats. These developments not only highlight the growing apprehension in the U.S. about Pakistan’s missile capabilities but also reflect broader geopolitical shifts and challenges in maintaining regional stability.

 

The Rise and Fall of a Partnership. The U.S.-Pakistan relationship has seen dramatic shifts over the decades. During the Cold War, Pakistan emerged as a critical ally for the United States in its containment strategy against the Soviet Union. The alliance shaped regional geopolitics, from military aid to intelligence sharing. One key event was Pakistan’s facilitating the U.S.-China rapprochement in the 1970s. Islamabad’s diplomatic efforts, particularly under leaders like Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, earned it significant goodwill from Washington. Following the events of September 11, 2001, Pakistan became a “frontline state” in the U.S.-led War on Terror. Billions of dollars in military and economic aid flowed to Islamabad as it supported American operations in Afghanistan. However, the relationship began to sour due to allegations of double-dealing. U.S. officials accused Pakistan of harbouring militant groups like the Haqqani network, which targeted American forces in Afghanistan.

 

Missile Development in Pakistan: A Strategic Imperative. Pakistan’s missile program’s evolution reflects Pakistan’s desire to maintain strategic parity with India while deterring external threats. The program began in earnest during the 1980s, driven by its strategic rivalry with India. The need for a credible deterrent grew more acute following India’s advancements in ballistic missile technology and its nuclear tests in 1974. Early development relied heavily on foreign assistance, with China and North Korea playing significant roles. The Hatf missile series, for example, showcased the fusion of indigenous efforts and imported technology. Over the decades, Pakistan’s missile arsenal expanded to include short-range, medium-range, and cruise missiles capable of delivering both conventional and nuclear payloads. Key missile developments include:-

 

    • Ghauri Missile. A medium-range ballistic missile developed with North Korean assistance.
    • Shaheen Series. A family of solid-fueled missiles with improved accuracy and range.
    • Babur Cruise Missile. A subsonic cruise missile with advanced targeting capabilities.

 

Recent Advancements in Pakistan’s Missile Program. Pakistan has made significant strides in its missile program, enhancing its strategic capabilities by developing Multiple Independently Targetable Re-entry Vehicles (MIRVs) and exploring hypersonic technologies.

 

    • MIRV. A notable advancement is the development of the Ababeel missile, designed to carry MIRVs. The Ababeel is a medium-range ballistic missile with a reported range of approximately 2,200 kilometers, capable of delivering multiple warheads to different targets independently. This capability enhances Pakistan’s deterrence by enabling it to penetrate advanced missile defence systems. The first publicly announced test of the Ababeel was conducted on January 24, 2017, with subsequent tests, including one on October 18, 2023, confirming its MIRV capabilities.

 

    • Hypersonic Technologies. While Pakistan does not currently have an indigenous hypersonic weapons program, there have been developments suggesting interest in this area. The Pakistan Air Force has indicated the development of a hypersonic-capable missile as part of a broader modernisation effort to counter evolving threats. A video released by the Pakistan Air Force featured the CM-400AKG anti-ship missile, a Chinese-manufactured missile that allegedly travels at hypersonic speeds.

 

Strategic Implications and Proliferation Risks. These recent advancements have raised concerns internationally.  U.S. officials fear these capabilities could destabilise the region and enable Pakistan to project power beyond South Asia. The U.S. has long been wary of Pakistan’s role in global proliferation networks. The infamous A.Q. Khan network, which supplied nuclear technology to countries like Iran, Libya, and North Korea, underscored the risks of unchecked development. One of Washington’s primary concerns is the intensifying arms race between India and Pakistan. Both countries have developed increasingly sophisticated missile systems, raising the risk of miscalculation and escalation.

 

Involvement of Pakistani Firms. The United States imposed sanctions on four Pakistani firms for their involvement in aiding Pakistan’s ballistic missile program, which is closely linked to its nuclear program. The sanctioned entities were found to be involved in the transfer of critical technologies and materials used in the development of ballistic missile systems. These technologies included components necessary for guidance systems, propulsion, and control mechanisms, which are vital for both missile and nuclear weapons development. The transfer of these technologies represents a significant concern for the U.S., as they could potentially enhance Pakistan’s ability to develop more advanced nuclear delivery systems. Some of these Pakistani firms were collaborating with foreign entities and institutions that are under U.S. and international sanctions. This collaboration allowed the transfer of sensitive technologies and expertise, which accelerated the development of Pakistan’s missile capabilities. These firms were directly involved in the design, development, and testing of ballistic missile systems. The U.S. identified these entities as providing essential support, including material assistance and technical expertise, which allowed Pakistan to improve its missile technology. This development raised concerns about the potential for these missile systems to be used in a nuclear context, thereby complicating global security dynamics.

 

Sanctions. These sanctions are aimed at curbing the spread of missile technology and preventing the enhancement of Pakistan’s military capabilities that could pose risks to regional stability and U.S. security interests. The latest sanctions specifically target entities involved in Pakistan’s missile development. These include National Development Complex (NDC), a state-owned organisation central to missile research and production, and Karachi-based Companies (Akhtar and Sons Private Limited, Affiliates International, and Rockside Enterprise), accused of supplying critical components and technology. The sanctions include freezing U.S.-based assets of the targeted entities, prohibiting American businesses and individuals from conducting transactions with them, and restricting access to international financial systems. These sanctions aim to disrupt Pakistan’s ability to acquire advanced technology and materials critical for its missile program.

 

Pakistan’s Response. Islamabad has strongly condemned the sanctions, describing them as “discriminatory” and counterproductive. The Pakistani Foreign Ministry issued a statement arguing that the sanctions undermine regional peace and stability. Pakistan claims that its missile program is purely defensive and aimed at maintaining strategic balance, and the U.S. is applying double standards, as similar concerns are not being raised about India’s missile developments. Within Pakistan, the sanctions have sparked a wave of nationalist rhetoric. Political leaders and media outlets have framed the U.S. actions as an affront to Pakistan’s sovereignty, bolstering anti-American sentiment.

 

Broader Implications and Realignments. The U.S. troop withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021 marked a turning point in U.S.-Pakistan relations. Washington’s diminished reliance on Islamabad for logistical support in the region has led to a reassessment of the partnership. As U.S.-Pakistan relations cool, Islamabad has sought closer ties with China and Russia. The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and growing military cooperation with Beijing underline this shift. At the same time, Pakistan’s increasing engagement with Moscow signals a diversification of its strategic alliances. The sanctions could exacerbate tensions in South Asia. With Pakistan feeling cornered, there is a risk of accelerated arms development or even closer alignment with adversaries of the U.S., such as China.

 

The U.S. sanctions on Pakistan’s missile program mark a significant moment in their bilateral relationship. While Washington’s concerns about proliferation and regional stability are valid, the move risks further alienating Islamabad at a time when global alliances are shifting. For Pakistan, the sanctions underscore the possibility of diversification of partnerships. For the U.S., they reflect the delicate balancing act of addressing security threats while maintaining influence in a critical region. As the two nations navigate these challenges, the question remains: Can they find common ground, or will their paths continue to diverge?

 

Please Do Comment.

 

1014
Default rating

Please give a thumbs up if you  like The Post?

 

For regular updates, please register your email here:-

Subscribe

 

 

References and credits

To all the online sites and channels.

References:-

  1. Landay, Jonathan S. “U.S. Imposes Sanctions on Pakistani Firms over Missile Proliferation.” Reuters, December 14, 2024.
  1. Haider, Kamran. “Pakistan Criticizes U.S. Sanctions, Calls Them Unjustified.” Dawn, December 15, 2024.
  1. Burns, John F. “Pakistan’s New Missiles Worry U.S. and India.” The New York Times, October 20, 2024.
  1. Tellis, Ashley J. “The Evolution of US-Pakistan Relations: Prospects for the Future.” The Washington Quarterly 34, no. 4 (2011): 109–123.
  1. U.S. Department of Defense. Military and Security Developments Involving the Islamic Republic of Pakistan 2023. Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2023.
  1. Federation of American Scientists (FAS). Pakistan Missile Program Overview. Washington, DC: FAS, 2022.
  1. Arms Control Association. “Pakistan’s Missile Capabilities.” December 2024. https://www.armscontrol.org
  1. Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI). “Pakistan’s Nuclear and Missile Programs: A Profile.” Updated October 2024. https://www.nti.org
  1. Kampani, Gaurav. “Pakistan’s Evolving Missile Strategy: Implications for Deterrence and Security.” South Asian Strategic Review 18, no. 2 (2023): 22–34.
  1. Tariq, Mohammad. “US-Pakistan Relations: From Strategic Alliance to Mutual Distrust.” Pakistan Horizon 71, no. 3 (2024): 15–37.

 

Disclaimer:

Information and data included in the blog are for educational & non-commercial purposes only and have been carefully adapted, excerpted, or edited from reliable and accurate sources. All copyrighted material belongs to respective owners and is provided only for wider dissemination.

574: BOOK REVIEW: Pakistan – The Balochistan Conundrum, By Tilak Devasher

 

 

Review by: Air Marshal Anil Khosla (Retd) PVSM, AVSM, VM

Former Vice Chief of Air Staff, Indian Air Force.

 

Pakistan: The Balochistan Conundrum by Tilak Devasher is a comprehensive, meticulously researched examination of one of Pakistan’s most complex and troubled regions. As a former Indian civil servant with years of experience analysing Pakistan’s internal and external affairs, Devasher offers a deep dive into Balochistan’s conflicts’ historical, political, and socioeconomic underpinnings. He presents a multidimensional narrative that explores the impact of colonial history, resource distribution, ethnic and cultural tensions, and geopolitical influences on Balochistan’s struggle for autonomy within Pakistan.

 

At the heart of the book lies the question: what makes Balochistan so difficult to integrate fully into Pakistan? Devasher’s analysis identifies factors that have driven Balochistan’s longstanding conflicts and challenges. The province’s vast resources, geostrategic location, and distinct ethnic identity make it both a prized possession and a perpetual problem for Pakistan’s federal government. Devasher sheds light on the complex relationship between the Pakistani state and Balochistan, often marked by mistrust, resentment, and recurring conflict. His work argues that Islamabad’s policies toward the province have remained largely focused on control rather than integration, a stance that has left Balochistan in perpetual marginalisation.

 

Devasher begins by tracing the origins of Balochistan’s discontent back to the time of British colonial rule. As the British expanded their influence in the region, they established an essentially exploitative relationship with Balochistan, incorporating the region into their empire while suppressing local political structures. This legacy of exploitation and suppression left the Baloch people with an enduring distrust of centralised rule, a sentiment that has only deepened under Pakistan’s federal government.

 

Post-independence, Pakistan adopted a similar approach to Balochistan, perceiving it as a remote, resource-rich frontier rather than an integrated part of the country. According to Devasher, the forced accession of the princely state of Kalat in 1948 laid the foundation for the ongoing resistance movements in Balochistan. The book provides a detailed account of the four main insurgencies that have taken place in Balochistan since Pakistan’s creation, underscoring how each conflict has only worsened the province’s resentment towards Islamabad. Devasher’s narration explains how Pakistan’s failure to address the region’s core issues—economic deprivation, lack of political representation, and cultural autonomy—has kept the fires of rebellion alive for decades.

 

Balochistan is Pakistan’s largest but least developed province, and Devasher strongly argues that the province’s socioeconomic plight is at the core of its grievances. Despite being rich in natural gas, coal, copper, and gold, most of Balochistan’s population remains impoverished and lacks access to primary education, healthcare, and infrastructure. The exploitation of these resources has been another source of discontent, as Islamabad reaps the economic benefits while Balochistan’s people continue to live in poverty. Devasher’s work highlights the deep disparities in resource distribution, pointing out that most of the profits generated from the province’s resources go to the central government rather than the local population. This economic exclusion only deepened feelings of alienation among the Baloch people. The book also addresses the question of royalties, noting that the revenues from natural gas production, for instance, rarely benefit the people of Balochistan themselves. In Devasher’s view, the Pakistani government’s policies of resource extraction without compensation or reinvestment are an example of economic colonialism that has further alienated the Baloch populace.

 

Devasher’s critique extends to Pakistan’s heavy reliance on military intervention to maintain control over Balochistan. Since the inception of Pakistan, the government has treated the Baloch independence movement as a national security issue rather than a political or economic one. This approach, according to Devasher, has resulted in widespread human rights abuses, including forced disappearances, extrajudicial killings, and a heavy military presence that has stifled civil life in the province. He brings forth testimonies and documented evidence from various sources to illustrate the brutality of Pakistan’s military tactics, highlighting how these methods have only fuelled further resistance among the Baloch people.

 

Devasher’s exploration of human rights issues is one of the book’s most powerful sections. He discusses the “missing persons” issue in depth, referring to the thousands of Baloch activists, students, and political leaders who have allegedly been abducted or killed by state security forces. This has led to what Devasher describes as a pervasive atmosphere of fear and oppression. He further explores the militarisation of Balochistan, showing how these repressive policies have created a sense of siege among ordinary Baloch citizens. By treating Balochistan as a security problem, Devasher argues that the Pakistani government has undermined its efforts to integrate the province, instead fostering an atmosphere of anger and resentment that has only served to strengthen separatist sentiments.

 

Another crucial element of Devasher’s analysis is Balochistan’s geopolitical significance, particularly its role in Pakistan’s relationships with Afghanistan, India, and China. Devasher notes that Balochistan’s location—bordering Iran and Afghanistan and close to the Persian Gulf—makes it a strategic asset for Pakistan. However, this same strategic significance has drawn external interest, especially from India and Afghanistan, which Pakistan accuses of supporting Baloch insurgents.

 

The book also covers China’s involvement in Balochistan through the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), a major infrastructural initiative that runs through the province. Devasher describes how the CPEC project while promising to bring development, has generated concerns among the Baloch over increased military presence, displacement, and lack of economic benefits for the local population. Devasher argues that while the CPEC may bring some development, it has also intensified fears that foreign powers exploit Balochistan’s resources without fair compensation to the local population. The geostrategic context adds further complexity to the Balochistan conundrum, as external involvement in the region creates additional pressure on Pakistan’s federal government.

 

In addition to political and economic issues, Devasher dedicates part of his analysis to the cultural and ethnic identity of the Baloch people. He discusses how the Pakistani state has attempted to impose a uniform national identity, one that prioritises Islam and disregards the distinct cultural heritage of the Baloch people. This attempt to assimilate Balochistan into a homogenised national identity has only heightened the Baloch people’s desire to preserve their distinct cultural and ethnic identity, adding to their resistance to centralisation.

 

Devasher argues that Pakistan’s policies have overlooked the Baloch people’s historical sense of autonomy and pride in their cultural identity. This aspect of Baloch identity is intertwined with their demand for greater independence and self-determination. Devasher presents an in-depth look at how cultural suppression has become a symbol of the broader political and economic neglect that the Baloch people face, arguing that this cultural dimension is a crucial yet often overlooked factor in understanding Balochistan’s resistance.

 

Pakistan: The Balochistan Conundrum is a profoundly insightful and compelling account of Balochistan’s struggle within Pakistan. Devasher combines historical perspective, human rights concerns, and geopolitical analysis to deliver a balanced and thorough examination of the region’s conflicts. His findings paint a sobering picture: unless Pakistan addresses the root causes of Balochistan’s grievances, its policies may continue to fuel instability and insurgency.

 

Devasher’s work ultimately suggests that the road to peace and integration lies not in military domination but in addressing the legitimate demands of the Baloch people, particularly in terms of economic inclusion, political representation, and respect for cultural identity. This book is a must-read for scholars, policymakers, and anyone interested in South Asian geopolitics, as it offers a clear-eyed look at a region that is both critical to Pakistan’s stability and emblematic of its internal struggles.

 

Your valuable comments are most welcome.

 

1014
Default rating

Please give a thumbs up if you  like The Post?

 

For regular updates, please register your email here:-

Subscribe

 

 

References and credits

To all the online sites and channels.

 

Disclaimer:

Information and data included in the blog are for educational & non-commercial purposes only and have been carefully adapted, excerpted, or edited from reliable and accurate sources. All copyrighted material belongs to respective owners and is provided only for wider dissemination.

 

571: THE BOOMERANG EFFECT: WHEN MILITANT GROUPS TURN ON THEIR SPONSORS

 

Pic Courtesy Net

 

My Article Published in the Life of Soldiers (a premier monthly defence magazine) on 30 Dec 24.

 

The Wagner Group, a Russian private military company, played a significant role in the Russia-Ukraine conflict, particularly in the battle for Bakhmut. In May 2023, Wagner forces captured Bakhmut for Russia after intense fighting. In June 2023, tensions between Wagner’s leadership and the Russian military culminated in a brief mutiny led by Yevgeny Prigozhin, Wagner’s chief. The rebellion ended with an agreement brokered by Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko, and charges against Prigozhin were later dropped. Following Prigozhin’s controversial death in a plane crash in August 2023, the future of Wagner became uncertain. By October 2023, elements of the group were integrated into Russia’s National Guard, Rosgvardia, indicating a restructuring under state control.

 

Boomerang Effect.

 

The phenomenon where militant groups turn on their sponsors is often called the “boomerang effect.” This happens when organisations or groups created, funded, or supported by a state or another actor shift their allegiances or use their skills and resources against their former backers. The reasons for this shift can be complex and multifaceted, involving ideological differences, changing power dynamics, or disillusionment with their sponsors’ objectives. Contributing factors are as follows:- 

 

Ideological Divergence. Initially, militant groups are often created with shared goals and objectives aligned with their sponsors. However, as they gain strength and experience, they may develop their agendas. Differences in ideology can lead to clashes, especially if the militants feel their sponsors are manipulating them for geopolitical gain.

 

Loss of Control. Sponsors often lose control over the militants they support. As these groups gain legitimacy and power, they may increasingly act independently, pursuing their objectives, which might not align with those of their sponsors. This can lead to a strategic shift where militants view their sponsors as obstacles rather than allies.

 

Disillusionment and Frustration. Sometimes, militants feel let down by their sponsors. They may believe that their resources or support are inadequate or misdirected. This frustration can lead to losing loyalty, with groups turning against their sponsors.

 

Changing Power Dynamics. As the geopolitical landscape changes, so too can militants’ strategic interests. They may switch sides in pursuit of more favourable conditions, especially when they see greater opportunities to achieve their goals with a different sponsor or on their own.

 

The Wagner Group Story

 

Wagner Group, a Russian private military contractor (PMC), provides a recent example of a sponsored organisation turning against its sponsor. Initially backed by the Russian government, Wagner became a powerful, semi-autonomous entity with ambitions and interests, ultimately leading to a public confrontation with the Russian state.

 

Background. The Wagner Group was founded around 2014 by Dmitry Utkin, a former Russian military officer, and Yevgeny Prigozhin, a businessman with close ties to the Kremlin. It served as a proxy force for Russian interests in global hotspots, allowing Russia to exert influence without direct military involvement or the political risk of deploying official troops. Wagner operated in Syria, Libya, the Central African Republic, and other countries, carrying out missions aligned with Russian geopolitical interests and reportedly receiving support and resources from the Russian state, including training facilities and equipment.

 

Tensions Leading to Conflict. As Wagner’s activities grew, so did its autonomy and influence. Wagner played a significant role in the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, taking on critical combat roles. However, Prigozhin became increasingly outspoken about the Russian military’s failings, explicitly criticising the Ministry of Defence’s handling of the war. Wagner’s leadership grew resentful, accusing Russian military officials of incompetence, neglecting logistical support, and underestimating Wagner’s sacrifices on the front lines.

 

The Wagner Rebellion of 2023. This tension culminated in a dramatic turn in June 2023, when Wagner launched an armed rebellion against the Russian military leadership. Prigozhin led his forces into the Russian city of Rostov-on-Don, seizing an army headquarters, and then began an advance toward Moscow. Prigozhin demanded changes in the Russian military leadership, mainly targeting Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu and General Valery Gerasimov. Although it was ultimately short-lived, this direct challenge to the Kremlin marked a sharp break with their previous sponsor, the Russian state. The rebellion ended after negotiations, reportedly brokered by Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko. Prigozhin agreed to stand down in exchange for a safe passage to Belarus, and Wagner’s forces withdrew. However, the incident exposed significant rifts between Wagner and the Russian government, highlighting how sponsorship of militant or paramilitary organisations can backfire when these groups gain enough power to pursue their agendas.

 

Aftermath and Fallout. The fallout from the rebellion was significant. Prigozhin’s death in a plane crash in August 2023 was widely speculated to have been orchestrated by elements within the Russian state. Wagner’s operations were subsequently restructured, with many members reportedly re-assigned or integrated into other units more directly controlled by the Russian government.

 

Lessons and Analysis. The Wagner Group’s rebellion is a cautionary tale about the risks of using paramilitary organisations for state purposes. Once such groups gain power, resources, and a sense of autonomy, they can become difficult to control, and their interests may diverge from those of their original sponsor. In Wagner’s case, the group’s loyalty to Prigozhin and its operational independence contributed to a volatile situation where, ultimately, Wagner’s ambitions turned against the very state that enabled its rise.

 

Boomerang Effect: Notable Instances

 

Several historical examples exist of militant organisations that initially received sponsorship from governments or other entities but later turned against their sponsors. This phenomenon often results from shifting political dynamics, ideological conflicts, or changes. in militant groups’ objectives.

 

Al-Qaeda and the United States. During the 1980s, the United States, along with Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, provided financial and military support to Afghan mujahideen fighters to combat the Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan. Many of these fighters, including Osama bin Laden, received resources and training indirectly through the CIA’s Operation Cyclone. After the Soviet withdrawal, some of these fighters, including bin Laden, formed Al-Qaeda. Al-Qaeda grew increasingly antagonistic toward the United States, particularly due to its military presence in the Middle East and its support for governments seen as oppressive or contrary to Islamic principles. This hostility culminated in the September 11, 2001 attacks, marking a complete break from their former indirect sponsor.

 

The Taliban and Pakistan. Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) supported the formation of the Taliban in the 1990s, seeing them as a potential ally to ensure a friendly government in Afghanistan, which would provide Pakistan with strategic depth against India. While the Taliban still maintains some ties with Pakistan, there have been periods of tension. Taliban-linked groups, such as the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), have turned against the Pakistani state, conducting attacks within Pakistan. The TTP aims to overthrow the Pakistani government and establish a stricter interpretation of Islamic law, which has led to significant violence and conflict within Pakistan itself.

 

Hamas and Israel. During the early years of the Palestinian resistance, Israel indirectly supported groups that would later form Hamas, aiming to create a counterbalance to the secular Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) led by Yasser Arafat. This was based on the notion that Islamist movements could divide the Palestinian resistance, making it easier to manage. Hamas eventually became a formidable opponent to Israel, adopting a hardline stance and engaging in numerous conflicts with the Israeli state. Today, Hamas is a prominent political and militant force in Gaza and has carried out attacks against Israeli targets, becoming one of Israel’s most persistent adversaries.

 

The Islamic State (ISIS) and the Gulf States. During the Syrian Civil War, several Gulf States, including Qatar and Saudi Arabia, provided funding and weapons to Sunni rebel groups to oppose the Assad regime in Syria. Some of these groups either merged with or evolved into extremist groups like ISIS. Although Gulf States may not have directly funded ISIS, their support for anti-Assad rebels indirectly bolstered ISIS’s power. Once ISIS gained control of territory and declared a caliphate, it posed a threat to all governments in the region, including those in the Gulf. ISIS targeted these governments rhetorically and sometimes directly, seeing them as illegitimate and corrupt.

 

M23 Rebels and Rwanda. The M23 rebel group in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) was reportedly supported by neighbouring Rwanda, which viewed them as a means to secure influence in the DRC and counter the presence of anti-Rwandan Hutu militias. Over time, M23 developed its political ambitions, creating sporadic tensions with Rwanda. Although the relationship between Rwanda and M23 is complex and fluctuates, there have been instances where M23 acted independently, with a leadership not fully aligned with Rwanda’s objectives.

 

Fatah al-Islam and Syria. Syria was alleged to have supported Fatah al-Islam, a militant group in Lebanon, to destabilise the Lebanese government, particularly during times of political tension between Syria and Lebanon. Fatah al-Islam later became a problem for Syria and the broader region. The group’s activities and increasing autonomy led to clashes with the Lebanese government and other regional actors, pushing them further away from Syrian influence.

 

 

Conclusion

These examples illustrate how sponsorship of militant groups is fraught with inherent risks and unintended consequences. Such alliances with unpredictable partners often backfire as these organisations evolve ideologically, gain independence, or shift their focus based on changing political landscapes.  The short-term gains can lead to long-term instability, undermining the sponsor’s original goals and threatening regional and global security. They are stark reminders of the dangers of using militancy as a proxy for power, underscoring the need for more sustainable and ethical approaches to conflict resolution and statecraft.

 

 

Your valuable comments are most welcome.

 

1014
Default rating

Please give a thumbs up if you  like The Post?

 

Link to the Article on the website:-

The Boomerang Effect: When Militant Groups Turn On Their Sponsors

For regular updates, please register your email here:-

Subscribe

References and credits

To all the online sites and channels.

References:

  1. Byman, Daniel. “Friends Like These: Counterinsurgency and the War on Terrorism.” International Security, vol. 31, no. 2, 2006, pp. 79–115.
  1. Crenshaw, Martha. “The Causes of Terrorism.” Comparative Politics, vol. 13, no. 4, 1981, pp. 379–399.
  1. Weinberg, Leonard, and William L. Eubank. “State-Sponsored Terrorism: A Reassessment.” Terrorism and Political Violence, vol. 2, no. 1, 1990, pp. 287–302.
  1. Piazza, James A. “Incubators of Terror: Do Failed and Failing States Promote Transnational Terrorism?” International Studies Quarterly, vol. 52, no. 3, 2008, pp. 469–488.
  1. Coll, Steve. Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001. New York: Penguin Press, 2004.
  1. Mamdani, Mahmood. Good Muslim, Bad Muslim: America, the Cold War, and the Roots of Terror. New York: Pantheon Books, 2004.
  1. Gerges, Fawaz A. The Far Enemy: Why Jihad Went Global. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005.
  1. Kepel, Gilles. Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002.
  1. Rashid, Ahmed. Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil, and Fundamentalism in Central Asia. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2000.
  1. Gunaratna, Rohan. Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror. New York: Columbia University Press, 2002.
  1. Katzman, Kenneth. Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy. Congressional Research Service Report, 2021.
  1. Jones, Seth G. In the Graveyard of Empires: America’s War in Afghanistan. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2009.
  1. Norton, Augustus R. Hezbollah: A Short History. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007.
  1. Fair, C. Christine. In Their Own Words: Understanding Lashkar-e-Taiba. New York: Oxford University Press, 2018.
  1. Galeotti, Mark. Putin’s Wars: From Chechnya to Ukraine. London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2022.
  1. Nixey, James. The Weaponisation of Everything: Russia’s Hybrid Warfare in the 21st Century. London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2021.
  1. Marten, Kimberly. Warlords and Coalition Politics in Post-Soviet States. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2012.
  1. Marten, Kimberly. “The Puzzle of Russian Behavior in Deir Al-Zour.” War on the Rocks, 2018.
  1. Galeotti, Mark. “Russia’s Private Military Companies: The Example of Wagner.” RUSI Journal, vol. 164, no. 1, 2019, pp. 20–28.
  1. MacFarquhar, Neil, and Eric Schmitt. “Inside the Wagner Group’s Mutiny Against the Kremlin.” The New York Times, June 2023.
  1. Seddon, Max. “The Wagner Group Mutiny: What It Tells Us About Putin’s Russia.” Financial Times, July 2023.
  1. Galeotti, Mark. “The Russian Way of War: From Chechnya to Ukraine.” Foreign Affairs, 2022.

Disclaimer:

Information and data included in the blog are for educational & non-commercial purposes only and have been carefully adapted, excerpted, or edited from reliable and accurate sources. All copyrighted material belongs to respective owners and is provided only for wider dissemination.

English हिंदी