Pakistan – Air Marshal's Perspective

April 22, 2025April 21, 2025

656: FROM ESTRANGEMENT TO ENGAGEMENT: PAKISTAN AND BANGLADESH RECALIBRATING TIES

My Article published on The EurasianTimes website on 20 Apr 25

On April 17, 2025, Bangladesh and Pakistan held their first foreign secretary-level talks in 15 years in Dhaka, marking a significant step toward resetting bilateral ties: Bangladesh’s Foreign Secretary, Md. Jashim Uddin and Pakistan’s Foreign Secretary Amna Baloch led the Foreign Office Consultations. The discussions covered various issues, including trade, economic cooperation, regional matters, and historically unresolved disputes.

Bangladesh demanded a public apology from Pakistan for alleged atrocities committed during the 1971 Liberation War and sought $4.52 billion as its share of pre-1971 assets from undivided Pakistan. Other issues included the repatriation of stranded Pakistanis and the transfer of foreign aid funds related to the 1970 cyclone. Jashim Uddin emphasised resolving these issues to build a “solid foundation” for relations, while Baloch described the talks as “constructive” and focused on harnessing bilateral potential.

Pakistan acknowledged “outstanding issues” but did not confirm commitments to Bangladesh’s demands in public statements. The talks also explored boosting trade, with Bangladesh highlighting investment opportunities in jute and textiles. Both sides noted a January 2025 MoU for rice procurement from Pakistan. Bangladesh has eased visa restrictions for Pakistani nationals and launched direct shipping links, while Pakistan approved Fly Jinnah, a low-cost airline, to operate between the two countries. Baloch met Yunus and the Foreign Affairs Adviser, Md. Touhid Hossain, discussing the revival of SAARC and regional cooperation. Pakistan’s Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, Ishaq Dar, is scheduled to visit Dhaka on April 27-28, 2025, the first such visit since 2012, with expectations of signing agreements to strengthen ties further.

For over five decades, the relationship between Pakistan and Bangladesh has been defined by estrangement, rooted in the traumatic 1971 Liberation War, when East Pakistan seceded to form Bangladesh with India’s military backing. The war left deep scars, with Bangladesh accusing Pakistani forces of committing genocide, resulting in an estimated 3 million deaths and widespread atrocities. Under Bangladesh’s former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina (2009–2024), ties remained frosty due to her government’s focus on war crime tribunals and alignment with India. However, the ouster of Hasina in August 2024, following a student-led uprising, marked a turning point. Under the interim government led by Muhammad Yunus, Bangladesh and Pakistan have embarked on a path of pragmatic engagement, driven by diplomatic, economic, and military cooperation. Unanswered questions include the drivers of this thaw, the challenges ahead, and the implications for South Asian geopolitics, particularly India.

Historical Context: A Legacy of Estrangement

The 1971 war remains the defining fault line in Pakistan-Bangladesh relations. Bangladesh’s narrative emphasises Pakistani military atrocities, including mass killings and the rapes, claims Pakistan disputes. Post-independence, Bangladesh’s early leaders, such as Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, sought to balance ties with Pakistan, attending the 1974 Organisation of Islamic Conference summit in Lahore. However, relations deteriorated after Mujib’s assassination in 1975, as subsequent Bangladeshi governments oscillated between secularism and Islamic identity, complicating reconciliation. During Hasina’s tenure, Bangladesh pursued war crimes trials, executing figures like Jamaat-e-Islami leader Motiur Rahman Nizami in 2016, prompting Pakistan’s condemnation and further straining ties. Visa restrictions, lack of direct flights, and minimal trade underscored the diplomatic freeze, with Pakistani goods often rerouted through third-party ports.

Catalysts for Change: The Post-Hasina Era

The political upheaval in Bangladesh in August 2024, which forced Hasina to flee to India, created a strategic opening for reconciliation. The interim government under Yunus adopted a “friendship to all” foreign policy, distancing itself from Hasina’s India-centric approach and opening doors to Pakistan. This significant shift in Bangladesh’s foreign policy can potentially reshape the region’s geopolitical dynamics.

- Political Realignment. Hasina’s ouster reduced anti-Pakistan rhetoric, as her Awami League had leveraged 1971 grievances for political legitimacy. Yunus’s neutral stance prioritises economic and diplomatic diversification.

- Strained India-Bangladesh Ties. Hasina’s exile in India and Bangladesh’s demand for her extradition have fueled anti-India sentiment, amplified by the “India Out” campaign in 2024. This has pushed Bangladesh to seek alternative partners like Pakistan to counterbalance India’s influence.

- Economic Pressures. Both nations face economic challenges, including high inflation and global trade uncertainties. Bangladesh’s 6% GDP growth since 2021 and Pakistan’s “Uraan Pakistan” plan for 6% growth by 2028 incentivise trade expansion.

- China’s Role. China’s strategic partnerships with both countries, including Bangladesh’s participation in the Belt and Road Initiative and Pakistan’s China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, encourage a trilateral alignment, raising concerns in India about the potential shift in power dynamics in the region.

Recent Engagements

Diplomatic Engagement. Diplomatic interactions have surged since August 2024. Yunus and Pakistan’s Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif met twice—on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly in September 2024 and the D-8 Summit in Cairo in December 2024—discussing trade, cultural exchanges, and regional cooperation, including reviving the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). A symbolic Eid al-Fitr phone call in March 2025 between the leaders underscored goodwill.

Economic and Trade Cooperation. Bilateral trade grew by 27% between August and December 2024, with both nations targeting a $3 billion trade volume within a year, over four times the current level. In November 2024, direct sea trade resumed after 53 years, with two Pakistani cargo ships docking at Chittagong Port carrying sugar and potatoes. Bangladesh also permitted Pakistani vessels at Mongla Port. Bangladesh scrapped mandatory 100% physical inspections of Pakistani goods in September 2024, reducing logistical costs. A memorandum of understanding signed on January 13, 2025, established a joint business council to boost private-sector ties. Bangladesh eased strict security clearances for Pakistani travellers, while Pakistan waived visa fees for Bangladeshis. Plans for direct flights, which have been absent since 2018, are underway.

Military Cooperation. Military ties have seen unprecedented growth, signalling a strategic shift. In January 2025, a Bangladeshi delegation led by Lt. General S.M. Kamrul-Hassan visited Pakistan, meeting Army Chief General Asim Munir to discuss joint exercises, training, and arms trade. Pakistan described the nations as “brotherly,” aiming to reshape South Asia’s security landscape. Bangladesh’s BNS Samudra Joy participated in Pakistan’s “Aman 2025” naval exercise in February 2025. This was the first major Bangladeshi warship deployment to Pakistan in over a decade, and the exercise focused on countering piracy and illegal fishing. Between September and December 2024, Bangladesh ordered 40,000 rounds of artillery ammunition, 2,000 rounds of tank ammunition, and 40 tonnes of RDX from Pakistan, tripling the previous year’s volume. Reports suggest interest in acquiring JF-17 Thunder fighter jets, co-developed by Pakistan and China, to support Bangladesh’s “Forces Goal 2030” modernisation. Pakistan will begin training Bangladesh’s army in February 2025, with a Pakistani Major General overseeing programs at Momenshahi Cantonment.

Cultural and People-to-People Ties. Shared cultural heritage has facilitated reconciliation, including Urdu-Bengali linguistic ties and a Muslim-majority identity. The 2024 visit of a Pakistani artist to Dhaka and the Bangladesh cricket team’s tour to Pakistan were celebrated as soft diplomacy successes. The “Bay of Bengal Conversation” seminar in November 2024, attended by Pakistani scholars, emphasised Track II diplomacy to rebuild trust.

Challenges to Sustained Engagement

Despite progress, several challenges persist. Bangladesh’s demand for a formal Pakistani apology and $4.2 billion in compensation for 1971 remains unmet, fuelling public opposition in Bangladesh, especially during Victory Day commemorations. While some Bangladeshis welcome renewed ties, others, particularly 1971 war survivors, oppose reconciliation without accountability. Further, Bangladesh’s economic reliance on India and shared counterterrorism goals may constrain its pivot toward Pakistan. Reports of a foiled coup in Bangladesh with alleged ISI backing raise concerns about Pakistan’s intentions, complicating military cooperation.

Implications for India

The Bangladesh-Pakistan thaw could reshape South Asian geopolitics. Given its ties with both nations, it may strengthen China’s regional influence, potentially forming a “trifecta” that concerns India. Unresolved 1971 issues and India’s security concerns may limit the depth of this alignment. India, a key player in Bangladesh’s 1971 independence and a close ally under Hasina, views this rapprochement with alarm. The warming ties threaten India’s influence in South Asia, particularly given concerns over the Siliguri Corridor, the narrow 20-22 km strip connecting India’s northeast.

Prime Minister Narendra Modi met Yunus at the BIMSTEC Summit in Bangkok in April 2025, raising concerns about the safety of the Hindu minority and Hasina’s extradition. India’s High Commissioner Pranay Verma emphasised a “people-centric” approach, advocating for a “democratic, stable” Bangladesh. India has provided Bangladesh $7.862 billion in Lines of Credit to support infrastructure projects. However, it recently terminated transhipment facilities for Bangladesh’s cargo, signalling displeasure.

India has to bolster its 4,096-km border with Bangladesh, deploying technology and increasing Border Security Force inspections to counter infiltration and smuggling. Fears persist that Pakistan’s ISI could transfer weapons to insurgent groups via Bangladesh, threatening India’s northeastern states.

Conclusion

The recalibration of Pakistan-Bangladesh ties since August 2024 marks a significant shift from estrangement to engagement, driven by political changes, economic imperatives, and strategic realignments. Diplomatic, economic, and military cooperation, underpinned by cultural ties, reflects an approach to overcoming historical animosities. However, unresolved grievances, public sentiment, and India’s wary response pose challenges to sustained progress. For India, the thaw necessitates a recalibrated strategy to maintain influence in Bangladesh while addressing regional security concerns. As South Asia navigates this evolving dynamic, the Bangladesh-Pakistan rapprochement underscores the region’s complex interplay of history, geopolitics, and pragmatism. The coming years will test whether this engagement can transcend tactical gains to foster lasting reconciliation.

Please Add Value to the write-up with your views on the subject.

For regular updates, please register your email here:-

Subscribe

Link to the article on the website:-

Lost In 1971 War, Pakistan Attempts To Rebuild Ties With Bangladesh With China’s Help; Concern For India?

References and credits

To all the online sites and channels.

Pics Courtesy: Internet

Disclaimer:

Information and data included in the blog are for educational & non-commercial purposes only and have been carefully adapted, excerpted, or edited from reliable and accurate sources. All copyrighted material belongs to respective owners and is provided only for wider dissemination.

References:-

AP News. “Bangladesh and Pakistan resume talks after 15 years, seek to mend strained ties.” April 18, 2025.

DW. “How Bangladesh-Pakistan reconciliation impacts India.” December 31, 2024.

India Today. “Pakistan moves to reset ties with Bangladesh as China factor grows.” April 9, 2025.

Lowy Institute. “The revival of Bangladesh-Pakistan ties.” February 2, 2025.

Modern Diplomacy. “Bangladesh-Pakistan Thaw and a Regional Realignment.” February 23, 2025.

Moneycontrol. “With China in the wings, Pakistan-Bangladesh talks resume after 15 years.” April 17, 2025.

NewKerala.com. “Bangladesh-Pakistan Ties: Implications for India’s Diplomacy.” February 2, 2025.

South Asian Voices. “Bangladesh in 2024: Protests, Political Shifts, and a New Path Ahead.” December 19, 2024.

South Asian Voices. “How Naval Diplomacy Could Rewrite Pakistan-Bangladesh Ties.” April 9, 2025.

Takshashila Institution. “India-Bangladesh relations – Challenges and Opportunities.” October 22, 2024.

The Diplomat. “Moonis Ahmar on the Future of Bangladesh-Pakistan Relations.” September 30, 2024.

TRT Global. “Pakistan and Bangladesh: A thaw begins after decades of frosty relations.” April 16, 2025.

World Economic Forum. “Pakistan’s path towards sustainable and inclusive growth.” January 21, 2025.

March 13, 2025March 13, 2025

619: PAKISTAN TRAIN HIJACK: START OF A LARGER CRISIS?

My Article was published on the Eurasian Times Website

on 12 Mar 25.

On March 11, 2025, separatist militants attacked the Jaffar Express passenger train in Balochistan’s Bolan district, Pakistan. The train, carrying approximately 500 passengers, was en route from Quetta to Peshawar when it was ambushed in a tunnel. The assailants detonated explosives on the railroad track and engaged in gunfire with onboard security personnel. The Baloch Liberation Army (BLA), designated as a terrorist organisation by both Pakistan and the United States, claimed responsibility for the assault. They asserted that they had taken security forces and civilians hostage, using women and children as human shields. Authorities face challenges accessing the remote, mountainous area to conduct rescue operations.

Reports on the number of hostages vary, with some sources estimating 182 while others suggest the initial number could exceed 400. The BLA later claimed to have released civilian passengers—including women, children, and Baloch citizens—but retained active-duty military and security personnel. Conflicting accounts also exist regarding casualties, with the BLA alleging deaths among security forces, though exact figures remain unconfirmed.

The crisis remains ongoing, with tensions high between the BLA and Pakistani authorities. The government and military face the challenge of resolving the standoff without further loss of life, while the BLA’s threats add urgency to the situation. The incident underscores the persistent unrest in Balochistan and the complexities of addressing the region’s separatist movements.

BLA Origin and Background. The Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) is an ethno-nationalist militant group that seeks an independent Balochistan, citing political marginalisation, economic exploitation, and human rights abuses by the Pakistani state. Its origins are deeply rooted in the broader Baloch nationalist movement, which began when Pakistan annexed the princely state of Kalat in 1948 despite resistance from its ruler, Mir Ahmad Yar Khan. This led to the first Baloch insurgency, followed by successive uprisings in 1958-59, 1973-77, and post-2000, each met with Pakistani military crackdowns. The modern BLA is believed to have formed in the late 1990s or early 2000s, allegedly led by Baloch separatist leaders such as Hyrbyair Marri and Balach Marri. The growing militarisation of Balochistan fueled its emergence, enforced disappearances, and the assassination of nationalist leaders, notably Nawab Akbar Bugti, in 2006. Initially, the BLA targeted Pakistani security forces, gas pipelines, and government installations, but in the 2010s, it expanded its focus to attacking Chinese interests, particularly the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). High-profile attacks include the 2018 Karachi consulate bombing, the 2019 Gwadar Pearl Continental attack, and the 2022 Karachi University suicide bombing targeting Chinese nationals. Pakistan has banned the BLA and designated it as a terrorist organisation, accusing India’s RAW and Afghan intelligence of supporting it, though India denies involvement. The BLA has since fragmented into factions like the Majeed Brigade, known for its suicide attacks and high-profile operations.

Pakistan’s Strategy to Deal with the Baloch Problem. Pakistan has adopted a military-centric approach to address the Baloch insurgency, using a combination of force, intelligence operations, and economic incentives. The Pakistan Army and intelligence agencies (ISI and MI) have led counterinsurgency campaigns, conducting large-scale military operations, airstrikes, and search-and-kill missions against Baloch militant groups like the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA). Reports suggest enforced disappearances, extrajudicial killings, and torture of suspected militants and activists, which have further fuelled resentment. To counter separatist narratives, Pakistan has also sought to integrate Balochistan into national development programs. Projects under the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), including Gwadar Port, are promoted as economic solutions, but many Baloch nationalists argue they benefit outsiders while displacing locals. The government has also offered amnesty programs, urging militants to surrender in exchange for reintegration and financial incentives. Diplomatically, Pakistan has labelled Baloch insurgents as foreign-backed terrorists. Security forces have intensified border controls and cracked down on pro-Baloch political groups and media outlets. However, these actions have failed to neutralise the insurgency, as groups like the BLA’s Majeed Brigade continue attacks, mainly targeting Pakistani forces and Chinese interests in the region.

Past Incidents Worldwide. Throughout history, militant groups have targeted trains for hijackings or attacks as part of their insurgencies. During the Nicaraguan Contra War (1980s), the leftist Sandinista rebels hijacked and ambushed trains carrying military supplies, disrupting government forces. In Russia, Chechen militants and North Caucasus insurgents targeted trains, including the 2009 Nevsky Express bombing, which killed dozens and highlighted vulnerabilities in railway security. Closer at home, in 1982, Naxalite rebels in India hijacked a train in Bhusaval, Maharashtra, using it as a platform to protest government policies. Naxalites have also derailed and bombed trains, particularly in Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, and Odisha, as part of their guerrilla warfare. These historical cases show how trains remain a strategic target for militants aiming to spread terror and weaken state control.

Likely Future Consequences.

This incident underscores the ongoing security challenges in Balochistan and reflects the BLA’s capacity to orchestrate significant attacks. It marks a serious escalation in the Baloch insurgency and could have far-reaching consequences for Pakistan’s security, economy, and regional stability. The incident demonstrates the BLA’s growing operational capability, suggesting that future attacks could target critical infrastructure, transport networks, and Chinese-backed projects like CPEC. In response, Pakistan is likely to intensify military operations, search-and-destroy missions, and intelligence-based crackdowns in Balochistan. However, such actions may exacerbate local grievances, leading to further radicalisation and recruitment into militant ranks. The potential future consequences of this incident are grave, emphasizing the need for immediate action and the audience’s understanding of the gravity of the situation.

Politically, the hijacking may prompt increased state suppression of Baloch political movements, fuelling more unrest. It could also heighten diplomatic tensions, as Pakistan is likely to accuse India (RAW) of supporting Baloch insurgents, increasing hostilities between the two nations. Additionally, the attack raises serious security concerns for Chinese investments, potentially discouraging future economic cooperation and funding for CPEC projects. Foreign investors may reconsider their commitments if such incidents continue, further straining Pakistan’s fragile economy. The incident could have significant economic implications, potentially discouraging foreign investment and economic cooperation and undermining the potential benefits of CPEC for regional development.

In the long term, the train hijacking could push the Baloch insurgency towards more sophisticated urban warfare tactics, creating sustained instability that Pakistan’s current military approach may struggle to contain.

Please Do Comment.

Link to the article on the website:-

https://www.eurasiantimes.com/train-attack-pakistan-sends-200-coffins-to-bolan/

For regular updates, please register your email here:-

Subscribe

References and credits

To all the online sites and channels.

Pics Courtesy: Internet

Disclaimer:

February 13, 2025

598: FROM ALLY TO ADVERSARY: US SANCTIONS HIGHLIGHT PAKISTAN MISSILE THREAT

On December 19, 2024, U.S. Deputy National Security Adviser Jon Finer described Pakistan’s missile developments as an “emerging threat,” noting the increasing sophistication of its missile technology and the potential to reach targets beyond South Asia, including the United States. In response, the U.S. has imposed new sanctions on Pakistan’s ballistic missile development, including on the state-run defence agency overseeing the program. This recent imposition of sanctions by the United States on Pakistan’s missile program has raised significant concerns about the trajectory of their bilateral relationship. Once regarded as a strategic ally in the Cold War and the War on Terror, Pakistan now finds itself under renewed scrutiny as Washington seeks to address emerging security threats. These developments not only highlight the growing apprehension in the U.S. about Pakistan’s missile capabilities but also reflect broader geopolitical shifts and challenges in maintaining regional stability.

The Rise and Fall of a Partnership. The U.S.-Pakistan relationship has seen dramatic shifts over the decades. During the Cold War, Pakistan emerged as a critical ally for the United States in its containment strategy against the Soviet Union. The alliance shaped regional geopolitics, from military aid to intelligence sharing. One key event was Pakistan’s facilitating the U.S.-China rapprochement in the 1970s. Islamabad’s diplomatic efforts, particularly under leaders like Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, earned it significant goodwill from Washington. Following the events of September 11, 2001, Pakistan became a “frontline state” in the U.S.-led War on Terror. Billions of dollars in military and economic aid flowed to Islamabad as it supported American operations in Afghanistan. However, the relationship began to sour due to allegations of double-dealing. U.S. officials accused Pakistan of harbouring militant groups like the Haqqani network, which targeted American forces in Afghanistan.

Missile Development in Pakistan: A Strategic Imperative. Pakistan’s missile program’s evolution reflects Pakistan’s desire to maintain strategic parity with India while deterring external threats. The program began in earnest during the 1980s, driven by its strategic rivalry with India. The need for a credible deterrent grew more acute following India’s advancements in ballistic missile technology and its nuclear tests in 1974. Early development relied heavily on foreign assistance, with China and North Korea playing significant roles. The Hatf missile series, for example, showcased the fusion of indigenous efforts and imported technology. Over the decades, Pakistan’s missile arsenal expanded to include short-range, medium-range, and cruise missiles capable of delivering both conventional and nuclear payloads. Key missile developments include:-

- Ghauri Missile. A medium-range ballistic missile developed with North Korean assistance.

- Shaheen Series. A family of solid-fueled missiles with improved accuracy and range.

- Babur Cruise Missile. A subsonic cruise missile with advanced targeting capabilities.

Recent Advancements in Pakistan’s Missile Program. Pakistan has made significant strides in its missile program, enhancing its strategic capabilities by developing Multiple Independently Targetable Re-entry Vehicles (MIRVs) and exploring hypersonic technologies.

- MIRV. A notable advancement is the development of the Ababeel missile, designed to carry MIRVs. The Ababeel is a medium-range ballistic missile with a reported range of approximately 2,200 kilometers, capable of delivering multiple warheads to different targets independently. This capability enhances Pakistan’s deterrence by enabling it to penetrate advanced missile defence systems. The first publicly announced test of the Ababeel was conducted on January 24, 2017, with subsequent tests, including one on October 18, 2023, confirming its MIRV capabilities.

- Hypersonic Technologies. While Pakistan does not currently have an indigenous hypersonic weapons program, there have been developments suggesting interest in this area. The Pakistan Air Force has indicated the development of a hypersonic-capable missile as part of a broader modernisation effort to counter evolving threats. A video released by the Pakistan Air Force featured the CM-400AKG anti-ship missile, a Chinese-manufactured missile that allegedly travels at hypersonic speeds.

Strategic Implications and Proliferation Risks. These recent advancements have raised concerns internationally. U.S. officials fear these capabilities could destabilise the region and enable Pakistan to project power beyond South Asia. The U.S. has long been wary of Pakistan’s role in global proliferation networks. The infamous A.Q. Khan network, which supplied nuclear technology to countries like Iran, Libya, and North Korea, underscored the risks of unchecked development. One of Washington’s primary concerns is the intensifying arms race between India and Pakistan. Both countries have developed increasingly sophisticated missile systems, raising the risk of miscalculation and escalation.

Involvement of Pakistani Firms. The United States imposed sanctions on four Pakistani firms for their involvement in aiding Pakistan’s ballistic missile program, which is closely linked to its nuclear program. The sanctioned entities were found to be involved in the transfer of critical technologies and materials used in the development of ballistic missile systems. These technologies included components necessary for guidance systems, propulsion, and control mechanisms, which are vital for both missile and nuclear weapons development. The transfer of these technologies represents a significant concern for the U.S., as they could potentially enhance Pakistan’s ability to develop more advanced nuclear delivery systems. Some of these Pakistani firms were collaborating with foreign entities and institutions that are under U.S. and international sanctions. This collaboration allowed the transfer of sensitive technologies and expertise, which accelerated the development of Pakistan’s missile capabilities. These firms were directly involved in the design, development, and testing of ballistic missile systems. The U.S. identified these entities as providing essential support, including material assistance and technical expertise, which allowed Pakistan to improve its missile technology. This development raised concerns about the potential for these missile systems to be used in a nuclear context, thereby complicating global security dynamics.

Sanctions. These sanctions are aimed at curbing the spread of missile technology and preventing the enhancement of Pakistan’s military capabilities that could pose risks to regional stability and U.S. security interests. The latest sanctions specifically target entities involved in Pakistan’s missile development. These include National Development Complex (NDC), a state-owned organisation central to missile research and production, and Karachi-based Companies (Akhtar and Sons Private Limited, Affiliates International, and Rockside Enterprise), accused of supplying critical components and technology. The sanctions include freezing U.S.-based assets of the targeted entities, prohibiting American businesses and individuals from conducting transactions with them, and restricting access to international financial systems. These sanctions aim to disrupt Pakistan’s ability to acquire advanced technology and materials critical for its missile program.

Pakistan’s Response. Islamabad has strongly condemned the sanctions, describing them as “discriminatory” and counterproductive. The Pakistani Foreign Ministry issued a statement arguing that the sanctions undermine regional peace and stability. Pakistan claims that its missile program is purely defensive and aimed at maintaining strategic balance, and the U.S. is applying double standards, as similar concerns are not being raised about India’s missile developments. Within Pakistan, the sanctions have sparked a wave of nationalist rhetoric. Political leaders and media outlets have framed the U.S. actions as an affront to Pakistan’s sovereignty, bolstering anti-American sentiment.

Broader Implications and Realignments. The U.S. troop withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021 marked a turning point in U.S.-Pakistan relations. Washington’s diminished reliance on Islamabad for logistical support in the region has led to a reassessment of the partnership. As U.S.-Pakistan relations cool, Islamabad has sought closer ties with China and Russia. The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and growing military cooperation with Beijing underline this shift. At the same time, Pakistan’s increasing engagement with Moscow signals a diversification of its strategic alliances. The sanctions could exacerbate tensions in South Asia. With Pakistan feeling cornered, there is a risk of accelerated arms development or even closer alignment with adversaries of the U.S., such as China.

The U.S. sanctions on Pakistan’s missile program mark a significant moment in their bilateral relationship. While Washington’s concerns about proliferation and regional stability are valid, the move risks further alienating Islamabad at a time when global alliances are shifting. For Pakistan, the sanctions underscore the possibility of diversification of partnerships. For the U.S., they reflect the delicate balancing act of addressing security threats while maintaining influence in a critical region. As the two nations navigate these challenges, the question remains: Can they find common ground, or will their paths continue to diverge?

Please Do Comment.

For regular updates, please register your email here:-

Subscribe

References and credits

To all the online sites and channels.

References:-

Landay, Jonathan S. “U.S. Imposes Sanctions on Pakistani Firms over Missile Proliferation.” Reuters, December 14, 2024.

Haider, Kamran. “Pakistan Criticizes U.S. Sanctions, Calls Them Unjustified.” Dawn, December 15, 2024.

Burns, John F. “Pakistan’s New Missiles Worry U.S. and India.” The New York Times, October 20, 2024.

Tellis, Ashley J. “The Evolution of US-Pakistan Relations: Prospects for the Future.” The Washington Quarterly 34, no. 4 (2011): 109–123.

U.S. Department of Defense. Military and Security Developments Involving the Islamic Republic of Pakistan 2023. Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2023.

Federation of American Scientists (FAS). Pakistan Missile Program Overview. Washington, DC: FAS, 2022.

Arms Control Association. “Pakistan’s Missile Capabilities.” December 2024. https://www.armscontrol.org

Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI). “Pakistan’s Nuclear and Missile Programs: A Profile.” Updated October 2024. https://www.nti.org

Kampani, Gaurav. “Pakistan’s Evolving Missile Strategy: Implications for Deterrence and Security.” South Asian Strategic Review 18, no. 2 (2023): 22–34.

Tariq, Mohammad. “US-Pakistan Relations: From Strategic Alliance to Mutual Distrust.” Pakistan Horizon 71, no. 3 (2024): 15–37.

Disclaimer: