Tag: military capability

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Arms Trade (Part I): Trends and Concerns

 

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) based in Stockholm, is an independent international institute dedicated to research into conflict, armaments, arms control and disarmament. Established in 1966, SIPRI provides data, analysis and recommendations, based on open sources, to policymakers, researchers, media and the interested public.

 

Recently it published its annual research report on Trends in International Arms Transfer, 2022. The report essentially compares two five years periods i.e. 2013-17 and 2018-22.

 

Relevant extracts related to trends and concerns are as follows:-

 

Overview: Exporters

 

There are 63 states as exporters of major arms. The top 25 arms exporters accounted for 98 per cent of the world’s arms exports in 2018–22.

 

The five largest exporters of arms during the period 2018–22 are the USA, Russia, France, China and Germany. These five account for over three-quarters (76 per cent) of all arms exports.

 

States in North America and Europe together accounted for 87 per cent of all arms exports in the period. The five largest exporters in Western Europe (France, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom and Spain) supplied around one-quarter (24 per cent) of total global arms exports in 2018–22.

 

USA. US arms exports accounted for 40 per cent of the global total in 2018–22 and were 14 per cent higher than in 2013–17. The USA delivered major arms to 103 states in 2018–22, almost as many as the next two biggest exporters combined. The USA’s arms exports grew by 14 per cent between 2013–17 and 2018–22 and its share of total global arms exports rose from 33 per cent to 40 per cent. Its total arms exports in 2018–22 were 148 per cent higher than those of Russia—the second largest exporter—compared with 50 per cent higher in 2013–17.

 

Russia. In 2018–22 Russia delivered major arms to 47 states and accounted for 16 per cent of total global arms exports. Russian arms exports remained stable between 2008–12 and 2013–17 but fell by 31 per cent between 2013–17 and 2018–22. The annual volumes of arms exports in 2018 and 2019 were at similar levels to or higher than those in each of the previous 20 years but were at significantly lower levels in 2020, 2021 and 2022.

 

Others. French arms exports increased by 44 per cent between 2013–17 and 2018–22, while Russian (–31 per cent), Chinese (–23 per cent) and German (–35 per cent) arms exports decreased.

 

Comments:

 

  • Four major exporters of arms are the USA, European Union, Russia and China.

 

  • Well established defence industry (Eco System) is essential to be a world power.

 

  • Defence export is necessary for the growth of the domestic defence industry.

 

  • While the export trend is upward for the USA, it is downward for Russia and China.

 

  • Are the US-led wars in the world, for the benefit of and encouraged by its arms industry?

 

Overview: Importers

 

SIPRI has identified 167 states as importers of major arms in 2018–22. The five largest arms importers in 2018–22, India, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Australia and China, together received 36 per cent of the world’s arms imports.

 

The main recipient region in 2018–22 was Asia and Oceania (accounting for 41 per cent of global arms imports), followed by the Middle East (31 per cent), Europe (16 per cent), the Americas (5.8 per cent) and Africa (5.0 per cent).

 

Six of the world’s 10 largest arms importers in 2018–22 were in Asia and Oceania: India, Australia, China, South Korea, Pakistan and Japan. The USA (31 per cent) accounted for the largest share of arms imports to states in the region, followed by Russia (26 per cent) and France (12 per cent).

 

Comments:

 

  • Arms are being pumped into Asia and Oceania, making them the biggest hot spots.

 

  • Hot spots in the Middle East are being kept alive to cash in on the prevailing arms market of oil-rich countries.

 

  • After a long period, a hot spot has appeared on the doorstep of Europe.

 

  • China is adding to its military power by every possible means.

 

Ukraine War

 

Ukraine imported very few major arms in the period from its independence in 1991 until the end of 2021. This changed after the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, as the United States and many European states began to send large quantities of military aid to Ukraine. As a result, it became the 3rd largest importer of major arms in 2022, after Qatar and India, and the 14th largest for the five-year period 2018–22, accounting for 2.0 per cent of total global arms imports.

 

Of the 29 states that supplied major arms to Ukraine in 2022, the main suppliers were the USA, which accounted for 35 per cent of total Ukrainian arms imports during the year, Poland (17 per cent), Germany (11 per cent), the United Kingdom (10 per cent) and Czechia (4.4 per cent).

 

Ukraine did not receive all the types of arms it asked its supporters to provide and, at different stages, there was a divergence between states about what they were willing to supply. In many cases, the supply of arms by one state was financed by other states or by the European Union (EU) through the European Peace Facility.

 

Russia, in contrast, relied almost exclusively on domestically produced arms—although it did import unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and flying bombs from Iran in 2022.

 

Effect: Ukraine War The war in Ukraine had only a limited impact on the total volume of arms transfers in 2018–22, but Ukraine did become a major importer of arms in 2022. In addition, most European states substantially increased their arms import orders and the war will have significant ramifications for future supplier–recipient arms trade relations globally.

 

Comments:

 

  • USA-led NATO has pushed Russia into the Ukraine conflict, with the benefit of weakening Russia and boost to its arms industry.

 

  • Many of the arms supplied were second-hand items from existing stocks. (Including artillery pieces, guided artillery rockets, old tanks, and anti-tank missiles).

 

  • Some newly produced arms, such as air defence systems were also supplied.

 

  • Most of the arms supplied were vital for Ukraine to halt the Russian offensive and provided limited offensive capability. They essentially boosted the defensive capability, with “urban jungle warfare” and “shoot and scoot” employment philosophy.

 

  • The Suppliers were not prepared to deliver arms with a long-range strike capability, such as combat aircraft and long-range land-attack missiles, presumably because of affordability and more importantly to keep the conflict below a certain threshold.

 

  • The Ukraine conflict will further reduce the Russian arms export in future.

 

Relevant Aspects: Closer to Home

 

China. China accounted for 5.2 per cent of total global arms exports in 2018–22. Its arms exports decreased by 23 per cent between 2013–17 and 2018–22. The vast majority of Chinese arms exports (80 per cent) went to states in Asia and Oceania. China delivered major arms to 46 states in 2018–22, but over half of its arms exports (54 per cent) went to just one state—Pakistan.

 

China’s arms imports grew by 4.1 per cent and accounted for 4.6 per cent of the global total in 2018–22. The vast majority of Chinese arms imports (83 per cent) came from Russia. Russian deliveries in the last three years of the period (2020–22) consisted almost entirely of helicopters and engines for aircraft, which are the last few types of major arms that China has had difficulties in developing.

 

 

Comments

 

  • China is increasing its logistic bases in Oceania and IOR, for future expeditionary operations capability.

 

  • China is pumping Chinese arms and equipment into countries of its interest to increase interoperability with them and also make them reliant on China in the long run.

 

Pakistan. Arms imports by Pakistan increased by 14 per cent between 2013–17 and 2018–22 and accounted for 3.7 per cent of the global total. China supplied over three-quarters (77 per cent) of Pakistan’s arms imports in 2018–22.

 

Comments

 

  • Pakistan keeps spending money on its military in spite of the economic crisis at home.

 

  • China has boosted Pakistan’s military capability (Army, Navy and Air Force), defence industry, nuclear capability, and long-range missile capability.

 

India. India’s tensions with Pakistan and China largely drive its demand for arms imports. With an 11 per cent share of total global arms imports, India was the world’s biggest importer of major arms in 2018–22, a position it has held for the period 1993–2022. It retained this position even though its arms imports dropped by 11 per cent between 2013–17 and 2018–22.

 

Russia was the largest supplier of arms to India in both 2013–17 and 2018–22, but its share of total Indian arms imports fell from 64 per cent to 45 per cent. Russia’s position as India’s main arms supplier is under pressure due to strong competition from other supplier states, increased Indian arms production and, since 2022, the above-mentioned constraints on Russia’s arms exports related to its invasion of Ukraine.

 

India’s arms imports from France,  increased by 489 per cent between 2013–17 and 2018–22. France, therefore, displaced the USA to become the second largest supplier to India in 2018–22.

 

Comments

 

  • India Continues to retain the dubious record of being the biggest defence importer.

 

  • The import content is showing a downward trend due to the attempts to replace imports with major arms that are designed and produced domestically (self-reliance).

 

  • Russian content in the Indian military is reducing and being replaced by the USA and other Western exporters.

 

  • The Indian military has a very diverse defence inventory resulting in a logistic nightmare. But it is also a blessing in disguise, as far as reliance on one particular supplier is concerned.

 

  • Indian procurement follows the principle of “Maximum bang for the buck”, buying the best available equipment in the market.

 

Bottom Line

Wheels within wheels in the Arms industry and trade.

Humans are in Self Protect or Self-destruct mode?

 

Coming Up

Arms TradePart II: Flows vis-à-vis Hot Spots

 

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References and credits

To all the online sites and channels.

Disclaimer:

Information and data included in the blog are for educational & non-commercial purposes only and have been carefully adapted, excerpted, or edited from sources deemed reliable and accurate. All copyrighted material belongs to respective owners and is provided only for purposes of wider dissemination.

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Future Air Strategies

 

Pic Courtesy: Internet

Technology has had a profound influence on and is a major driver of innovation and evolution in air strategy.  Future strategies would generally depend upon the influence of technology on warfare and the changing nature of warfare, besides the prevailing threats. Some of these aspects are discussed in the succeeding paragraphs.

 

Investment in Technology.  Air Force is a technology-intensive service and converting technology into capability is a time-consuming process. To stay on top of the challenges, there is a need to invest in emerging technologies and ideate about their utilisation in warfare. Some of the future technologies that are impacting the air war are: 

  • Quantum computing. 
  • Hypersonic weapon systems.
  • Artificial Intelligence. 
  • Unmanned platforms, Drones and swarm technology. 
  • Network-centric environment / Internet of things/system of systems.

 

Situational Awareness & Decision Making. One of the effects of advanced technology on air warfare is the increased pace and intensity of air operations. In such a scenario the decision-making process has to be quick to keep up with the OODA cycle. The three most important contributing factors are a high degree of situational awareness, a robust and fast, network system for information sharing, and AI-based decision support systems.

 

Unmanned Platforms. The use of unmanned platforms and systems is growing in warfare. This shift is expected to continue as technology advances and the capabilities of unmanned systems improve further. Drones of various sizes and capabilities are taking over the tasks of conventional platforms. Their utilisation is spread across the entire spectrum of threats ranging from sub-conventional, and conventional to long-range attacks. Investment in anti-drone systems is also a need of the hour.

 

Loyal Wing Man Concept. Both man and unmanned platforms have their respective advantages and disadvantages. The thought process for the next generation of platforms is to harness the advantages of both and develop networked systems, wherein, both can work in an integrated manner. Research is going on in many countries on the “Loyal wingman” concept. HAL in India is also working on the ICATs program on similar lines.

 

Sixth Generation Aircraft. Sixth-generation aircraft are still in the development phase however, based on current trends in air technology, sixth-generation aircraft will likely have several key features that will shape air strategy in the future. They are likely to have increased automation with advanced AI and machine learning algorithms that will enable autonomous decision-making and allow them to adapt to changing situations quickly. They would also have enhanced stealth capabilities making them virtually invisible to radar and other detection systems. Integrated sensor systems in these aircraft will provide comprehensive situational awareness and the ability to engage targets with great precision. Overall, sixth-generation aircraft are expected to have a significant impact on air strategy in the future, with their advanced capabilities enabling air forces to operate with greater autonomy and to strike enemy targets with unprecedented precision and speed. However, as with any new technology, there may also be challenges associated with the introduction of sixth-generation aircraft, including the need to develop new tactics, training programs, and support infrastructure to fully realize their potential.

 

Hypersonic Weapons. The development of hypersonic weapons is likely to have a significant impact on air strategy. Hypersonic weapons provide new opportunities for rapid response and long-range strike capabilities with precision. They also pose new challenges in terms of protection and air defence.  The high speed and unpredictability of hypersonic weapons will require the development of new air defence strategies, as traditional air defence systems may be unable to detect or intercept these weapons. This could lead to the development of new technologies, such as directed energy weapons or advanced sensors, to counter the threat posed by hypersonic weapons. Also, protective infrastructure would be required which can withstand the destructive power of these weapons.

 

New Domains of Warfare. The domains like cyber, space, electronics and information are coming into the influence of warfare. China’s formation of a Joint Strategic Support Force (JSSF) as a separate service, with defensive and offensive capabilities, in above mentioned four domains, indicates future challenges. Reorientation is required in IAF to deal with these changes.

 

Grey Zone Operations.  Grey zone operations are operations in the contested arena somewhere between routine statecraft and open warfare.  These are becoming a norm in modern-day warfare. Both the adversaries of India are resorting to these operations regularly. Air power besides offensive use can also be effectively utilised in many ways, in non-conventional hostile situations categorised above. Various aspects of grey zone operations need to be deliberated from the point of view of airpower involvement. A certain amount of reorientation would be required in the application of airpower in these grey zone situations supported by capability enhancement in certain fields.

 

Space-Based Capabilities.  The term airpower has changed to aerospace power with the aerial warfare envelope expanding to the domain of space. Space-based systems and applications are embedded in every aspect of aerial warfare. In Grey zone warfare the involvement of space-based equipment and systems is on an even larger scale. Space-based systems are becoming increasingly important in air warfare, providing capabilities such as navigation, targeting, communication, early warning of missile launches and space-based surveillance.  The integration of these systems with air assets is expected to continue, providing new opportunities for offensive and defensive operations.

 

Defence Diplomacy. Defence diplomacy is conducted utilizing several defence activities like defence cooperation, exchange visits, joint exercises, training, and loan or gift of equipment etc. Air Force has a big role in defence diplomacy. It is an effective tool for political signalling and strategic coercion. The escalation matrix can be developed by a combination of the number and extent of these defence activities. Multi-lateral, multi-service and multi-domain exercises are essential for defence cooperation, not only during hostilities but even for grey zone operations during peace.  Even without a military alliance certain degree of interoperability with friendly foreign forces is desirable.

 

Self-Reliance, Indigenisation and Make in India. Indian Air Force has always encouraged the development of indigenous defence production capability and it is one of its key result areas. It has played an important role in creating an aerospace ecosystem in India and has been operating indigenously built aircraft and also aircraft built in India under licence production. This has given impetus to indigenous industry in the past and will continue to support it in future. The important thing to remember is that while supporting self-reliance the minimum level of deterrence capability needs to be maintained at all times. Also, the balance between quality and quantity needs to be maintained all the time.

 

Bottom Line

 Learn from Past,

Deal with Present,

 Plan for future.

 

 

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References and credits

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Disclaimer:

Information and data included in the blog are for educational & non-commercial purposes only and have been carefully adapted, excerpted, or edited from sources deemed reliable and accurate. All copyrighted material belongs to respective owners and is provided only for purposes of wider dissemination.

 

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Evolution of IAF : Historic Perspective

 

Like the role of air power in the last century, the air strategy of the Indian Air Force (IAF) has evolved, reflecting changes in technology, doctrine, and strategic priorities. Some key milestones in the evolution of the air strategy of the IAF are:

Genesis & Early Years. The Indian Air Force was established in British India as an auxiliary air force of the Royal Air Force on 8 Oct 1932, with four Westland Wapiti biplanes and five Indian pilots. The then Royal IAF (RIAF) grew in size during World War II to eventually ten squadrons. In the early years of the IAF, the primary focus was on providing air support to British and Commonwealth ground forces. During World War II, the IAF played a significant role in the Burma campaign by halting the advance of the Japanese army, by providing air cover and support for ground troops. IAF evolved initially in a tactical role primarily to support surface and maritime wars.

              

Partition in 1947. Indian Air Force (IAF) of independent India came into being with seven squadrons (six fighter squadrons and one transport squadron). By then the IAF had a well-established professional ethos and a reputation to live up to.

 

The Indo-Pakistani War of 1947. Almost immediately after Independence, India, and Pakistan clashed over the future of Kashmir. On the first day itself on 27 October 1947, an infantry battalion was airlifted from Delhi to Srinagar. IAF thereafter carried out air operations (airlift of troops and supplies, photo-reconnaissance, bombing, strafing, and interdiction), in support of surface forces. The air power usage was tactical and reactionary to emerging situations.

 

Initial Growth. The decade of the 1950s saw the induction of aircraft and support systems, both in quantity and quality, into the IAF.  During this period, the IAF acquired its first jet fighters and transport aircraft and India began to develop its own indigenous aircraft and weapons systems. IAF began to shift its focus to defending India’s borders and air space, and its capabilities started developing beyond the limited scope of the support role.

 

1962 war. The ground reality in 1962 was that IAF had relatively potent air power with Western aircraft vis-a-vis old Russian aircraft with China. Despite a clear combat edge, the fighter component of the air force was not used during the Sino-Indian conflict of 1962. There has been a general reluctance to use air power due to the perceived fear of escalation of conflict, which was evident even up to the 1999 Kargil conflict and has changed since the Balakot strike in 2019. However, post-war it was decided to build up the IAF strength to 45 squadrons.

 

The Indo-Pakistani War of 1965. In 1965, the IAF gave a good account in the skies and in support of ground operations. Air superiority in specific terms was not contested by either side. IAF provided close air support to help the Army stem Pak armoured thrusts. Eventually, the Pakistan offensive was stopped, and the war ceased. After the war, the IAF continued to acquire modern combat aircraft and had 39 combat aircraft squadrons by 1971. It also improved tactics and techniques based on the lessons of the 1965 war. IAF decided the war priorities in sequence to be air defence, support to surface forces, and offensive action to counter or neutralise or counter the enemy air.

 

The Indo-Pakistani War of 1971. In 1971 the IAF was in much better shape in qualitative and quantitative terms than the PAF. This was the first time the IAF actively engaged the enemy air force. IAF achieved complete air superiority over the eastern wing of Pakistan within a few days. Air operations included close air support and air cover to the Indian Army, independent raid missions against Pakistani Air Force bases, assistance to Indian Navy in maritime operations, offensive attacks on enemy armour, and strategic bombing. IAF played a pivotal role in the victory, leading to the liberation of Bangladesh, and it was probably the high point for the IAF. In this war, IAF carried out all air campaigns in parallel.

 

Modernization and Expansion (1980-2000): To retain relevance in the evolving operational environment with the induction of modern aircraft and systems in the immediate neighbourhood, in the 1980s and 1990s, the IAF modernised itself with advanced aircraft, weapons, and sensors, and expanded its capabilities to include strategic airlift.

 

Power Projection Abroad. During 1987-90 IAF was involved with operations in Sri Lanka and Maldives. IAF established an “air bridge” between mainland India and Sri Lanka for the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF). Although combat aircraft were not used, IAF helicopters provided fire support for the army. In 1988, IAF undertook Operation Cactus, wherein, it flew at least a battalion of paratroopers, more than 1000 Miles away to Maldives when rebels attempted to overthrow the government. In these operations, the IAF demonstrated its ability to project forces on short notice.

 

Kargil Operations 1999. Kargil operations demonstrated once again the impact of air power in the achievement of objectives. The IAF flew hundreds of strike missions supported by combat patrols and escorts. Air power was employed in a very innovative way in high altitudes. The Kargil War forced the IAF to rethink aerial strategies as it attempted to orchestrate an aerial campaign at altitudes of 14,000 to 18,000 feet against well-camouflaged targets.

 

Balakot Strike. A game-changer shift took place on 26 February 2019, when India decided to use offensive air power by carrying out deep strikes against targets in Pakistan even beyond the Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK). The myth about the use of air power being escalatory in nature was broken.

 

Strategic Transformation. Originally the IAF had formed purely for the requirements of the British interests of its Empire, its roles and responsibilities were limited to tactical applications of air power. Post-independence also the application of air power continued to remain tactical in nature. It was only in 1971 that the IAF carried out strategic effect-based operations with air campaigns in parallel. In the first decade of this century, IAF inducted airborne early warning, and aerial refuelling capability leading to an increase in strategic reach along with conventional deterrence. The transformation of the Indian Air Force from a tactical air power to a strategic one had begun, and subsequently, the pace picked up for it to become a broad-spectrum air force in future.

 

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Disclaimer:

Information and data included in the blog are for educational & non-commercial purposes only and have been carefully adapted, excerpted, or edited from sources deemed reliable and accurate. All copyrighted material belongs to respective owners and is provided only for purposes of wider dissemination.