CURTAIN RAISER (IAF ANNIVERSAY): GOOSE BUMPS ASSURED

 

Pic courtesy: Internet

 

IAF Promo film on the occasion of 91st anniversary.

 

 

Air Show at Bhopal on 30 Sep23

 

 

Glimpses

 

 

 

 

Aerial Ballet

 

Look at the skies above  “Sangam” at  Prayagraj on 08 Oct 23

for an  aerial display by  over 120 aircraft,

operating seamlessly from various bases and flying at varying altitudes & speeds.

 

Click below for the for a representative sneak peek:-

 

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Indian Air Force@91

 

This article has been contributed by a colleague of mine Gp Capt Kishore Kumar Khera.  I found him to be totally ops oriented, focused and candid in his approach. 

 

Pic Courtesy: Internet

 

In this article, Gp Capt Khera holistically reviews the challenges and capabilities of the IAF.

 

Coming Sunday, the Indian Air Force will be 91 and a perfect time for reflection. With two nuclear-powered neighbours, our current geostrategic environment is precarious as one of them is politically and economically fragile and the other is trying to flex its muscles on our borders. The standoff on northern borders has continued for the last three years with no signs of change. China has modernized its armed forces in the last three decades and reorganized them for better integration in 2016. Qualitatively and quantitatively, India can’t match Chinese military hardware. The only way forward for India is to use its resources in a focused manner to achieve its well-defined strategic goals. Lessons from the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war are very relevant in our context.

 

The challenges the Indian Air Force faces today relate not only to the situation on borders but also in terms of equipment and organisation.

 

The number of combat aircraft, the cutting-edge tools in a battle, is receding fast. Against an authorization of over 1000 combat aircraft, the Indian armed forces now are in the region of 600. This number will keep reducing and by 2030 is expected to go down to 450 with the phase-out of MiG-21, MiG-29, Jaguars and Mirage-2000. The induction of 36 Rafale and the very slow induction of LCA are only slowing down the force drawdown and cannot reverse it. The IAF needs to prepare for the next war with this realistic combat fleet strength. On the other hand, the induction of 56 new C295 transport aircraft replacing vintage Avro will boost the single wave airlift capability and offset the phase-out of Il-76 and An-32 fleets. In the helicopters, the capability will gradually increase with indigenous ALH and LCH. Unmanned systems are also gradually increasing and will share the workload of manned aircraft, especially in intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, ground and maritime attack roles. New and more capable radars, surface-to-air weapon systems and integrated networks are replacing the old systems giving a robust defensive capability. Will these be enough?

 

Recent and ongoing wars indicate the expansion of battlespace, the significance of battlespace transparency, time compression for action and offence-defence balance tilting in favour of offence. Military operation plans are based on two significant verticals- capability differential and information differential between the competing sides. A classical information matrix about the opposing force includes intent, strategy, military doctrine, and military objectives, Besides the overall direction that military strategy gives, an operational plan and its execution are based on an information matrix to achieve defined objectives with the least cost or in the minimum possible timeframe. IAF with its new doctrine IAP2000-22 endeavours to capture the essence of these changes and plans to transform itself into a smart force rather than a strong force. However, the equipment profile does not yet support the creation of a smart force. The number of AWACS, in-flight refuelers, and long-range weapons are rather limited. And in the surveillance and space domains, the resources are meagre. This poses a great challenge for the men and women in blues.

 

Organizationally, the integration of three wings of the Indian armed forces is likely to pick up pace in the coming years. With dwindling combat aircraft strength and meagre force multipliers, resource allocation and utilization for various theatres will define how successful the integration model is. Will there be a holistic approach for the utilization of resources or will India fritter away its limited combat resources to appease various theater commanders?

 

Public sector monopoly in defence has not yielded the desired results for the last seven decades. India has the dubious distinction of being the largest importer of military hardware in the last five decades. Atamnirbhar from being a rhetoric is gradually taking shape with orders being placed on Indian enterprises and a policy of earmarking part of the capital budget for Indian entities. Productivity and quality control of the public sector enterprises are yet to reach the requisite standards. The extremely low rate of production of LCA till now is a case in point. Along with this, the absence of technology and capabilities like aero engines, air-launched weapons, and electronic warfare systems remains critical. Opening up the defence sector for private entities, allowing DRDO to share available testing facilities and technology, and creating defence manufacturing corridors are steps in the right direction but not adequate at this juncture. MOUs with various foreign vendors have been signed but will these lead to requisite technology transfer, only time will tell. The impetus to R&D in these segments is imperative.

 

Indian Air Force needs to be ready with its limited assets and deter war. If it fails to deter then IAF will have to augment its limited resources with courage, ingenuity and smart resource employment to outwit the adversary.  There are no runners up in war.

 

About The Author

Gp Capt Kishore Kumar Khera (Retd) VM

 

Group Captain Kishore Kumar Khera, served as a fighter pilot in the Indian Air Force for 33 years. He is an alumnus of the National Defence Academy and Defence Services Staff College. He has served in Plans and Operational Branches at Air Headquarters as well as in the High Commission of India, Dhaka, Bangladesh. He is a pioneer member of the Composite Battle Response and Analysis (COBRA) Group and headed the Operational Planning and Assessment Group at Air Headquarters. He conceptualised, designed and deployed multiple tools and processes for efficient and effective operational planning and execution. He was a Research Fellow at the Military Affairs Centre in the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi. He is the author of the must-read book “Combat Aviation Flight Path”.

 

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INPUTS: IAF DETERRENCE CAPABILITY

Pic Courtesy: Internet

 

IAF will be Celeberating its 91st anniversary on 08 Oct 2023.

 

It has been a nine decade old journey of touching the sky with glory.

 

It is also the time to reminisce its past, review its present and plan its future trajectory.

 

In the coming week defence journalists will be busy discussing these issues.

 

Views of veterans are also being sought on several aspects.

 

(Views are Personal)

 

  1. Possible reasons for the fighter squadron drawdown and delays in regaining the authorised strength.

 

    • The notion that there will be no war.

 

    • Expenditure on development rather than defence.

 

    • Lengthy and cumbersome procurement procedures.

 

    • Scam Phobia – looking for ghosts where there are none.

 

    • Politicisation of defence acquisitions.

 

  1. Practical time frames to fill the gaps.

 

    • I do not think in the next 5-7 years we will be able to fill this gap.

 

    • Maybe over 10 years or so, but it is not going to be easy.

 

    • To speed up the process, a multi-pronged approach would be required:-

 

      • Spend more money on Defence.

 

      • Speed up indigenous development of LCA MkII, and AMCA.

 

      • Enhance indigenous production capability.

 

      • Acquire and Infuse technology.

 

      • Procure from outside to fill urgent gaps.

 

    • Steps have already been initiated towards it – maybe we have gone into 3rd or 4th gear, and we need to step up to 5th.

 

  1. Recommended approach towards capability and capacity enhancement.

 

    • Maintain minimum deterrence value (especially in the face of what has happened in Ladakh due to China’s belligerence).

 

    • Boost self-reliance and indigenous capability.

 

    • Maintain a balance between quality and quantity of platforms.

 

    • Procure from abroad if the minimum deterrence value goes down.

 

    • Procure keeping in mind, maximum bang for the buck and boost to Atmanirbharata.

 

    • Procure in a phased manner.

 

    • Keep the inventory diversity in mind.

 

  1. Debate about the redundancy of manned aircraft in view of AI-empowered unmanned platforms.

 

    • This debate has been going on for decades.

 

    • Earlier it was limited to Fighter aircraft vis-à-vis LR Vectors, now it is manned fighter aircraft vis-à-vis no contact warfare with LR Vectors and unmanned platforms.

 

    • Both manned and unmanned platforms have their advantages and disadvantages.

 

    • Worldover (including India), work is going on in the development of 6th and 7th-generation platforms which will see the integration of manned and unmanned platforms, utilising the strengths of both. It is being called as “Loyal Wing Man concept”, I call it the “Mother Goose Concept”.

 

    • LR vectors and unmanned platforms are useful in two scenarios. Firstly during the initiation of war to create chaos by disruption and second during the long-drawn phase of retaliation and punitive action.

 

    • Relevance of manned fighter aircraft will remain for some time to come.

 

 

  1. While trying to reach the authorised strength, there is a need to review the minimum deterrence value required to meet current and future challenges and make long-term plans to achieve it.

 

 

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Disclaimer:

Information and data included in the blog are for educational & non-commercial purposes only and have been carefully adapted, excerpted, or edited from sources deemed reliable and accurate. All copyrighted material belongs to respective owners and is provided only for purposes of wider dissemination.