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685: OP SINDOOR: PUNITIVE DETERRENCE –  TARGETING TERROR CAMPS

 

My article published on the IIRF website on 19 Jun 25.

 

India’s policy of punitive deterrence is a strategic doctrine aimed at dissuading Pakistan from sponsoring cross-border terrorism by imposing credible costs through calibrated military responses. Rooted in the need to break the cycle of provocation and restraint, this policy combines political resolve, precision strikes, and international diplomatic engagement to establish red lines. As exemplified by earlier responses, it marks a shift from reactive to proactive counter-terrorism. This framework underscores India’s intent to reshape adversary behaviour, strengthen national security, and reinforce deterrence without escalating into full-scale war, thereby maintaining strategic stability in South Asia.

Operation Sindoor was a series of precision strikes conducted by the Indian Armed Forces against the terror infrastructure in Pakistan. On May 7, 2025, nine terror camps in Pakistan and Pakistan-occupied Jammu and Kashmir (PoJK) were hit in retaliation for the 22 April 25, terror attack at Pahalgam that killed 26 civilians.

Geographic Distribution of Terror Camps and Their Strategic Importance. The nine targeted camps were critical nodes in the terror infrastructure of Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM), Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), and Hizbul Mujahideen (HuM). These groups have been responsible for major attacks on Indian soil, including the 2008 Mumbai attack, 2016 Uri attack, 2019 Pulwama attack, and the 2025 Pahalgam attack. The camps served as hubs for recruitment, training, indoctrination, logistics, and infiltration, often with logistical support from Pakistan’s military and ISI. Three camps (Bahawalpur, Muridke, Sialkot) were located in mainland Pakistan, 5–200 km from the International Border. Six camps (including Muzaffarabad, Kotli, Bhimber) were closer to the Line of Control, 9–15 km, reflecting their role as infiltration and staging points. Camps near the IB/LoC (e.g., Sialkot, Kotli, Bhimber, Muzaffarabad) were critical for immediate infiltration and logistics, posing direct threats to Jammu and Kashmir. Deep inland camps (e.g., Bahawalpur, Muridke) served as ideological and operational headquarters.

 

Extent of Overall Damage.

Indian sources reported the destruction of all nine camps, with over 100 terrorists killed, including high-value targets like Yusuf Azhar, Abdul Malik Rauf, and Mudasir Ahmed, linked to the IC-814 hijacking and the Pulwama attack. Satellite imagery confirmed extensive damage, with key facilities like Markaz Subhan Allah (Bahawalpur) and Markaz Taiba (Muridke) reduced to rubble. The operation reportedly used SCALP cruise missiles, HAMMER precision-guided bombs, and loitering munitions, ensuring minimal civilian casualties and no targeting of Pakistani military installations.

Pakistani Claim.  Pakistan claimed 26–31 civilian deaths and damage to mosques and residential areas, labelling the strikes an “act of war.” These claims remain unverified by independent sources, and India refuted them, asserting that no civilian infrastructure was targeted.

Indian Perspective. The strikes were described as “focused, measured, and non-escalatory,” targeting only terror infrastructure with no civilian or military targets hit. Indian officials provided satellite imagery and videos to substantiate claims of precision and extensive damage to terror camps.

 

Message through Operation Sindoor.

Operation Sindoor was not just a tactical military response; it was a calibrated strategic message from India to Pakistan, signalling a decisive shift in how India intends to respond to cross-border terrorism. It sent a powerful message that India would strike precisely when provoked and where it hurts most. It reframed the India-Pakistan dynamic from reactive defence to assertive offence, clarifying that India will no longer play by the rules written in Rawalpindi.

Zero Tolerance for Cross-Border Terrorism. India conveyed that state-sponsored terrorism will no longer be met with diplomatic restraint or reactive defence, but with proactive and pre-emptive military action. By hitting deep into Pakistan and PoK, India underscored that terror safe havens will be treated as legitimate military targets.

Deterrence by Punishment. Rather than relying solely on deterrence by denial (defensive security), Operation Sindoor shifted to deterrence by punishment, raising the cost of using terrorism as an instrument of state policy.

Strategic and Tactical Escalation Control Lies with India. India emphasised that the strikes were “focused, measured, and non-escalatory,” targeting only terror infrastructure and avoiding Pakistani military or civilian sites. By choosing the time, location, and scale of the strikes, India seized escalation dominance, demonstrating that it can punish terror proxies without triggering a full-scale war. The precision and speed of the operation signalled India’s ability to strike hard while managing strategic escalation.

Deep-Strike Capability and Political Will. The strikes were more profound and extensive than previous cross-border operations, such as the 2016 surgical strikes or the 2019 Balakot airstrikes. This conveyed India’s enhanced ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance), strike capabilities, and, more importantly, a firm political will to act on them.

Terror Infrastructure Will Not Be Tolerated. By targeting Terror organisation headquarters, training camps, launch pads, and logistical nodes, India conveyed that no location, whether in PoK or even close to Pakistan’s heartland, is beyond reach if it harbours anti-India terror operations. By striking deep into Pakistan’s Punjab province (e.g., Bahawalpur, Muridke, Sialkot) and PoJK (e.g., Muzaffarabad, Kotli, Bhimber), India demonstrated its military reach and resolve to target terrorist sanctuaries regardless of location. The message was clear: “No place is beyond India’s reach,” challenging the sense of impunity enjoyed by terror groups.

Global Signalling: From Victim to Enforcer. India sent a signal not just to Pakistan, but to the worldwide community—that it is no longer content with merely being seen as a victim of terrorism. India now positions itself as an active enforcer of its national security, willing to act unilaterally when international pressure fails to deter terror networks.

A Warning for the Deep State and Proxy Groups. India’s message was also aimed at the Pakistani military-intelligence complex (ISI). If you continue to support terrorist groups like Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) and Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), the cost will be imposed not only on your proxies but on your assets and territory.

 

Conclusion

Operation Sindoor marks a watershed in India’s counter-terrorism doctrine—an audacious assertion of sovereign resolve against cross-border terrorism. By targeting deep-rooted terror hubs across both Pakistan-occupied Jammu and Kashmir and mainland Pakistan, the operation showcased India’s enhanced surveillance, precision strike capability, and political will to act decisively. Each of the nine camps held operational and symbolic relevance—from the ideological headquarters of Lashkar-e-Taiba in Muridke to suicide bomber training camps in Kotli and pre-infiltration staging points in Sialkot. The comprehensive destruction of these facilities, verified through satellite imagery and on-ground assessments, sent a clear message: India will not hesitate to dismantle the terror infrastructure at its source, regardless of geographical or political boundaries. The strikes redefined the contours of Indian deterrence, shifting from reactive defence to offensive punishment, and conveyed a strong message to the Pakistani establishment and the global community alike. India has demonstrated that it is no longer a passive recipient of terror but a proactive enforcer of its national security imperatives.

 

List of Terror Camps Targeted

  1. Markaz Subhan Allah, Bahawalpur (Pakistan) – Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM).

Location and Relevance. Bahawalpur, Punjab, is approximately 150–200 km from the international border with India (near the Rajasthan or Punjab border). Located in Pakistan’s Punjab heartland, far from the LoC, this was a strategic, ideological and operational hub, making it a deep-strike target. Considered the ideological and operational headquarters of JeM, a major anti-India terror group and served as a recruitment, training, and indoctrination center for JeM operatives. Historically, it hosted senior cadre training sessions linked to major attacks, including the 2019 Pulwama attack and reportedly financed by Osama Bin Laden with rupees one crore for constructing a mosque and a guest house within the complex.

Extent of Damage: Satellite imagery showed significant destruction, with the mosque’s dome collapsed, widespread debris, and surrounding buildings reduced to rubble. Before-and-after visuals confirmed substantial structural damage, leaving the hub in ruins.

 

  1. Markaz Taiba, Muridke (Pakistan) – Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT).

Location and Relevance. Muridke, Punjab, Pakistan. Approximately 30–40 km from the International Border (near Wagah, Punjab, India). Situated near Lahore, this 200-acre facility was close to the IB, making it a high-priority target due to its proximity and role in training for major attacks like the 2008 Mumbai attack. A 200-acre compound serving as the operational and ideological heart of LeT, known as Pakistan’s “terror nursery.” Used for indoctrination, logistics, and planning major attacks, including the 2008 Mumbai attack, where terrorists like Ajmal Kasab were trained. Key infrastructure for training and coordinating terror activities against India.

Extent of Damage. Satellite imagery revealed extensive destruction, with buildings reduced to rubble. Videos and images showed rescuers searching through debris, indicating severe structural damage. The Indian military confirmed the destruction of command centers and training facilities.

 

  1. Syedna Bilal Camp, Muzaffarabad (PoJK) – Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM)

Location and Relevance. Muzaffarabad, Pakistan-occupied Jammu and Kashmir, approximately 10–15 km from the Line of Control. A key infiltration point in PoJK, its proximity to the LoC made it critical for cross-border terror activities targeting Kashmir. A key infiltration point and training facility for JeM sleeper cells. Linked to attacks in Sonmarg, Gulmarg (October 2024), and Pahalgam (April 2025). Served as a logistics and transit point for terrorists infiltrating into Indian-administered Kashmir.

Extent of Damage. Destroyed at 1:04 AM on May 7, 2025, OSINT imagery confirmed significant damage to infrastructure with minimal civilian impact.

 

  1. Shawai Nala Camp, Muzaffarabad (PoJK) – Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT)

Location and Relevance. Shawai Nala, Muzaffarabad, Pakistan-occupied Jammu and Kashmir, approximately 10–12 km from the Line of Control. Another Muzaffarabad-based camp, close to the LoC, is used for training and staging infiltrators for attacks in Jammu and Kashmir. A major LeT center for training terrorists involved in attacks on Sonmarg, Gulmarg (October 2024), and Pahalgam (April 2025). Used as an infiltration point and staging facility for cross-border terror activities.

Extent of Damage. Destroyed, with UAV reconnaissance and OSINT imagery confirming the elimination of training facilities and arms depots.

 

  1. Abbas Terrorist Camp, Kotli (PoJK) – Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT)

Location and Relevance. Kotli, Pakistan-occupied Jammu and Kashmir, approximately 13 km from the Line of Control. A nerve center for suicide bomber training, its proximity to the LoC made it a significant threat for infiltration into India.

Extent of Damage. Satellite imagery confirmed that the camp was reduced to rubble.

 

  1. Markaz Abbas, Kotli (PoJK) – Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM)

Location and Relevance. Kotli, Pakistan-occupied Jammu and Kashmir, approximately 13 km from the Line of Control. A hub for suicide bomber training and weapons distribution for PoJK-based terrorists. Facilitated by Pakistan’s Special Services Group for logistics and training.

Extent of Damage. UAV surveillance confirmed the elimination of key infrastructure, with precision strikes targeting training and logistical centers.

 

  1. Sarjal/Tehra Kalan, Sialkot (Pakistan) – Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM)

Location and Relevance. Tehra Kalan, Sialkot, Punjab, Pakistan, approximately 6 km from the International Border (near Jammu, India). A pre-infiltration camp located within a primary health center premises, its proximity to the IB made it a key staging ground for infiltration and logistics coordination, established in the late 1990s and linked to the March 2025 attack in Kathua, Jammu, where four J&K police personnel were killed.

Extent of Damage. Satellite imagery confirmed its destruction, showing significant damage to infrastructure.

 

  1. Mehmoona Joya Facility, Sialkot (Pakistan) – Hizbul Mujahideen (HuM)

Location and Relevance. Sialkot, Punjab, Pakistan, approximately 5–7 km from the International Border. A facility for Hizbul Mujahideen, a pro-Pakistan separatist group founded in 1989, was used for training and planning attacks in Indian-administered Kashmir.

Extent of Damage. Destroyed in the strikes, with the elimination of key infrastructure.

 

  1. Markaz Ahle Hadith, Barnala, Bhimber (PoJK) – Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT)

Location and Relevance. Barnala, Bhimber, is in Pakistan-occupied Jammu and Kashmir, approximately 9 km from the Line of Control. A logistics and training hub for LeT, its strategic location near the LoC supported cross-border operations. It is used for training in weapons, improvised explosive devices (IEDs), and jungle survival.

Extent of Damage.  Destroyed, with satellite imagery confirming the elimination of logistical and training facilities.

 

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Disclaimer:

Information and data included in the blog are for educational & non-commercial purposes only and have been carefully adapted, excerpted, or edited from reliable and accurate sources. All copyrighted material belongs to respective owners and is provided only for wider dissemination.

 

Link to the article on the website:-

OP SINDOOR: Punitive Deterrence – Targeting Terror Camps

References:-

  1. Ministry of Defence, Government of India. (2025, May 8). Press Briefing on Counter-Terror Strikes: Operation Sindoor.
  1. Indian Air Force. (2025, May 9). Statement on Precision Air Strikes Against Terror Infrastructure, May 7, 2025.
  1. South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP). (2025). Profiles of Terrorist Groups and Training Camps in Pakistan. Institute for Conflict Management.
  1. WION News. (2025, May 8). India’s Operation Sindoor: A Deep Dive into the Strikes on Terror Camps.
  1. BBC News. (2025, May 8). India Strikes Terror Camps in Pakistan: What We Know So Far.
  1. The Hindu. (2025, May 9). Nine Terror Camps Targeted in India’s Precision Air Strikes: Official Sources.
  1. Daily Excelsior. (2025, May 8). Operation Sindoor: India Targets Terror Camps in PoJK, Pakistan.
  1. India Today. (2025, May 8). Operation Sindoor: India’s Precision Strikes Hit 9 Terror Camps in Pakistan, PoJK.
  1. ORF Occasional Paper No. 396. (2021). The Terror Infrastructure in Pakistan: The Role of JeM and LeT. Observer Research Foundation.
  1. Singh, A. (2020). India’s Cross-Border Strikes and Strategic Signalling: The Doctrine of Deterrence by Punishment. Carnegie India.
  1. Bhatnagar, G. (2019). Terrorist Training Camps in Pakistan: Locations, Capabilities and Patterns. Centre for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS).
  1. CSIS Transnational Threats Project. (2018). Pakistan-Based Militancy and the Role of the ISI. Center for Strategic and International Studies.
  1. Sethi, M. (2025). India’s Offensive Deterrence Post-Balakot and Operation Sindoor: A Strategic Shift?. Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA).
  1. Jane’s Defence Weekly. (2025, May 10). Analysis of Satellite Imagery Confirms Targeted Destruction of Militant Infrastructure in PoJK and Punjab, Pakistan.
  1. NDTV. (2025, May 8). India Used SCALP, HAMMER and Loitering Munitions in Operation Sindoor.
  1. GlobalSecurity.org. (2024). JeM, LeT, and HuM Training Facilities: Historical Patterns and Tactical Analysis.
  1. Maxar Technologies. (2025, May). Satellite Imagery of Bahawalpur, Muridke, Muzaffarabad Before and After May 7 Strikes.

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665: OP SINDOOR – DESPERATE MEN DO DESPERATE THINGS IN DESPERATE SITUATIONS: PAKISTAN ARMY CHIEF PLAYING WITH FIRE

 

My article was published on The EurasianTimes website

on 01 May 25.

 

The recent terrorist attack in Phalgam, Jammu and Kashmir, has once again brought the spotlight on Pakistan’s deep state and its time-tested strategy of using militant proxies to pursue its strategic aims in the region. Coming at a time when Pakistan is facing extraordinary internal and external pressures, the timing and nature of the attack raise pressing questions about the motives behind this provocation and the extent to which the current military leadership may be resorting to desperation-driven tactics. The phrase “desperate men do desperate things in desperate situations” encapsulates the narrative that Munir, grappling with Pakistan’s cascading crises, resorted to terrorism to unify a fractured nation and reassert military dominance. The question remains whether it is a calculated move or a strategic blunder that would result in a bigger crisis.

 

Desperate Act

On April 22, 2025, the serene Baisaran Valley in Pahalgam became the site of a horrific terror attack. Armed militants, later identified as members of Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), stormed a tourist campsite, killing 26  civilians, predominantly Hindu tourists. The attackers, wielding M4 carbines and AK-47s, verified victims’ religious identities before executing them, marking the deadliest assault in the region since the 2008 Mumbai attacks. The Pahalgam attack was no ordinary act of terrorism. Its precision, weaponry, and targeting suggest sophistication beyond typical militant operations. The attackers, led by Hashim Musa, a former Pakistan Army para-commando dismissed from service, infiltrated deep to strike a tourist hotspot 100 kilometres from the Line of Control (Loc).

The attack in Phalgam was a brazen act of desperation, targeting unarmed, innocent tourists in a relatively stable and tourist-frequented part of Kashmir. The use of high-grade weaponry and coordinated execution points toward sophisticated planning, likely beyond the capabilities of isolated local cells. Indian officials allege the attack was planned by Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), with direct oversight from Munir. A key piece of evidence is Musa’s background. Sources claim he was “loaned” by Pakistan’s Special Service Group (SSG) to Let, and the attackers’ weaponry, M4 carbines, are rare in militant hands, further pointing to state backing.

The attack’s communal nature adds another layer. The militants spared Muslim tourists, targeting Hindus in a deliberate bid to inflame religious tensions. This aligns with Munir’s April 16, 2025, speech, where he emphasised Pakistan’s Islamic identity and the Two-Nation Theory, framing India as an existential threat. The timing—six days after the hate speech—suggests a deliberate signal to terror groups. The Resistance Front (TRF), a LeT offshoot, initially claimed responsibility but later retracted, a move Indian analysts attribute to Pakistan’s attempt to distance itself from the backlash.

 

Desperate Situation

Under General Asim Munir, the Pakistan Army faces a precarious state that is a unique and combustible blend of crises, a collapsing economy, surging insurgencies, and eroding public trust in the military.

Economic Collapse. Pakistan’s GDP growth is under 2%, inflation is soaring past 20%, and the Pakistani rupee is plummeting. A $7-billion IMF loan, secured in 2024, imposes austerity measures that have sparked nationwide protests. The Karachi Stock Exchange crashed 3% in a single day post-Pahalgam, reflecting investor fears of regional instability. Pakistan’s economy is on life support, with an IMF deal hanging by a thread and foreign reserves dipping dangerously low. The economic hardship is palpable across society, eroding public faith in national institutions.

 Political Instability. Politically, Pakistan is a tinderbox. The 2023 arrest of former Prime Minister Imran Khan, widely seen as orchestrated by the military, has galvanised his Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) party. The military’s overt role in political engineering has backfired, leading to widespread public discontent and intra-elite fragmentation. Mass protests, often met with brutal crackdowns, have eroded the military’s legitimacy. Social media campaigns like #ResignAsimMunir, despite Pakistan’s ban on X, highlight Munir’s unpopularity. Analysts describe the military’s public support as at its lowest since the 1971 Bangladesh liberation, when Pakistan lost its eastern wing. For Munir, appointed Army Chief in November 2022, these crises threaten his leadership and the military’s grip on power.

Institutional Crisis. Militarily, Pakistan is under siege. The Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) has intensified attacks in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa, including a March 2025 train hijacking that killed several passengers. In Balochistan, separatist groups like the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) target Chinese-funded CPEC projects, undermining Pakistan’s strategic ties with Beijing. The military, once revered as the nation’s protector, struggles to contain these threats, with over 1,200 security personnel killed in 2024 alone. For perhaps the first time in decades, the Pakistan Army’s credibility is under sustained attack. Retired officers have voiced dissent, and social media campaigns have openly criticised the top brass—something previously unthinkable.

 Strategic Isolation. Once seen as a pivotal state in the U.S.-China rivalry, Pakistan is increasingly isolated. China’s Belt and Road investments have slowed, while Gulf nations redirect capital elsewhere. Washington remains wary, and New Delhi has successfully lobbied global forums to pressure Islamabad on terror financing.

 

Desperation Levels and Motives

The narrative of Munir’s desperation hinges on his need to reverse the military’s declining fortunes. With Pakistan unravelling, the Army Chief faces pressure to reassert control. Possible motives for orchestrating the Pahalgam attack include the following:-

Rallying Domestic Support. By reigniting the Kashmir issue, Munir seeks to unify Pakistanis under the military’s narrative of India as the eternal enemy. The military has historically used anti-India sentiment to deflect domestic criticism, as seen after the 1999 Kargil War and the 2016 Uri attack. With protests and insurgencies eroding public trust, a high-profile attack could galvanise nationalist fervour.

Disrupting India’s Kashmir Narrative. The region has seen relative stability since India revoked Article 370 in 2019, stripping Jammu and Kashmir of its autonomy. Record tourism (2 million visitors in 2024), successful elections, and infrastructure development have undermined Pakistan’s claim to Kashmir. The Pahalgam attack, targeting tourists, aims to deter visitors, disrupt normalcy, and revive Pakistan’s relevance in the dispute.

Risking Controlled Escalation. A limited conflict with India could restore the military’s image as Pakistan’s protector. Past crises, like the 2019 Pulwama attack, saw Pakistan weather Indian airstrikes while rallying domestic support. Munir may have calculated that India’s response—diplomatic measures, border skirmishes—would remain containable, avoiding all-out war given both nations’ nuclear arsenals.

 

Calculated Act or Strategic Miscalculation?

General Munir, a former ISI chief, is acutely aware of the strategic value and political risk of cross-border terrorism. His tenure began with promises of internal reform and a clean break from overt politicking. However, Munir has returned to the tried-and-tested path of external diversion under mounting internal pressures and the erosion of military dominance in domestic affairs.

A terrorist attack in Kashmir achieves several aims simultaneously: it unites domestic opinion around a perceived external threat, deflects criticism from internal dysfunction, and tests India’s threshold for retaliation. It may also galvanise the rank and file within the army, reasserting its role as the sole guardian of Pakistan’s ideological and territorial integrity.

The attack has plunged India-Pakistan relations into crisis. India responded with punitive measures: suspending the Indus Waters Treaty, closing borders, expelling diplomats, and cancelling Visas.  Small-arms fire along the LoC has escalated, with Pakistan closing its airspace to Indian flights. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi vowed a “befitting reply,” raising speculation of Military action.

 

India’s Options

India faces a complex decision matrix. A kinetic response, such as surgical strikes or air raids like Balakot in 2019, may yield short-term political dividends, especially if the Pakistan Army is seeking precisely such a reaction to rally domestic support. Conversely, restraint may embolden further provocations, especially if it is perceived as a lack of resolve. Therefore, India must pursue a calibrated strategy that combines tactical counter-terror operations with strategic multi-domain actions.

India’s response will be shaped by the need to address domestic outrage, signal strength to Pakistan, and manage international pressure to avoid escalation between the two nuclear-armed states.  The response is likely to be multi-pronged in several domains.

Diplomatic Offensive. India has already accused Pakistan of sponsoring terrorism, with Prime Minister Narendra Modi calling Pakistan a “rogue state” at the UN and vowing to pursue attackers “to the ends of the earth.” India will likely intensify efforts to diplomatically isolate Pakistan by raising the issue in international forums like the UN, G20, or bilateral talks with allies like the US, UK, and France.

Severing Diplomatic Ties. India has already expelled Pakistani diplomats and may further downgrade diplomatic ties, potentially recalling its high commissioner from Islamabad or imposing additional visa restrictions.

Economic and Trade Restrictions. India has suspended the Indus Waters Treaty, a significant move signalling economic retaliation. Further steps could include tightening trade restrictions or pushing for international financial scrutiny of Pakistan, leveraging India’s influence with institutions like the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), where Pakistan has faced grey-listing for terrorism financing concerns.

Cultural and Sporting Bans. To sustain domestic momentum against Pakistan, India may reinforce existing bans on cultural exchanges, sports events, and media collaborations.

Strategic Military Posturing.  India is likely to increase military deployments along the Line of Control (LoC) and international border, as implied by Modi’s “complete operational freedom” grant to the armed forces.

Surgical Strikes or Targeted Operations. India’s response to the 2019 Pulwama attack—a surgical airstrike on a Jaish-e-Mohammed camp in Balakot, Pakistan—sets a precedent. A similar operation targeting an appropriate target in Pakistan is possible.

Escalation of Skirmishes. Intermittent cross-border firing along the LOC, reported since the attack, may intensify. If not controlled, these skirmishes may escalate to a full-fledged war.

 

A Dangerous Game of Desperation

The Phalgam attack is not an isolated incident—it is a symptom of deeper rot within Pakistan’s civil-military structure. It underscores the Pakistan military’s enduring reliance on terrorism to counter internal and external pressures. But the diminishing returns of this strategy, combined with growing international scrutiny and a more assertive India, make this a dangerous game.

Desperate men in desperate institutions often resort to desperate measures. For Pakistan’s military, external provocation has long served as a tool to distract, deflect, and dominate. The costs may outweigh the benefits if General Munir pivots back to cross-border militancy as a pressure valve. Whether driven by Munir’s desperation or institutional strategy, the operation has reignited India-Pakistan tensions, risking escalation in a nuclear-armed region.

India must remain wise enough not to be baited, yet take appropriate multi-pronged, multi-domain retaliatory action, stay alert, agile, and strategically ready to counter these designs. India would be willing to climb the escalatory ladder, as Indian patience has run out, and a red line has been crossed this time. Once again, regional peace teeters on the edge of a dangerous gamble from across the border.

 

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References and credits

To all the online sites and channels.

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Disclaimer:

Information and data included in the blog are for educational & non-commercial purposes only and have been carefully adapted, excerpted, or edited from reliable and accurate sources. All copyrighted material belongs to the respective owners and is provided only for wider dissemination.

 

References:-

1. The Hindu, “Tourism Terror Targeted: Pahalgam Massacre,” April 23, 2025. https://www.thehindu.com

2. Indian Express, “How Pakistan’s Proxy War Is Mutating,” April 2025.

3. Dawn (Pakistan), “General Munir’s Gamble: What the Army’s Silence Hides,” April 25, 2025.

4. Reuters, “India Accuses Pakistan of Orchestrating Deadly Kashmir Attack,” April 2025.

5. Al Jazeera, “Terror Returns to Kashmir: Who Gains?” April 24, 2025.

6. Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA), India – Dossiers on LeT, TRF, ISI

Home Page

7. RAND Corporation Reports – “Proxy Warfare and Strategic Risk in South Asia” (2021). https://www.rand.org

8. Brookings Institution – “The Pakistan Army’s Strategic Calculus in a Post-Imran Era” (2024), https://www.brookings.edu

9. Carnegie India – “Pakistan’s New Military Doctrine: Continuity or Crisis?” (2023).

10. Observer Research Foundation (ORF), India – Reports on terrorism, India-Pakistan conflict cycles, https://www.orfonline.org

11. Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) – “Pakistan’s Internal Security Collapse” (2024), https://www.cfr.org

12. Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India – Official statements on the Phalgam attack and diplomatic responses. https://www.mea.gov.in

13. United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Briefings – Historical and recent discussions on Pakistan-sponsored terrorism. https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/

14. Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR), Pakistan – Official statements from Pakistan’s military. https://www.ispr.gov.pk/

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