Tag: China

Posted on

US REPORT ON CHINA: EXCERPTS BRI

CHINA’S BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE (BRI)

 

Key Takeaways

 

  • The PRC uses BRI to support its strategy of national rejuvenation by seeking to expand global transportation and trade linkages to support its development and deepen its economic integration with nations along its periphery and beyond.

 

  • In 2022, BRI projects saw mixed economic outcomes, experiencing both growth and decline. However, overall spending on BRI projects remained consistent with the previous year and Beijing continued to prioritize public health, digital infrastructure, and green energy.

 

  • Overseas development and security interests under BRI will drive the PRC towards expanding its overseas security relationships and presence to protect those interests.

 

Detailed explanation of aspects summarised as takeaways above

 

First announced in 2013, the PRC’s BRI initiative is the signature foreign and economic policy advanced by Xi that rebranded and further expanded China’s global outreach. Beijing uses BRI to support its strategy of national rejuvenation by seeking to expand global transportation and trade links to support its development and deepen its economic integration with nations along its periphery and beyond. The PRC implements BRI by financing, constructing, and developing transportation infrastructure, natural gas pipelines, hydropower projects, digital connectivity, and technology and industrial parks worldwide. As of 2022, at least 147 countries had signed BRI cooperation documents, up from 146 in 2021, 138 in 2020, and 125 in 2019.

 

In support of its national strategy, Beijing leverages BRI to strengthen its territorial integrity, energy security, and international influence. The PRC aims to improve stability and diminish threats, for example, by investing in projects along its western and southern periphery. Similarly, through BRI projects associated with pipelines and port construction in Pakistan, it seeks to become less reliant on transporting energy resources through strategic choke points, such as the Strait of Malacca. It also attempts to exploit the relationships it builds through BRI to pursue additional economic cooperation with participating countries.

 

Since 2022, two distinct trends have developed relative to BRI. First, the share of PRC financial investment relative to construction increased to its highest levels, with investments almost doubling. Beijing experienced strong growth in their East Asian and the Middle Eastern investments but a decline in their Sub-Saharan Africa efforts. Conversely, spiraling construction costs over the past three years have resulted in $78 billion in bad loans which needed to be written off or renegotiated in 2022. Second, Beijing began to replace previous BRI rhetoric with language highlighting cooperation and partnership, which likely is designed to make BRI more appealing to foreign partners. The official name of “Belt and Road Initiative” was removed from the English version of many of Xi’s speeches in 2022 and replaced with phrases such as “Belt and Road cooperation.” After launching the GDI in September 2021, Xi mentioned Belt and Road Cooperation eight times while referring to GDI more than 16 times.

 

China has continued to prioritize public health, digital infrastructure, and green energy opportunities through its “Health Silk Road (健康丝绸之路)” (HSR), “Digital Silk Road (数字丝绸之路)” (DSR), and “Green Silk Road (绿色丝绸之路)” (GSR), respectively. Improving each of these “roads” offers Beijing benefits beyond economic integration.

 

  • HSR is the PRC’s World Health Organization-supported initiative for providing medical assistance through BRI transportation In the future, it may help the PRC expand the international market share of PRC medical products, strengthen its bid for a role as a global public health leader, and identify the need for – and justify – new BRI projects.

 

  • GSR aims to support low-carbon infrastructure, energy, and finance projects; this initiative aligns with the PRC’s own goal of achieving carbon neutrality before 2060 and presents Beijing as a responsible party in working toward the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development Goals established by the United Nations General Assembly.

 

  • DSR is one of the primary ways Beijing seeks to facilitate transfer of PRC technology to partner countries, which the PRC leverages to propagate its own technology standards as it seeks to set global standards for next-generation technology. Announced in 2015 as a digital subset of BRI, the PRC’s Digital Silk Road initiative, seeks to build a PRC-centric digital infrastructure, export industrial overcapacity, facilitate expansion of the PRC’s technology corporations, and access large repositories of data. As of 2016, 16 countries had signed memorandums of understanding with Beijing to participate in the DSR. The PRC hopes the DSR will increase international e-commerce by reducing cross-border trade barriers and establishing regional logistics centers by promoting e-commerce through digital free trade zones. Another goal of the DSR is to reduce PRC dependence on foreign tech leaders by providing markets for Chinese goods, thereby creating production opportunities for PRC tech firms. The PRC is investing in digital infrastructure abroad, including next-generation cellular networks—such as fifth-generation (5G) networks—fiber optic cables, undersea cables, and data The initiative also includes developing advanced technologies including satellite navigation systems, artificial intelligence (AI), and quantum computing for domestic use and export. International opponents of China’s DSR fear that Beijing will encourage recipient countries to use this technology as a tool of repression modeled on China’s authoritarian-style government. Likewise, host country political elites would probably risk their sovereignty by becoming vulnerable to espionage and political blackmail.

 

Since BRI’s inception, its long-term viability has faced challenges from international concerns over corruption, debt sustainability, and environmental effects, coupled with suspicion of the PRC’s motives and the risk inherent in operating in politically unstable areas. China has applied military, intelligence, diplomatic, and economic tools to counter perceived threats, but the party- state leaders lack the expertise to assess comprehensive risks in most participating countries.

 

As the PRC’s overseas development and security interests expanded under BRI, the CCP has signaled that its overseas security footprint will increase accordingly to protect those interests, which Beijing recognizes may provoke pushback from other states. Some of BRI’s planned or active economic corridors transit regions prone to violence, separatism, armed conflict, and instability, putting BRI-related projects and PRC citizens working overseas at risk. In 2022, for example, five PRC citizens were injured when ISIS-K terrorists attacked a hotel in Kabul where Chinese nationals were known to stay.

 

China has therefore sought to extend its ability to safeguard its overseas interests, including BRI, by developing closer regional and bilateral counterterrorism cooperation and supporting host- nation security forces through military aid, including military equipment donations. In an October 2022 speech to the National Party Congress, Xi spoke of the need to become more adept at deploying the PLA to protect China’s national security interests. Xi also said, “We will better coordinate strategies and plans, align policies and systems, and share resources and production factors between the military and civilian sectors.”

 

The PRC has adopted new security legislation establishing a legal basis to violate people’s data privacy and includes the aforementioned National Intelligence and Cybersecurity Laws of the People’s Republic of China. Under the auspices of national security, the PRC and its security services have the authority to compel any private Chinese company to turn over all data collected by their systems, if desired. GSR aims to support low-carbon infrastructure, energy, and finance projects – an initiative that aligns with the PRC’s own goal of achieving carbon neutrality before 2060 and presents Beijing as a responsible party in working toward the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development Goals established by the United Nations General Assembly.

 

The PRC has applied military, intelligence, diplomatic, and economic tools to counter perceived threats, but the party-state leaders lack the expertise to assess comprehensive risks in most participating countries. As the PRC’s overseas development and security interests expand under BRI, the CCP has signaled that its overseas security footprint will expand accordingly to protect those interests, which Beijing recognizes may provoke pushback from other states. Some of BRI’s planned or active economic corridors transit regions prone to violence, separatism, armed conflict, and instability, putting BRI-related projects and PRC citizens working overseas at risk. In 2022, for example, five PRC nationals were injured when ISIS-K terrorists attacked a hotel in Kabul where Chinese nationals were known to stay.

 

COMING UP: DETAILED ANALYSIS WITH INDIAN PERSPECTIVE

 

Suggestions and value additions are most welcome

 

For regular updates, please register here

Subscribe

References and credits

To all the online sites and channels.

Disclaimer:

Information and data included in the blog are for educational & non-commercial purposes only and have been carefully adapted, excerpted, or edited from sources deemed reliable and accurate. All copyrighted material belongs to respective owners and is provided only for purposes of wider dissemination.

Posted on

US REPORT ON CHINA: EXCERPTS OTHER DOMAINS

ADVANCING TOWARDS AN INFORMATIZED MILITARY

 

  • The PLA considers information operations (IO) as a means of achieving information dominance early in a conflict and continues to expand the scope and frequency of IO in military.

 

  • The PLA is pursuing next-generation combat capabilities based on its vision of future conflict, which it calls “intelligentized warfare,” defined by the expanded use of AI and other advanced technologies at every level of warfare.

 

  • The PRC is advancing its cyberspace attack capabilities and has the ability to launch cyberspace attacks—such as disruption of a natural gas pipeline for days to weeks—in the United States.

 

SPACE AND COUNTERSPACE CAPABILITIES

 

 

  • The PLA views space superiority, the ability to control the space-enabled information sphere and to deny adversaries their own space-based information gathering and communication capabilities, as critical components to conduct modern “informatized warfare.”

 

  • The PLA continues to invest in improving its capabilities in space-based intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), satellite communication, satellite navigation, and meteorology, as well as human spaceflight and robotic space exploration.

 

  • The PLA continues to acquire and develop a range of counterspace capabilities and related technologies, including kinetic-kill missiles, ground-based lasers, and orbiting space robots, as well as expanding space surveillance capabilities, which can monitor objects in space within their field of view and enable counterspace actions.

 

NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES

 

 

  • Over the next decade, the PRC will continue to rapidly modernize, diversify, and expand its nuclear forces. Compared to the PLA’s nuclear modernization efforts a decade ago, current efforts dwarf previous attempts in both scale and complexity.

 

  • The PRC is expanding the number of its land-, sea-, and air-based nuclear delivery platforms while investing in and constructing the infrastructure necessary to support further expansion of its nuclear forces.

 

  • In 2022, Beijing continued its rapid nuclear expansion, and DoD estimates that the PRC possessed more than 500 operational nuclear warheads as of May 2023—on track to exceed previous projections.

 

  • DoD estimates that the PRC will probably have over 1,000 operational nuclear warheads by 2030, much of which will be deployed at higher readiness levels and will continue growing its force to 2035 in line with its goal of ensuring PLA modernization is “basically complete” that year, which serves as an important milestone on the road to Xi’s goal of a “world class” military by 2049.

 

  • The PRC probably will use its new fast breeder reactors and reprocessing facilities to produce plutonium for its nuclear weapons program, despite publicly maintaining these technologies are intended for peaceful purposes.

 

  • The PRC probably completed the construction of its three new solid-propellant silo fields in 2022, which consists of at least 300 new ICBM silos, and has loaded at least some ICBMs into these silos. This project and the expansion of China’s liquid-propellant silo force is meant to increase the peacetime readiness of its nuclear force by moving to a launch-on-warning (LOW).

 

  • The PRC is fielding the DF-5C, a silo-based liquid-fueled ICBM armed with a nuclear warhead with a multi-megaton yield. The PRC is fielding the longer-range JL-3 SLBMs on its current JIN class SSBN, rendering them capable of ranging the continental United States from PRC littoral waters.

 

CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL RESEARCH

 

 

  • The PRC continues to engage in biological activities with dual-use applications, which raise oncerns regarding its compliance with the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). This includes studies at PRC military medical institutions on potent toxins with dual-use.

 

  • The PRC likely possesses capabilities relevant to chemical and biological warfare that pose a threat to U.S., Allied, and partner forces, military operations, and civilian populations.

 

  • The United States cannot certify that the PRC has met its obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) due to concerns regarding the PRC’s research on pharmaceutical-based agents (PBAs) and toxins with potential dual-use applications.

 

OPERATIONAL STRUCTURE AND ACTIVITIES ON CHINA’S PERIPHERY

 

 

  • The PRC continues to refine military reforms associated with the establishment of the Eastern, Southern, Western, Northern, and Central Theater Commands, which are organized based on the PRC’s perception of peripheral threats.

 

  • Under the direction of the CMC, each Theater Command has operational authority over the PLA conventional forces within the theater.

 

  • In August 2022, the PLA carried out large-scale joint military exercises aimed at pressuring Taiwan. The exercises included firing ballistic missiles over Taiwan’s main island, over a dozen naval patrols, and hundreds of flights into Taiwan’s claimed ADIZ.

 

DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SECURITY SITUATION IN THE SCS

 

  • The PRC states that international military presence within the SCS is a challenge to its sovereignty.

 

  • Throughout 2022, the PRC deployed PLAN, CCG, and civilian ships to maintain a presence in disputed areas, such as near Scarborough Reef and Thitu Island, as well as in response to oil and gas exploration operations by rival claimants within the PRC’s claimed “nine-dash line.”

 

  • During 2022, the PRC conducted multiple coercive actions against the Philippines in the SCS, including cutting the tow line of a Philippine Navy vessel, executing dangerous maneuvers in close proximity to Philippine vessels; and reportedly reclaiming several unoccupied land features in the SCS, which the Philippines noted contravenes the Declaration of Conduct on the South China Sea’s undertaking on self-restraint and the 2016 Arbitral Award.

 

DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SECURITY SITUATION IN THE TAIWAN STRAIT

 

  • In 2022, the PRC amplified diplomatic, political, and military pressure against Taiwan. The PLA’s increased provocative and destabilizing actions in and around the Taiwan Strait included ballistic missile overflights of Taiwan, sharply increased flights into Taiwan’s self- declared ADIZ and a series of major military exercises near Taiwan.

 

  • At the 20th Party Congress in 2022, Xi Jinping repeated the CCP’s longstanding public position that China seeks peaceful unification with Taiwan but would never renounce the use of force as an option.

 

  • The PLA practiced elements of each of its military courses of action against Taiwan during its August 2022 large-scale military exercise aimed at pressuring Taiwan, and again in April 2023 in response to Taiwan president Tsai Ing-wen’s transit of the United States.

 

PLA COERCIVE AND RISKY OPERATIONAL BEHAVIOR

 

  • Between the fall of 2021 and fall of 2023, the United States has documented over 180 instances of PLA coercive and risky air intercepts against U.S. aircraft in the region – more in the past two years than in the previous decade. Over the same period, the PLA has conducted around 100 instances of coercive and risky operational behavior against U.S. Allies and partners, in an effort to deter both the United States and others from conducting lawful operations in the region.

 

  • Examples of the PRC’s coercive and risky operational behavior against S. and Allied aircraft have included lasing; reckless maneuvers; close approaches in the air or at sea; high rates of closure; discharging chaff or flares in front of, or in close proximity to, aircraft; and other actions.

 

  • The PLA’s behavior contravenes flight safety protocols and the international maritime rules of the road, and increases the risk of a major accident, incident, or crisis, including the potential for loss of life.

THE PLA’S GROWING GLOBAL PRESENCE

 

  • CCP leaders view the PLA’s growing global presence as an essential part of the PRC’s international activities to create an international environment conducive to China’s national rejuvenation.

 

  • The CCP has tasked the PLA to develop the capability to project power outside China’s borders and immediate periphery to secure the PRC’s growing overseas interests and advance its foreign policy This has led to the PRC’s greater willingness to use military coercion— and inducements—to advance its global security and development interests.

 

  • In 2022, the PLA continued to normalize its presence overseas through participation UN peacekeeping operations and anti-piracy escorts in the Gulf of Aden and waters off Somalia. The also PLA restarted in-person military diplomacy in 2022 that was suspended due to COVID-19.

PLA OVERSEAS BASING AND ACCESS

 

  • The PRC is seeking to expand its overseas logistics and basing infrastructure to allow the PLA to project and sustain military power at greater distances. If realized, a global PLA military logistics network could disrupt S. military operations as the PRC’s global military objectives evolve.

 

  • Beyond the PLA support base in Djibouti, the PRC is very likely already considering and planning for additional military logistics facilities to support naval, air, and ground forces projection.

 

  • In June 2022, a PRC official confirmed that the PLA would have access to parts of Cambodia’s Ream Naval The PRC probably also has considered other countries as locations for PLA military logistics facilities, including Burma, Thailand, Indonesia, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, United Arab Emirates, Kenya, Equatorial Guinea, Seychelles, Tanzania, Angola, Nigeria, Namibia, Mozambique, Bangladesh, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, and Tajikistan.

 

  • The SSF operates tracking, telemetry, and command stations in Namibia, Pakistan, Argentina, and The SSF also has a handful of Yuan-wang space support ships to track satellite and ICBM launches.

 

LESSONS LEARNED FROM RUSSIA’S WAR ON UKRAINE

 

  • The PRC almost certainly is learning lessons from the Russian war of aggression in Ukraine that are most applicable to the PRC’s goal of strengthening its whole-of-government approach to countering a perceived U.S.-led containment strategy.

 

  • Western sanctions against Russia almost certainly have amplified the PRC’s push for defense and technological self-sufficiency and financial resilience.

 

RESOURCES AND TECHNOLOGY FOR FORCE MODERNIZATION

 

  • The PRC’s long-term goal is to create an entirely self-reliant defense-industrial sector—fused with a strong civilian industrial and technology sector—that can meet the PLA’s needs for modern military capabilities.

 

  • The PRC has mobilized vast resources in support of its defense modernization, including through its Military-Civil Fusion (MCF) Development Strategy, as well as espionage activities to acquire sensitive, dual-use, and military-grade equipment.

 

  • In 2022, the PRC announced its official annual military budget would increase by 1 percent, continuing more than 20 years of annual defense spending increases and sustaining its position as the second-largest military spender in the world.

 

DEVELOPMENTS AND TRENDS IN ITS DEFENSE INDUSTRY

 

  • China’s hypersonic missile technologies have greatly advanced during the past 20 years and many of the PRC’s missile programs are comparable to other international top-tier producers.

 

  • China is developing beyond-visual-range air-to-air missiles and exploring missile capabilities that improve target-selection and make the missiles more resistant to countermeasures.

 

  • In 2022, China launched its first domestically designed and manufactured aircraft carrier, featuring an electromagnetic catapult launch and arresting devices. The carrier will be able to deploy up to 70 aircraft, including J-15 fighters and Z-9C anti-submarine helicopters.

 

ESPIONAGE ACTIVITIES SUPPORTING CHINA’S MILITARY MODERNIZATION

 

  • The PRC presents a sophisticated, persistent cyber-enabled espionage and attack threat to military and critical infrastructure systems through its efforts to develop, acquire, or gain access to information and advanced technologies.

 

  • There have also been multiple U.S. criminal indictments since 2015 involving espionage by PRC nationals, naturalized S. citizens or permanent resident aliens from the PRC, as well as U.S. citizens, for their efforts to illegally acquire information and technology to advance PLA modernization.

DEFENSE CONTACTS AND EXCHANGES IN 2022

 

  • In 2022, the PLA largely denied, cancelled, and ignored recurring bilateral engagements and DoD requests for communication. The PLA’s refusal to engage with DoD has largely continued in 2023.

 

  • The PLA’s refusal to engage in military-to-military communications with the United States, combined with the PLA’s increasingly coercive and risky operational behavior, raises the risk of an operational incident or miscalculation spiraling into crisis or conflict.

 

  • DoD is committed to re-opening lines of communication with the PRC to ensure competition does not veer into conflict. DoD’s objectives in opening lines of communication include ensuring crisis communications channels, reducing strategic and operational risk, and avoiding misperceptions.

 

COMING UP: DETAILED ANALYSIS WITH INDIAN PERSPECTIVE

 

Suggestions and value additions are most welcome

 

For regular updates, please register here

Subscribe

 

 

References and credits

To all the online sites and channels.

 

Disclaimer:

Information and data included in the blog are for educational & non-commercial purposes only and have been carefully adapted, excerpted, or edited from sources deemed reliable and accurate. All copyrighted material belongs to respective owners and is provided only for purposes of wider dissemination.

 

Posted on

US REPORT ON CHINA 2023: UNDERSTANDING CHINA’S STRATEGY

CHINA’S NATIONAL STRATEGY

 

  • The PRC’s national strategy is to achieve “the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” by 2049. The strategy is a determined pursuit of political, social, and military modernity to expand the PRC’s national power, perfect its governance, and revise the international order in support of the PRC’s system of governance and national The PRC views the United States as deploying a whole-of-government effort meant to contain the PRC’s rise, which presents obstacles to its national strategy.

 

  • The PRC characterizes its view of strategic competition in terms of a rivalry among powerful nation states, as well as a clash of opposing ideological systems. PRC leaders believe that structural changes in the international system and a confrontational United States are the root causes of intensifying strategic competition between the PRC and the United States.

 

‒ In March 2023, Xi Jinping told delegates to the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference that “Western countries led by the United States have implemented comprehensive containment, encirclement and suppression against us, bringing unprecedented severe challenges to our country’s development.”

 

  • The PRC’s strategy entails deliberate and determined efforts to amass, improve, and harness the internal and external elements of national power that will place the PRC in a “leading position” in an enduring competition between systems.

 

  • In the 20th Party Congress Political Work Report, the CCP expanded on its calls to prepare for an increasingly turbulent international climate, while reporting it had “enhanced” the PRC’s security on all fronts and “withstood political, economic, ideological, and natural risks, challenges, and trials.”

 

FOREIGN POLICY

 

 

  • The PRC’s foreign policy seeks to build a “community of common destiny” that supports its strategy to realize “the great rejuvenation of the Chinese ” The PRC’s ambition to reshape the international order derives from the objectives of its national strategy and the Party’s political and governing systems.

 

  • Beginning late 2022 Beijing launched a diplomatic ‘charm offensive’ targeting European countries in an apparent effort to improve perceptions of Beijing following years of ‘wolf warrior’ diplomacy and COVID isolation.

 

  • In April 2022, Xi Jinping announced the Global Security Initiative (GSI). Echoing the previous year’s rollout of the Global Development Initiative (GDI), Beijing has promoted GSI extensively and attempted to insert GSI language into multilateral forums and documents.

 

  • Russia’s war on Ukraine in February 2022 represented a major, unexpected challenge for the PRC as it sought to react to the largest military conflict in Europe since the end of World War. As Beijing deliberates the scale and scope of materiel commitments to Russia’s war on Ukraine, it probably will seek to balance its strategic partnership with Russia while avoiding reputational or economic costs that could result from its assistance.

 

ECONOMIC POLICY

 

 

  • At the end of 2022, China abruptly reversed its zero-COVID The decision to implement China’s reopening took most by surprise and was probably triggered by country-wide protests against the PRC’s zero-COVID policies, economic pressures, and fiscal difficulties for local governments.

 

  • The 20th Party Congress emphasized the importance of quality growth rather than the speed of growth. General Secretary Xi also highlighted “common prosperity,” more equitable access to basic public services, a better multi-tiered social security system, and cultural and green developments as a few of the PRC’s economic initiatives.

 

  • The PRC’s ongoing military modernization objectives are commensurate with and part of China’s broader national development aspirations.

 

CHINA’S BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE (BRI)

 

 

  • The PRC uses BRI to support its strategy of national rejuvenation by seeking to expand global transportation and trade linkages to support its development and deepen its economic integration with nations along its periphery and beyond.

 

  • In 2022, BRI projects saw mixed economic outcomes, experiencing both growth and decline. However, overall spending on BRI projects remained consistent with the previous year and Beijing continued to prioritize public health, digital infrastructure, and green energy.

 

  • Overseas development and security interests under BRI will drive the PRC towards expanding its overseas security relationships and presence to protect those interests.

 

MILITARY-CIVIL FUSION (MCF) DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY

 

 

  • The PRC pursues its Military-Civil Fusion (MCF) (军民融合) Development Strategy to “fuse” its security and development strategies into its Integrated National Strategic System and Capabilities in support of China’s national rejuvenation goals.

 

  • The PRC’s MCF strategy includes objectives to develop and acquire advanced dual-use technology for military purposes and deepen reform of the national defense science and technology industries and serves a broader purpose to strengthen all of the PRC’s instruments of national power.

 

  • Since early 2022, the CCP appears to have been deemphasizing the term “Military Civil Fusion” in public, in favor of “integrated national strategic systems and capabilities.”

 

 

COMING UP: DETAILED ANALYSIS WITH INDIAN PERSPECTIVE

 

Suggestions and value additions are most welcome

 

For regular updates, please register here

Subscribe

 

 

References and credits

To all the online sites and channels.

 

Disclaimer:

Information and data included in the blog are for educational & non-commercial purposes only and have been carefully adapted, excerpted, or edited from sources deemed reliable and accurate. All copyrighted material belongs to respective owners and is provided only for purposes of wider dissemination.