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352: Arms Trade (Part I): Trends and Concerns

 

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) based in Stockholm, is an independent international institute dedicated to research into conflict, armaments, arms control and disarmament. Established in 1966, SIPRI provides data, analysis and recommendations, based on open sources, to policymakers, researchers, media and the interested public.

 

Recently it published its annual research report on Trends in International Arms Transfer, 2022. The report essentially compares two five years periods i.e. 2013-17 and 2018-22.

 

Relevant extracts related to trends and concerns are as follows:-

 

Overview: Exporters

 

There are 63 states as exporters of major arms. The top 25 arms exporters accounted for 98 per cent of the world’s arms exports in 2018–22.

 

The five largest exporters of arms during the period 2018–22 are the USA, Russia, France, China and Germany. These five account for over three-quarters (76 per cent) of all arms exports.

 

States in North America and Europe together accounted for 87 per cent of all arms exports in the period. The five largest exporters in Western Europe (France, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom and Spain) supplied around one-quarter (24 per cent) of total global arms exports in 2018–22.

 

USA. US arms exports accounted for 40 per cent of the global total in 2018–22 and were 14 per cent higher than in 2013–17. The USA delivered major arms to 103 states in 2018–22, almost as many as the next two biggest exporters combined. The USA’s arms exports grew by 14 per cent between 2013–17 and 2018–22 and its share of total global arms exports rose from 33 per cent to 40 per cent. Its total arms exports in 2018–22 were 148 per cent higher than those of Russia—the second largest exporter—compared with 50 per cent higher in 2013–17.

 

Russia. In 2018–22 Russia delivered major arms to 47 states and accounted for 16 per cent of total global arms exports. Russian arms exports remained stable between 2008–12 and 2013–17 but fell by 31 per cent between 2013–17 and 2018–22. The annual volumes of arms exports in 2018 and 2019 were at similar levels to or higher than those in each of the previous 20 years but were at significantly lower levels in 2020, 2021 and 2022.

 

Others. French arms exports increased by 44 per cent between 2013–17 and 2018–22, while Russian (–31 per cent), Chinese (–23 per cent) and German (–35 per cent) arms exports decreased.

 

Comments:

 

  • Four major exporters of arms are the USA, European Union, Russia and China.

 

  • Well established defence industry (Eco System) is essential to be a world power.

 

  • Defence export is necessary for the growth of the domestic defence industry.

 

  • While the export trend is upward for the USA, it is downward for Russia and China.

 

  • Are the US-led wars in the world, for the benefit of and encouraged by its arms industry?

 

Overview: Importers

 

SIPRI has identified 167 states as importers of major arms in 2018–22. The five largest arms importers in 2018–22, India, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Australia and China, together received 36 per cent of the world’s arms imports.

 

The main recipient region in 2018–22 was Asia and Oceania (accounting for 41 per cent of global arms imports), followed by the Middle East (31 per cent), Europe (16 per cent), the Americas (5.8 per cent) and Africa (5.0 per cent).

 

Six of the world’s 10 largest arms importers in 2018–22 were in Asia and Oceania: India, Australia, China, South Korea, Pakistan and Japan. The USA (31 per cent) accounted for the largest share of arms imports to states in the region, followed by Russia (26 per cent) and France (12 per cent).

 

Comments:

 

  • Arms are being pumped into Asia and Oceania, making them the biggest hot spots.

 

  • Hot spots in the Middle East are being kept alive to cash in on the prevailing arms market of oil-rich countries.

 

  • After a long period, a hot spot has appeared on the doorstep of Europe.

 

  • China is adding to its military power by every possible means.

 

Ukraine War

 

Ukraine imported very few major arms in the period from its independence in 1991 until the end of 2021. This changed after the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, as the United States and many European states began to send large quantities of military aid to Ukraine. As a result, it became the 3rd largest importer of major arms in 2022, after Qatar and India, and the 14th largest for the five-year period 2018–22, accounting for 2.0 per cent of total global arms imports.

 

Of the 29 states that supplied major arms to Ukraine in 2022, the main suppliers were the USA, which accounted for 35 per cent of total Ukrainian arms imports during the year, Poland (17 per cent), Germany (11 per cent), the United Kingdom (10 per cent) and Czechia (4.4 per cent).

 

Ukraine did not receive all the types of arms it asked its supporters to provide and, at different stages, there was a divergence between states about what they were willing to supply. In many cases, the supply of arms by one state was financed by other states or by the European Union (EU) through the European Peace Facility.

 

Russia, in contrast, relied almost exclusively on domestically produced arms—although it did import unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and flying bombs from Iran in 2022.

 

Effect: Ukraine War The war in Ukraine had only a limited impact on the total volume of arms transfers in 2018–22, but Ukraine did become a major importer of arms in 2022. In addition, most European states substantially increased their arms import orders and the war will have significant ramifications for future supplier–recipient arms trade relations globally.

 

Comments:

 

  • USA-led NATO has pushed Russia into the Ukraine conflict, with the benefit of weakening Russia and boost to its arms industry.

 

  • Many of the arms supplied were second-hand items from existing stocks. (Including artillery pieces, guided artillery rockets, old tanks, and anti-tank missiles).

 

  • Some newly produced arms, such as air defence systems were also supplied.

 

  • Most of the arms supplied were vital for Ukraine to halt the Russian offensive and provided limited offensive capability. They essentially boosted the defensive capability, with “urban jungle warfare” and “shoot and scoot” employment philosophy.

 

  • The Suppliers were not prepared to deliver arms with a long-range strike capability, such as combat aircraft and long-range land-attack missiles, presumably because of affordability and more importantly to keep the conflict below a certain threshold.

 

  • The Ukraine conflict will further reduce the Russian arms export in future.

 

Relevant Aspects: Closer to Home

 

China. China accounted for 5.2 per cent of total global arms exports in 2018–22. Its arms exports decreased by 23 per cent between 2013–17 and 2018–22. The vast majority of Chinese arms exports (80 per cent) went to states in Asia and Oceania. China delivered major arms to 46 states in 2018–22, but over half of its arms exports (54 per cent) went to just one state—Pakistan.

 

China’s arms imports grew by 4.1 per cent and accounted for 4.6 per cent of the global total in 2018–22. The vast majority of Chinese arms imports (83 per cent) came from Russia. Russian deliveries in the last three years of the period (2020–22) consisted almost entirely of helicopters and engines for aircraft, which are the last few types of major arms that China has had difficulties in developing.

 

 

Comments

 

  • China is increasing its logistic bases in Oceania and IOR, for future expeditionary operations capability.

 

  • China is pumping Chinese arms and equipment into countries of its interest to increase interoperability with them and also make them reliant on China in the long run.

 

Pakistan. Arms imports by Pakistan increased by 14 per cent between 2013–17 and 2018–22 and accounted for 3.7 per cent of the global total. China supplied over three-quarters (77 per cent) of Pakistan’s arms imports in 2018–22.

 

Comments

 

  • Pakistan keeps spending money on its military in spite of the economic crisis at home.

 

  • China has boosted Pakistan’s military capability (Army, Navy and Air Force), defence industry, nuclear capability, and long-range missile capability.

 

India. India’s tensions with Pakistan and China largely drive its demand for arms imports. With an 11 per cent share of total global arms imports, India was the world’s biggest importer of major arms in 2018–22, a position it has held for the period 1993–2022. It retained this position even though its arms imports dropped by 11 per cent between 2013–17 and 2018–22.

 

Russia was the largest supplier of arms to India in both 2013–17 and 2018–22, but its share of total Indian arms imports fell from 64 per cent to 45 per cent. Russia’s position as India’s main arms supplier is under pressure due to strong competition from other supplier states, increased Indian arms production and, since 2022, the above-mentioned constraints on Russia’s arms exports related to its invasion of Ukraine.

 

India’s arms imports from France,  increased by 489 per cent between 2013–17 and 2018–22. France, therefore, displaced the USA to become the second largest supplier to India in 2018–22.

 

Comments

 

  • India Continues to retain the dubious record of being the biggest defence importer.

 

  • The import content is showing a downward trend due to the attempts to replace imports with major arms that are designed and produced domestically (self-reliance).

 

  • Russian content in the Indian military is reducing and being replaced by the USA and other Western exporters.

 

  • The Indian military has a very diverse defence inventory resulting in a logistic nightmare. But it is also a blessing in disguise, as far as reliance on one particular supplier is concerned.

 

  • Indian procurement follows the principle of “Maximum bang for the buck”, buying the best available equipment in the market.

 

Bottom Line

Wheels within wheels in the Arms industry and trade.

Humans are in Self Protect or Self-destruct mode?

 

Coming Up

Arms TradePart II: Flows vis-à-vis Hot Spots

 

Suggestions and value additions are most welcome

 

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References and credits

To all the online sites and channels.

Disclaimer:

Information and data included in the blog are for educational & non-commercial purposes only and have been carefully adapted, excerpted, or edited from sources deemed reliable and accurate. All copyrighted material belongs to respective owners and is provided only for purposes of wider dissemination.

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348: Q&A: IMPACT OF PLASSF

Pic courtesy: strategicstudyindia.blogspot.com.webp

 

Q 1.  Does bringing together the capabilities in space, cyber, electronic and information domains under PLASSF, provide an edge to China through greater civil-military integration?

 

  • It is a good concept and, it gives an advantage to China for the conduct of operations in these four new and important domains (Cyber, Space, Electronic and Information).

 

  • These domains are intrinsically interconnected and should not be dealt with in isolation.

 

  • It enhances the capability even for grey zone warfare (China has mastered the art and uses anything and everything as a weapon).

 

  • Even USA is studying this model for its reorganisation.

 

  • The Chinese model gives us a preview of future warfare challenges.

 

  • More than Civil-Military fusion it streamlines defensive and offensive operations in these domains.

 

  • It ensures seamless operations in the overlapping areas of these domains.

 

  • It has both support and active function.

 

  • It provides support to the service HQs and the theatre commands.

 

Q2.   What are your views about the formation of JSSF and its progress?

 

  • It was formed in 2015 and work is still in progress.

 

  • A Building block methodology has been adopted for it.

 

  • Initially, existing structures were reorganised, giving some new charters to them.

 

  • Thereafter, new structures were added.

 

  • Besides, the military and even some of the civil organisational structures were included in it.

 

  • Operating in expeditionary mode is still a challenge.

 

  • It still has lots of challenges that are being dealt with and the whole concept is evolving.

 

  • It is being exercised during training and live situations, and the lessons learnt are being implemented to make it a viable and efficient service.

 

Q3.   How would the service (JSSF) be used during hostilities?

 

  • Intelligence and information gathering and analysis is a continuous process.

 

  • It would also be used during peacetime for grey zone covert operations with some degree of deniability.

 

  • It would also be used during tense situations for strategic coercion.

 

  • During hostilities, the trend these days is to initiate war with disruptive operations to create chaos. This is followed by attacks by long-range precision vectors to disrupt command, control and communications, adding to the chaos. Kinetic contact force is applied in the prevailing chaotic environment.

 

  • The targets for offensive action in these domains would include ISR capabilities (especially space-based surveillance), military command and control centres and networks, and networks of national importance in sectors like railways, power, banking, health, maritime domain, transportation etc.

 

  • Information warfare would be used to influence the minds of decision-makers in particular and the general public at large.

 

  • The extent of effect (degradation) would depend upon several factors like defensive capability and measures, existing architecture providing alternatives and redundancy, and ability to recoup etc.

 

  • JSSF will provide support (Intelligence and information) and carry out offensive and defensive actions in all four domains, throughout the period of hostilities.

 

Q4.   Do you think China will succeed in building a credible narrative against India, using JSSF and media campaigns (print, electronic, social media), and will such propaganda affect the morale of our defence forces and the civilian population?

 

  • China believes in and follows the three-war theory.

 

  • Media and info war to create a false narrative is a very common practice and China would try.

 

  • It also believes in twisting history to its advantage and creating doctored documents to support its narrative.

 

  • China generally creates two narratives, one for domestic consumption and the other for international use.

 

  • Three major factors in our favour are the high morale of our forces, the high degree of legitimacy of actions by India, and the high nationalistic/patriotic feelings of the general public and citizens.

 

  • Due to the reasons, covered above, the effect will be minimal.

 

  • Even the civilian population can see through the Chinese design and would not get waylaid.

 

  • At the moment the credibility of China in the world is low, and in my opinion, China may not succeed in its endeavour.

 

  • However, it would be prudent to be ready for it and take some proactive steps.

 

  • International opinion is another area to look at.

 

Q5.   What remedial measures need to be implemented to mitigate the threats emerging from this service (JSSF) of PLA?

 

  • The threat of offensive action exists in all four domains.

 

  • Not only the military but a whole government approach (All the stakeholders) would be required.

 

  • It would have to be dealt with at three levels, individual service and stakeholder, at the tri-service level and sector/zone level and the national level.

 

  • Besides fortification of our systems and networks by firewalls and other security features, a Multi-pronged approach is required.

 

  • A multi-layered defence system is required.

 

  • It is not a one-time fix but requires continuous monitoring and upgrades.

 

  • A multi-domain monitoring system is needed.

 

  • A round-the-clock operating, operations room would have to be set up.

 

  • In addition, a Quick Reaction Team concept is required at different levels to contain the effects of any attack.

 

  • An audit and research structure would help in identifying weak areas, vulnerabilities, new developments, and future challenges.

 

  • A Proactive Approach (using electronic, print and cyber media) to counter adverse propaganda.

 

  • Development of counter-offensive capabilities.

 

Bottom Line

The nature of warfare is changing at a very fast pace.

Adapt or Perish

 

Question

Are our proposed changes future looking?

 

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Information and data included in the blog are for educational & non-commercial purposes only and have been carefully adapted, excerpted, or edited from sources deemed reliable and accurate. All copyrighted material belongs to respective owners and is provided only for purposes of wider dissemination.

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346: Evolution of IAF : Historic Perspective

 

Like the role of air power in the last century, the air strategy of the Indian Air Force (IAF) has evolved, reflecting changes in technology, doctrine, and strategic priorities. Some key milestones in the evolution of the air strategy of the IAF are:

Genesis & Early Years. The Indian Air Force was established in British India as an auxiliary air force of the Royal Air Force on 8 Oct 1932, with four Westland Wapiti biplanes and five Indian pilots. The then Royal IAF (RIAF) grew in size during World War II to eventually ten squadrons. In the early years of the IAF, the primary focus was on providing air support to British and Commonwealth ground forces. During World War II, the IAF played a significant role in the Burma campaign by halting the advance of the Japanese army, by providing air cover and support for ground troops. IAF evolved initially in a tactical role primarily to support surface and maritime wars.

              

Partition in 1947. Indian Air Force (IAF) of independent India came into being with seven squadrons (six fighter squadrons and one transport squadron). By then the IAF had a well-established professional ethos and a reputation to live up to.

 

The Indo-Pakistani War of 1947. Almost immediately after Independence, India, and Pakistan clashed over the future of Kashmir. On the first day itself on 27 October 1947, an infantry battalion was airlifted from Delhi to Srinagar. IAF thereafter carried out air operations (airlift of troops and supplies, photo-reconnaissance, bombing, strafing, and interdiction), in support of surface forces. The air power usage was tactical and reactionary to emerging situations.

 

Initial Growth. The decade of the 1950s saw the induction of aircraft and support systems, both in quantity and quality, into the IAF.  During this period, the IAF acquired its first jet fighters and transport aircraft and India began to develop its own indigenous aircraft and weapons systems. IAF began to shift its focus to defending India’s borders and air space, and its capabilities started developing beyond the limited scope of the support role.

 

1962 war. The ground reality in 1962 was that IAF had relatively potent air power with Western aircraft vis-a-vis old Russian aircraft with China. Despite a clear combat edge, the fighter component of the air force was not used during the Sino-Indian conflict of 1962. There has been a general reluctance to use air power due to the perceived fear of escalation of conflict, which was evident even up to the 1999 Kargil conflict and has changed since the Balakot strike in 2019. However, post-war it was decided to build up the IAF strength to 45 squadrons.

 

The Indo-Pakistani War of 1965. In 1965, the IAF gave a good account in the skies and in support of ground operations. Air superiority in specific terms was not contested by either side. IAF provided close air support to help the Army stem Pak armoured thrusts. Eventually, the Pakistan offensive was stopped, and the war ceased. After the war, the IAF continued to acquire modern combat aircraft and had 39 combat aircraft squadrons by 1971. It also improved tactics and techniques based on the lessons of the 1965 war. IAF decided the war priorities in sequence to be air defence, support to surface forces, and offensive action to counter or neutralise or counter the enemy air.

 

The Indo-Pakistani War of 1971. In 1971 the IAF was in much better shape in qualitative and quantitative terms than the PAF. This was the first time the IAF actively engaged the enemy air force. IAF achieved complete air superiority over the eastern wing of Pakistan within a few days. Air operations included close air support and air cover to the Indian Army, independent raid missions against Pakistani Air Force bases, assistance to Indian Navy in maritime operations, offensive attacks on enemy armour, and strategic bombing. IAF played a pivotal role in the victory, leading to the liberation of Bangladesh, and it was probably the high point for the IAF. In this war, IAF carried out all air campaigns in parallel.

 

Modernization and Expansion (1980-2000): To retain relevance in the evolving operational environment with the induction of modern aircraft and systems in the immediate neighbourhood, in the 1980s and 1990s, the IAF modernised itself with advanced aircraft, weapons, and sensors, and expanded its capabilities to include strategic airlift.

 

Power Projection Abroad. During 1987-90 IAF was involved with operations in Sri Lanka and Maldives. IAF established an “air bridge” between mainland India and Sri Lanka for the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF). Although combat aircraft were not used, IAF helicopters provided fire support for the army. In 1988, IAF undertook Operation Cactus, wherein, it flew at least a battalion of paratroopers, more than 1000 Miles away to Maldives when rebels attempted to overthrow the government. In these operations, the IAF demonstrated its ability to project forces on short notice.

 

Kargil Operations 1999. Kargil operations demonstrated once again the impact of air power in the achievement of objectives. The IAF flew hundreds of strike missions supported by combat patrols and escorts. Air power was employed in a very innovative way in high altitudes. The Kargil War forced the IAF to rethink aerial strategies as it attempted to orchestrate an aerial campaign at altitudes of 14,000 to 18,000 feet against well-camouflaged targets.

 

Balakot Strike. A game-changer shift took place on 26 February 2019, when India decided to use offensive air power by carrying out deep strikes against targets in Pakistan even beyond the Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK). The myth about the use of air power being escalatory in nature was broken.

 

Strategic Transformation. Originally the IAF had formed purely for the requirements of the British interests of its Empire, its roles and responsibilities were limited to tactical applications of air power. Post-independence also the application of air power continued to remain tactical in nature. It was only in 1971 that the IAF carried out strategic effect-based operations with air campaigns in parallel. In the first decade of this century, IAF inducted airborne early warning, and aerial refuelling capability leading to an increase in strategic reach along with conventional deterrence. The transformation of the Indian Air Force from a tactical air power to a strategic one had begun, and subsequently, the pace picked up for it to become a broad-spectrum air force in future.

 

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Disclaimer:

Information and data included in the blog are for educational & non-commercial purposes only and have been carefully adapted, excerpted, or edited from sources deemed reliable and accurate. All copyrighted material belongs to respective owners and is provided only for purposes of wider dissemination.

 

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