504: HELLSCAPE VS DRAGONSCAPE: BATTLE OF AUTONOMOUS MACHINES

 

 

 

My Article published on the Newsanalytics Journal

 

 

China’s rise as a global power is multifaceted, encompassing economic growth, technological advancements, military modernisation, and increasing geopolitical influence. However, in some ways, the Chinese seem to be in a medieval thought process. Their aspirations are guided by the principle that “a strong empire expands and a weaker empire shrinks”. China’s expansionist strategies are driven by securing its national interests, asserting its status as a global power, and reshaping the international order, favouring its long-term strategic goals. These efforts, however, lead to tensions and pushback from other nations, contributing to a complex and often contentious international environment.

 

One China Policy. The “One China Policy” is a cornerstone of diplomatic relations between China and other countries. It asserts that there is only one China, and Taiwan is an inseparable part of it. This policy is crucial to understanding China’s foreign relations, particularly with the United States and other Western countries. Beijing regards Taiwan as part of China to be reunited at any cost. Taiwan has developed a distinct identity with a democratic political system, vibrant civil society, and robust economy, differing significantly from mainland China. Taiwan seeks peaceful relations with mainland China but resists unification under the terms proposed by Beijing. Many Taiwanese prefer maintaining the status quo rather than pursuing formal independence or unification. The One China Policy is a sensitive issue in U.S.-China relations. The U.S. acknowledges the One China Policy but maintains ties with Taiwan through the Taiwan Relations Act (1979), allowing commercial, cultural, and other exchanges. The US is the island’s biggest supplier of arms. In recent years, tensions have escalated due to factors such as the PRC’s military activities near Taiwan, increased U.S. support for Taiwan, and Taiwan’s efforts to gain greater international recognition.

 

Unification Plans. China is increasingly getting ready for the unification of Taiwan. It is reported that Beijing has increased its defence budget in recent years and is the second highest behind the US. China is building its military and nuclear arsenal at a rapid pace. PLA has commissioned over 400 new fighter jets and 20 warships in the last few years and doubled its ballistic and cruise missile inventory. China is also building a fourth amphibious landing craft. Xi has called for China to build a “world-class military” by 2027 when the PLA marks 100 years since its founding. These signs suggest the country is sticking to its ambitions of reuniting the self-ruled island with China “by force if necessary.”

 

Salami Slicing and Cabbage Strategy. China believes in Sun Tzu’s philosophy of subduing the enemy without fighting. It prefers salami-slicing rather than overt aggression, i.e., gaining strategic advantage through a steady progression of small actions. It limits adversaries’ options by baffling their plans and making it problematic for them to develop a response. Beijing will continue to apply military and economic pressure and public messaging and influence activities while promoting long-term cross-strait economic and social integration to induce Taiwan to move toward unification. PLA also uses the “cabbage strategy” to seize control of islands. This strategy involves surrounding and wrapping the island in successive layers of Chinese naval ships, China Coast Guard ships, and fishing boats and cutting off the island from outside support.

 

Grey Zone Activities. Beijing’s recent military and ‘grey-zone’ manoeuvres near Taiwan have raised the spectre of a potential conflict. These actions include repeated war games, simulations, combat training, aerial and sea incursions, and encirclement of the island nation. The Chinese forces have conducted military drills around Taiwan and claim that they can impose and maintain a blockade on an island using different types of drones. At the same time, the warships and submarines prowled the surrounding waters. The Chinese actions prompted the USA to announce its new strategy dubbed “Hellscape.”

 

 

US Hellscape Strategy. The strategy assumes that China, learning from the Russian stalemate in the Ukraine war, will launch a mass drone and missile attack to overwhelm Taiwan with little warning. In this scenario, when the Chinese invasion fleet moves out from its ports to sail towards Taiwan to cross the 100-mile (160-kilometre) wide Taiwan Straits, the US military will flood the waterway with thousands of swarm unmanned underwater and surface vessels, apart from kamikaze drones and loitering munitions. The intention is to turn the Taiwan Strait into an unmanned hellscape, making the life of the invading Chinese fleet miserable, to harass, distract, and delay them, creating a barrier and buying crucial time for the U.S. and its allies to respond. The recent Ukrainian strategy inspires this strategy, but the US will use a lot of artificial intelligence and machine learning to detect, identify, and harass the Chinese ships crossing the straits. The US plans to deploy many cheap, unmanned drones across multiple domains—air, sea, and land. The drones are designed to function autonomously, even in environments with limited or disrupted communications, and succeed independently on the battlefield. The idea is to counter China’s advantage of mass (i.e., ships, missiles, and drones) with smarter mass, creating an asymmetric advantage.

 

Replicator Programme. The US has already started to work on its hellscape strategy plan. The US Department of Defense (DoD) has given a billion dollars to a program called “Replicator.” This program will build swarms of thousands of UUVs, USVs, and loitering munitions within the next two years. These cost-effective, dependable drones would be produced close to the battlefield at a fraction of the cost of traditional weapons systems. The targeting data across the theatre is also being integrated through the Assault Breaker II programme of the Defence Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA).

 

 

The strategy of Mass vs Smarter Mass. The United States military strategy often incorporates overwhelming force (mass) and advanced technology, which can create a “hellscape” for adversaries. This approach leverages the U.S.’s technological edge and substantial military resources to achieve rapid and decisive victories in conflicts. In this case, China is no pushover and has comparable technological prowess. The success of their respective strategies would depend on technologically advanced autonomous platforms. It is bound to create an arms race between the two camps. The strategy’s success also relies on the speed of subsequent response by the US and its allies.

 

Ramifications. Taiwan is in a crucial geopolitical location in East Asia, making it a significant point of interest for regional and global powers. The USA’s Hellscape strategy and the Chinese plan to counter it have stimulated a “war of words” with a highly contentious and hostile exchange of rhetoric and aggressive, inflammatory, and vitriolic language. A potential war over Taiwan would indeed be complex and potentially catastrophic, with far-reaching consequences for the involved parties and the world.

 

    • The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is one of the world’s largest and rapidly modernising militaries. A conflict involving China would likely involve advanced weaponry, cyber warfare, and significant military assets. Taiwan has a well-equipped and highly motivated military, with substantial investments in defence technologies and support from allies like the United States. The U.S. has a longstanding commitment to Taiwan’s defence through the Taiwan Relations Act. Any conflict would likely draw in U.S. military forces and other regional allies, escalating the situation.

 

    • Taiwan is a major global technology and manufacturing player, particularly in semiconductors. A conflict could disrupt international supply chains and have severe economic repercussions worldwide. The economies of East Asia are highly interconnected, and a war could destabilise the entire region.

 

    • Both sides will likely engage in cyber warfare, targeting critical infrastructure, communication networks, and financial systems, which could have widespread and long-lasting effects.

 

    • While less likely, any escalation involving nuclear-armed states like the United States and China carries the risk of a nuclear confrontation, which would have devastating consequences.

 

 

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References and credits

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  1. Swarajya Staff, “Can China Counter United States’ ‘Hellscape’ Plan When Invading Taiwan?” Swarajya website, 13 Jun 2024.
  1. FP Staff, ”What is the ‘Hellscape’ strategy the US is planning to use on China if it invades Taiwan?” First Post website, 11 Jun 2024.
  1. Keoni Everington, “US plans ‘hellscape’ of drones if China invades Taiwan”, Taiwan News website, 11 Jun 2024.
  1. John Grady, “‘Hellscape’ Swarms Could Be as Cost Effective Taiwan Defense”, USNI News, 02 July 2024.
  1. Joe Saballa, “China ‘on Track’ for Potential Taiwan Invasion by 2027”, The Defence Post website, 22 Mar 2024.
  1. Jesse Johnson, “China on track to be ready to invade Taiwan by 2027,” The Japan Times website, 21 March 2024.
  1. Abhinav Singh, “China plans to use drones to blockade Taiwan after the US unveils ‘Hellscape’ strategy”, Wion website, 07 Jul 2024.
  1. Ujjwal Shrotryia, “US Has A Nasty Surprise For China If It Tries To Invade Taiwan — Hellscape”, Swarajya website, 11 Jun 24.

 

Disclaimer:

Information and data included in the blog are for educational & non-commercial purposes only and have been carefully adapted, excerpted, or edited from reliable and accurate sources. All copyrighted material belongs to respective owners and is provided only for wider dissemination.

497: CHINA’S MILITARY REORGANISATION: A STORY OF EVOLUTION AND REVERSION  

 

 

My Article published in the Newsanalytics journal

 

China’s military modernisation has been a critical focus for the Chinese government over the past few decades. This process involves significant investments in technology, equipment, training, and organisational reforms to transform the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) into a world-class military force. China has a set target of 2027, the year of its centenary, to achieve its modernisation goals, paving the way for it to become a “world-class” military power by 2049.

 

China’s military reorganisation is crucial to its broader modernisation efforts to transform the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) into a more efficient, capable, and flexible force. The process involved several vital reforms and structural changes, including the establishment of the Joint Staff Department, the creation of the Central Military Commission (CMC), the formation of Theatre Commands, and the reorganisation of Military Services and Branches. The reforms have implications for regional security dynamics and are closely watched by other countries.

 

Reorganisation. Significant military and state security apparatus reforms have been implemented under the leadership of Xi Jinping, who assumed China’s presidency on 14 March 2013. Xi’s military restructuring has been guided by the long-term strategic purpose of national rejuvenation and the need to respond to the conflicts of the 21st century. The reorganisation began in 2015 and included renaming the Second Artillery the Rocket Force, creating a Joint Logistics Force, and establishing the Strategic Support Force (SSF). All of these measures were intended towards the approach that “The CMC governs, services train and equip, and the theatres fight.”

 

Strategic Support Force. The China Joint Strategic Support Force (SSF) was established on December 31, 2015, as part of the broader military reforms to modernise and integrate various aspects of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). Creating the Strategic Support Force (SSF) was a unique and innovative move that showcased China’s strategic thinking. It was designed as a cross-discipline, multi-domain warfare force, a concept that had no equivalent in any other military. The SSF was intended to consolidate space, cyber, electronic, and psychological warfare capabilities under one umbrella, making it a crucial and formidable component of China’s military strategy.

 

Reversion. On 19 April 2024, the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) Central Military Commission (CMC) announced the end of the PLA’s Strategic Support Force (SSF), the creation of a new Information Support Force (ISF), and the re-designation of The SSF’s Aerospace Systems and Network Systems departments as the Aerospace Force (ASF) and Cyberspace Force (CSF) respectively. These forces can be considered PLA equivalents to US functional combatant commands, non-geographically defined joint-force structures intended to support services and military theatres by providing critical capabilities and operations in strategic domains of warfare. These three organisations will manage offensive and defensive PLA information capabilities, including communications networks, global and space-based ISR capabilities, and offensive and defensive cyber and electronic warfare. They will operate alongside the Joint Logistics Support Force, established in 2016, and report directly to the PLA’s CMC, making the new “4+4″ military structure directly subordinate to the Central Military Commission. The CMC, headed by Xi, is the top party organ in charge of China’s military and paramilitary forces.

 

Possible Reasons. While the exact reasons behind this significant reshuffle remain a mystery, it’s clear that a complex interplay of factors related to military capability and political control influenced this decision. The potential reasons for this change are numerous and open to speculative interpretation, underscoring the significant impact of this event and its potential to reshape the military landscape.

 

    • CMC’s dissatisfaction with the SSF’s performance is a possible reason. The SSF had become a bloated organisation due to the integration of various departments. Even after eight years, the SSF’s elements could not be integrated and operated as separate entities.

 

    • Political considerations may also have led to the organisational change. As the information and space domains (and related capability development) intersect with areas of political sensitivity and China’s foreign affairs, a desire to gain greater control may have been the reason for the restructure. By removing the layers of bureaucracy between the CMC and the ASF, CSF and ISF, Xi gains greater oversight of the strategic force.

 

    • Speculation on motive includes the possibility of corruption at the highest levels. Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption campaign has regularly targeted commanders and generals. The disappearance from public view of the former SSF commander, General Ju Qiansheng, and the former SSF Deputy Commander, Lieutenant General Shang Hong (responsible for the former SSF Aerospace Systems Department), has led to speculation of corruption in the SSF akin to the Rocket Force.

 

    • Recent ongoing wars between Russia and Ukraine and between Israel and Hamas have demonstrated the importance of shaping the public perception of a conflict and flexibility in the release and use of resources in cyber, space, information and electronic domains. Strategic Support Force was an unnecessary layer in the command and control chain.

 

Information Support Force (ISF). The People’s Liberation Army’s Information Support Force (ISF) replaced the former Strategic Support Force (SSF). This restructuring is part of a broader effort to enhance the PLA’s capabilities in information warfare and streamline its command structure. The ISF has been assigned the functions of the former Information Communication Base (ICB) and elevated from a corps-grade organisation to a deputy theatre-grade organisation. The ISF and the other three arms are now one grade lower than the PLA’s five theatre commands and each of the four services. The ISF would be crucial in integrating and coordinating various information systems across the PLA, ensuring it operates efficiently in modern, informatised warfare.

 

Implications. The creation of the ISF underscores the importance the Chinese leadership places on information operations and cyber warfare. PLA no longer sees information warfare as a tactical or operational resource but as a strategic outcome. The restructuring reflects an ongoing adaptation to modern military needs, particularly in the cyber, space, and information security domains, which are increasingly critical in contemporary multi-domain conflicts. Xi Jinping, the CMC, and the PLA are unwavering in their pursuit of dominance in information warfare. This strategic goal will remain a key focus, regardless of the challenges and changes that may arise, even if it entails slippage in the 2027 deadline for PLA to be fully modernised.

 

Improved Efficiency. The ISF, along with the newly formed Cyberspace Force and Aerospace Force, will be under the direct control of the Central Military Commission (CMC). The CMC has restructured the PLA’s overall hierarchy, directly overseeing four services, five joint-force military theatres, and four joint support forces. This reorganisation, aimed at streamlining command and reducing management layers, will ensure more direct oversight and quicker decision-making, enhancing China’s military efficiency.

 

Indian Perspective. China’s military modernisation and evolving reorganisation present a complex array of strategic challenges and implications for India. In the future, India, like other countries, will face confronting situations and be compelled to respond. China’s focus on these warfare domains signals a shift towards newer forms of warfare, where information, cyber, and space operations could become essential elements of military strategy. The rapid growth of the PLA’s military capabilities and the belligerent attitude of China necessitates enhancing India’s military capabilities on priority. India needs to reorient and reorganise to develop a warfare capability in the strategic domains of space, cyber, electromagnetic, and information.

 

It is too soon to predict the effect of recent developments on the PLA’s ability to fight and win wars. Notwithstanding, the PLA’s restructuring is a significant development that will have far-reaching implications for China’s military capabilities and strategic posture. It reflects China’s growing emphasis on modernising its military and developing advanced cyber and space warfare capabilities. It reflects a clear shift in China’s military strategy and doctrine. The PLA’s new structure will enable it to operate more effectively in a rapidly changing global security environment and enhance China’s ability to project its power and influence beyond its borders. The evolutionary process may provide additional time for the affected countries to take appropriate measures to face future challenges.

 

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References:-

  1. Matt Bruzzese and Peter W. Singer “Farewell to China’s Strategic Support Force”, Defenseone, 28 Apr 2024.
  1. Dean Cheng, “Why Xi created a new Information Support Force, and why now”, Breaking Defense Indo-Pacific, 29 Apr 2024.
  1. Kartik Bommakanti, “China removes the PLASSF and establishes ISF: Implications for India”, Observer Research Foundation, 15 May 2024.
  1. Joe McReynolds and John Costello, “Planned Obsolescence: The Strategic Support Force In Memoriam (2015-2024)”, The Jamestown Foundation, 26 Apr 2024.
  1. Tenzin Younten, “China’s Latest Military Reorganization Terminates the PLA SSF & launches Three New Arm Forces based on it: Strategic implications of the PLA’s latest Reforms and Structural Changes”, 26 Apr 2024.
  1. Joe Keary, “Four services and four arms lifts CCP control over information warfare”, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 24 May 2024.
  1. Kalpit A Mankar and Satyam Singh, “Tracking China’s moves on information warfare”, Observer Research Foundation, 22 May 2024.
  1. Amber Wang, “New force for China’s PLA eyes modern warfare information support”, South China Morning Post, 23 Apr 2024.
  1. Lindsay Maizland, “China’s Modernizing Military”, Council on Foreign Relations, 05 Feb 2020.

Disclaimer:

Information and data included in the blog are for educational & non-commercial purposes only and have been carefully adapted, excerpted, or edited from reliable and accurate sources. All copyrighted material belongs to respective owners and is provided only for wider dissemination.

INDIAN AIR FORCE CHALLENGES AND FUTURE TRAJECTORY

 

 

My Article published in the News Analytics Journal Jul 2024.

 

 

India faces two nuclear-powered inimical neighbours. China is emerging as a major regional power with the aspiration to be a global power, and her desire to dominate Asia and, finally, the world has implications for India. India’s relations with China have changed from cooperative to competitive to combative. China sees India as a competitor and would like to keep India off-balance. On the other hand, Pakistan remains a security threat and continues to use non-state actors to maintain a situation of unrest. Asymmetric warfare will remain an instrument of its state policy. These two countries have a close and longstanding strategic partnership that includes cooperation even in areas of defence and security. Pakistan openly boasts of collusive support from China in case of a war with India. Due to its unique geographical location and geopolitical environment, India faces a collusive threat with significant chances of military conflict. Therefore, her national interest dictates that the country be able to deter her inimical neighbours from any military misadventure, either singly or collusively.

 

China’s warfare strategy focuses on developing a modern and capable force to support its national security interests and regional/global ambitions. The Chinese forces are undergoing significant modernisation and expansion at a rapid pace, with particular emphasis on developing advanced technologies and capabilities. China’s investment and progress in space-based systems, quantum technology, unmanned platforms, hypersonic weapons, directed energy weapons, etc., will give it surveillance and precision strike capability with lightning speeds.

 

India’s military aspirations must align with its socioeconomic condition and likely threats. The path forward for India is clear: it must enhance its deterrence capability while investing in future war-fighting technologies. With its significant offensive potential and responsiveness, air power is the most crucial arm of military action.  The Indian Air Force (IAF), like air power in the last century, has evolved to reflect changes in technology, doctrine, and strategic priorities. However, it must continuously adapt to the existing and changing environment to build focused capabilities. The IAF will have to create deterrence and be able to dominate the air. The IAF must remain adaptive and agile to win wars in a network-centric battlefield with conflicts varying across the complete threat spectrum. Identifying focus areas and developing assets, platforms, facilitators, and infrastructure is essential. While several issues are vital requirements, the main pillars are trained manpower, combat leadership, combat sustenance resources, and sound strategy. The IAF must focus on capability building and adopt a multidisciplinary and integrated war-fighting approach.

 

 

The IAF should expand its investments in advanced munitions, combat support aircraft, electronic warfare, and physical infrastructure. Boosting the IAF’s fighter force strength should be a top priority, maintaining a balance between quantity and quality. An adequate number of combat support platforms should follow. Air Defence has evolved from point defence to offensive defence, with the spectrum expanding to cater for sub-conventional threats to long-range hypersonic weapons. Appropriate weapons, systems, and networks need to be added. The weapon list should provide various options, including high-tech, long-range smart weapon systems with increased accuracy and assurance. Air combat support and protective infrastructure are essential. The IAF’s networking capability has evolved well and is applied to air defence, air ops planning, maintenance, and logistics functions. However, there is still room for further progress and integration of new inductions.

 

The Indian Air Force, as a technology-intensive service, must continuously incorporate modern, cutting-edge equipment and technology. Technology’s profound influence on air strategy is a significant driver of innovation and evolution. Investing in emerging technologies is necessary and exciting, opening up new possibilities. Future technologies impacting the air war, such as Quantum computing, Hypersonic weapon systems, Artificial Intelligence, Robotics, Nanotechnology, Unmanned platforms, Drones and swarm technology, and Network-centric environment / Internet of things/system of systems, are on the horizon. Impetus is also required for some of the existing aviation-related programs like fifth-generation fighters, Transport aircraft (for civil and military requirements), Development of gas turbines and engines, sensors and seekers,  stealth, metallurgy and composites, unmanned platforms and swarms, AI-enabled autonomous systems and long-range vectors.

 

A strategic focus is required for a medium-term and long-term technology plan supported by adequate budget allocation. A suitable ecosystem needs to be developed to harness these dual-use technologies. IAF must define a defence science and technology strategy with a vision to harness technology and convert it into decisive capability. The following focus areas are advocated, with a particular emphasis on Indigenous defence production capability:-

 

    • Situational Awareness & Decision Making. One effect of advanced technology on air warfare is the increased pace and intensity of air operations. In such a scenario, the decision-making process must quickly keep up with the OODA cycle. The three most important contributing factors are high situational awareness, a robust and fast network system for information sharing, and AI-based decision-support systems.

 

    • Space-Based Capabilities. The term airpower has changed to aerospace power, with the aerial warfare envelope expanding to the space domain. Space-based systems and applications are embedded in every aspect of aerial warfare. The involvement of space-based equipment and systems is even more significant in Grey zone warfare. Space-based systems are becoming increasingly crucial in air warfare, providing capabilities such as navigation, targeting, communication, early warning of missile launches and space-based surveillance.  The integration of these systems with air assets is expected to continue, providing new opportunities for crucial offensive and defensive operations.

 

    • Hypersonic Weapons. The development of hypersonic weapons is likely to impact air strategy significantly. Hypersonic weapons provide new opportunities for rapid response and long-range strike capabilities with precision. They also pose new challenges in terms of protection and air defence.  The high speed and unpredictability of hypersonic weapons will require the development of new air defence strategies, as traditional air defence systems may be unable to detect or intercept these weapons. This could lead to the development of new technologies, such as directed energy weapons or advanced sensors, to counter the threat posed by hypersonic weapons. Also, protective infrastructure would be required to withstand these weapons’ destructive power.

 

    • Unmanned Platforms. The use of unmanned platforms and systems is growing in warfare. This shift is expected to continue as technology advances and the capabilities of unmanned systems improve further. Drones of various sizes and capabilities are taking over the tasks of conventional platforms. Their use is spread across the entire spectrum of threats, ranging from sub-conventional and conventional to long-range attacks. Investment in anti-drone systems is also a need of the hour.

 

    • Sixth Generation Aircraft. Sixth-generation aircraft are still in the development phase; however, based on current trends in air technology, sixth-generation aircraft will likely have several key features that will shape air strategy in the future. They are likely to have increased automation with advanced AI and machine learning algorithms that will enable autonomous decision-making and allow them to adapt to changing situations quickly. They would also have enhanced stealth capabilities, making them virtually invisible to radar and other detection systems. Integrated sensor systems in these aircraft will provide comprehensive situational awareness and the ability to engage targets with great precision. Sixth-generation aircraft are expected to significantly impact air strategy in the future, with their advanced capabilities enabling air forces to operate with greater autonomy and strike enemy targets with unprecedented precision and speed. However, as with any new technology, challenges may be associated with introducing sixth-generation aircraft, including developing new tactics, training programs, and support infrastructure to realise their full potential.

 

    • Loyal Wing Man Concept. Both piloted and unmanned platforms have their respective advantages and disadvantages. The thought process for the next generation of platforms is to harness the benefits of both and develop networked systems wherein both can work in an integrated manner. Research is being done in many countries on the “loyal wingman” concept.

 

Indian Air Force has always encouraged the development of indigenous defence production capability, and it is one of its key result areas. It has played an essential role in creating an aerospace ecosystem in India and has been operating indigenously built aircraft and aircraft built in India under licence production. This has given impetus to indigenous industry in the past and will continue to support it in future. The critical thing to remember is that while supporting self-reliance, the minimum level of deterrence capability must always be maintained.

 

 

Perceived threats and challenges to national security, calling for immediate and substantial measures to enhance IAF’s war-fighting capacity and capability. Capability building entails a long gestation period. The IAF should continue prioritising modernisation efforts, including acquiring advanced aircraft, weapons systems, and sensors. This will enable the IAF to maintain a technological edge over potential adversaries and respond effectively to emerging threats. The IAF should concentrate on new areas of capability development, such as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), cyber warfare, and space-based systems. These capabilities will enhance its ability to conduct various operations, from intelligence gathering to precision strikes. Operational preparedness includes reviewing doctrines, strategy and tactics, organisational structures, human resource adaptation, training, and maintenance and logistics concepts.

 

IAF must think differently to tackle various asymmetric and non-traditional security threats. This would require more innovative, out-of-the-box solutions that leverage the prevalent technology. Overall, the IAF should strive to balance traditional air power capabilities and emerging areas of strategic importance. This will enable the IAF to defend India’s air space and national security interests while contributing to the broader role of nation-building, regional stability and humanitarian assistance.

 

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References and credits

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References

  1. Air Marshal Anil Chopra (Retd), “Air Power Transformational Challenges India”, Air Power Asia.
  2. Basic Doctrines of the Indian Air Force 1995, 2012 and 2022.
  3. Ashley J Tellis, “Troubles They Come In Battalion”, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2016.
  4. Air Mshl Anil Chopra (Retd), “IAF modernisation challenges ahead”, South Asia defence and strategic review.
  5. Vivek Kapur, “IAF Equipment & Force Structure Requirements to Meet External Threats, 2032”, MPIDSA, 2014.
  6. “Interview with CAS and articles in IAF”, IAF anniversary issue of Chanakya Aerospace, defence and maritime review, 2018.
  7. Gp Capt AK Sachdeva(Retd), “Rebuilding the IAF fighter fleet”, SP’s Aviation issue 2, 2019.
  8. Sanjay Badri-Maharaj, “Indian Air Force at 86: options and challenges”, Vayu V/2018.
  9. Gp Capt J Noronha (Retd), “Strength lies in numbers: Rebuilding the combat fleet of IAF”, Indian Defence Review Oct-Dec 18.
  10. Air Marshal Dhiraj Kukreja, “IAF 2020 and beyond”, Indian Defence Review, Jan – Mar 17.

Disclaimer:

Information and data included in the blog are for educational & non-commercial purposes only and have been carefully adapted, excerpted, or edited from reliable and accurate sources. All copyrighted material belongs to respective owners and is provided only for wider dissemination.