COUNTERING HYPERSONIC WEAPON THREAT: A DIFFICULT BUT MANAGEABLE PROBLEM

 

Article published on the Chanakya Forum Site.

 

Depiction of Aegis Layered Hypersonic Defense

Source: Missile Defense Agency.

Introduction

Decades ago, ballistic missile defence was developed to intercept predictable targets outside the atmosphere. Since then, the missile threat spectrum has broadened, becoming more endo-atmospheric and manoeuvrable. Hypersonic weapons, a new breed of threat, combine the speed and range of ballistic missiles with a cruise missile’s low-altitude and manoeuvrable flight profile. Defending against hypersonic missiles is not just necessary; it’s a complex and formidable challenge that demands new designs, capabilities, and operational concepts.

 

While finding a technologically possible and fiscally affordable solution isn’t easy, it’s crucial to recognise that existing defence frameworks, despite not explicitly designed for hypersonic threats, hold significant potential to counter them. This potential should inspire a new way of thinking and a different approach from those employed for legacy ballistic and cruise missile defence systems. The characteristics that make hypersonic missiles attractive may also be the key to defeating them.  Instead of thinking about hypersonic defence as an adjunct to the legacy ballistic missile defence, it will be better to learn from it and develop new defence capabilities, with a mix of active and passive measures, to meet the new challenges. 

 

Attributes & Challenges

 

Hypersonic weapons, with their staggering speed over Mach 5, or five times the speed of sound, are a force to be reckoned with. They are not just fast; they are agile. While they are often categorised into two types—hypersonic glide vehicles and hypersonic cruise missiles—this classification fails to capture the true diversity of the hypersonic missile threat spectrum. It’s not just about speed. Long-range ballistic missiles can reach similar or greater speeds as they re-enter the atmosphere. What sets hypersonic weapons apart is their ability to sustain these speeds at altitudes below those of most ballistic missiles and, most importantly, their manoeuvrability. They operate at altitudes below 100 km, where space is often said to begin, and typically around 20 to 60 km, above the ceilings of most aircraft and cruise missiles. This unique combination of high speed, lower altitude, and manoeuvrability makes it incredibly difficult to predict the trajectories of hypersonic weapons, especially with terrestrial sensors, posing a significant challenge to the existing defence systems.

 

Source: CSIS Missile Defense Project.

 

At speeds around Mach 5, flying objects encounter thermal and aerodynamic phenomena distinct from those experienced in supersonic and exo-atmospheric flight. These phenomena involve extreme temperatures and aero-thermal interactions on the vehicle surface. Of particular importance are the remarkable amounts of flow friction and viscous dissipation encountered by the hypersonic vehicle, which leads to substantial temperature increases, the dissociation and ionisation of surrounding gases, and the formation of plasmas. Hypersonic weapons must survive this environment for a sustained period, which poses a unique and significant challenge.

 

Vulnerabilities

 

The phenomena of sustained hypersonic flight offer specific vulnerabilities. Some of the same characteristics that make advanced hypersonic missiles desirable present opportunities that could be exploited. Each feature that gives hypersonic weapons an advantage comes with a cost. Extended flight through the atmosphere may expose them to new failure modes.

 

    • Their ability to manoeuvre comes at the cost of expending energy and range.

 

    • Hypersonic weapons experience challenging aero-thermal conditions that strain the limits of current guidance, control, and materials technologies.

 

    • After Re-entering the atmosphere, the hypersonic glide vehicle experiences extreme pressures, vibrations, and temperatures. The vehicle’s surrounding atmosphere dissociates into a plasma in such an environment, reacting violently with the airframe’s surface.

 

    • Ensuring reliable performance in this environment often requires exotic materials and highly integrated designs, especially for higher speeds.

 

    • Minor alterations in the basic shape or weight distribution in a hypersonic vehicle’s airframe, for instance, can have downstream effects on thermal and propulsion system performance and accuracy.

 

    • Hypersonic systems are challenging to design and operate partly because their performance variables are closely coupled.

 

Defence Is Possible

 

Hypersonic missiles are not invincible. They are not the ultimate threat. Hypersonic missile defence is not only possible, but it’s also within reach. However, achieving it requires a fresh perspective on existing defence designs and a willingness to approach the problem differently. Hypersonic weapons have certain limitations that ballistic and cruise missiles do not. By targeting the specific characteristics of hypersonic flight, one can break the problem into manageable portions. Just as ballistic missile defence was oriented around the predictability of a ballistic trajectory, the hypersonic defence can also be tailored to the vulnerabilities of the hypersonic flight regime, offering a glimmer of hope in the face of this evolving threat.

 

The characteristic challenges of hypersonic flight raise intriguing possibilities for a defence system. By definition, hypersonic gliders expend energy while performing manoeuvres. A defence design that encourages manoeuvres early can often exploit those actions’ cost. Moreover, the severe conditions of hypersonic flight—the risk of boundary layer transition and the need for shock wave management—create vulnerabilities that different kill mechanisms can exploit. Minor impacts or perturbations may disrupt hypersonic weapons to their structure or surrounding airflow.

 

 Defence System Architecture

 

These systems must employ multiple defeat mechanisms, such as kinetic effectors, electronic warfare, and various classes and types of directed-energy systems.

 

Space-Based Sensors. A vital element for a hypersonic defence program is a resilient and persistent space sensor layer capable of observing, classifying, and tracking missile threats of all types, azimuths, and trajectories. Elevated sensors are necessary to resolve surface-based systems’ range and mobility challenges. Space-based sensors would enable a “launch to impact” tracking capability. Such a capability would be critical for disrupting or defeating hypersonic weapons early in flight, where interception is easier and follow-up shots are possible. The information from those sensors must be fused into a single picture to identify how many missiles have been launched, where they are, and where they are going, all necessary information for defeating them.

Interception. The second most crucial element is the glide-phase interception. Engaging hypersonic threats earlier in flight will be necessary for area defence rather than point defence. A comprehensive, integrated and layered approach would be beneficial. Direct hit interceptors would have to be supplemented and integrated with wide area measures, including high-powered microwave systems and other means to target vulnerabilities of the hypersonic flight regime. Loitering airborne platforms carrying interceptors, sensors, or alternative kill mechanisms could also increase a defensive system’s range. Kinetic interceptors benefit from being launched at higher altitudes, conserving the disproportionate amount of fuel needed to accelerate from the surface and through the thicker lower atmosphere. Multiple aircraft or unmanned platforms would be required to maintain continuous coverage.

Twenty-First Century Flak. Defence against highly manoeuvring hypersonic missiles may require wide-area defences. Here, “layered defence” differs from the legacy concept of a linear interception sequence. Other layers or kill mechanisms do not merely catch what a previous layer missed but cumulatively stack together to degrade a given threat. Instead of relying only on a fast, single-purpose interceptor with a highly agile kill vehicle, interceptors with alternative payloads may be able to present hypersonic weapons with multiple challenges together. One such possibility is a twenty-first-century version of “dust defence.” Missiles or airborne platforms could dispense particulate matter to disrupt or destroy hypersonic weapons. At hypersonic velocities, missile impact against atmospheric dust, rain, and other particles can encounter bullet-like kinetic energies, triggering unpredictable aerodynamic, thermal, and structural disruptions.

 

Directed Energy Weapons. Directed-energy systems offer another alternative to tackle hypersonic attacks. Unlike kinetic weapons, directed-energy weapons may offer large magazine capacities, significantly lower cost per shot, and more straightforward guidance requirements. Although limited mainly by their direct line of sight, directed-energy systems may be suited for augmenting terminal defences or basing close to adversary launch positions. The prospect of using lasers for hypersonic defence has been the subject of considerable debate. Recent technical advances promise significant beam power increases with smaller size, weight, and power demands.

High-powered Microwave (HPM). These weapons represent another directed-energy option for hypersonic defence. High-powered microwave weapons could exploit vulnerabilities in hypersonic weapons’ communications systems and radiation shielding to achieve mission kill. Depending on the extent of damage, a microwave weapon could achieve complete or partial mission kill, disrupting a vehicle’s ability to navigate, arm its warhead, or maintain level flight. Microwave radiation can enter a hypersonic weapon through antennae operating at the same frequency as other unshielded vehicle elements, damaging internal electronics. HPMs are less sensitive to weather conditions than lasers and do not require sophisticated aiming or optical compensation systems. Sensor data that is less precise than that needed for kinetic interceptor fire control could be enough to cue HPMs. Given their considerably shorter range, HPMs may benefit from different platforms and basing modes. For the hypersonic defence mission, HPMs might be deployed on loitering unmanned aircraft as a non-kinetic obstacle. Alternatively, an HPM payload could be delivered to the general vicinity of an incoming target by an interceptor booster or other platform.

 

Modular Payloads. A comprehensive approach to hypersonic defence might include an interceptor or other platform capable of accommodating multiple payload types, such as blast fragmentation, particle dispensing, direct hit weapon, directed energy, or electromagnetic systems. A standard booster system with various warhead types would create doubt about which modalities an attacker needs to overcome and from where.

 

Passive Defence and Deception. Active defence alone cannot contend with the expected volume of the hypersonic, cruise, and advanced ballistic missiles. The passive defence must also play an increased role in a comprehensive approach to countering advanced hypersonic threats. Forward-deployed forces must, above all, frustrate adversary targeting. In the near term, existing bases could use dispersal, decoys, camouflage, and other forms of deception to confound hypersonic weapons’ terminal guidance systems.

 

Evolutionary Approach

 

The experiences gained from legacy air and missile defences can be leveraged. These include terrestrial radar tracking, space-based sensing and communication, low-latency networking, and battle management modernisation. Hypersonic defences can and should emerge from an evolution of existing frameworks rather than as a new, standalone solution. Given its global reach and integrated development, today’s Ballistic Missile Defence System (BMDS) is the most promising major defence acquisition program to adapt to the hypersonic defence challenge.

 

However, converting the BMDS into the Hypersonic Missile Defence System (HMDS) will require considerable architectural and cultural change. The “scale and urgency of change required” should not be underestimated. By adopting a system-of-systems approach, fielding space sensors and improved interceptors, and employing other imaginative ways to target the unique characteristics of hypersonic flight, the problem of hypersonic defence will be recognisable as a complex but increasingly tractable form of air defence.

 

Conclusion

 

Hypersonic weapons are not silver bullets. A single silver-bullet solution will not meet the challenge of defending against the full spectrum of hypersonic missile threats. Countering hypersonic missiles will require a comprehensive approach, including offensive and defensive methods to deter them. An effective hypersonic defence must include space sensors and a glide-phase interceptor, but it should not stop there. Numerous efforts pursued in tandem across a comprehensive architecture will be necessary to meet the challenge. Alternative kill mechanisms and area weapons would be required. Cyber and electronic warfare may significantly defeat hypersonic threats of all types. Fielding hypersonic defences will require an integrated, layered system-of-systems approach, new sensing and interceptor capabilities, different operational concepts, and doctrinal and organisational changes. Existing doctrine and organisational structure may not be adequate to address the cross-domain threat posed by these high-speed manoeuvring weapons.

 

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COUNTERING HYPERSONIC WEAPON THREAT: A DIFFICULT BUT MANAGEABLE PROBLEM

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References and credits

To all the online sites and channels.

References

  1. Tom Karako and Masao Dahlgren, “Complex Air Defense Countering the Hypersonic Missile Threat” A Report of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) Missile Defence Project Feb 2022.
  1. Rylie White, “An Emerging Threat: The Impact of Hypersonic Weapons on National Security, Crisis Instability, and Deterrence Strategy”, Potomac Institute for Policy Studies.
  1. David Roza, “Why Hypersonic Missiles’ Greatest Strength Also Makes Them Vulnerable”, Air and Space Forces Magazine, Dec 2023.
  1. Col Mandeep Singh, “Countering Hypersonics”, Indian Defence Review, Jan 2024.

 

Disclaimer:

Information and data included in the blog are for educational & non-commercial purposes only and have been carefully adapted, excerpted, or edited from reliable and accurate sources. All copyrighted material belongs to respective owners and is provided only for wider dissemination.

News & Views: DRAGON AT SHIGATSE

 

Pic Courtesy: Allsourceanalysis on Internet

 

On 27 May, a satellite picture revealed that China had deployed its J-20 aircraft at Shigatse airbase in Tibet. The imagery shows six J-20 aircraft, eight J-10 aircraft, and one KJ-500 airborne Early Warning aircraft on the tarmac.

 

These deployments are regularly monitored and recorded. Purpose of these deployments are generally for:-

1. During Peace Time- Operate aircraft from a new base to ascertain and address the short comings / problem areas (including aircraft operations from high altitude area). 

 2. During Peace/No war No Peace conditions – For Political Signalling.

 3. During Pre War Hostile situation – For Strategic Coercion.

4. During Hostilities – For war fighting ( In this case the air assets are dispersed, camouflaged and protected.

 

In this case the aircraft are positioned on the tarmac in a line, not dispersed, camouflaged, or under protected shelters. This deployment seems to be mainly  under number 1 category, and to some extend the second one.

 

 

Pic Coutesy: Internet

 

China claims J-20 to be 5th generation aircraft with superior performance, stealth features, advanced avionics and potent weapon suit. It claims it to be at par with or better than F-22 and F-35 of USA. It carries PL-15 Air to air missile with claimed range of 300 km.

 

These claims have not been demonstrated or proven anywhere during the air shows or air combat exercises. Notwithstanding, credit needs to be given to the adversary and one should prepare for the worst case scenario.

 

 

Pic Courtesy: Internet

 

Shigatse is a dual purpose airfield in Tibet, located at a height of 12,408 ft.  It is located approximately 150 km from the Sikkim LoC and 300 km from Hashimara base.

 

China has been upgrading its air war fighting infrastructure Including 37 airports and heliports) in the Tibet area.

 

Pic Courtesy: Internet

 

The deployment is a significant occurrence considering the prevailing Situation.

 

    • China’s military power and capability is growing rapidly.

 

    • It is displaying a belligerent and aggressive attitude.

 

    • It has expansionist aspirations.

 

    • Having annexed Tibet, it is looking at Taiwan next.

 

    • It has also expressed claims on Arunachal Pradesh.

 

With India, China has been following the policy of “keep the pot boiling”, besides salami slicing and  String of pearls”. In the last decade, major Conflicts (skirmishes / Clashes / Encounters / Scuffles) have taken place at regular interval. In 2017, There was a standoff at Doklam in the Sikkim area. Post Galwan incident three years back, the situation is still not normal with both sides forward deploying their forces. 

 

Possibility of Chinese action in the Eastern sector cannot be ruled out.  This could be as a diversionary tactics for annexation of Taiwan or post Taiwan for annexation of Indian territory.

 

 

India has taken cognisance of the challenge and adopted a multi-prongrd approach to  deal with it.

 

Air power capability is being increased in the eastern sector with stationing and operationalisation of Rafael fighter aircraft, S-400 Air defence system, Combat support aircraft (fixed wing, helicopters, and UAVs). The combat enhancing infrastructure is being developed on a fast track.

 

Question

Are we doing enough and at the required pace?

 

Bottom Line

 We have woken up late and gone into 3rd/4th gear. We need to get into even higher gear.

 

KEEP ALERT & ENHANCE MILITARY CAPABILITY RAPIDLY.

 

Video Bytes to News Channel

 

 

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Ritu’s Column: When Eagles Kept Falcons at Bay

 

 

 

Ritu Sharma is a journalist, with a Master’s Degree in Conflict Studies and Management of Peace from the University of Erfurt, Germany. Her areas of interest include Asia-Pacific, the South China Sea, and Aviation history. She has been writing on subjects related to defence, foreign affairs, and nuclear technology for the last 15 years. She has written for PTI, IANS and The New Indian Express. Presently she is writing for the EurAsian Times.  

 

Her article on Kargil Operations (Op Safed Sagar)  was published on 01 Jun 2024 on “The EurAsian Times”.

 

(Besides the two quotes, the views of the author are her own)

 

When Eagles Kept Falcons At Bay – How IAF’s MiG-29 Fighters Triumphed Pakistan’s F-16s At 18,000 Feet

 

By Ritu Sharma – 01 Jun 2024

 

On May 26, the Indian Air Force (IAF) launched Operation Safed Sagar, which saw the deployment of air power at 18,000 feet. As the intruders, backed by the Pakistan Army, entrenched themselves on the treacherous heights of the Kargil sector, the IAF deployed its entire fleet, and the pounding continued for the next 60 days.

 

On May 21, the IAF launched a Canberra PR57 to conduct a reconnaissance of the Kargil area to assess the extent of intrusion. The aircraft descended to 22,000 feet, just two miles from the LoC, and was just 4,000 feet above the highest Himalayan points. The Canberra sustained a hit on its right engine by what was later determined to have been a Chinese-made Anza infrared surface-to-air missile. This called for a change in tactics by the IAF.

 

The Indian government had given the green light for the use of air power, albeit with one caveat – the Indian fighter jets were not allowed to cross the border with Pakistan. India began the air bombing on May 26 with MiG-21, MiG-23, and MiG-27 fighters carrying out six attacks against intruder camps, materiel dumps, and supply routes.

 

On the second day, the force lost two fighter jets—a MiG-27 and a MiG-21. The Pakistan-backed insurgents were using Stinger, a Man-Portable Air Defence System (MANPADS) that operates as an infrared-homing surface-to-air missile (SAM). The IAF MiG-21 piloted by Squadron Leader Ajay Ahuja, tasked with photo reconnaissance during the Kargil conflict, was shot down by ground-fired missiles over Batalik along the Line of Control in Ladakh. He ejected in time but parachuted down into Pakistan-occupied Kashmir and was later executed by the Pakistan forces in contravention of the Geneva Convention. On the third day of air operations, an IAF Mi-17 helicopter was downed again by an enemy shoulder-fired Stinger surface-to-air missile while conducting a low-level attack. After this, the IAF stopped using all slow-moving air assets in the conflict.

 

India had pressed its fleet of MiG-21s, MiG-23s, MiG-25s, MiG-27s, MiG-29 Fulcrums, Jaguars, and Mirage-2000s into the attack of the enemy positions within a small target area of just 5-12 km from the Line of Control (LoC). These fighters flew at 30,000 feet to avoid Pakistan missiles. The Pakistan and Indian Air Forces did not have dogfights. But, the Indian MiG-29s called ‘Baaz’ (or Eagle) did have whoever blinks first games with Pakistan’s F-16 ‘Falcons.’

 

“While PAF fighters did fly Combat Air Patrols (CAP) during the conflict, they stayed well within Pakistani air space. On occasions, IAF MiG-29s armed with the deadly R-77 BVR Air-to-Air missiles could lock on to PAF F-16s, forcing the latter to disengage. In the absence of a PAF threat, the IAF was able to deliver numerous devastating strikes on intruder positions and supply dumps,” a Strategy Page report said in the aftermath of the conflict. During the Kargil War, the PAF’s director of operations later reported isolated instances of IAF and PAF fighters locking on to each other with their onboard fire control radars.

 

The IAF pilots carried out 6,500 sorties, including strikes, reconnaissance, evacuation, transportation, and logistic support. In a 2012 report by Benjamin Lambeth of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace titled “Airpower at 18,000 feet: The Indian Air Force in the Kargil War” explained how the IAF pummelled the Pakistan Army and the PAF: “Throughout the campaign, whenever IAF reconnaissance or ground attack operations were underway in the immediate combat zone, Western Air Command ensured that MiG-29s or other air-to-air fighters were also airborne on combat air patrol stations over the ground fighting on India’s side of the LoC to provide top cover against any attempt by the PAF to enter the fray in a ground attack role.”

 

The result was that PAF F-16s maintained a safe distance of 10 to 20 miles on the Pakistani side of the border. The report quotes Air Marshal (retired) Vinod Patney, the then head of Western Air Command: “I think my insistence on mounting CAPs across the (command’s entire area of responsibility) at different heights and times to give the message that we were ready and angling for an enlarged conflict helped. It was akin to throwing a glove, but it was not picked up.” Then IAF Chief AY Tipnis later recalled that he had “authorised the escorting fighter pilots to chase away Pakistani aircraft further back across the LoC.”

 

 

Talking to the EurAsian Times, Air Marshal Anil Khosla (retired) said: “Mig-29 and Mig-21 aircraft played an important role in local area air dominance by preventing enemy aircraft from interfering with our air and ground operations.” “The effort these aircraft put into air defence escorts and Combat Air Patrolling by day and night proved an effective deterrent, ensuring local air superiority. At times, PAF F-16s, orbiting on their side of the LOC, were kept at bay by our air defence fighters flying a protective pattern above the strike,” Khosla added.

 

MiG-23 and MiG-27 fighter jets had to manually dive to bomb the targets as they lacked modern equipment to locate them. However, this tactic did not work well in the rarefied atmosphere of the Himalayas. Hence, the IAF introduced the French Mirage 2000H equipped with day—and night laser-guided bomb delivery pods. On June 24, the IAF’s two Mirage 2000Hs dropped the first-ever laser-guided bombs of the force in a combat mission and destroyed the Northern Light Infantry’s command and control bunkers. The IAF reported at the end of 1999 that it resulted in as many as 300 enemy casualties within just minutes.

 

 

 

Air Marshal Khosla said: “Interdiction proved effective (Attack on NLI’s (Northern Light Infantry of Pakistan) command headquarters at Tiger Hill and supply dumps at Muntho Dhalo).” However, he adds, “helicopters and fixed-wing combat support aircraft are vulnerable in confined and contested air space”. This holds even in today’s battleground. Air Marshal Khosla underscores that airpower needs to be applied innovatively with ingenuity. The challenges during the Kargil conflict were manifold, including the high-altitude terrain (10,000 to 18,000 ft), low air density, strong winds, small camouflaged targets, and self-imposed restrictions like not crossing the border.

 

The IAF’s MiG-21s operated without modern navigation equipment, and pilots navigated with handheld GPS gadgets. The Indian Air Force integrated the 1000-kg bombs with laser-guided weapon pods. The IAF selected weapon impact points that would snowball into landslides or avalanches.

 

The IAF also deployed its ‘Super Spy’ MiG-25 Foxbat for reconnaissance missions. With an operational flight of over 70,000 feet and a speed of Mach 2.5, the fighter jet had regularly flown reconnaissance missions. Such was the clarity of the camera fitted in the belly of the aircraft, which allowed it to click photos of humans on a Pakistani tarmac. The Foxbat would create a sonic boom and escape before PAF could scramble its interceptors. In 1999, however, its mission parameters were different—it was to fly low and slow to map the targets on the Pakistani side for the Mirage-2000s bombing. The aircraft flew at a lower height, which was never envisaged, and there were no Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) laid down. Also, it needed to maintain a velocity and height ratio for the camera to click clear photographs. At the given height, the aircraft was well beyond the range of the surface-to-air missiles, but the only threat was from aerial interception. To overcome that, the aircraft was escorted by Mirage-2000s during the mission.

 

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Disclaimer:

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