185: Major Arms Transfers to Afghanistan (Last Two Decades)

SIPRI published a Topical backgrounder on 03 Sep 21, giving an overview of known international flows of major arms transfer to the Afghan armed forces between 2001 and 2020. The document discusses the supplier states, volumes, types and numbers of major arms deliveries.

Relevant extracts are as follows:-

Since 2001, significant numbers of major arms had been delivered to bolster the Afghan military and security forces, in the expectation that they would eventually be able to maintain security and suppress the Taliban insurgency without international support.

Sixteen states are known to have supplied major arms to Afghanistan.

Slightly over three-quarters of the major arms delivered, by volume, were newly produced, while the rest were second-hand, but in some cases modified prior to delivery.

Transfers from the USA

The USA was the largest major arms supplier to Afghanistan (74 per cent of country’s imports of major arms by volume).

Deliveries from the USA to Afghanistan included an estimated 21 924 armoured vehicles (e.g. HMMWV-UA, ASV-150/M-1117), 66 MD-530F armed light helicopters, 34 Cessna-208B armed light transport aircraft, and 53 UH-60A transport helicopters.

The USA also delivered 65 ScanEagle (unarmed) unmanned aerial vehicles and an estimated 250 Paveway guided bombs. Most of the arms were supplied to Afghanistan as aid.

Transfers from Russia

Russia was the second largest supplier of major arms to the Afghan armed forces in the period, accounting for 14 per cent of imports, by volume.

Deliveries from Russia mainly consisted of 90 second-hand and newly produced Mi-8MTV and Mi-17 transport helicopters.

Early deliveries were in the form of aid, but later, most of the transport helicopters were bought via and financed by the USA or United Arab Emirates.

Transfers from other suppliers

Several other states, mainly North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member states, delivered smaller volumes of major arms to Afghanistan directly or supplied major arms through US-run and US-funded programmes.

Italy accounted for 3.8 per cent of all deliveries of major arms to Afghanistan, by volume. These consisted of 16 second-hand G-222 transport aircraft in 2009–2012, financed by the USA. The aircraft were modernized in Italy before delivery.

Czechia supplied six Mi-24 combat helicopters and six Mi-17 transport helicopters. All were second-hand but were modernized in Czechia before delivery.

The United Kingdom supplied two Mi-17 transport helicopters.

Bosnia and Herzegovina, Slovakia and Turkey supplied a total of 128 second-hand artillery pieces

Norway supplied an estimated 159 TOW anti-tank missile in 2009. All these transfers came as direct aid or were financed by the USA.

Brazil was the fourth largest supplier, accounting for 2.7 per cent of all deliveries. These were 26 Super Tucano (A-29B) trainer/combat aircraft. They were bought through a US programme, financed by the USA and modified in the USA before delivery to Afghanistan. They became the main combat aircraft of the Afghan air force.

Switzerland supplied 18 PC-12 light transport aircraft in 2015. These reached Afghanistan via the USA and were probably modified in the USA for reconnaissance before final delivery.

India supplied three Cheetal light helicopters and four second-hand Mi-25 combat helicopters. It also financed the supply of four second-hand Mi-24V combat helicopters from Belarus in 2019.

Present State

The Afghan military and security forces received a substantial number of major arms in the last twenty years.

Despite this very substantial material investment, not to mention years of military training and combat support, the Taliban were able to seize most of Afghanistan from Afghan Government.

Some of the major arms listed were subsequently lost or scrapped. However, a substantial number have been captured by the Taliban.

Air Force Assets and Equipment

The Afghan Air Force was considered as Kabul government’s lethal advantage over the Taliban.

The Afghan Air Force once stood at approximately 200 fixed-wing and rotary aircraft, including A-29 Super Tucanos, AC-208 light attack aircraft, Cessna 208s, PC-12 Pilatus surveillance aircraft, C-130 Hercules transport planes, and a fleet of helicopters that included UH-60 Black Hawks and Russian-made Mi-8 and Mi-17s.

It is estimated that 25% of Afghan Air Force Fledm (to Uzbekistan), and remainder is in Disarray. Very few of the aircraft left behind are fly worthy due to lack of spare parts and maintenance support.

While the Taliban now controls a number of attack, surveillance, and transport aircraft, it still requires pilots to fly them. Taliban had been on a campaign to assassinate Afghan Air Force pilots to diminish the air strategic advantage. It is not known how many crews fled across the border or are in hiding. Aircrew shortage will further diminish their capability.

Analysis

Concern is about the effect of presence of these weapons on security and stability, both within and beyond Afghanistan’s borders.

It is unclear how many of these are or can be made operational.

The aircraft will need specialized maintenance and spare parts that are probably not easily available to the Taliban.

Other, simpler to maintain, major arms such as the light armoured vehicles can easily be operated for many years.

All in all, it seems unlikely that the major arms captured by the Taliban would pose any serious threat to stability in Afghanistan or neighbourhood.

However, the large numbers of small arms and light weapons and associated ammunition are potentially of much graver concern.

In India, concern is that these weapons may soon find a way into Pakistan, and then, through Pakistan-sponsored terrorists, to India, especially Jammu and Kashmir.

There is also a possibility that these weapons may get used for violence in Pakistan itself.

Questions

Taliban in Afghanistan has an Air Force, Will they be able to revive it and make it operational?

Will China and Pakistan help Afghanistan in its revival?

Suggestions and Value additions are most welcome

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References

https://www.sipri.org/commentary/topical-backgrounder/2021/transfers-major-arms-afghanistan-between-2001-and-2020

https://www.airforcemag.com/afghan-air-force-fled-remainder-in-disarray-sources-say/

September 5, 2021December 27, 2024

184: Flight Safety: Importance of Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs).

SOPs enhance flight safety by helping flight crews conform their actions to recommendations by aircraft manufacturers and by standardising operations. SOPs should include and emphasise aspects that avoid errors and deviations that are frequently associated with incidents and accidents.

Standard Operating Procedures evolve over a long period of time with much thought and experience gone into them. They need to be followed strictly in letter and spirit.

Purpose. Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) serve a number of purposes such as:

Ensuring that aircraft is flown correctly in accordance with the manufacturer’s guidelines.

Promote adherence to the manufacturers operating philosophy.

Promote operational safety.

Promote operational efficiency.

Utilise aircraft resources and functionality appropriately.

Violations. Sometimes pilots do get tempted to adjust, reorder or even skip some SOPs. Reasons could be:

They feel that the SOP doesn’t exactly fit the situation at hand.

They would take more time than a widely accepted shortcut.

Perception of existence of a better method.

Ramifications. Not following SOPs in letter and spirit could create problems as follows:

Ad hoc operations have the risk of missing out on some critical factor.

Reordering SOP have the risk of forgetting something important or failing to consider any sequential priorities.

Crew resource management (CRM) becomes more difficult as other crew members will have to guess about our procedures and techniques.

First Violation (and getting away with it) may encourage subsequent repeated violations.

Violation by one may encourage others making it organisational culture to skip SOPs.

Correct Approach. Any situation that creates a doubt about an SOP in the minds of crew should be reviewed in a formal and planned manner. The steps could be as follows:

Analyse the existing SOP, try to understand why the SOP exists in its form.

If one feels that some aspect needs to be changed as a better and improved alternative solution exists – study the changes and repercussion in more detail.

Discussion with other more experienced crew and peer group helps in this process and is recommended.

The suggestion needs to be put up for change to those who have the power to change it.

Flight department leaders should, select a well-experienced team to spearhead the study and obtain manufacturer comments if required.

The change should be adequately debated and tested if required.

Once it is decided that the SOP is to be changed, it should be documented at all the relevant places.

All Crew should be made aware of the new SOP.

Adherence to SOPs: Some Other Factors.

Training. Training is only as good as the teaching staff or instructor. Relevant aspects are as follows:

Any Instructor with a deviant behaviour of cutting corners or ignoring SOPs can have a damaging influence on potential crew.

Lack of proper oversight by the instructors could also lead to development of deviant habits.

Simulators have lot of scope for getting away with deviations and short cuts. This may encourage such behaviour becoming a habit. Simulator Instructors need to be aware and vigilant about this aspect.

Training should not become a square filling exercise.

Peer Group Influence. Peer group has a strong influence (especially during training period). In a peer group a subtle desire to demonstrate skills, impress others and compete can become a recipe for increased risk. Good crew can be corrupted by a poor peer groups.

Organisational Pressures. Crew at times come under extreme pressure to overlook SOPs to meet organisational goals and targets. This can lead to disastrous situations.

Resorting to formal waivers should be an exception rather than a rule.

Target fixation should be avoided at all costs.

Mission accomplishment should not be at the cost of safety risk.

“Safety first” motto should not only be quoted but religiously enforced.

Experience and Expertise. The machine does not know the expertise level of the pilot. The title of EXPERT demands maturity and extra safety consciousness. Skill, knowledge and experience of an expert does not give a license to deviate. Superior skill and experience should be used to avoid potential dangerous situations rather than getting out of them. There is no room for over confidence or complacency in the field of aviation.

Always Remember

In aviation mistake can occur anytime and even by best of the aviators. There is no scope of letting one’s guard down.

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September 4, 2021December 27, 2024

183: Taliban’s Runover: Some Factors

Setting and Population Density Pattern.

Afghanistan’s overall population density is only about 148 people per square mile / 57 people per square kilometer (Indian population density is 1202 per square mile / 464 per square kilometer).

Even in the populated areas of Afghanistan, people are quite spread out, with only 26 percent of the population living in urban centres. This dispersed population pattern, is a challenge for the state army to defend while, it favours the Taliban’s quick-moving offensive.

Taliban Strategy.

Following the withdrawal of Western forces, the Taliban swiftly and easily occupied vast swaths of sparsely populated territory. They then used that territory to launch coordinated and fast-moving offensives.

Instead of traditional tools of warfare (like artillery and armour), the Taliban moved quickly in weaponised pickup trucks to defeat dug-in defensive They forced The Afghan forces to retreat from outposts and checkpoints to (safety of) urban areas, thereby ceding control of supply lines and major highways. This allowed Taliban forces to surround and isolate urban centers.

Local officials were quick to accept Taliban control because they had little allegiance to the central government and knew that Afghan forces were unwilling (and unable) to defend their areas from Taliban

Taliban Advantages.

Taliban enjoyed a presence throughout the country, allowing them to pressure the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces in multiple locations.

The Taliban were able to conduct lightning offensives across many fronts, which fatally stressed the limited cohesion of the Afghan National Defense and Security.

Afghan Security Force: Challenges

Low force-to-space ratios meant that defenders had significant ground to cover and had to move swiftly and in a coordinated fashion to stand any chance of successfully countering Taliban threats from many The Afghan security forces were not geared up to these tasks.

The Afghan military lacked the capacity and cohesion required to stand firm and defend against fast-moving offensives across many fronts.

Afghan forces had always been heavily dependent on S. air support for troop movement, re-supply, and combat operations. In absence of the air support, the Afghan military was unable to regroup or move units around quickly.

Afghan forces were hampered by lack of cohesion, leadership, motivation, and limited training & mobility.

Outcome.

The weaknesses of the Afghan security forces, combined with the low force-to-space ratios generated by Afghanistan’s terrain and its population distribution, made a quick Taliban victory a reality.

Taliban rarely had to use force because they could leverage their geographic reach to intimidate local leaders and convince defenders to flee or surrender.

Lessons