PRACHAND: THE HIMALAYAN GRIFFIN

My Article published on the Chanakya Forum

In mid-June, news channels and strategic community circles were abuzz with the news that the Ministry of Defence, Government of India, had issued an RFP for the procurement of 156 Light Combat Helicopters (90 for the Indian Army and 66 for the Indian Air Force). LCH is the first indigenous Multi-Role Combat Helicopter designed and manufactured by Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL). “Prachand” (which means “fierce” in Hindi), the name given to India’s LCH, reflects the helicopter’s aggressive and powerful capabilities. It stands out with its ground attack and aerial combat capability, setting it apart from other helicopters in the market. Other attack helicopters and armed helicopters (held in the Indian armed forces inventory) are severely limited in operating at high altitudes and are best suited for operations in lower terrains.

HAL has thus far manufactured 15 limited-series Prachand helicopters (10 for the IAF and 5 for the IA), already in service from 2021 onwards. The new procurement order will enhance the operational capability of the Indian defence forces and further boost India’s drive for self-reliance. Reviewing the aircraft (features, performance, capabilities, and roles) and the project (development, production capabilities, Indigenous content, etc.) will be worthwhile.

Development Project. The need for such a helicopter was felt by the Indian armed forces during the Kargil conflict in 1999 when they were required to dislodge intruding Pakistani forces entrenched at altitudes around 18,000 feet. HAL started developing the LCH in the early 2000s, unveiling its plan to build the LCH in 2006. The Indian government sanctioned the project in the same year. The first flight on a prototype on 29 March 2010 was followed by an extensive test programme on four prototypes. The LCH became the first attack helicopter to land in Siachen at altitudes as high as 15,800 feet (4,815 metres). The LCH received a certificate of basic configuration in October 2015 and achieved initial operational clearance in August 2017.

Induction. The LCH was developed to meet the requirements of the Indian Air Force and the Indian Army. In August 2017, limited-series production began for 15 aircraft. In January 2019, after completing all weapon integration tests, HAL declared the LCH ready for operational induction. On November 19, 2021, the LCH was formally handed over to IAF, starting the process of full-scale induction. On October 03, 2022, the LCH was formally inducted into the IAF and was officially named ‘Prachand’. By November 2022, the IA had begun receiving its LCH. The Ministry of Defence (MoD) has now given preliminary approval to acquire 156 more Light Combat Helicopters.

Features. The LCH, an attack helicopter derived from a weaponised version of the HAL-manufactured Dhruv helicopter ‘Rudra’, is a light and agile machine with a unique feature that sets it apart from any other combat helicopter in the world: its ability to operate at high altitudes. This is a significant advantage, as it allows the LCH to operate effectively in the mountainous terrain of the Himalayas, a crucial area for India’s defence strategy. The helicopter possesses modern stealth characteristics, robust armour protection, advanced weapon systems, and electronic warfare systems. Its performance characteristics and features are as follows, showcasing its unique and impressive capabilities:

- Performance. The LCH is designed for high-altitude operations, with a service ceiling of about 6,500 meters (21,300 feet), the highest among all attack helicopters worldwide. It has a maximum Take-off Weight of around 5,800 kg and can carry 700 kg of payload. The helicopter can cruise at 260km/h and achieve a maximum speed of 268km/h. With a range of 550 km with weapons, it can fly for about 3 hours, showcasing its impressive performance capabilities.

- Armament. The LCH has a chin-mounted and twin-barrel M621 20mm cannon on a Nexter THL-20 turret, integrated with the Helmet Mounted Sighting System. Its modular design allows it to be armed with various weapons, including air-to-air and air-to-ground missiles, rocket pods, iron bombs, cluster bombs, and grenade launchers. This versatility in carrying different weapons makes the LCH suitable for various missions, from air-to-air combat to ground attack. It has four hardpoints capable of carrying a combination of multiple weapons. It is also equipped with a Forges de Zeebrugge-built FZ231 rocket launcher capable of carrying 70mm rockets, MBDA air-to-air, air-to-surface, anti-radiation missiles, and Helina anti-tank guided missiles (Dhruvastra).

- Engine: The helicopter is powered by two HAL/Turbomeca Shakti turboshaft engines, each of which can generate approximately 1000kW and has a Full Authority Digital Electronic Control system (FADEC). The French Turbomeca and HAL jointly developed the Shakti engine, which was also fitted on the Dhruv and Rudra helicopters.

- Advanced Technology (Sensors and Avionics): The helicopter features a glass cockpit, a composite airframe structure, and a state-of-the-art sensor suite, enhancing operational efficiency and durability. The glass cockpit accommodates two crew members in tandem. It has an Integrated Avionics Display System (IADS), multi-function displays, a target acquisition and designation system (TADS) with FLIR (laser range finder and a designator), a helmet-mounted sight and a digital video recorder to capture battlefield footage for debriefing. The sensors fitted on the helicopter include a charge-coupled device camera, a forward-looking infrared camera and a laser designator. The two cameras capture the enemy’s location and position. The targeting system features an electro-optical pod, helmet-mounted sight display (HMSD), and a laser range finder and designator for precise targeting and engagement. The LCH is also equipped with a data link for network-centric operations.

- Survivability: The helicopter has numerous features to increase its survivability, including stealth features to reduce radar and infrared signatures. It has systems like Radar warning receivers (RWR), missile approach warning systems, laser warning systems, and chaff and flare dispensers for self-protection. The helicopter also has engine exhaust Infra-Red Suppression Systems (IRSS). The IRSS enhances aircraft resilience against IR-guided missiles by diminishing the missile lock-on distance and facilitating the superior functioning of IR jammers and flares. It has several other protection features, such as armour protection, self-sealing fuel tanks, a digital camouflage system, and crashworthy landing gear to enhance its survivability in hostile environments. The pressurised cabin of the helicopter offers protection from Nuclear, Biological and Chemical (NBC) attacks.

- Versatility and Agility: The features above allow LCH to perform numerous roles under all weather and day-night conditions. Its narrow fuselage and advanced aerodynamics provide high agility, making it difficult to detect and target. The specially designed hinge-less rotor makes it highly agile due to its immediate response to flight control commands.

Roles and Tasks. The LCH meets the requirements of modern warfare and has the capability parameters to operate under varied conditions. Equipped with advanced systems and various weapons, it can perform multiple combat and support roles. In attack roles, it can undertake missions like the destruction of enemy air defence (DEAD), anti-tank warfare, battlefield air support, interdiction, and counter-surface force operations. It is capable of battlefield reconnaissance and target acquisition. It can also be used to escort convoys and provide aerial coverage. The LCH can track and attack slow-moving aerial targets and remotely piloted aircraft. It is also effective in counter-insurgency operations in jungle and urban environments.

Capability Enhancement. The LCH’s versatility and offensive potential are at par or better than most attack helicopters operating globally. Its presence itself deters adversaries. The induction of the Light Combat Helicopter adds unique capability to India’s combat potential. The LCH is noted for its capability to operate at high altitudes up to 6,500 meters, making it particularly suitable for operations in mountainous regions like the Himalayas along India’s northern and northeastern borders. This versatility, along with advanced avionics and weaponry, makes the LCH a force multiplier, significantly enhancing the combat capabilities of the Indian armed forces. It is a potent platform with day and night ground attack and aerial combat capability. It is a game changer, reflecting its multiple capabilities and strategic importance. It offers strategic flexibility through rapid deployment, allowing quick responses to emerging threats. The helicopter’s data link will mesh into the IAF’s networked environment.

Self-reliance and Challenges. Being an Indigenous platform developed by Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL), the LCH reduces reliance on foreign military technology and supports India’s defence industry. With the Indian thrust on indigenisation, the LCH is being developed under a public-private partnership model, with the active participation of the private sector. There is still much left to be achieved regarding self-reliance. The LCH reportedly has an indigenous content of 45% by value, which is likely to progressively increase to more than 55%. The development of indigenous engines is the foremost challenge. Developing an aircraft engine is tough and expensive; it requires considerable investment in R&D and sustained effort over many years. These helicopters are on one of the government’s positive indigenisation lists. The list bans importing weapons, systems, and ammunition. Integration of Indigenous Anti-Tank Guided Missiles is another challenge. Helina/Dhruvastra, a helicopter version of the Nag missile, has already been tested on ALH (Rudra) and is in the process of integration with LCH. Next on the list is the challenge of production rate. The new order of 156 LCH aircraft will likely take 5 to 6 years to complete.

The induction of an additional 156 LCH is a significant development. The LCH’s high-altitude operational capability, advanced avionics, versatile armament, and Indigenous development make it a crucial asset for India’s defence forces. Its ability to operate in challenging terrains and perform multiple combat roles effectively positions it as a game changer in modern warfare, particularly in India’s unique geographic and strategic challenges.

Suggestions and value additions are most welcome.

Link to the article on Chanakya website: -https://chanakyaforum.com/prachand-the-himalayan-griffin/

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References and credits

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References:-

Air Chief Marshal Fali H Major (retd), “Why India’s Light Combat Helicopter could be a game changer”, DailyO, 28 Feb 2020.

Air Marshal Anil Chopra (Retd), “Rotary Wing Platforms: India’s Great Indigenisation Story”, Indian Defence Review, Issue Vol. 38.1, Jan-Mar 2023, 13 Apr 2023.

“Ten reasons why indigenously-built Light Combat Helicopter is a game changer for the Indian Air Force”, India News Network, 04 Apr 2022.

Rahul Singh, “Govt to buy 156 light combat helicopters from HAL at ₹50k-cr”, Hindustan Times, 18 Jun 2024.

D Raghunandan, “India’s Combat Helicopter: Re-discovering Self-reliance?”, NEWSclick, 14 Oct 2022.

Lt Gen (Retd) BS Pawar, “Induction of ‘Prachand’ Light Combat Helicopter: Impact on Operations At High Altitudes”, Bharat Shakti, 13 Jan 2024.

“HAL Light Combat Helicopter (LCH)”, Air Force Technology, 18 Apr 2024.

Ministry of Defence, “Indigenously Designed and Developed Light Combat Helicopter (LCH) inducted into Indian Air Force”, Press Release, 03 OCT 2022.

Gordon Arthur, “India advances light attack helicopter program with large tender”, Air Warfare, 21 Jun 2024.

Huma Siddiqui, “MoD Issues RFP for 156 Prachand Helicopters to HAL for IAF and Army”, Financial Express, 20 Jun 2024.

Disclaimer:

Information and data included in the blog are for educational & non-commercial purposes only and have been carefully adapted, excerpted, or edited from reliable and accurate sources. All copyrighted material belongs to respective owners and is provided only for wider dissemination.

June 26, 2024

COMBAT AVIATION: MOST ESSENTIAL, LEAST UNDERSTOOD

My Article published in the Indus International Research Foundation Year Book 2024.

“Air power is not only a fascinating subject, but its theory and practice also constitute a very demanding profession, and even a lifetime’s study and devotion is inadequate to unravel its mystique or fully understand its imperatives.”

– Air Cmde Jasjit Singh

Air power is a revolutionary force that transformed the fundamental nature of war in less than a century. The concept of air power is often considered one of the most essential elements in modern military operations, but it can also be the least understood aspect for various reasons. Aviation technology advances open up many new possibilities for air power applications. Developing, maintaining, and operating a modern air force is resource-intensive. Balancing budget constraints with the need for cutting-edge technology and capabilities is a complex task. The effective integration of air power with surface forces can be challenging. Joint operations require seamless communication, coordination, and a shared understanding of each other’s roles, tasks, and core competencies. These complexities make it challenging to understand the potential of air power and the nuances of its application for both the practitioners of air power and those affected directly or indirectly by it. Douhet, Mitchell, and Trenchard, the three airpower prophets from military aviation’s earliest years, articulated their airpower theories that shaped military aviation for decades. While it is good always to remember the basics, it is worthwhile to revisit and review them, especially with the ongoing and urgent debate about proposed organisational changes.

Continue reading “COMBAT AVIATION: MOST ESSENTIAL, LEAST UNDERSTOOD”

June 7, 2024

COUNTERING HYPERSONIC WEAPON THREAT: A DIFFICULT BUT MANAGEABLE PROBLEM

Article published on the Chanakya Forum Site.

Depiction of Aegis Layered Hypersonic Defense

Source: Missile Defense Agency.

Introduction

Decades ago, ballistic missile defence was developed to intercept predictable targets outside the atmosphere. Since then, the missile threat spectrum has broadened, becoming more endo-atmospheric and manoeuvrable. Hypersonic weapons, a new breed of threat, combine the speed and range of ballistic missiles with a cruise missile’s low-altitude and manoeuvrable flight profile. Defending against hypersonic missiles is not just necessary; it’s a complex and formidable challenge that demands new designs, capabilities, and operational concepts.

While finding a technologically possible and fiscally affordable solution isn’t easy, it’s crucial to recognise that existing defence frameworks, despite not explicitly designed for hypersonic threats, hold significant potential to counter them. This potential should inspire a new way of thinking and a different approach from those employed for legacy ballistic and cruise missile defence systems. The characteristics that make hypersonic missiles attractive may also be the key to defeating them. Instead of thinking about hypersonic defence as an adjunct to the legacy ballistic missile defence, it will be better to learn from it and develop new defence capabilities, with a mix of active and passive measures, to meet the new challenges.

Attributes & Challenges

Hypersonic weapons, with their staggering speed over Mach 5, or five times the speed of sound, are a force to be reckoned with. They are not just fast; they are agile. While they are often categorised into two types—hypersonic glide vehicles and hypersonic cruise missiles—this classification fails to capture the true diversity of the hypersonic missile threat spectrum. It’s not just about speed. Long-range ballistic missiles can reach similar or greater speeds as they re-enter the atmosphere. What sets hypersonic weapons apart is their ability to sustain these speeds at altitudes below those of most ballistic missiles and, most importantly, their manoeuvrability. They operate at altitudes below 100 km, where space is often said to begin, and typically around 20 to 60 km, above the ceilings of most aircraft and cruise missiles. This unique combination of high speed, lower altitude, and manoeuvrability makes it incredibly difficult to predict the trajectories of hypersonic weapons, especially with terrestrial sensors, posing a significant challenge to the existing defence systems.

Source: CSIS Missile Defense Project.

At speeds around Mach 5, flying objects encounter thermal and aerodynamic phenomena distinct from those experienced in supersonic and exo-atmospheric flight. These phenomena involve extreme temperatures and aero-thermal interactions on the vehicle surface. Of particular importance are the remarkable amounts of flow friction and viscous dissipation encountered by the hypersonic vehicle, which leads to substantial temperature increases, the dissociation and ionisation of surrounding gases, and the formation of plasmas. Hypersonic weapons must survive this environment for a sustained period, which poses a unique and significant challenge.

Vulnerabilities

The phenomena of sustained hypersonic flight offer specific vulnerabilities. Some of the same characteristics that make advanced hypersonic missiles desirable present opportunities that could be exploited. Each feature that gives hypersonic weapons an advantage comes with a cost. Extended flight through the atmosphere may expose them to new failure modes.

- Their ability to manoeuvre comes at the cost of expending energy and range.

- Hypersonic weapons experience challenging aero-thermal conditions that strain the limits of current guidance, control, and materials technologies.

- After Re-entering the atmosphere, the hypersonic glide vehicle experiences extreme pressures, vibrations, and temperatures. The vehicle’s surrounding atmosphere dissociates into a plasma in such an environment, reacting violently with the airframe’s surface.

- Ensuring reliable performance in this environment often requires exotic materials and highly integrated designs, especially for higher speeds.

- Minor alterations in the basic shape or weight distribution in a hypersonic vehicle’s airframe, for instance, can have downstream effects on thermal and propulsion system performance and accuracy.

- Hypersonic systems are challenging to design and operate partly because their performance variables are closely coupled.

Defence Is Possible

Hypersonic missiles are not invincible. They are not the ultimate threat. Hypersonic missile defence is not only possible, but it’s also within reach. However, achieving it requires a fresh perspective on existing defence designs and a willingness to approach the problem differently. Hypersonic weapons have certain limitations that ballistic and cruise missiles do not. By targeting the specific characteristics of hypersonic flight, one can break the problem into manageable portions. Just as ballistic missile defence was oriented around the predictability of a ballistic trajectory, the hypersonic defence can also be tailored to the vulnerabilities of the hypersonic flight regime, offering a glimmer of hope in the face of this evolving threat.

The characteristic challenges of hypersonic flight raise intriguing possibilities for a defence system. By definition, hypersonic gliders expend energy while performing manoeuvres. A defence design that encourages manoeuvres early can often exploit those actions’ cost. Moreover, the severe conditions of hypersonic flight—the risk of boundary layer transition and the need for shock wave management—create vulnerabilities that different kill mechanisms can exploit. Minor impacts or perturbations may disrupt hypersonic weapons to their structure or surrounding airflow.

Defence System Architecture

These systems must employ multiple defeat mechanisms, such as kinetic effectors, electronic warfare, and various classes and types of directed-energy systems.

Space-Based Sensors. A vital element for a hypersonic defence program is a resilient and persistent space sensor layer capable of observing, classifying, and tracking missile threats of all types, azimuths, and trajectories. Elevated sensors are necessary to resolve surface-based systems’ range and mobility challenges. Space-based sensors would enable a “launch to impact” tracking capability. Such a capability would be critical for disrupting or defeating hypersonic weapons early in flight, where interception is easier and follow-up shots are possible. The information from those sensors must be fused into a single picture to identify how many missiles have been launched, where they are, and where they are going, all necessary information for defeating them.

Interception. The second most crucial element is the glide-phase interception. Engaging hypersonic threats earlier in flight will be necessary for area defence rather than point defence. A comprehensive, integrated and layered approach would be beneficial. Direct hit interceptors would have to be supplemented and integrated with wide area measures, including high-powered microwave systems and other means to target vulnerabilities of the hypersonic flight regime. Loitering airborne platforms carrying interceptors, sensors, or alternative kill mechanisms could also increase a defensive system’s range. Kinetic interceptors benefit from being launched at higher altitudes, conserving the disproportionate amount of fuel needed to accelerate from the surface and through the thicker lower atmosphere. Multiple aircraft or unmanned platforms would be required to maintain continuous coverage.

Twenty-First Century Flak. Defence against highly manoeuvring hypersonic missiles may require wide-area defences. Here, “layered defence” differs from the legacy concept of a linear interception sequence. Other layers or kill mechanisms do not merely catch what a previous layer missed but cumulatively stack together to degrade a given threat. Instead of relying only on a fast, single-purpose interceptor with a highly agile kill vehicle, interceptors with alternative payloads may be able to present hypersonic weapons with multiple challenges together. One such possibility is a twenty-first-century version of “dust defence.” Missiles or airborne platforms could dispense particulate matter to disrupt or destroy hypersonic weapons. At hypersonic velocities, missile impact against atmospheric dust, rain, and other particles can encounter bullet-like kinetic energies, triggering unpredictable aerodynamic, thermal, and structural disruptions.

Directed Energy Weapons. Directed-energy systems offer another alternative to tackle hypersonic attacks. Unlike kinetic weapons, directed-energy weapons may offer large magazine capacities, significantly lower cost per shot, and more straightforward guidance requirements. Although limited mainly by their direct line of sight, directed-energy systems may be suited for augmenting terminal defences or basing close to adversary launch positions. The prospect of using lasers for hypersonic defence has been the subject of considerable debate. Recent technical advances promise significant beam power increases with smaller size, weight, and power demands.

High-powered Microwave (HPM). These weapons represent another directed-energy option for hypersonic defence. High-powered microwave weapons could exploit vulnerabilities in hypersonic weapons’ communications systems and radiation shielding to achieve mission kill. Depending on the extent of damage, a microwave weapon could achieve complete or partial mission kill, disrupting a vehicle’s ability to navigate, arm its warhead, or maintain level flight. Microwave radiation can enter a hypersonic weapon through antennae operating at the same frequency as other unshielded vehicle elements, damaging internal electronics. HPMs are less sensitive to weather conditions than lasers and do not require sophisticated aiming or optical compensation systems. Sensor data that is less precise than that needed for kinetic interceptor fire control could be enough to cue HPMs. Given their considerably shorter range, HPMs may benefit from different platforms and basing modes. For the hypersonic defence mission, HPMs might be deployed on loitering unmanned aircraft as a non-kinetic obstacle. Alternatively, an HPM payload could be delivered to the general vicinity of an incoming target by an interceptor booster or other platform.

Modular Payloads. A comprehensive approach to hypersonic defence might include an interceptor or other platform capable of accommodating multiple payload types, such as blast fragmentation, particle dispensing, direct hit weapon, directed energy, or electromagnetic systems. A standard booster system with various warhead types would create doubt about which modalities an attacker needs to overcome and from where.

Passive Defence and Deception. Active defence alone cannot contend with the expected volume of the hypersonic, cruise, and advanced ballistic missiles. The passive defence must also play an increased role in a comprehensive approach to countering advanced hypersonic threats. Forward-deployed forces must, above all, frustrate adversary targeting. In the near term, existing bases could use dispersal, decoys, camouflage, and other forms of deception to confound hypersonic weapons’ terminal guidance systems.

Evolutionary Approach

The experiences gained from legacy air and missile defences can be leveraged. These include terrestrial radar tracking, space-based sensing and communication, low-latency networking, and battle management modernisation. Hypersonic defences can and should emerge from an evolution of existing frameworks rather than as a new, standalone solution. Given its global reach and integrated development, today’s Ballistic Missile Defence System (BMDS) is the most promising major defence acquisition program to adapt to the hypersonic defence challenge.

However, converting the BMDS into the Hypersonic Missile Defence System (HMDS) will require considerable architectural and cultural change. The “scale and urgency of change required” should not be underestimated. By adopting a system-of-systems approach, fielding space sensors and improved interceptors, and employing other imaginative ways to target the unique characteristics of hypersonic flight, the problem of hypersonic defence will be recognisable as a complex but increasingly tractable form of air defence.

Conclusion

Hypersonic weapons are not silver bullets. A single silver-bullet solution will not meet the challenge of defending against the full spectrum of hypersonic missile threats. Countering hypersonic missiles will require a comprehensive approach, including offensive and defensive methods to deter them. An effective hypersonic defence must include space sensors and a glide-phase interceptor, but it should not stop there. Numerous efforts pursued in tandem across a comprehensive architecture will be necessary to meet the challenge. Alternative kill mechanisms and area weapons would be required. Cyber and electronic warfare may significantly defeat hypersonic threats of all types. Fielding hypersonic defences will require an integrated, layered system-of-systems approach, new sensing and interceptor capabilities, different operational concepts, and doctrinal and organisational changes. Existing doctrine and organisational structure may not be adequate to address the cross-domain threat posed by these high-speed manoeuvring weapons.