581: GUERRILLA AIR DEFENCE: STRATEGY OF THE UNDERDOG

Pic Courtesy Net

My article published on the Peninsula Foundation Website on 14 Jan 25

In the modern era of warfare, air superiority has become a cornerstone of military strategy. Nations with advanced air forces often dominate battlefields, leveraging precision-guided munitions, reconnaissance drones, and stealth technology. However, guerrilla forces, lacking comparable resources, have developed innovative air defence strategies to counter such overwhelming air dominance. Guerrilla air defence embodies the ingenuity of the underdog, employing asymmetric tactics and exploiting weaknesses in advanced air forces.

Guerrilla Air Defence

Guerrilla air defence refers to the methods and tactics employed by ground forces, mainly non-state actors or irregular forces, to counter the overwhelming aerial superiority of state militaries. In modern conflicts, air dominance often plays a pivotal role in determining outcomes, and ground forces must innovate to level the battlefield. These tactics range from using man-portable air defence systems (MANPADS) to employing deception, leveraging urban terrain, and deploying counter-drone measures.

Historical Foundation. The concept of guerrilla air defence emerged during the Cold War, as smaller forces sought ways to combat technologically superior opponents. Early examples include the North Vietnamese forces, with Soviet and Chinese support, employing a mix of surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), anti-aircraft artillery (AAA), and man-portable air defence systems (MANPADS) to counter American air supremacy. The infamous downing of U.S. planes over Hanoi—dubbed “SAM City”—highlighted the effectiveness of such strategies. During the Afghan-Soviet War (1979-1989), Afghan mujahideen famously utilised U.S.-supplied Stinger missiles to neutralise Soviet helicopters and jets, turning the tide in specific regions and undermining Soviet morale. These historical precedents set the stage for modern guerrilla air defence tactics, which blend ingenuity, adaptability, and external support.

Principles of Guerrilla Air Defence.

Mobility and Concealment. Mobility and concealment are fundamental to guerrilla air defence. Unlike conventional militaries that deploy fixed air defence installations, guerrilla forces rely on portable systems and improvised techniques to remain undetected. Camouflage, underground networks, and rapid movement are essential to avoid detection by aerial surveillance. Guerrilla fighters exploit natural and urban terrain to conceal their positions, using forests, mountains, and cityscapes as cover.

Decentralisation. Unlike conventional forces, guerrillas rely on dispersed, mobile, small, independent cells. This limits the effectiveness of an enemy’s centralised air strikes and ensures survivability by reducing the risk of total system compromise if one group is detected.

Exploiting Vulnerabilities. Guerrilla air defence capitalises on the inherent vulnerabilities of modern air power. Helicopters and battlefield air support aircraft often operate at low altitudes and are prime targets for guerrilla forces. Air forces operating in conflict zones usually follow predictable flight paths or schedules. Guerrilla forces use intelligence and reconnaissance to identify and exploit these patterns.

Innovation, Improvisation and Resource Maximisation. Guerrillas rely on improvised systems, salvaged weaponry, and external aid to bolster their capabilities. Guerrilla air defence thrives on innovation, often repurposing civilian technologies or adapting outdated equipment. Guerrilla groups have been known to convert commercial drones into makeshift anti-aircraft platforms or deploy modified artillery to target aircraft. Using decoys and false signals to mislead enemy pilots and air defence systems is a common tactic.

Psychological and Strategic Impact. The psychological effects of guerrilla air defence extend beyond physical damage to aircraft. Even a limited success rate in downing aircraft can significantly reduce the adversary’s willingness to conduct low-risk operations. Each successful engagement serves as a propaganda tool, showcasing the resilience and effectiveness of the underdog.

Modern Techniques in Guerrilla Air Defence.

Modern technology, the fighting environment, and new systems and platforms influence the evolution of newer techniques of guerrilla warfare.

MANPADS. MANPADS have revolutionised guerrilla air defence due to their portability, ease of use, and effectiveness against low-flying aircraft. One of the most effective tools in guerrilla air defence is using MANPADS, such as the American-made FIM-92 Stinger or the Russian Igla systems. Small teams can carry these portable missile systems and target low-flying aircraft, including helicopters and drones. By utilising these weapons in ambushes or from concealed positions, ground forces can inflict significant damage on technologically superior adversaries, as demonstrated in Afghanistan during the 1980s and the recent Russia-Ukraine war.

Innovations. While less mobile than MANPADS, AAA remains a staple of guerrilla air defence. Improvised mounts, hidden emplacements, and integration with civilian infrastructure enhance its effectiveness. Groups frequently modify heavy machine guns and anti-aircraft guns like the ZSU-23-4 Shilka. These systems are often mounted on trucks for mobility and used to target low-altitude threats. While less precise than missiles, their volume of fire can pose a substantial threat to helicopters and low-flying planes.

Urban Environment. Urban environments provide an advantage for the ground forces due to the dense infrastructure that limits aircraft manoeuvrability. Ground fighters use rooftops, narrow streets, and underground networks to evade detection and launch surprise attacks. In Syria and Iraq, insurgents have used such strategies to counter aerial operations by state and coalition forces.

Drones. Modern airpower—characterised by drones, advanced jets, and electronic warfare capabilities—poses unique challenges to ground forces. The proliferation of drones has forced forces to develop countermeasures, such as portable jammers, anti-drone rifles, and improvised kinetic solutions like nets or small arms fire.

Passive Measures. Camouflage and deception remain critical in evading aerial surveillance. Ground forces must rely on natural cover, decoy installations, and rapid mobility to avoid detection. In the Vietnam War, the Viet Cong famously used tunnels and dense jungle foliage to counter U.S. air superiority.

Implications of Guerrilla Air Defence on Modern Warfare

Guerrilla air defence has emerged as a critical factor in modern warfare, reshaping the dynamics of aerial supremacy and asymmetric conflict. While these strategies aim to counter technologically superior air forces, they carry profound implications for guerrilla groups and conventional militaries. By disrupting aerial operations and imposing costs on powerful adversaries, guerrilla air defence challenges traditional military doctrines and influences the broader landscape of modern conflict.

Prolonging Conflicts and Increasing Costs. Guerrilla air defence strategies can effectively neutralise or deter low-altitude operations. This capability forces adversaries to adapt, often at significant financial and operational costs. For instance, deploying advanced countermeasures, rerouting flight paths, or relying on high-altitude bombers requires additional resources. As a result, conflicts involving guerrilla air defence tend to become protracted, straining the logistics and finances of all involved parties. The prolonged nature of such conflicts can also erode public and political support for military interventions. For example, the psychological and economic toll of losing expensive aircraft or personnel to guerrilla defences can influence domestic perceptions of the conflict’s viability.

Evolving Air Warfare Tactics. Conventional militaries must adapt their air warfare strategies to counter guerrilla air defence. This evolution includes increased reliance on high-altitude operations, precision-guided munitions, and stealth technology. Modern air forces also invest heavily in countermeasures such as infrared jammers, flares, and electronic warfare systems to neutralise guerrilla threats. The rise of guerrilla air defence has also accelerated the development of unmanned aerial systems (UAS) for reconnaissance, surveillance, and strike missions. Being expendable and capable of operating in hostile environments, drones minimise the risks associated with manned operations. This shift represents a significant transformation in aerial warfare, emphasising technology over traditional pilot-led missions.

Impact on Urban and Asymmetric Warfare. Urban environments provide natural concealment and mobility advantages for guerrilla fighters, making them ideal battlegrounds for deploying guerrilla air defence systems. By leveraging civilian infrastructure and the complexity of urban terrain, guerrilla forces can create no-fly zones or deny access to key air corridors. This trend has made urban warfare increasingly challenging for conventional militaries, which must balance operational objectives with minimising civilian casualties and collateral damage.

Proliferation of Advanced Technology. The success of guerrilla air defence has spurred the proliferation of advanced yet accessible technologies. MANPADS, drones, and electronic warfare tools have become increasingly available on the black market or through state sponsorship. This diffusion of technology not only empowers guerrilla groups but also raises concerns about their use by terrorist organisations or non-state actors in unconventional warfare.

Redefining Air Superiority. In traditional warfare, air superiority was synonymous with dominance over adversaries. However, guerrilla air defence challenges this notion by proving that even technologically inferior forces can contest airspace. This shift underscores the importance of integrating multi-domain strategies considering ground-based threats alongside aerial operations. For example, in conflicts such as the Syrian Civil War or the Ukraine-Russia war, guerrilla air defence has demonstrated that controlling the skies no longer guarantees uncontested dominance on the ground. The interplay between air and ground forces requires a more nuanced approach, blending technology with adaptable tactics.

Strategic and Political Implications. Guerrilla air defence imposes strategic dilemmas on conventional forces, often compelling them to overextend resources or adopt more cautious operational postures. This dynamic can undermine the perceived effectiveness of powerful militaries, affecting their credibility and deterring future interventions. Politically, the effectiveness of guerrilla air defence can shift the balance of power in asymmetric conflicts. By contesting air supremacy, guerrilla forces gain leverage in negotiations or peace processes, demonstrating their resilience and capacity to endure prolonged engagements.

Challenges and Limitations of Guerrilla Air Defence

Guerrilla air defence, while innovative and impactful in certain situations, faces numerous challenges and limitations. These obstacles stem from technological gaps, resource constraints, and the inherent asymmetry between irregular forces and advanced air power.

Technological Disparity. One of the primary challenges guerrilla groups face is the vast technological gulf between them and conventional military forces. Modern air forces deploy fifth-generation stealth aircraft, precision-guided munitions, and advanced surveillance systems. In contrast, guerrilla forces often rely on outdated or improvised equipment. While tools like man-portable air defence systems (MANPADS) can neutralise low-flying aircraft, they are ineffective against high-altitude bombers or stealth fighters. Advanced countermeasures, such as infrared jammers and decoys, further diminish the impact of guerrilla tactics.

Logistics and Maintenance. Air defence systems, even portable ones, require robust logistical support. Maintaining and deploying these systems necessitates technical expertise, spare parts, and a steady supply of ammunition. Guerrilla groups, often operating in resource-scarce environments, struggle to sustain such logistical chains. Over time, wear and tear render many systems inoperable, and acquiring replacements or repairs can be risky and costly.

Detection and Targeting Vulnerabilities. The effectiveness of guerrilla air defence relies heavily on concealment and mobility. However, advancements in surveillance technology, such as drones, satellite imagery, and AI-powered analytics, make it increasingly challenging for guerrilla forces to remain hidden. Once detected, these forces become vulnerable to precision strikes or overwhelming aerial assaults, negating their defensive efforts.

Dependence on External Support. Guerrilla groups often depend on external states or entities to access advanced air defence systems. This reliance introduces vulnerabilities, as shifts in international politics or interruptions in supply chains can leave these groups without critical resources. For example, a sudden embargo or the withdrawal of support from a sponsor state can cripple guerrilla air defence capabilities.

Financial Constraints. Air defence is inherently resource-intensive. Procuring, transporting, and maintaining systems like MANPADS or drones requires significant financial investment. Guerrilla groups operating with limited funding must prioritise resources across multiple operational needs, often leaving air defence underfunded. Moreover, the cost-benefit ratio usually favours their adversaries; an advanced air force can deploy inexpensive countermeasures or overwhelm defences with superior numbers.

Psychological and Operational Strain. Constant exposure to aerial bombardments and the awareness of technological inferiority take a toll on guerrilla fighters’ morale. The strain of operating under the persistent threat of airstrikes can lead to operational inefficiencies and diminished cohesion. Furthermore, the psychological impact of losing critical assets, such as an air defence unit or a valuable weapon system, can significantly affect a group’s strategic planning.

Limited Strategic Impact. Guerrilla air defence is inherently reactive, designed to mitigate air superiority rather than achieve dominance. While it can disrupt operations and impose costs on adversaries, it rarely shifts the overall balance of power in a conflict. This limitation means that guerrilla air defence is more a delaying tactic than a decisive strategy.

Conclusion. Guerrilla air defence is a testament to human ingenuity in asymmetrical warfare. Irregular forces can challenge even the most sophisticated air powers by adapting low-cost solutions, decentralised tactics, innovative technologies, and asymmetrical strategies. Guerrilla air defence’s implications for modern warfare are far-reaching, influencing military strategy, technology development, and conflict outcomes. While it disrupts aerial operations and challenges conventional doctrines, guerrilla air defence also faces significant limitations, such as resource constraints and susceptibility to countermeasures. Nevertheless, its role in redefining the dynamics of air superiority and asymmetric warfare highlights its growing importance in the ever-evolving landscape of modern conflict.

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Guerrilla Air Defence: Strategy of the Underdog

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References and credits

To all the online sites and channels.

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June 7, 2024January 4, 2025

485: COUNTERING HYPERSONIC WEAPON THREAT: A DIFFICULT BUT MANAGEABLE PROBLEM

Article published on the Chanakya Forum Site.

Depiction of Aegis Layered Hypersonic Defense

Source: Missile Defense Agency.

Introduction

Decades ago, ballistic missile defence was developed to intercept predictable targets outside the atmosphere. Since then, the missile threat spectrum has broadened, becoming more endo-atmospheric and manoeuvrable. Hypersonic weapons, a new breed of threat, combine the speed and range of ballistic missiles with a cruise missile’s low-altitude and manoeuvrable flight profile. Defending against hypersonic missiles is not just necessary; it’s a complex and formidable challenge that demands new designs, capabilities, and operational concepts.

While finding a technologically possible and fiscally affordable solution isn’t easy, it’s crucial to recognise that existing defence frameworks, despite not explicitly designed for hypersonic threats, hold significant potential to counter them. This potential should inspire a new way of thinking and a different approach from those employed for legacy ballistic and cruise missile defence systems. The characteristics that make hypersonic missiles attractive may also be the key to defeating them. Instead of thinking about hypersonic defence as an adjunct to the legacy ballistic missile defence, it will be better to learn from it and develop new defence capabilities, with a mix of active and passive measures, to meet the new challenges.

Attributes & Challenges

Hypersonic weapons, with their staggering speed over Mach 5, or five times the speed of sound, are a force to be reckoned with. They are not just fast; they are agile. While they are often categorised into two types—hypersonic glide vehicles and hypersonic cruise missiles—this classification fails to capture the true diversity of the hypersonic missile threat spectrum. It’s not just about speed. Long-range ballistic missiles can reach similar or greater speeds as they re-enter the atmosphere. What sets hypersonic weapons apart is their ability to sustain these speeds at altitudes below those of most ballistic missiles and, most importantly, their manoeuvrability. They operate at altitudes below 100 km, where space is often said to begin, and typically around 20 to 60 km, above the ceilings of most aircraft and cruise missiles. This unique combination of high speed, lower altitude, and manoeuvrability makes it incredibly difficult to predict the trajectories of hypersonic weapons, especially with terrestrial sensors, posing a significant challenge to the existing defence systems.

Source: CSIS Missile Defense Project.

At speeds around Mach 5, flying objects encounter thermal and aerodynamic phenomena distinct from those experienced in supersonic and exo-atmospheric flight. These phenomena involve extreme temperatures and aero-thermal interactions on the vehicle surface. Of particular importance are the remarkable amounts of flow friction and viscous dissipation encountered by the hypersonic vehicle, which leads to substantial temperature increases, the dissociation and ionisation of surrounding gases, and the formation of plasmas. Hypersonic weapons must survive this environment for a sustained period, which poses a unique and significant challenge.

Vulnerabilities

The phenomena of sustained hypersonic flight offer specific vulnerabilities. Some of the same characteristics that make advanced hypersonic missiles desirable present opportunities that could be exploited. Each feature that gives hypersonic weapons an advantage comes with a cost. Extended flight through the atmosphere may expose them to new failure modes.

- Their ability to manoeuvre comes at the cost of expending energy and range.

- Hypersonic weapons experience challenging aero-thermal conditions that strain the limits of current guidance, control, and materials technologies.

- After Re-entering the atmosphere, the hypersonic glide vehicle experiences extreme pressures, vibrations, and temperatures. The vehicle’s surrounding atmosphere dissociates into a plasma in such an environment, reacting violently with the airframe’s surface.

- Ensuring reliable performance in this environment often requires exotic materials and highly integrated designs, especially for higher speeds.

- Minor alterations in the basic shape or weight distribution in a hypersonic vehicle’s airframe, for instance, can have downstream effects on thermal and propulsion system performance and accuracy.

- Hypersonic systems are challenging to design and operate partly because their performance variables are closely coupled.

Defence Is Possible

Hypersonic missiles are not invincible. They are not the ultimate threat. Hypersonic missile defence is not only possible, but it’s also within reach. However, achieving it requires a fresh perspective on existing defence designs and a willingness to approach the problem differently. Hypersonic weapons have certain limitations that ballistic and cruise missiles do not. By targeting the specific characteristics of hypersonic flight, one can break the problem into manageable portions. Just as ballistic missile defence was oriented around the predictability of a ballistic trajectory, the hypersonic defence can also be tailored to the vulnerabilities of the hypersonic flight regime, offering a glimmer of hope in the face of this evolving threat.

The characteristic challenges of hypersonic flight raise intriguing possibilities for a defence system. By definition, hypersonic gliders expend energy while performing manoeuvres. A defence design that encourages manoeuvres early can often exploit those actions’ cost. Moreover, the severe conditions of hypersonic flight—the risk of boundary layer transition and the need for shock wave management—create vulnerabilities that different kill mechanisms can exploit. Minor impacts or perturbations may disrupt hypersonic weapons to their structure or surrounding airflow.

Defence System Architecture

These systems must employ multiple defeat mechanisms, such as kinetic effectors, electronic warfare, and various classes and types of directed-energy systems.

Space-Based Sensors. A vital element for a hypersonic defence program is a resilient and persistent space sensor layer capable of observing, classifying, and tracking missile threats of all types, azimuths, and trajectories. Elevated sensors are necessary to resolve surface-based systems’ range and mobility challenges. Space-based sensors would enable a “launch to impact” tracking capability. Such a capability would be critical for disrupting or defeating hypersonic weapons early in flight, where interception is easier and follow-up shots are possible. The information from those sensors must be fused into a single picture to identify how many missiles have been launched, where they are, and where they are going, all necessary information for defeating them.

Interception. The second most crucial element is the glide-phase interception. Engaging hypersonic threats earlier in flight will be necessary for area defence rather than point defence. A comprehensive, integrated and layered approach would be beneficial. Direct hit interceptors would have to be supplemented and integrated with wide area measures, including high-powered microwave systems and other means to target vulnerabilities of the hypersonic flight regime. Loitering airborne platforms carrying interceptors, sensors, or alternative kill mechanisms could also increase a defensive system’s range. Kinetic interceptors benefit from being launched at higher altitudes, conserving the disproportionate amount of fuel needed to accelerate from the surface and through the thicker lower atmosphere. Multiple aircraft or unmanned platforms would be required to maintain continuous coverage.

Twenty-First Century Flak. Defence against highly manoeuvring hypersonic missiles may require wide-area defences. Here, “layered defence” differs from the legacy concept of a linear interception sequence. Other layers or kill mechanisms do not merely catch what a previous layer missed but cumulatively stack together to degrade a given threat. Instead of relying only on a fast, single-purpose interceptor with a highly agile kill vehicle, interceptors with alternative payloads may be able to present hypersonic weapons with multiple challenges together. One such possibility is a twenty-first-century version of “dust defence.” Missiles or airborne platforms could dispense particulate matter to disrupt or destroy hypersonic weapons. At hypersonic velocities, missile impact against atmospheric dust, rain, and other particles can encounter bullet-like kinetic energies, triggering unpredictable aerodynamic, thermal, and structural disruptions.

Directed Energy Weapons. Directed-energy systems offer another alternative to tackle hypersonic attacks. Unlike kinetic weapons, directed-energy weapons may offer large magazine capacities, significantly lower cost per shot, and more straightforward guidance requirements. Although limited mainly by their direct line of sight, directed-energy systems may be suited for augmenting terminal defences or basing close to adversary launch positions. The prospect of using lasers for hypersonic defence has been the subject of considerable debate. Recent technical advances promise significant beam power increases with smaller size, weight, and power demands.

High-powered Microwave (HPM). These weapons represent another directed-energy option for hypersonic defence. High-powered microwave weapons could exploit vulnerabilities in hypersonic weapons’ communications systems and radiation shielding to achieve mission kill. Depending on the extent of damage, a microwave weapon could achieve complete or partial mission kill, disrupting a vehicle’s ability to navigate, arm its warhead, or maintain level flight. Microwave radiation can enter a hypersonic weapon through antennae operating at the same frequency as other unshielded vehicle elements, damaging internal electronics. HPMs are less sensitive to weather conditions than lasers and do not require sophisticated aiming or optical compensation systems. Sensor data that is less precise than that needed for kinetic interceptor fire control could be enough to cue HPMs. Given their considerably shorter range, HPMs may benefit from different platforms and basing modes. For the hypersonic defence mission, HPMs might be deployed on loitering unmanned aircraft as a non-kinetic obstacle. Alternatively, an HPM payload could be delivered to the general vicinity of an incoming target by an interceptor booster or other platform.

Modular Payloads. A comprehensive approach to hypersonic defence might include an interceptor or other platform capable of accommodating multiple payload types, such as blast fragmentation, particle dispensing, direct hit weapon, directed energy, or electromagnetic systems. A standard booster system with various warhead types would create doubt about which modalities an attacker needs to overcome and from where.

Passive Defence and Deception. Active defence alone cannot contend with the expected volume of the hypersonic, cruise, and advanced ballistic missiles. The passive defence must also play an increased role in a comprehensive approach to countering advanced hypersonic threats. Forward-deployed forces must, above all, frustrate adversary targeting. In the near term, existing bases could use dispersal, decoys, camouflage, and other forms of deception to confound hypersonic weapons’ terminal guidance systems.

Evolutionary Approach

The experiences gained from legacy air and missile defences can be leveraged. These include terrestrial radar tracking, space-based sensing and communication, low-latency networking, and battle management modernisation. Hypersonic defences can and should emerge from an evolution of existing frameworks rather than as a new, standalone solution. Given its global reach and integrated development, today’s Ballistic Missile Defence System (BMDS) is the most promising major defence acquisition program to adapt to the hypersonic defence challenge.

However, converting the BMDS into the Hypersonic Missile Defence System (HMDS) will require considerable architectural and cultural change. The “scale and urgency of change required” should not be underestimated. By adopting a system-of-systems approach, fielding space sensors and improved interceptors, and employing other imaginative ways to target the unique characteristics of hypersonic flight, the problem of hypersonic defence will be recognisable as a complex but increasingly tractable form of air defence.

Conclusion

Hypersonic weapons are not silver bullets. A single silver-bullet solution will not meet the challenge of defending against the full spectrum of hypersonic missile threats. Countering hypersonic missiles will require a comprehensive approach, including offensive and defensive methods to deter them. An effective hypersonic defence must include space sensors and a glide-phase interceptor, but it should not stop there. Numerous efforts pursued in tandem across a comprehensive architecture will be necessary to meet the challenge. Alternative kill mechanisms and area weapons would be required. Cyber and electronic warfare may significantly defeat hypersonic threats of all types. Fielding hypersonic defences will require an integrated, layered system-of-systems approach, new sensing and interceptor capabilities, different operational concepts, and doctrinal and organisational changes. Existing doctrine and organisational structure may not be adequate to address the cross-domain threat posed by these high-speed manoeuvring weapons.

Suggestions and value additions are most welcome.

Link to the Article:-

COUNTERING HYPERSONIC WEAPON THREAT: A DIFFICULT BUT MANAGEABLE PROBLEM

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References and credits

To all the online sites and channels.

References

Tom Karako and Masao Dahlgren, “Complex Air Defense Countering the Hypersonic Missile Threat” A Report of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) Missile Defence Project Feb 2022.

Rylie White, “An Emerging Threat: The Impact of Hypersonic Weapons on National Security, Crisis Instability, and Deterrence Strategy”, Potomac Institute for Policy Studies.

David Roza, “Why Hypersonic Missiles’ Greatest Strength Also Makes Them Vulnerable”, Air and Space Forces Magazine, Dec 2023.

Col Mandeep Singh, “Countering Hypersonics”, Indian Defence Review, Jan 2024.

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May 16, 2024January 4, 2025

476: CHANGING DYNAMICS OF AIR DEFENCE OPERATIONS AND THE WAY AHEAD

Article published on the Chanakya Forum Site.

CHANGING DYNAMICS OF AIR DEFENCE OPERATIONS AND THE WAY AHEAD

Raksha Mantri Shri Rajnath Singh, during the Air Force Commanders’ Conference in New Delhi on 26 Oct 23, pointed out that new trends have emerged in the field of air warfare, and there is a need to analyse and learn from them to strengthen defence preparedness. He urged the IAF to focus on strengthening air defence systems, using drones, and making headway in aerospace to protect India’s air domain.

On 07 Oct 23, Hamas-led militant groups attacked Israel, infiltrating using powered para-gliders under the barrage of several thousand rockets. In the ongoing war, Iran launched Operation ‘True Promise’ on 13 Apr 24, ﬁring hundreds of drones, ballistic missiles, and cruise missiles at Israel. It is reported that the salvo deployed by Iran comprised more than 30 cruise missiles, at least 120 ballistic missiles and 170 drones. The attack, it is suspected, was aimed at overwhelming Israel’s air defences. However, Israel claims to have shot down most of the incoming projectiles. Israel’s multi-tiered air defence system consists of various components, including man-portable air defence systems (MANPADS), short-range air defence systems (SHORADS), Spyder air defence system, Iron Dome, David’s Sling, Patriot air defence system, Arrow anti-ballistic missiles, Iron Beam and the naval air defence system or C-Dome. In the prolonged Russia-Ukraine war, the skirmishes now are mainly in the form of attacks on each other by long-range vectors and armed drones. There have been reports about the use of hypersonic weapons (Zircon and Kinzhal missiles) by Russia. These developments indicate the likely threats air defence would have to deal with.

Air Defence (AD) operations have undergone extensive transformation in recent years. The development of new threats and technologies has triggered these changes. Research is underway on new technologies, such as Quantum computing, Artificial Intelligence, Hypersonics, Nanotechnologies, and Unmanned systems, which will also have a transformational impact on AD. A Review of the concept of AD operations is advisable to take stock of the present situation and crystal-gaze into the future.

AD Perspective

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