667: KASHMIR THROUGH CHINESE LENS

 

Inputs to the questions posed by the Journalist.

 

Q1. How’s the current Pahalgam crisis beneficial for the CCP’s South Asian agendas? 

The Pahalgam crisis indirectly serves the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) strategic agendas in South Asia.

Weakening India’s Regional Influence. India, entangled in Kashmir-related conflicts, limits its ability to project power in South Asia, aligning with Beijing’s goal of maintaining regional dominance.

Strengthening the China-Pakistan Alliance. China’s “all-weather” partnership with Pakistan is a cornerstone of its South Asia strategy, particularly through the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). The crisis reinforces Pakistan’s reliance on China, as Islamabad faces diplomatic and economic isolation from India’s retaliatory measures, like trade restrictions and treaty suspensions. China’s public support for Pakistan (evident in Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s call for a “swift and fair investigation” into the attack and backing Pakistan’s sovereignty) bolsters this alliance.

Exploiting Regional Instability. The CCP benefits from controlled instability in South Asia, as it keeps India and Pakistan preoccupied with bilateral tensions rather than challenging China’s regional projects, like the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The Pahalgam crisis, by escalating border skirmishes and diplomatic hostilities, creates a volatile environment that diverts attention from China’s activities in Nepal, Bangladesh, and the Indian Ocean.

Undermining India’s Economic Narrative. The Pahalgam attack has challenged India’s narrative of stability and economic growth, particularly in Kashmir post-Article 370 revocation. This undermines India’s appeal to foreign investors, a key CCP concern given India’s role as a rival in attracting manufacturing post-U.S. tariffs on China.

Limiting U.S.-India Strategic Convergence. The crisis occurs amid U.S. distractions, with President Trump’s focus on trade wars and tariffs. By keeping India embroiled in a regional conflict, the CCP reduces the likelihood of deeper U.S.-India strategic alignment, which could counter China’s influence.

 

Q2. What’s behind China’s support for Pakistan on the Kashmir issue? Why is China supporting Pakistan’s call for an impartial probe into the April 22 attack? 

China’s support for Pakistan on the Kashmir issue stems from a mix of strategic, geopolitical, and domestic considerations that align with Beijing’s long-term regional agenda.

China’s support for Pakistan on Kashmir is not just about friendship—it’s about undermining India strategically, protecting infrastructure interests, controlling regional narratives, and securing ideological consistency on separatism and counterterrorism.

The call for an “impartial probe” is part of a larger strategy of positioning China as “neutral” while subtly backing Pakistan to complicate India’s diplomatic standing.

Strategic Alliance with Pakistan (Counterbalance to India). China and Pakistan have a decades-long strategic alliance. Beijing views Islamabad as a critical counterweight to India in South Asia.

Protection of CPEC Interests. CPEC passes through Gilgit-Baltistan, a region India claims as part of Jammu & Kashmir. India opposes this on sovereignty grounds. By backing Pakistan on Kashmir, China strengthens the legitimacy of its infrastructure investments in disputed territories. Also, any instability in Kashmir has a direct impact on the security of Chinese nationals and assets working in Pakistan-administered regions.

Diplomatic Leverage and Global Narrative Control. By supporting an “impartial probe” into the April 22 attack (in which Indian civilians were killed), China is deflecting attention from Pakistan-based terror groups, buying Islamabad diplomatic time.

 

Q3. A hidden Huawei satellite phone has surfaced in the probe into the Pehalgam attack. What does it indicate? What’s the history of Chinese equipment in the Kashmir terrorism ecosystem? 

The detection of a Huawei satellite phone near the attack site in Pahalgam’s Baisaran Valley indicates the terrorists’ use of advanced communication tactics. The phone connects to China’s satellite network, enabling secure, off-grid communication without reliance on local cellular networks. This capability allows operatives to evade Indian surveillance systems, which heavily monitor terrestrial networks.

Intelligence sources reportedly indicate the phone was active during the attack, suggesting its use for real-time coordination among attackers or with handlers across borders, possibly in Pakistan.

Encrypted Chinese messaging apps alongside the phone further point to a deliberate strategy to avoid detection, as these apps were banned in India post-2020 Galwan clash due to security concerns.

Huawei products are banned in India due to national security risks, meaning the phone was likely smuggled, possibly from Pakistan.

The phone’s connection to Tiantong-1, a Chinese state-controlled network, raises questions about whether Chinese technology is being repurposed for terrorist activities, either deliberately or through illicit markets.

Chinese equipment has periodically surfaced in J&K’s terrorism landscape, reflecting both the global proliferation of Chinese technology and targeted use by militant networks.

 

Q4. What’s China’s agenda (not policy) today on Kashmir? With Turkey and China supporting Pakistan in the current crisis, how do you gauge the emerging geopolitical situation? 

China’s current agenda on Kashmir—distinct from its official policy—is geopolitically opportunistic, destabilising in intent, and part of a broader strategy to constrain India’s rise.

It operates below the threshold of overt conflict but consistently supports Pakistan diplomatically, technologically, and in multilateral forums.

The support by both China and Turkey to Pakistan during the ongoing Pahalgam crisis indicates the emergence of a soft anti-India bloc seeking to leverage Kashmir as a pressure point.

While China’s official policy is neutrality and calls for bilateral resolution, its agenda is about instrumentalising Kashmir to box in India strategically and diplomatically.

Turkey has emerged as a loud voice on Kashmir, echoing Pakistan’s positions at the UN and OIC. Turkey’s support complements China’s involvement. This triad works to internationalise Kashmir, delegitimise Indian control, and challenge India’s secular-democratic image.

 

Q5. Was the attack timed with the development of the India-US trade deal? It diverted the whole world’s attention from Trump’s trade tariff war to Kashmir! Was it to thwart the US trade war with China? 

April 22, 2025’s timing has sparked speculation about its alignment with geopolitical developments, particularly the India-US trade deal negotiations and the escalating US-China trade war under President Donald Trump’s tariff policies.

The timing of the attack, during Vance’s visit and amid trade negotiations, suggests a possible intent to maximise disruption.

The choice of Pahalgam, a tourist destination, ensured global media coverage, potentially overshadowing trade discussions.

The attack dominated Indian and international headlines and undeniably shifted global media and diplomatic focus to Kashmir, at least temporarily. It did not “eclipse” the trade war but added a parallel crisis, particularly in South Asia, where India-Pakistan tensions dominated regional discourse.

The attack significantly diverted attention to Kashmir, particularly in India and among its partners, but it did not entirely overshadow the US-China trade war globally.

The attack aligns with China’s interest in disrupting India’s US trade alignment, but lacks evidence of direct Chinese intent. It likely served Pakistan’s goals while indirectly benefiting China’s agenda.

 

Q6. Other relevant aspects? 

Pakistan’s military and government are grappling with economic woes and political unrest, exacerbated by India’s trade restrictions and diplomatic isolation. Supporting militant proxies may be a way to deflect domestic criticism. However, this is a foolish mistake, and domestic pressures could push both nations toward miscalculation.

The crisis’s economic fallout extends beyond India and Pakistan, affecting volatile global markets. India’s trade restrictions and border closures further damage Pakistan’s already strained economy, increasing its reliance on China’s financial support.

The India-Pakistan-China nuclear dynamic raises the stakes. While restraint is being held, the crisis tests this balance.

 

Link to the article by Venus Upadhayaya on The Epoch Times (Quoted four times):-

https://www.theepochtimes.com/world/chinas-footprint-is-clear-in-kashmir-crisis-analysts-say-5852309

 

 

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References and credits

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Information and data included in the blog are for educational & non-commercial purposes only and have been carefully adapted, excerpted, or edited from reliable and accurate sources. All copyrighted material belongs to respective owners and is provided only for wider dissemination.

 

666:GPS INTERFERENCE INCIDENT INVOLVING IAF AIRCRAFT OVER MYANMAR

 

My article was published in Issue 4 (May 25) of the SP Aviation journal.

 

On March 28, 2025, a devastating 7.7-magnitude earthquake struck Myanmar, claiming over 3,649 lives and injuring more than 5,000 people. In response, India launched Operation Brahma, a humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) mission, to deliver critical supplies, medical teams, and rescue personnel to the affected regions. The IAF deployed six military transport aircraft, including C-130J Super Hercules and C-17 Globemaster, to ferry 625 metric tons of aid to cities such as Yangon, Nay Pyi Taw, and Mandalay.

 

The Incident

The first reported incident of GPS spoofing occurred on March 29, when a C-130J aircraft, carrying 15 tons of relief material from Hindon Airbase to Yangon, experienced navigation anomalies in Myanmar’s airspace. Subsequent flights reported similar issues, with sources indicating that most of the six aircraft involved in the operation encountered GPS spoofing on multiple sorties. After the initial incident, IAF pilots were briefed to anticipate such challenges, enabling them to prepare for and mitigate the risks on subsequent flights.

The IAF later clarified that a Notice to Airmen (NOTAM) issued by Mandalay International Airport highlighted the possibility of degraded GPS availability. The NOTAM warned of potential navigation issues in Myanmar’s airspace, and IAF crews were trained to operate under such conditions. Despite the disruptions, all missions were completed successfully, with no reported accidents or deviations from the planned routes. This underscores the professionalism and preparedness of the IAF pilots, providing reassurance about their capabilities in challenging situations.

 

GPS Spoofing

GPS spoofing is a form of electronic warfare where false signals are broadcast to deceive a receiver, causing it to calculate an incorrect position. Unlike GPS jamming, which blocks signals entirely, spoofing manipulates data to mislead navigation systems, potentially directing an aircraft off course. The technique exploits the weak signal strength of GPS satellites, which can be overpowered by stronger, fraudulent signals generated from ground-based or airborne platforms. GPS spoofing is increasingly common in conflict zones, where state and non-state actors deploy electronic warfare to disrupt adversaries.

Modern military aircraft, however, are equipped with additional navigation systems, such as INS, which uses gyroscopes and accelerometers to track position independently of external signals. The IAF’s prompt switch to INS ensured safe navigation, but the incident highlighted the vulnerability of GPS-dependent systems in contested environments.

 

Attributability

Myanmar’s complex political landscape provides critical context for the incident. Since the military coup in 2021, the country has been embroiled in civil conflict, with the junta facing resistance from ethnic insurgent groups and pro-democracy forces. The region is also a geopolitical flashpoint, with major powers like China, India, and the United States vying for influence. China, in particular, has made significant strategic inroads in Myanmar, including infrastructure and military cooperation investments.

Some reports speculated that the spoofing may have been linked to Chinese-enabled systems, given Beijing’s advanced electronic warfare capabilities and presence in the region. The proximity of the interference to the Coco Islands, where China is suspected of developing surveillance and electronic warfare facilities, fueled these suspicions. However, attributing responsibility is difficult due to a lack of definitive evidence.

Other potential actors include non-state militant groups or regional adversaries seeking to cause disruption as a geopolitical signal. Myanmar’s airspace, described as a conflict zone, is particularly susceptible to such interference, with GPS spoofing reported as a common tactic in similar environments globally. Investigating spoofing in foreign airspace is nearly impossible due to limited access and jurisdictional constraints. Myanmar’s junta’s lack of transparency, restricted internet access, and communication controls further complicate any efforts to investigate the incident.

 

IAF Response and Mitigation

The IAF’s response to the GPS spoofing incidents was swift and effective. The pilots’ training in handling navigation anomalies allowed them to transition seamlessly to INS, ensuring the safe completion of all missions. The pre-emptive NOTAM from Mandalay International Airport also played a crucial role, enabling crews to anticipate and prepare for degraded GPS availability. This response highlights the IAF’s operational resilience in such challenges.

On April 14, the IAF clarified that its crews were well-equipped to operate in environments with compromised GPS signals. The statement avoided directly referencing spoofing, focusing instead on the successful execution of Operation Brahma and the robustness of IAF protocols. This measured response likely aimed to avoid escalating tensions in an already volatile region while highlighting India’s operational resilience.

The incident has sparked discussions within India’s defence establishment about enhancing countermeasures and navigation redundancies. Recommendations include installing real-time interference detection systems, conducting regular audits of navigation vulnerabilities, and advocating for international standards to counter GPS spoofing. The urgent need for global cooperation against electronic warfare is also underscored.

 

Broader Global Implications

The Myanmar incident is part of a global surge in GPS interference, with similar cases reported near the India-Pakistan border, the Middle East, and Eastern Europe. Spoofing has affected civilian and military aircraft globally, with notable cases like the 2024 Azerbaijan Airlines crash linked to GPS disruption and widespread interference in the Baltic and Black Sea regions.

For military operations, GPS spoofing poses risks beyond navigation errors, including compromised mission security and potential airspace violations. The Myanmar incident underscores the need for robust countermeasures, such as encrypted navigation systems and alternative positioning technologies like Galileo or India’s NavIC. This highlights the importance of preparedness in electronic warfare and the need for robust countermeasures.

Civilian aviation also faces growing risks, as commercial aircraft rely heavily on GPS for navigation, raising concerns about passenger safety. To enhance resilience, the aviation industry is exploring solutions like multi-constellation receivers, which integrate signals from multiple satellite systems, and ground-based navigation aids.

Geopolitically, the incident highlights the challenges of operating in contested regions. It underscores the need for diplomatic efforts to establish international norms against electronic warfare, though enforcement remains difficult in conflict zones.

 

Lessons Learned and Mitigation Measures

The Myanmar GPS spoofing incident offers several lessons for India and the global aviation community. First, it emphasises the importance of pilot training and redundant navigation systems, which proved critical in averting disaster. Second, it highlights the need for real-time intelligence sharing among allies to map and counter interference trends. Groups like OPSGROUP, which tracks aviation risks, could play a pivotal role in this effort.

Technologically, the incident underscores the urgency of developing spoofing-resistant navigation systems. Advances in quantum positioning, which relies on atomic clocks, and machine learning-based anomaly detection could reduce dependence on vulnerable GPS signals. India’s investment in NavIC, a regional navigation system, offers a potential alternative, though its coverage remains limited compared to GPS.

There is also a case for a global ban on GPS spoofing, similar to existing prohibitions on laser attacks against aircraft. While such measures face resistance from states with advanced electronic warfare programs, they could set a precedent for protecting peaceful humanitarian missions. Regional cooperation, particularly within ASEAN, could also address the region’s airspace vulnerabilities, though political instability poses challenges.

 

Conclusion

The GPS spoofing of IAF aircraft during Operation Brahma was a stark reminder of modern aviation’s evolving threats. While the IAF’s preparedness ensured the mission’s success, the incident exposed the fragility of GPS-dependent systems in conflict zones. As electronic warfare becomes more sophisticated, nations must invest in resilient technologies, robust training, and international collaboration to safeguard military and civilian operations. The incident reinforces India’s role as a responsible regional power capable of overcoming adversity to deliver aid. Still, it also signals the need for vigilance in an increasingly contested digital landscape.

 

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Disclaimer:

Information and data included in the blog are for educational & non-commercial purposes only and have been carefully adapted, excerpted, or edited from reliable and accurate sources. All copyrighted material belongs to respective owners and is provided only for wider dissemination.

 

 

References:-

  1. India Today. “Cyber-attack on IAF aircraft involved in Myanmar quake relief op, say defence sources.” April 13, 2025.
  1. The Hindu. “Frequent GPS interference, including ‘spoofing’, near India’s border with Pakistan, Myanmar.” December 28, 2024.
  1. The Print. “Operation Brahma: IAF aircraft flying into earthquake-hit Myanmar faced GPS spoofing.” April 14, 2025.
  1. First post. “Indian Air Force aircraft faced massive cyber attacks in Myanmar airspace during aid mission: Report.” April 13, 2025.
  1. India Sentinels. “What is ‘GPS spoofing’ that the Indian Air Force’s transport aircraft faced in Myanmar airspace?” April 14, 2025.
  1. The Times of India. “IAF jet cyber-attack: IAF jet on Myanmar relief operation faced cyber-attack in the air.” April 14, 2025.
  1. ANI News. “IAF issues clarification on GPS spoofing incident during Myanmar relief operations.” April 14, 2025.
  1. Rediff.com. “IAF jets faced ‘GPS spoofing’ during Myanmar relief mission.” April 13, 2025.
  1. The Economic Times. “IAF planes faced GPS spoofing in Myanmar’s airspace while carrying relief materials for quake victims: Sources.” April 13, 2025.
  1. Mathrubhumi English. “IAF aircraft face GPS spoofing over Myanmar during quake relief mission.” April 13, 2025.
  1. Eurasian Times. “U.S.-Supplied C-130J, C-17 Come ‘Under Attack’ Over Myanmar; What Happened With IAF Aircraft?” April 14, 2025.

665: DESPERATE MEN DO DESPERATE THINGS IN DESPERATE SITUATIONS: PAKISTAN ARMY CHIEF PLAYING WITH FIRE

 

My article was published on The EurasianTimes website

on 01 May 25.

 

The recent terrorist attack in Phalgam, Jammu and Kashmir, has once again brought the spotlight on Pakistan’s deep state and its time-tested strategy of using militant proxies to pursue its strategic aims in the region. Coming at a time when Pakistan is facing extraordinary internal and external pressures, the timing and nature of the attack raise pressing questions about the motives behind this provocation and the extent to which the current military leadership may be resorting to desperation-driven tactics. The phrase “desperate men do desperate things in desperate situations” encapsulates the narrative that Munir, grappling with Pakistan’s cascading crises, resorted to terrorism to unify a fractured nation and reassert military dominance. The question remains whether it is a calculated move or a strategic blunder that would result in a bigger crisis.

 

Desperate Act

On April 22, 2025, the serene Baisaran Valley in Pahalgam became the site of a horrific terror attack. Armed militants, later identified as members of Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), stormed a tourist campsite, killing 26  civilians, predominantly Hindu tourists. The attackers, wielding M4 carbines and AK-47s, verified victims’ religious identities before executing them, marking the deadliest assault in the region since the 2008 Mumbai attacks. The Pahalgam attack was no ordinary act of terrorism. Its precision, weaponry, and targeting suggest sophistication beyond typical militant operations. The attackers, led by Hashim Musa, a former Pakistan Army para-commando dismissed from service, infiltrated deep to strike a tourist hotspot 100 kilometres from the Line of Control (Loc).

The attack in Phalgam was a brazen act of desperation, targeting unarmed, innocent tourists in a relatively stable and tourist-frequented part of Kashmir. The use of high-grade weaponry and coordinated execution points toward sophisticated planning, likely beyond the capabilities of isolated local cells. Indian officials allege the attack was planned by Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), with direct oversight from Munir. A key piece of evidence is Musa’s background. Sources claim he was “loaned” by Pakistan’s Special Service Group (SSG) to Let, and the attackers’ weaponry, M4 carbines, are rare in militant hands, further pointing to state backing.

The attack’s communal nature adds another layer. The militants spared Muslim tourists, targeting Hindus in a deliberate bid to inflame religious tensions. This aligns with Munir’s April 16, 2025, speech, where he emphasised Pakistan’s Islamic identity and the Two-Nation Theory, framing India as an existential threat. The timing—six days after the hate speech—suggests a deliberate signal to terror groups. The Resistance Front (TRF), a LeT offshoot, initially claimed responsibility but later retracted, a move Indian analysts attribute to Pakistan’s attempt to distance itself from the backlash.

 

Desperate Situation

Under General Asim Munir, the Pakistan Army faces a precarious state that is a unique and combustible blend of crises, a collapsing economy, surging insurgencies, and eroding public trust in the military.

Economic Collapse. Pakistan’s GDP growth is under 2%, inflation is soaring past 20%, and the Pakistani rupee is plummeting. A $7-billion IMF loan, secured in 2024, imposes austerity measures that have sparked nationwide protests. The Karachi Stock Exchange crashed 3% in a single day post-Pahalgam, reflecting investor fears of regional instability. Pakistan’s economy is on life support, with an IMF deal hanging by a thread and foreign reserves dipping dangerously low. The economic hardship is palpable across society, eroding public faith in national institutions.

 Political Instability. Politically, Pakistan is a tinderbox. The 2023 arrest of former Prime Minister Imran Khan, widely seen as orchestrated by the military, has galvanised his Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) party. The military’s overt role in political engineering has backfired, leading to widespread public discontent and intra-elite fragmentation. Mass protests, often met with brutal crackdowns, have eroded the military’s legitimacy. Social media campaigns like #ResignAsimMunir, despite Pakistan’s ban on X, highlight Munir’s unpopularity. Analysts describe the military’s public support as at its lowest since the 1971 Bangladesh liberation, when Pakistan lost its eastern wing. For Munir, appointed Army Chief in November 2022, these crises threaten his leadership and the military’s grip on power.

Institutional Crisis. Militarily, Pakistan is under siege. The Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) has intensified attacks in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa, including a March 2025 train hijacking that killed several passengers. In Balochistan, separatist groups like the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) target Chinese-funded CPEC projects, undermining Pakistan’s strategic ties with Beijing. The military, once revered as the nation’s protector, struggles to contain these threats, with over 1,200 security personnel killed in 2024 alone. For perhaps the first time in decades, the Pakistan Army’s credibility is under sustained attack. Retired officers have voiced dissent, and social media campaigns have openly criticised the top brass—something previously unthinkable.

 Strategic Isolation. Once seen as a pivotal state in the U.S.-China rivalry, Pakistan is increasingly isolated. China’s Belt and Road investments have slowed, while Gulf nations redirect capital elsewhere. Washington remains wary, and New Delhi has successfully lobbied global forums to pressure Islamabad on terror financing.

 

Desperation Levels and Motives

The narrative of Munir’s desperation hinges on his need to reverse the military’s declining fortunes. With Pakistan unravelling, the Army Chief faces pressure to reassert control. Possible motives for orchestrating the Pahalgam attack include the following:-

Rallying Domestic Support. By reigniting the Kashmir issue, Munir seeks to unify Pakistanis under the military’s narrative of India as the eternal enemy. The military has historically used anti-India sentiment to deflect domestic criticism, as seen after the 1999 Kargil War and the 2016 Uri attack. With protests and insurgencies eroding public trust, a high-profile attack could galvanise nationalist fervour.

Disrupting India’s Kashmir Narrative. The region has seen relative stability since India revoked Article 370 in 2019, stripping Jammu and Kashmir of its autonomy. Record tourism (2 million visitors in 2024), successful elections, and infrastructure development have undermined Pakistan’s claim to Kashmir. The Pahalgam attack, targeting tourists, aims to deter visitors, disrupt normalcy, and revive Pakistan’s relevance in the dispute.

Risking Controlled Escalation. A limited conflict with India could restore the military’s image as Pakistan’s protector. Past crises, like the 2019 Pulwama attack, saw Pakistan weather Indian airstrikes while rallying domestic support. Munir may have calculated that India’s response—diplomatic measures, border skirmishes—would remain containable, avoiding all-out war given both nations’ nuclear arsenals.

 

Calculated Act or Strategic Miscalculation?

General Munir, a former ISI chief, is acutely aware of the strategic value and political risk of cross-border terrorism. His tenure began with promises of internal reform and a clean break from overt politicking. However, Munir has returned to the tried-and-tested path of external diversion under mounting internal pressures and the erosion of military dominance in domestic affairs.

A terrorist attack in Kashmir achieves several aims simultaneously: it unites domestic opinion around a perceived external threat, deflects criticism from internal dysfunction, and tests India’s threshold for retaliation. It may also galvanise the rank and file within the army, reasserting its role as the sole guardian of Pakistan’s ideological and territorial integrity.

The attack has plunged India-Pakistan relations into crisis. India responded with punitive measures: suspending the Indus Waters Treaty, closing borders, expelling diplomats, and cancelling Visas.  Small-arms fire along the LoC has escalated, with Pakistan closing its airspace to Indian flights. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi vowed a “befitting reply,” raising speculation of Military action.

 

India’s Options

India faces a complex decision matrix. A kinetic response, such as surgical strikes or air raids like Balakot in 2019, may yield short-term political dividends, especially if the Pakistan Army is seeking precisely such a reaction to rally domestic support. Conversely, restraint may embolden further provocations, especially if it is perceived as a lack of resolve. Therefore, India must pursue a calibrated strategy that combines tactical counter-terror operations with strategic multi-domain actions.

India’s response will be shaped by the need to address domestic outrage, signal strength to Pakistan, and manage international pressure to avoid escalation between the two nuclear-armed states.  The response is likely to be multi-pronged in several domains.

Diplomatic Offensive. India has already accused Pakistan of sponsoring terrorism, with Prime Minister Narendra Modi calling Pakistan a “rogue state” at the UN and vowing to pursue attackers “to the ends of the earth.” India will likely intensify efforts to diplomatically isolate Pakistan by raising the issue in international forums like the UN, G20, or bilateral talks with allies like the US, UK, and France.

Severing Diplomatic Ties. India has already expelled Pakistani diplomats and may further downgrade diplomatic ties, potentially recalling its high commissioner from Islamabad or imposing additional visa restrictions.

Economic and Trade Restrictions. India has suspended the Indus Waters Treaty, a significant move signalling economic retaliation. Further steps could include tightening trade restrictions or pushing for international financial scrutiny of Pakistan, leveraging India’s influence with institutions like the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), where Pakistan has faced grey-listing for terrorism financing concerns.

Cultural and Sporting Bans. To sustain domestic momentum against Pakistan, India may reinforce existing bans on cultural exchanges, sports events, and media collaborations.

Strategic Military Posturing.  India is likely to increase military deployments along the Line of Control (LoC) and international border, as implied by Modi’s “complete operational freedom” grant to the armed forces.

Surgical Strikes or Targeted Operations. India’s response to the 2019 Pulwama attack—a surgical airstrike on a Jaish-e-Mohammed camp in Balakot, Pakistan—sets a precedent. A similar operation targeting an appropriate target in Pakistan is possible.

Escalation of Skirmishes. Intermittent cross-border firing along the LOC, reported since the attack, may intensify. If not controlled, these skirmishes may escalate to a full-fledged war.

 

A Dangerous Game of Desperation

The Phalgam attack is not an isolated incident—it is a symptom of deeper rot within Pakistan’s civil-military structure. It underscores the Pakistan military’s enduring reliance on terrorism to counter internal and external pressures. But the diminishing returns of this strategy, combined with growing international scrutiny and a more assertive India, make this a dangerous game.

Desperate men in desperate institutions often resort to desperate measures. For Pakistan’s military, external provocation has long served as a tool to distract, deflect, and dominate. The costs may outweigh the benefits if General Munir pivots back to cross-border militancy as a pressure valve. Whether driven by Munir’s desperation or institutional strategy, the operation has reignited India-Pakistan tensions, risking escalation in a nuclear-armed region.

India must remain wise enough not to be baited, yet take appropriate multi-pronged, multi-domain retaliatory action, stay alert, agile, and strategically ready to counter these designs. India would be willing to climb the escalatory ladder, as Indian patience has run out, and a red line has been crossed this time. Once again, regional peace teeters on the edge of a dangerous gamble from across the border.

 

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Disclaimer:

Information and data included in the blog are for educational & non-commercial purposes only and have been carefully adapted, excerpted, or edited from reliable and accurate sources. All copyrighted material belongs to the respective owners and is provided only for wider dissemination.

 

References:-

1. The Hindu, “Tourism Terror Targeted: Pahalgam Massacre,” April 23, 2025. https://www.thehindu.com

2. Indian Express, “How Pakistan’s Proxy War Is Mutating,” April 2025.

3. Dawn (Pakistan), “General Munir’s Gamble: What the Army’s Silence Hides,” April 25, 2025.

4. Reuters, “India Accuses Pakistan of Orchestrating Deadly Kashmir Attack,” April 2025.

5. Al Jazeera, “Terror Returns to Kashmir: Who Gains?” April 24, 2025.

6. Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA), India – Dossiers on LeT, TRF, ISI

Home Page

7. RAND Corporation Reports – “Proxy Warfare and Strategic Risk in South Asia” (2021). https://www.rand.org

8. Brookings Institution – “The Pakistan Army’s Strategic Calculus in a Post-Imran Era” (2024), https://www.brookings.edu

9. Carnegie India – “Pakistan’s New Military Doctrine: Continuity or Crisis?” (2023).

10. Observer Research Foundation (ORF), India – Reports on terrorism, India-Pakistan conflict cycles, https://www.orfonline.org

11. Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) – “Pakistan’s Internal Security Collapse” (2024), https://www.cfr.org

12. Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India – Official statements on the Phalgam attack and diplomatic responses. https://www.mea.gov.in

13. United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Briefings – Historical and recent discussions on Pakistan-sponsored terrorism. https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/

14. Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR), Pakistan – Official statements from Pakistan’s military. https://www.ispr.gov.pk/

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