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533: LEARNING FROM ISRAELI DEFENCE FORCES (PART II: Lessons from Notable Operations Conducted by the Israeli Defence Forces)

 

My Article published on the Chanakya forum Website

on 16 Nov 24

 

Pic: Courtesy Internet

 

The Israel Defence Forces (IDF) has conducted numerous military operations since its establishment in 1948.  Given Israel’s complex security environment, these operations combine defensive actions, counterterrorism efforts, and strategic pre-emptive strikes to maintain security. These operations are primarily driven by the need to protect Israel from external threats, insurgent groups, and regional conflicts.

 

Notable Operations Conducted by Israeli Defence Forces.

 

The Israel Defence Forces (IDF) has conducted numerous military operations since its establishment in 1948. Given Israel’s complex security environment, these operations combine defensive actions, counterterrorism efforts, and strategic pre-emptive strikes to maintain security. These operations are primarily driven by the need to protect Israel from external threats, insurgent groups, and regional conflicts.

 

1948 Arab-Israeli War (War of Independence). This war was to defend the newly created State of Israel against the invasion of Arab armies (Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq, and others) following the UN’s partition plan. Israel successfully defended itself and expanded its borders beyond the original UN partition plan, although Jerusalem remained divided.

 

1956 Suez Crisis (Operation Kadesh). Israel, alongside Britain and France, aimed to seize control of the Suez Canal after Egypt’s President Nasser nationalised it. Israel also sought to eliminate the threat of Egyptian-fed Fedayeen fighters in the Sinai Peninsula. Israel captured the Sinai Peninsula but withdrew under international pressure, especially from the U.S. and Soviet Union.

 

1967 Six-Day War. Israel carried out a pre-emptive strike against Egypt, Syria, and Jordan, who were mobilising forces near Israel’s borders. The aim was to neutralise immediate military threats. A decisive Israeli victory resulted in the capture of the Sinai Peninsula, Gaza Strip, West Bank, East Jerusalem, and the Golan Heights.

 

1973 Yom Kippur War. A surprise attack by Egypt and Syria during Yom Kippur, a major Jewish holiday, was aimed to reverse Israeli territorial gains from the Six-Day War. Israeli forces defending the attack initially suffered significant losses but ultimately repelled the attacks, maintaining its territorial control. The war led to the eventual peace treaty with Egypt.

 

Operation Entebbe (1976). One of the IDF’s most famous operations, this mission involved the rescue of hostages from a hijacked Air France plane in Uganda. Commandos from Sayeret Matkal, the elite Special Forces unit, flew over 2,500 miles to execute the mission, successfully freeing 102 hostages. The operation is considered one of the most daring hostage rescues in history.

 

Operation Opera (1981). In this pre-emptive airstrike, the Israeli Air Force bombed Iraq’s Osirak nuclear reactor near Baghdad to prevent Saddam Hussein from acquiring nuclear weapons. The successful strike eliminated the threat of Iraq developing nuclear capabilities and showcased Israel’s proactive defence strategy.

 

1982 Lebanon War (Operation Peace for Galilee). The objective of this operation was to expel the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), which was launching attacks on northern Israel from southern Lebanon. The IDF succeeded in driving the PLO out of Lebanon, but the operation evolved into a long-term military occupation of south Lebanon, leading to a protracted conflict with Hezbollah.

 

First Intifada (1987–1993). The aim was to suppress the Palestinian uprising (Intifada) in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, which involved widespread protests, strikes, and violent clashes with the IDF. The Intifada led to the Oslo Accords in 1993, marking the first direct negotiations between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO).

 

Operation Defensive Shield (2002). This operation was launched during the Second Intifada and aimed to dismantle terrorist infrastructure in the West Bank. The IDF entered major Palestinian cities to arrest militants, gather intelligence, and destroy weapons caches. It was one of the largest ground operations conducted by the IDF since the 1982 Lebanon War.  The IDF regained control of key West Bank cities and reduced terrorist activity, but the conflict continued for several years.

 

2006 Lebanon War.  Israel’s response to the abduction of two Israeli soldiers by Hezbollah militants led to an escalation in hostilities. The war aimed to neutralise Hezbollah’s missile threat and dismantle its infrastructure in southern Lebanon. The war ended in a ceasefire brokered by the UN, but Hezbollah remained a potent force in Lebanon. The conflict was marked by heavy rocket fire in northern Israel and significant destruction in Lebanon.

 

Operation Cast Lead (2008–2009). This operation was in response to persistent rocket fire from Hamas in Gaza by launching a major offensive aimed at crippling Hamas’ military infrastructure and stopping rocket attacks. The three-week operation targeted Hamas infrastructure in the Gaza Strip after years of rocket attacks on southern Israel. The IDF used airstrikes, naval bombardments, and ground operations to weaken Hamas’ military capabilities and rocket-launching systems. The IDF achieved its goal of reducing Hamas’ rocket capabilities, but the operation resulted in significant civilian casualties in Gaza and international criticism.

 

Operation Pillar of Defence (2012). The operation was aimed at halting rocket fire from Gaza into Israel, and this operation focused on degrading Hamas’ rocket infrastructure and eliminating critical militant leaders. The operation primarily relied on precision airstrikes and targeted attacks. The operation ended with a ceasefire brokered by Egypt, with Hamas significantly weakened but still in control of Gaza.

 

Operation Protective Edge (2014). One of the more recent and significant operations was a 50-day military campaign against Hamas in Gaza. It was triggered by a sharp escalation in rocket fire from Gaza. The IDF carried out airstrikes and ground operations, and the Iron Dome missile defence system played a crucial role in protecting Israeli civilians from rocket attacks. The target was Hamas’ rocket fire and the extensive tunnel network used for smuggling and cross-border attacks from Gaza into Israel. The IDF conducted extensive air and ground operations in Gaza, inflicting heavy damage on Hamas’ infrastructure.

 

Operation Northern Shield (2018-2019). Focused on neutralising Hezbollah’s cross-border tunnels from Lebanon into northern Israel, this operation aimed to eliminate a strategic threat posed by Hezbollah, the Lebanese-based militant group backed by Iran. The IDF uncovered and destroyed several attack tunnels during this operation.

 

Operation Black Belt (2019). A brief but intense military campaign against Islamic Jihad in Gaza followed the targeted killing of one of its senior leaders. The operation involved precision strikes in preventing rocket fire on Israeli communities, and the use of the Iron Dome was central to Israel’s defence.

 

Operation Guardian of the Walls.  The operation was in response to escalating violence between Israel and Palestinian militants in Gaza following tensions in East Jerusalem. Hamas and Islamic Jihad launched thousands of rockets into Israel. The IDF carried out extensive airstrikes, targeting militant leaders, rocket launchers, and tunnel networks. A ceasefire was reached after 11 days of fighting.

 

Operation Breaking Dawn (2022). In response to threats from Islamic Jihad in Gaza, this operation involved airstrikes targeting military commanders and infrastructure. It was a short but intense campaign aimed at preventing an imminent threat from the group, while Israel’s Iron Dome intercepted over 95% of rockets fired from Gaza.

 

Cyber and Covert Operations. The IDF has also been involved in covert and cyber operations, mainly targeting Iranian nuclear facilities and military infrastructure. While many of these operations are highly classified, there have been reports of cyber-attacks, such as the Stuxnet virus, which disrupted Iran’s nuclear enrichment process.

 

Ongoing Operations. The IDF is involved in ongoing security operations, particularly in Gaza, West Bank, Lebanon and Iran. These include counterterrorism missions, targeted airstrikes, and border defence. The Iron Dome missile defence system plays a crucial role in intercepting rockets fired from Gaza and other hostile entities.

 

Lessons Drawn from Operations Conducted by Israeli Defence Forces

 

The operations conducted by the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) over the decades have provided crucial lessons for Israel and militaries worldwide. These lessons span strategic, tactical, and operational insights, especially given Israel’s unique geopolitical challenges and the nature of modern warfare.

 

Pre-emptive Action and Deterrence. Operation Opera (1981) demonstrated the effectiveness of a pre-emptive strike when Israel destroyed Iraq’s Osirak nuclear reactor. The lesson here is that preventing adversaries from acquiring weapons of mass destruction can neutralise existential threats before they materialise. It also underscores the importance of intelligence and timely decision-making in military strategy.

 

Precision and Technology. Investing in precision-guided munitions and intelligence allows for targeted strikes with minimal collateral damage, which is crucial in asymmetric warfare, where civilians are often in close proximity to combatants. During Operation Cast Lead (2008–2009) and Operation Pillar of Defence (2012), Israel’s use of precise airstrikes targeted key Hamas infrastructure while minimising harm to civilians. This lesson has been adopted by modern militaries, where precision and technology are prioritised to avoid international criticism and maintain ethical warfare practices.

 

Protection Through Defensive Systems. Active defence systems, such as missile interceptors, can save lives and reduce the need for offensive actions. The Iron Dome missile defence system, used in operations like Protective Edge (2014) and Breaking Dawn (2022), demonstrated the ability to intercept short-range rockets and reduce civilian casualties. This enabled Israel to minimise the pressure for rapid escalation, allowing more strategic responses. The success of the Iron Dome has led other nations to explore similar systems, reinforcing the importance of layered defence in modern conflict.

 

Intelligence-Driven Warfare. Accurate and real-time intelligence is crucial to the success of military operations, especially in identifying critical enemy infrastructure and high-value targets. The targeted assassination of key terrorist leaders, such as in Operation Black Belt (2019) and Operation Breaking Dawn (2022), highlighted how actionable intelligence can destroy the enemy leadership and prevent retaliatory attacks. This underscores the critical role of intelligence agencies, such as Mossad and Aman, in modern warfare and the blending of military and intelligence operations.

 

Urban Warfare Challenges. Combat in dense urban environments requires specialised tactics and technologies to deal with the challenges of non-conventional warfare, such as booby traps, tunnels, and combatants embedded among civilians. During Operation Defensive Shield (2002) and the later Gaza operations, the IDF learned the complexity of fighting in cities and refugee camps, leading to the development of new urban warfare doctrines and equipment. The experience in urban warfare has influenced militaries worldwide to prioritise counter-insurgency training, urban combat techniques, and unmanned systems (such as drones) to reduce risk to soldiers in such environments.

 

Asymmetric Warfare and Counterinsurgency. Asymmetric threats from non-state actors require adaptability and a multi-pronged approach that includes military, political, and economic measures. In combating groups like Hezbollah and Hamas, the IDF has had to adjust from traditional state-to-state warfare to dealing with insurgents and terrorists using guerrilla tactics. Operations like Northern Shield (2018-2019), which targeted Hezbollah’s cross-border tunnels, exemplified how Israel has adapted to non-conventional threats. The IDF’s approach to counterinsurgency has shaped the doctrine of militaries dealing with non-state actors by emphasising intelligence, targeted strikes, and humanitarian considerations.

 

The Importance of Public Relations and International Perception. In modern conflicts, information warfare and managing public perception are nearly as important as battlefield success. In operations like the 2010 Gaza Flotilla Raid and Operation Protective Edge (2014), Israel faced widespread international criticism despite military success. Israel learned the importance of domestic and international strategic communication to justify its actions and manage the fallout. This lesson underscores the role of media strategy, humanitarian law compliance, and the importance of diplomatic channels during and after military operations.

 

Hybrid Warfare and Multi-Domain Operations. Modern warfare involves multiple domains (land, sea, air, cyber, and space), and victory often requires dominance in all of them simultaneously. Operation Northern Shield (2018-2019) involved ground forces and cyber and intelligence elements. The IDF has increasingly adopted a multi-domain approach, leveraging electronic warfare, cyber operations, and intelligence to support traditional military manoeuvres. The shift towards hybrid warfare has led many global militaries to integrate cyber defence and electronic warfare capabilities into their broader military strategies.

 

Resilience and Civilian-Military Integration. Civilian resilience and readiness are essential to enduring long-term conflict. This includes managing public expectations, integrating reservists, and maintaining high morale. During operations like Operation Protective Edge (2014), Israeli civilians faced heavy rocket fire, but resilience was maintained thanks to the Iron Dome and effective civil defence systems. Reservists were critical in bolstering the IDF’s ranks during intense military operations. The importance of a resilient home front, effective communication, and preparedness for protracted conflict are vital elements other nations have adopted from Israel’s experience.

 

The IDF’s operations reflect Israel’s emphasis on maintaining regional security and responding to threats pre-emptively or in retaliation. The IDF continues to adapt to modern threats, including cyber warfare, missile defence, and asymmetric warfare, with non-state actors such as Hezbollah, Hamas, and Islamic Jihad. The Israeli operations highlight the need for a dynamic and adaptive military in the face of evolving threats, focusing on intelligence and technology and minimising collateral damage while maintaining strategic deterrence. The IDF’s experiences have influenced modern military strategies worldwide, especially in counterterrorism, urban combat, and technological warfare.

 

Your valuable comments are most welcome.

 

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References and credits

To all the online sites and channels.

References

  1. Jewish Virtual Library, “Israel Defense Forces: Wars & Operations”, https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/israel-s-wars-and-operations
  1. Israeli Air Force website, https://www.idf.il/en/mini-sites/israeli-air-force/
  1. By the Center for Preventive Action, “Israeli-Palestinian Conflict”, Global Conflict Tracker, 06 Oct 2024.
  1. Army University Press, “Israeli Conflicts”, https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Books/CSI-Press-Publications/Israeli-Conflicts/
  1. Editors of Encyclopedia Britannica, “Arab-Israeli wars”, Britannica, 09 Sep 2024.
  1. Dr Jack Watling and Nick Reynolds, “Occasional Papers – Tactical Lessons from Israel Defense Forces Operations in Gaza”, RUSI, 11 Jul 2024.
  1. Brief, “Lessons from Israel’s war in Gaza”, Rand Corporation.
  1. Daniel Byman, “Lessons from Israel’s Last War in Lebanon”, CSIS Brief, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 02 Oct 2024.
  1. Report, “Lessons from Israel’s Forever Wars”, Reports and Papers Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School.
  1. Raphael S. Cohen, David E. Johnson, David E. Thaler, Brenna Allen, Elizabeth M. Bartels, James Cahill, Shira Efron, “Lessons from Israel’s Wars in Gaza”, RAND Research Summary, 18 Oct 2017.

Disclaimer:

Information and data included in the blog are for educational & non-commercial purposes only and have been carefully adapted, excerpted, or edited from reliable and accurate sources. All copyrighted material belongs to respective owners and is provided only for wider dissemination.

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523: CHINA: CHALLENGES IN DEVELOPING NEXT-GENERATION FIGHTER ENGINES

 

 

My Article published on The EurasionTimes Website on 22 Oct 24.

 

China’s defence policies underscore its commitment to self-reliance and the relentless pursuit of advanced technology development, aiming to reduce dependence on foreign sources. The country’s defence industry, a critical component of its national strategy, stands as one of the largest and most advanced in the world. It is a testament to China’s significant investments in military modernisation and technological innovation, bolstering military readiness and asserting its global influence. The roots of China’s defence industry can be traced back to the 1950s, following the establishment of the People’s Republic of China. Over the decades, it has evolved from focusing on basic weaponry to a more sophisticated and diversified military production capability, with a strong emphasis on advanced technology. The industry is primarily state-owned and heavily regulated by the Chinese government.

 

Defence Aviation Industry. The military aviation sector is part of China’s broader defence industry and is critical for the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF). China’s military aviation industry has rapidly evolved over the past few decades, reflecting its growing emphasis on modernising its armed forces and enhancing its defence capabilities. The industry focuses on producing a range of military aircraft, including fighter jets, transport planes, helicopters, and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). The Chinese military has undertaken extensive modernisation efforts, including developing advanced fighter jets (Chengdu J-20 and J-31, fifth-generation stealth fighters). However, China faces several challenges in developing advanced fighter aircraft engines, which are critical for enhancing the capabilities of its military aviation.

 

Aero Engine Corporation of China. The Aero Engine Corporation of China (AECC) is a Chinese state-owned enterprise focused on developing, manufacturing, and servicing aircraft engines. It was officially established in August 2016 in response to China’s growing need to develop its indigenous aero-engine technology for military and civilian aircraft. The company merged parts of AVIC (Aviation Industry Corporation of China) and other related entities to consolidate China’s aerospace engine research, development, and production capabilities. Developing advanced Indigenous engines is a strategic priority for China, both for the defence sector and the expanding commercial aviation industry (e.g., China’s domestically developed C919 airliner). AECC aims to reduce China’s reliance on foreign engine manufacturers and to enhance China’s aerospace capabilities, especially in the context of its military modernisation and commercial aviation expansion.

 

Current State of Development. Historically, China has relied on foreign-sourced engines, and AECC is central to the effort to change that. AECC is focused on developing turbofan and turboprop engines for military jets, such as the WS-10 series (for fighter aircraft) and the WS-15 (for China’s next-generation stealth fighter). It is also developing high-bypass turbofan engines for commercial aircraft, aiming to rival global engine makers General Electric and Rolls-Royce.

 

    • WS-10 “Taihang” Engine. The 13-14 ton thrust WS-10, a product of several years of dedicated development, represents China’s first successful attempt at producing a modern turbofan engine for its advanced fighters. This achievement, intended for use in the J-10 and J-11 fighter jets, is a testament to China’s progress in engine development. While early versions faced reliability issues, newer variants, such as the WS-10B and WS-10C, have reportedly improved significantly in thrust and performance, instilling optimism about China’s future in aviation technology.

 

    • WS-13 “Tianshan” Engine. A turbofan engine (8.5-9 ton thrust), primarily designed for the FC-1/JF-17 fighter, a joint Chinese-Pakistani light fighter aircraft. The WS-13 is a lighter engine designed for smaller fighters and is an alternative to the Russian-made RD-93 engine used in earlier JF-17 models.

 

    • The WS-15 “Emei” Engine. A next-generation turbofan engine with an estimated 18 tons of thrust is a significant milestone in China’s fighter engine development. Designed to power the J-20 stealth fighter jet, the WS-15 is strategically important as it aims to provide the thrust and performance required for fifth-generation fighter jets, particularly for China’s J-20 stealth fighter. Its potential to achieve super cruise capability (sustained supersonic flight without afterburners) underscores the strategic implications of China’s advancements in fighter engine development. Despite facing delays and challenges in achieving the desired performance standards, the WS-15 represents a promising future for China’s military aviation capabilities (Timelines for the development of this engine are attached).

 

    • WS-18. It is a high-thrust turbofan engine for heavy transport aircraft like the Y-20 and may be used in future bomber or tanker aircraft. The WS-18 is intended to replace foreign engines in China’s large transport aircraft, such as the Y-20, which initially relied on Russian D-30KP engines.

 

    • WS-20 Engine. A high bypass turbofan engine designed for the Y-20 transport aircraft, the WS-20 represents another step in China’s efforts to enhance its engine technology and reduce reliance on imports.

 

China’s Challenges in Fighter Aircraft Engine Development. The complex process of developing reliable, high-performance aero engines presents a significant challenge for AECC. Multifaceted challenges encompassing technological, material, and geopolitical factors hinder China’s quest to catch up with global leaders in engine technology. While the country has made notable strides in recent years, overcoming these challenges is crucial for enhancing its military aviation capabilities and achieving greater self-sufficiency in defence technology.

 

    • Technological Challenges. Developing advanced jet engines involves advanced knowledge and complex engineering challenges, including materials science, aerodynamics, and thermodynamics. Achieving high thrust-to-weight ratios, fuel efficiency, and durability while maintaining stealth capabilities requires innovative design solutions, advanced materials, and cutting-edge technology that has taken years to develop.

 

    • Material Limitations. Engine components must withstand extreme temperatures and stresses. Developing high-performance materials that can endure these conditions is crucial. China needs to catch up in producing advanced alloys and composite materials required for next-generation engines. Advanced manufacturing methods, such as precision casting and 3D printing, are essential for creating complex engine parts. While China has progressed in this area, ensuring quality control remains challenging.

 

    • Reliability and Quality. Rigorous testing and quality assurance are vital to ensuring engine reliability. Despite advancements, Chinese engines have struggled with quality and reliability issues compared to their Western counterparts. Early versions of domestically produced engines, like the WS-10, experienced reliability issues that needed to be addressed through ongoing refinements and improvements. There have been concerns about durability and performance under extreme conditions.

 

    • Research and Development Challenges. Building a skilled workforce with expertise in aerospace engineering and related fields is critical. While China has many engineering graduates, there is a need for more specialised training and experience in aerospace propulsion systems. Although the Chinese government has significantly increased investments in aerospace R&D, various sectors still compete for resources. Prioritising engine development over other military technologies can be a challenge.

 

    • Dependency on Foreign Technology. Historically, China has relied on foreign technology and imports for advanced aircraft engines and critical engine components, especially from Russia. This dependency has limited China’s ability to develop fully indigenous capabilities in this crucial area. For instance, China’s early fighter jets, such as the J-11, used Russian engines (AL-31F), which affected operational independence. While efforts are underway to develop indigenous capabilities, breaking this dependency takes time. Attempts to acquire foreign technology through partnerships and joint ventures have often faced political hurdles, leading to limited access to advanced engine technologies.

 

    • Geopolitical Pressures. Geopolitical tensions, particularly with Western nations, lead to sanctions that limit China’s access to advanced aerospace technologies. This slows down development and innovation in the aviation sector. Competing with established aerospace powerhouses like the United States and Russia, which have decades of experience and technological advancements in engine development, poses another significant challenge.

 

    • Intellectual Property Concerns. Efforts to reverse-engineer foreign engines have raised intellectual property issues, leading to tensions with countries that view these actions as unfair competition.

 

Present Status. China has been making significant strides in developing indigenous fighter aircraft engines. The country aims to reduce its reliance on foreign-made engines, mainly from Russia, and to enhance its domestic military aviation capabilities. China’s fighter aircraft engine development has advanced significantly in recent years, reflecting the country’s growing ambitions in military aviation. Chinese engineers have made strides in materials science, advanced manufacturing techniques, and thrust vectoring technology, enhancing engine performance and reliability. China has sought to acquire foreign technology to bolster its capabilities. Collaborations with countries like Russia have facilitated knowledge transfer, especially in engine design and testing.

 

Future Prospects. China is likely to increase its investment in R&D to improve its engine technology further. The goal is to achieve greater self-sufficiency and enhance the performance of its fighter aircraft. The exploration of next-generation technologies, including AI-driven engine management systems, adaptive cycle engines, and environmentally sustainable fuels, could shape the future of Chinese military aviation. Developing advanced fighter aircraft engines is crucial for China’s military modernisation efforts. As tensions rise in the Asia-Pacific region, the ability to produce competitive engines will play a vital role in enhancing China’s defence capabilities.

 

Strategic Implications. China’s struggles with fighter aircraft engine development have strategic implications, particularly in its military modernisation efforts and aspirations to become a global aerospace leader. Achieving self-sufficiency in engine technology is crucial for ensuring operational independence and enhancing the capabilities of its air force. Continued efforts in this area will be essential for China to strengthen its military aviation capabilities and achieve its broader defence objectives.

 

Conclusion. China’s fighter aircraft engine development is critical to its broader military modernisation strategy. While significant progress has been made, ongoing challenges remain. The emphasis on indigenous production, technological innovation, and strategic partnerships will be essential for China to enhance its position in the global military aviation landscape. As the situation evolves, monitoring these developments will be crucial for understanding the implications for regional and global security dynamics.

 

Timeline of WS-15 Engine development.

Estimates vary on when WS-15 development began.

 1990: Preliminary steps initiated.

2005: The blueprint for the WS-15 began to materialise

2006: A preliminary image of the WS-15 engine emerged five years before the J-20 prototype was unveiled.

2010: The first WS-15 prototypes entered the ground testing phase

2012: The full-scale demonstration project was completed , and extensive trials followed.

2013: The WS-15 development program started achieving significant milestones.

July 2018: The Chinese academic overseeing aviation engine R&D in Beijing, Liu Daxiang, announced that WS-15 development was progressing rapidly and would be fully completed within three years.

2019: The Russian AL-31 powering the J-20 was replaced by the domestic WS-10C engine.

2021:  the WS-15 was nearing operational readiness.

2022: One WS-15 engine was flown on the jet along with another older version of the engine for testing purposes.

March 2023: The WS-15 engine achieved full operational capability. WS-15 project Chief Chang Young at the AECC Beijing Institute of Aeronautical Materials announced at the 7th Chinese Aviation Innovation and Entrepreneurship Competition (CAIEC) that the WS-15 engine is now ready for mass production.

29th June 2023:  Chengdu Aircraft Corporation (CAC) conducted the maiden flight of the new variant J-20 fighter, fitted with two WS-15 turbofan engines.

As of late August 2024, the Chinese WS-15 engine reportedly encounters several significant hurdles impacting its deployment and operational efficiency. One major issue involves supply chain disruptions related to the advanced alloys needed for the engine’s production.

 

Link to the Article

https://www.eurasiantimes.com/chinas-struggle-with-aero-engines-keep/

 

Your valuable comments are most welcome.

 

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References and credits

To all the online sites and channels.

References:-

  1. Adnan Moussa, “China’s WS-15. Does it challenge US dominance over fighter jet engine tech?” aljundi.ae, 01 Dec 23.
  1. Reuben Johnson, “China’s J-20 fighter seems to have a new homegrown engine, after years of struggle”, Air Warfare Global, 18 July 2023.
  1. Boyko Nikolov, “F-22 rival Chinese J-20 may have overcome engine setbacks”, Bulgarianmilitary.com, 10 Sep 2024.
  1. Alexander Holderness, Nicholas Velazquez, Jasmine Phillips, Gregory Sanders, and Cynthia Cook, “Powering Proliferation: The Global Engine Market and China’s Indigenisation” Brief CSIS, 21 Mar 2023.

Disclaimer:

Information and data included in the blog are for educational & non-commercial purposes only and have been carefully adapted, excerpted, or edited from reliable and accurate sources. All copyrighted material belongs to respective owners and is provided only for wider dissemination.

 

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497: CHINA’S MILITARY REORGANISATION: A STORY OF EVOLUTION AND REVERSION  

 

 

My Article published in the Newsanalytics journal

 

China’s military modernisation has been a critical focus for the Chinese government over the past few decades. This process involves significant investments in technology, equipment, training, and organisational reforms to transform the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) into a world-class military force. China has a set target of 2027, the year of its centenary, to achieve its modernisation goals, paving the way for it to become a “world-class” military power by 2049.

 

China’s military reorganisation is crucial to its broader modernisation efforts to transform the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) into a more efficient, capable, and flexible force. The process involved several vital reforms and structural changes, including the establishment of the Joint Staff Department, the creation of the Central Military Commission (CMC), the formation of Theatre Commands, and the reorganisation of Military Services and Branches. The reforms have implications for regional security dynamics and are closely watched by other countries.

 

Reorganisation. Significant military and state security apparatus reforms have been implemented under the leadership of Xi Jinping, who assumed China’s presidency on 14 March 2013. Xi’s military restructuring has been guided by the long-term strategic purpose of national rejuvenation and the need to respond to the conflicts of the 21st century. The reorganisation began in 2015 and included renaming the Second Artillery the Rocket Force, creating a Joint Logistics Force, and establishing the Strategic Support Force (SSF). All of these measures were intended towards the approach that “The CMC governs, services train and equip, and the theatres fight.”

 

Strategic Support Force. The China Joint Strategic Support Force (SSF) was established on December 31, 2015, as part of the broader military reforms to modernise and integrate various aspects of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). Creating the Strategic Support Force (SSF) was a unique and innovative move that showcased China’s strategic thinking. It was designed as a cross-discipline, multi-domain warfare force, a concept that had no equivalent in any other military. The SSF was intended to consolidate space, cyber, electronic, and psychological warfare capabilities under one umbrella, making it a crucial and formidable component of China’s military strategy.

 

Reversion. On 19 April 2024, the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) Central Military Commission (CMC) announced the end of the PLA’s Strategic Support Force (SSF), the creation of a new Information Support Force (ISF), and the re-designation of The SSF’s Aerospace Systems and Network Systems departments as the Aerospace Force (ASF) and Cyberspace Force (CSF) respectively. These forces can be considered PLA equivalents to US functional combatant commands, non-geographically defined joint-force structures intended to support services and military theatres by providing critical capabilities and operations in strategic domains of warfare. These three organisations will manage offensive and defensive PLA information capabilities, including communications networks, global and space-based ISR capabilities, and offensive and defensive cyber and electronic warfare. They will operate alongside the Joint Logistics Support Force, established in 2016, and report directly to the PLA’s CMC, making the new “4+4″ military structure directly subordinate to the Central Military Commission. The CMC, headed by Xi, is the top party organ in charge of China’s military and paramilitary forces.

 

Possible Reasons. While the exact reasons behind this significant reshuffle remain a mystery, it’s clear that a complex interplay of factors related to military capability and political control influenced this decision. The potential reasons for this change are numerous and open to speculative interpretation, underscoring the significant impact of this event and its potential to reshape the military landscape.

 

    • CMC’s dissatisfaction with the SSF’s performance is a possible reason. The SSF had become a bloated organisation due to the integration of various departments. Even after eight years, the SSF’s elements could not be integrated and operated as separate entities.

 

    • Political considerations may also have led to the organisational change. As the information and space domains (and related capability development) intersect with areas of political sensitivity and China’s foreign affairs, a desire to gain greater control may have been the reason for the restructure. By removing the layers of bureaucracy between the CMC and the ASF, CSF and ISF, Xi gains greater oversight of the strategic force.

 

    • Speculation on motive includes the possibility of corruption at the highest levels. Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption campaign has regularly targeted commanders and generals. The disappearance from public view of the former SSF commander, General Ju Qiansheng, and the former SSF Deputy Commander, Lieutenant General Shang Hong (responsible for the former SSF Aerospace Systems Department), has led to speculation of corruption in the SSF akin to the Rocket Force.

 

    • Recent ongoing wars between Russia and Ukraine and between Israel and Hamas have demonstrated the importance of shaping the public perception of a conflict and flexibility in the release and use of resources in cyber, space, information and electronic domains. Strategic Support Force was an unnecessary layer in the command and control chain.

 

Information Support Force (ISF). The People’s Liberation Army’s Information Support Force (ISF) replaced the former Strategic Support Force (SSF). This restructuring is part of a broader effort to enhance the PLA’s capabilities in information warfare and streamline its command structure. The ISF has been assigned the functions of the former Information Communication Base (ICB) and elevated from a corps-grade organisation to a deputy theatre-grade organisation. The ISF and the other three arms are now one grade lower than the PLA’s five theatre commands and each of the four services. The ISF would be crucial in integrating and coordinating various information systems across the PLA, ensuring it operates efficiently in modern, informatised warfare.

 

Implications. The creation of the ISF underscores the importance the Chinese leadership places on information operations and cyber warfare. PLA no longer sees information warfare as a tactical or operational resource but as a strategic outcome. The restructuring reflects an ongoing adaptation to modern military needs, particularly in the cyber, space, and information security domains, which are increasingly critical in contemporary multi-domain conflicts. Xi Jinping, the CMC, and the PLA are unwavering in their pursuit of dominance in information warfare. This strategic goal will remain a key focus, regardless of the challenges and changes that may arise, even if it entails slippage in the 2027 deadline for PLA to be fully modernised.

 

Improved Efficiency. The ISF, along with the newly formed Cyberspace Force and Aerospace Force, will be under the direct control of the Central Military Commission (CMC). The CMC has restructured the PLA’s overall hierarchy, directly overseeing four services, five joint-force military theatres, and four joint support forces. This reorganisation, aimed at streamlining command and reducing management layers, will ensure more direct oversight and quicker decision-making, enhancing China’s military efficiency.

 

Indian Perspective. China’s military modernisation and evolving reorganisation present a complex array of strategic challenges and implications for India. In the future, India, like other countries, will face confronting situations and be compelled to respond. China’s focus on these warfare domains signals a shift towards newer forms of warfare, where information, cyber, and space operations could become essential elements of military strategy. The rapid growth of the PLA’s military capabilities and the belligerent attitude of China necessitates enhancing India’s military capabilities on priority. India needs to reorient and reorganise to develop a warfare capability in the strategic domains of space, cyber, electromagnetic, and information.

 

It is too soon to predict the effect of recent developments on the PLA’s ability to fight and win wars. Notwithstanding, the PLA’s restructuring is a significant development that will have far-reaching implications for China’s military capabilities and strategic posture. It reflects China’s growing emphasis on modernising its military and developing advanced cyber and space warfare capabilities. It reflects a clear shift in China’s military strategy and doctrine. The PLA’s new structure will enable it to operate more effectively in a rapidly changing global security environment and enhance China’s ability to project its power and influence beyond its borders. The evolutionary process may provide additional time for the affected countries to take appropriate measures to face future challenges.

 

Suggestions and value additions are most welcome.

 

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References and credits

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References:-

  1. Matt Bruzzese and Peter W. Singer “Farewell to China’s Strategic Support Force”, Defenseone, 28 Apr 2024.
  1. Dean Cheng, “Why Xi created a new Information Support Force, and why now”, Breaking Defense Indo-Pacific, 29 Apr 2024.
  1. Kartik Bommakanti, “China removes the PLASSF and establishes ISF: Implications for India”, Observer Research Foundation, 15 May 2024.
  1. Joe McReynolds and John Costello, “Planned Obsolescence: The Strategic Support Force In Memoriam (2015-2024)”, The Jamestown Foundation, 26 Apr 2024.
  1. Tenzin Younten, “China’s Latest Military Reorganization Terminates the PLA SSF & launches Three New Arm Forces based on it: Strategic implications of the PLA’s latest Reforms and Structural Changes”, 26 Apr 2024.
  1. Joe Keary, “Four services and four arms lifts CCP control over information warfare”, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 24 May 2024.
  1. Kalpit A Mankar and Satyam Singh, “Tracking China’s moves on information warfare”, Observer Research Foundation, 22 May 2024.
  1. Amber Wang, “New force for China’s PLA eyes modern warfare information support”, South China Morning Post, 23 Apr 2024.
  1. Lindsay Maizland, “China’s Modernizing Military”, Council on Foreign Relations, 05 Feb 2020.

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