Category: Pakistan

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667: KASHMIR THROUGH CHINESE LENS

 

Inputs to the questions posed by the Journalist.

 

Q1. How’s the current Pahalgam crisis beneficial for the CCP’s South Asian agendas? 

The Pahalgam crisis indirectly serves the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) strategic agendas in South Asia.

Weakening India’s Regional Influence. India, entangled in Kashmir-related conflicts, limits its ability to project power in South Asia, aligning with Beijing’s goal of maintaining regional dominance.

Strengthening the China-Pakistan Alliance. China’s “all-weather” partnership with Pakistan is a cornerstone of its South Asia strategy, particularly through the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). The crisis reinforces Pakistan’s reliance on China, as Islamabad faces diplomatic and economic isolation from India’s retaliatory measures, like trade restrictions and treaty suspensions. China’s public support for Pakistan (evident in Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s call for a “swift and fair investigation” into the attack and backing Pakistan’s sovereignty) bolsters this alliance.

Exploiting Regional Instability. The CCP benefits from controlled instability in South Asia, as it keeps India and Pakistan preoccupied with bilateral tensions rather than challenging China’s regional projects, like the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The Pahalgam crisis, by escalating border skirmishes and diplomatic hostilities, creates a volatile environment that diverts attention from China’s activities in Nepal, Bangladesh, and the Indian Ocean.

Undermining India’s Economic Narrative. The Pahalgam attack has challenged India’s narrative of stability and economic growth, particularly in Kashmir post-Article 370 revocation. This undermines India’s appeal to foreign investors, a key CCP concern given India’s role as a rival in attracting manufacturing post-U.S. tariffs on China.

Limiting U.S.-India Strategic Convergence. The crisis occurs amid U.S. distractions, with President Trump’s focus on trade wars and tariffs. By keeping India embroiled in a regional conflict, the CCP reduces the likelihood of deeper U.S.-India strategic alignment, which could counter China’s influence.

 

Q2. What’s behind China’s support for Pakistan on the Kashmir issue? Why is China supporting Pakistan’s call for an impartial probe into the April 22 attack? 

China’s support for Pakistan on the Kashmir issue stems from a mix of strategic, geopolitical, and domestic considerations that align with Beijing’s long-term regional agenda.

China’s support for Pakistan on Kashmir is not just about friendship—it’s about undermining India strategically, protecting infrastructure interests, controlling regional narratives, and securing ideological consistency on separatism and counterterrorism.

The call for an “impartial probe” is part of a larger strategy of positioning China as “neutral” while subtly backing Pakistan to complicate India’s diplomatic standing.

Strategic Alliance with Pakistan (Counterbalance to India). China and Pakistan have a decades-long strategic alliance. Beijing views Islamabad as a critical counterweight to India in South Asia.

Protection of CPEC Interests. CPEC passes through Gilgit-Baltistan, a region India claims as part of Jammu & Kashmir. India opposes this on sovereignty grounds. By backing Pakistan on Kashmir, China strengthens the legitimacy of its infrastructure investments in disputed territories. Also, any instability in Kashmir has a direct impact on the security of Chinese nationals and assets working in Pakistan-administered regions.

Diplomatic Leverage and Global Narrative Control. By supporting an “impartial probe” into the April 22 attack (in which Indian civilians were killed), China is deflecting attention from Pakistan-based terror groups, buying Islamabad diplomatic time.

 

Q3. A hidden Huawei satellite phone has surfaced in the probe into the Pehalgam attack. What does it indicate? What’s the history of Chinese equipment in the Kashmir terrorism ecosystem? 

The detection of a Huawei satellite phone near the attack site in Pahalgam’s Baisaran Valley indicates the terrorists’ use of advanced communication tactics. The phone connects to China’s satellite network, enabling secure, off-grid communication without reliance on local cellular networks. This capability allows operatives to evade Indian surveillance systems, which heavily monitor terrestrial networks.

Intelligence sources reportedly indicate the phone was active during the attack, suggesting its use for real-time coordination among attackers or with handlers across borders, possibly in Pakistan.

Encrypted Chinese messaging apps alongside the phone further point to a deliberate strategy to avoid detection, as these apps were banned in India post-2020 Galwan clash due to security concerns.

Huawei products are banned in India due to national security risks, meaning the phone was likely smuggled, possibly from Pakistan.

The phone’s connection to Tiantong-1, a Chinese state-controlled network, raises questions about whether Chinese technology is being repurposed for terrorist activities, either deliberately or through illicit markets.

Chinese equipment has periodically surfaced in J&K’s terrorism landscape, reflecting both the global proliferation of Chinese technology and targeted use by militant networks.

 

Q4. What’s China’s agenda (not policy) today on Kashmir? With Turkey and China supporting Pakistan in the current crisis, how do you gauge the emerging geopolitical situation? 

China’s current agenda on Kashmir—distinct from its official policy—is geopolitically opportunistic, destabilising in intent, and part of a broader strategy to constrain India’s rise.

It operates below the threshold of overt conflict but consistently supports Pakistan diplomatically, technologically, and in multilateral forums.

The support by both China and Turkey to Pakistan during the ongoing Pahalgam crisis indicates the emergence of a soft anti-India bloc seeking to leverage Kashmir as a pressure point.

While China’s official policy is neutrality and calls for bilateral resolution, its agenda is about instrumentalising Kashmir to box in India strategically and diplomatically.

Turkey has emerged as a loud voice on Kashmir, echoing Pakistan’s positions at the UN and OIC. Turkey’s support complements China’s involvement. This triad works to internationalise Kashmir, delegitimise Indian control, and challenge India’s secular-democratic image.

 

Q5. Was the attack timed with the development of the India-US trade deal? It diverted the whole world’s attention from Trump’s trade tariff war to Kashmir! Was it to thwart the US trade war with China? 

April 22, 2025’s timing has sparked speculation about its alignment with geopolitical developments, particularly the India-US trade deal negotiations and the escalating US-China trade war under President Donald Trump’s tariff policies.

The timing of the attack, during Vance’s visit and amid trade negotiations, suggests a possible intent to maximise disruption.

The choice of Pahalgam, a tourist destination, ensured global media coverage, potentially overshadowing trade discussions.

The attack dominated Indian and international headlines and undeniably shifted global media and diplomatic focus to Kashmir, at least temporarily. It did not “eclipse” the trade war but added a parallel crisis, particularly in South Asia, where India-Pakistan tensions dominated regional discourse.

The attack significantly diverted attention to Kashmir, particularly in India and among its partners, but it did not entirely overshadow the US-China trade war globally.

The attack aligns with China’s interest in disrupting India’s US trade alignment, but lacks evidence of direct Chinese intent. It likely served Pakistan’s goals while indirectly benefiting China’s agenda.

 

Q6. Other relevant aspects? 

Pakistan’s military and government are grappling with economic woes and political unrest, exacerbated by India’s trade restrictions and diplomatic isolation. Supporting militant proxies may be a way to deflect domestic criticism. However, this is a foolish mistake, and domestic pressures could push both nations toward miscalculation.

The crisis’s economic fallout extends beyond India and Pakistan, affecting volatile global markets. India’s trade restrictions and border closures further damage Pakistan’s already strained economy, increasing its reliance on China’s financial support.

The India-Pakistan-China nuclear dynamic raises the stakes. While restraint is being held, the crisis tests this balance.

 

Link to the article by Venus Upadhayaya on The Epoch Times (Quoted four times):-

https://www.theepochtimes.com/world/chinas-footprint-is-clear-in-kashmir-crisis-analysts-say-5852309

 

 

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References and credits

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665: DESPERATE MEN DO DESPERATE THINGS IN DESPERATE SITUATIONS: PAKISTAN ARMY CHIEF PLAYING WITH FIRE

 

My article was published on The EurasianTimes website

on 01 May 25.

 

The recent terrorist attack in Phalgam, Jammu and Kashmir, has once again brought the spotlight on Pakistan’s deep state and its time-tested strategy of using militant proxies to pursue its strategic aims in the region. Coming at a time when Pakistan is facing extraordinary internal and external pressures, the timing and nature of the attack raise pressing questions about the motives behind this provocation and the extent to which the current military leadership may be resorting to desperation-driven tactics. The phrase “desperate men do desperate things in desperate situations” encapsulates the narrative that Munir, grappling with Pakistan’s cascading crises, resorted to terrorism to unify a fractured nation and reassert military dominance. The question remains whether it is a calculated move or a strategic blunder that would result in a bigger crisis.

 

Desperate Act

On April 22, 2025, the serene Baisaran Valley in Pahalgam became the site of a horrific terror attack. Armed militants, later identified as members of Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), stormed a tourist campsite, killing 26  civilians, predominantly Hindu tourists. The attackers, wielding M4 carbines and AK-47s, verified victims’ religious identities before executing them, marking the deadliest assault in the region since the 2008 Mumbai attacks. The Pahalgam attack was no ordinary act of terrorism. Its precision, weaponry, and targeting suggest sophistication beyond typical militant operations. The attackers, led by Hashim Musa, a former Pakistan Army para-commando dismissed from service, infiltrated deep to strike a tourist hotspot 100 kilometres from the Line of Control (Loc).

The attack in Phalgam was a brazen act of desperation, targeting unarmed, innocent tourists in a relatively stable and tourist-frequented part of Kashmir. The use of high-grade weaponry and coordinated execution points toward sophisticated planning, likely beyond the capabilities of isolated local cells. Indian officials allege the attack was planned by Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), with direct oversight from Munir. A key piece of evidence is Musa’s background. Sources claim he was “loaned” by Pakistan’s Special Service Group (SSG) to Let, and the attackers’ weaponry, M4 carbines, are rare in militant hands, further pointing to state backing.

The attack’s communal nature adds another layer. The militants spared Muslim tourists, targeting Hindus in a deliberate bid to inflame religious tensions. This aligns with Munir’s April 16, 2025, speech, where he emphasised Pakistan’s Islamic identity and the Two-Nation Theory, framing India as an existential threat. The timing—six days after the hate speech—suggests a deliberate signal to terror groups. The Resistance Front (TRF), a LeT offshoot, initially claimed responsibility but later retracted, a move Indian analysts attribute to Pakistan’s attempt to distance itself from the backlash.

 

Desperate Situation

Under General Asim Munir, the Pakistan Army faces a precarious state that is a unique and combustible blend of crises, a collapsing economy, surging insurgencies, and eroding public trust in the military.

Economic Collapse. Pakistan’s GDP growth is under 2%, inflation is soaring past 20%, and the Pakistani rupee is plummeting. A $7-billion IMF loan, secured in 2024, imposes austerity measures that have sparked nationwide protests. The Karachi Stock Exchange crashed 3% in a single day post-Pahalgam, reflecting investor fears of regional instability. Pakistan’s economy is on life support, with an IMF deal hanging by a thread and foreign reserves dipping dangerously low. The economic hardship is palpable across society, eroding public faith in national institutions.

 Political Instability. Politically, Pakistan is a tinderbox. The 2023 arrest of former Prime Minister Imran Khan, widely seen as orchestrated by the military, has galvanised his Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) party. The military’s overt role in political engineering has backfired, leading to widespread public discontent and intra-elite fragmentation. Mass protests, often met with brutal crackdowns, have eroded the military’s legitimacy. Social media campaigns like #ResignAsimMunir, despite Pakistan’s ban on X, highlight Munir’s unpopularity. Analysts describe the military’s public support as at its lowest since the 1971 Bangladesh liberation, when Pakistan lost its eastern wing. For Munir, appointed Army Chief in November 2022, these crises threaten his leadership and the military’s grip on power.

Institutional Crisis. Militarily, Pakistan is under siege. The Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) has intensified attacks in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa, including a March 2025 train hijacking that killed several passengers. In Balochistan, separatist groups like the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) target Chinese-funded CPEC projects, undermining Pakistan’s strategic ties with Beijing. The military, once revered as the nation’s protector, struggles to contain these threats, with over 1,200 security personnel killed in 2024 alone. For perhaps the first time in decades, the Pakistan Army’s credibility is under sustained attack. Retired officers have voiced dissent, and social media campaigns have openly criticised the top brass—something previously unthinkable.

 Strategic Isolation. Once seen as a pivotal state in the U.S.-China rivalry, Pakistan is increasingly isolated. China’s Belt and Road investments have slowed, while Gulf nations redirect capital elsewhere. Washington remains wary, and New Delhi has successfully lobbied global forums to pressure Islamabad on terror financing.

 

Desperation Levels and Motives

The narrative of Munir’s desperation hinges on his need to reverse the military’s declining fortunes. With Pakistan unravelling, the Army Chief faces pressure to reassert control. Possible motives for orchestrating the Pahalgam attack include the following:-

Rallying Domestic Support. By reigniting the Kashmir issue, Munir seeks to unify Pakistanis under the military’s narrative of India as the eternal enemy. The military has historically used anti-India sentiment to deflect domestic criticism, as seen after the 1999 Kargil War and the 2016 Uri attack. With protests and insurgencies eroding public trust, a high-profile attack could galvanise nationalist fervour.

Disrupting India’s Kashmir Narrative. The region has seen relative stability since India revoked Article 370 in 2019, stripping Jammu and Kashmir of its autonomy. Record tourism (2 million visitors in 2024), successful elections, and infrastructure development have undermined Pakistan’s claim to Kashmir. The Pahalgam attack, targeting tourists, aims to deter visitors, disrupt normalcy, and revive Pakistan’s relevance in the dispute.

Risking Controlled Escalation. A limited conflict with India could restore the military’s image as Pakistan’s protector. Past crises, like the 2019 Pulwama attack, saw Pakistan weather Indian airstrikes while rallying domestic support. Munir may have calculated that India’s response—diplomatic measures, border skirmishes—would remain containable, avoiding all-out war given both nations’ nuclear arsenals.

 

Calculated Act or Strategic Miscalculation?

General Munir, a former ISI chief, is acutely aware of the strategic value and political risk of cross-border terrorism. His tenure began with promises of internal reform and a clean break from overt politicking. However, Munir has returned to the tried-and-tested path of external diversion under mounting internal pressures and the erosion of military dominance in domestic affairs.

A terrorist attack in Kashmir achieves several aims simultaneously: it unites domestic opinion around a perceived external threat, deflects criticism from internal dysfunction, and tests India’s threshold for retaliation. It may also galvanise the rank and file within the army, reasserting its role as the sole guardian of Pakistan’s ideological and territorial integrity.

The attack has plunged India-Pakistan relations into crisis. India responded with punitive measures: suspending the Indus Waters Treaty, closing borders, expelling diplomats, and cancelling Visas.  Small-arms fire along the LoC has escalated, with Pakistan closing its airspace to Indian flights. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi vowed a “befitting reply,” raising speculation of Military action.

 

India’s Options

India faces a complex decision matrix. A kinetic response, such as surgical strikes or air raids like Balakot in 2019, may yield short-term political dividends, especially if the Pakistan Army is seeking precisely such a reaction to rally domestic support. Conversely, restraint may embolden further provocations, especially if it is perceived as a lack of resolve. Therefore, India must pursue a calibrated strategy that combines tactical counter-terror operations with strategic multi-domain actions.

India’s response will be shaped by the need to address domestic outrage, signal strength to Pakistan, and manage international pressure to avoid escalation between the two nuclear-armed states.  The response is likely to be multi-pronged in several domains.

Diplomatic Offensive. India has already accused Pakistan of sponsoring terrorism, with Prime Minister Narendra Modi calling Pakistan a “rogue state” at the UN and vowing to pursue attackers “to the ends of the earth.” India will likely intensify efforts to diplomatically isolate Pakistan by raising the issue in international forums like the UN, G20, or bilateral talks with allies like the US, UK, and France.

Severing Diplomatic Ties. India has already expelled Pakistani diplomats and may further downgrade diplomatic ties, potentially recalling its high commissioner from Islamabad or imposing additional visa restrictions.

Economic and Trade Restrictions. India has suspended the Indus Waters Treaty, a significant move signalling economic retaliation. Further steps could include tightening trade restrictions or pushing for international financial scrutiny of Pakistan, leveraging India’s influence with institutions like the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), where Pakistan has faced grey-listing for terrorism financing concerns.

Cultural and Sporting Bans. To sustain domestic momentum against Pakistan, India may reinforce existing bans on cultural exchanges, sports events, and media collaborations.

Strategic Military Posturing.  India is likely to increase military deployments along the Line of Control (LoC) and international border, as implied by Modi’s “complete operational freedom” grant to the armed forces.

Surgical Strikes or Targeted Operations. India’s response to the 2019 Pulwama attack—a surgical airstrike on a Jaish-e-Mohammed camp in Balakot, Pakistan—sets a precedent. A similar operation targeting an appropriate target in Pakistan is possible.

Escalation of Skirmishes. Intermittent cross-border firing along the LOC, reported since the attack, may intensify. If not controlled, these skirmishes may escalate to a full-fledged war.

 

A Dangerous Game of Desperation

The Phalgam attack is not an isolated incident—it is a symptom of deeper rot within Pakistan’s civil-military structure. It underscores the Pakistan military’s enduring reliance on terrorism to counter internal and external pressures. But the diminishing returns of this strategy, combined with growing international scrutiny and a more assertive India, make this a dangerous game.

Desperate men in desperate institutions often resort to desperate measures. For Pakistan’s military, external provocation has long served as a tool to distract, deflect, and dominate. The costs may outweigh the benefits if General Munir pivots back to cross-border militancy as a pressure valve. Whether driven by Munir’s desperation or institutional strategy, the operation has reignited India-Pakistan tensions, risking escalation in a nuclear-armed region.

India must remain wise enough not to be baited, yet take appropriate multi-pronged, multi-domain retaliatory action, stay alert, agile, and strategically ready to counter these designs. India would be willing to climb the escalatory ladder, as Indian patience has run out, and a red line has been crossed this time. Once again, regional peace teeters on the edge of a dangerous gamble from across the border.

 

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References and credits

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Disclaimer:

Information and data included in the blog are for educational & non-commercial purposes only and have been carefully adapted, excerpted, or edited from reliable and accurate sources. All copyrighted material belongs to the respective owners and is provided only for wider dissemination.

 

References:-

1. The Hindu, “Tourism Terror Targeted: Pahalgam Massacre,” April 23, 2025. https://www.thehindu.com

2. Indian Express, “How Pakistan’s Proxy War Is Mutating,” April 2025.

3. Dawn (Pakistan), “General Munir’s Gamble: What the Army’s Silence Hides,” April 25, 2025.

4. Reuters, “India Accuses Pakistan of Orchestrating Deadly Kashmir Attack,” April 2025.

5. Al Jazeera, “Terror Returns to Kashmir: Who Gains?” April 24, 2025.

6. Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA), India – Dossiers on LeT, TRF, ISI

Home Page

7. RAND Corporation Reports – “Proxy Warfare and Strategic Risk in South Asia” (2021). https://www.rand.org

8. Brookings Institution – “The Pakistan Army’s Strategic Calculus in a Post-Imran Era” (2024), https://www.brookings.edu

9. Carnegie India – “Pakistan’s New Military Doctrine: Continuity or Crisis?” (2023).

10. Observer Research Foundation (ORF), India – Reports on terrorism, India-Pakistan conflict cycles, https://www.orfonline.org

11. Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) – “Pakistan’s Internal Security Collapse” (2024), https://www.cfr.org

12. Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India – Official statements on the Phalgam attack and diplomatic responses. https://www.mea.gov.in

13. United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Briefings – Historical and recent discussions on Pakistan-sponsored terrorism. https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/

14. Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR), Pakistan – Official statements from Pakistan’s military. https://www.ispr.gov.pk/

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662:INDIA’S WATER CANNON AGAINST PAKISTAN-SPONSORED TERRORISM: INDUS WATER TREATY

 

My article was published on the “Life of Soldier” website

on 29 Apr 25.

 

 

“Blood and water cannot flow together”

– Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi

 

The Indus Waters Treaty is a water-sharing agreement between India and Pakistan, signed on September 19, 1960, in Karachi by Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and Pakistani President Ayub Khan. The World Bank brokered it and governs the use of the Indus River system, which includes six rivers: Indus, Jhelum, Chenab, Ravi, Beas, and Sutlej. The Indus River system is critical for both countries’ irrigation, hydropower, and drinking water.

India held the Indus Waters Treaty in abeyance on April 23, 2025, following the Pahalgam terrorist attack that killed 26 civilians. India’s decision, citing national security concerns, grants it greater control over the western rivers, potentially impacting Pakistan’s agriculture and water supply. Pakistan condemned the move as an “act of war,” suspending the Simla Agreement and closing the Wagah border. The World Bank, a treaty signatory, has urged dialogue but lacks enforcement power. This development heightens regional instability and raises concerns about future conflicts and diplomatic relations.

 

Key Provisions

Division of Rivers. Western Rivers (Indus, Jhelum, Chenab) are allocated to Pakistan for unrestricted use, except for limited Indian uses (e.g., domestic, non-consumptive, and specified agricultural purposes). Eastern Rivers (Ravi, Beas, Sutlej) are allocated to India for unrestricted use.

Water Sharing. Pakistan receives about 80% of the Indus system’s water (around 135 million acre-feet annually), while India gets 20%.

Infrastructure. India can build run-of-the-river dams on Western Rivers for hydropower, but cannot store water beyond specified limits. Pakistan can object to designs that violate the treaty.

Permanent Indus Commission. A bilateral body with representatives from both countries meets regularly to monitor implementation, share data, and resolve disputes.

 

Context and Significance.

The treaty was necessitated by the 1947 partition, which split the Indus basin, leaving canal headworks in India and irrigated lands in Pakistan. A 1948 standoff, when India briefly cut off water to Pakistan, underscored the need for a formal agreement. It is considered one of the most successful water-sharing treaties globally, surviving three wars.

The Indus system originates in the Himalayas, with major tributaries flowing through Indian-administered Jammu, Kashmir, and Pakistani-occupied Gilgit-Baltistan, making it geopolitically sensitive. In 2016, after a terrorist attack in Uri, India reviewed the treaty. In 2022 and 2023, India issued notices to Pakistan for treaty modification, citing “fundamental changes” like cross-border terrorism and environmental challenges, but no formal revocation has occurred. In 2023, Pakistan sought arbitration over Kishanganga and Ratle, while India challenged the arbitration process, preferring Neutral Expert resolution.

Pakistan, heavily dependent on the Indus for 90% of its water needs, fears reduced flows due to Indian projects or climate change. Delays in its storage infrastructure (e.g., Diamer-Bhasha Dam) exacerbate vulnerabilities. Glacial melt, erratic monsoons, and floods (e.g., 2010, 2022) strain the treaty’s framework, which lacks provisions for climate adaptation.

 

Recent Development

India has officially held the IWT with Pakistan in abeyance, marking a significant shift in bilateral relations. This decision was announced on April 23, 2025, following a terrorist attack in Pahalgam, Jammu and Kashmir. India invoked Article XII(3) of the IWT and sent a formal notice to Pakistan. The Ministry of Jal Shakti cited Pakistan’s alleged support for cross-border terrorism, shifting demographics, and energy demands as reasons the agreement could no longer continue “in good faith.”​

With the treaty placed in abeyance, India is no longer obligated to share information regarding water storage levels or flow in the rivers of the Indus River System with Pakistan.​ India has ceased sharing hydrological data (e.g., water flow, snowmelt, flood updates) with Pakistan, halted technical meetings, and stopped allowing Pakistani inspections of Indian projects. India is no longer bound by treaty restrictions on building storage or hydropower projects on the western rivers (Indus, Jhelum, Chenab).

 

Adverse Impact on Pakistan

India’s suspension of the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) poses significant adverse impacts on Pakistan, particularly in agriculture, water supply, energy, and economic stability.

Agriculture. Pakistan relies on the Indus River system for 80% of its irrigated agriculture, supporting 16 million hectares of farmland. The western rivers (Indus, Jhelum, Chenab) allocated to Pakistan under the IWT provide 93% of its irrigation water. A 10-20% reduction in water availability could lead to significant declines in agricultural output, threatening food security and rural livelihoods. Pakistan’s agriculture sector, which employs 40% of the workforce and contributes 24% to GDP, faces severe risks. While India’s current infrastructure limits immediate large-scale water diversion, future dams or storage projects could reduce water availability, especially during critical sowing seasons (e.g., Rabi and Kharif), reduced flows could lower crop yields for wheat, rice, and cotton—key staples and export crops.

Water Scarcity in Urban Centres. Major cities like Karachi, Lahore, Multan, and Faisalabad depend on the Indus and its tributaries for drinking water and industrial use. Any reduction in river flows, even temporary, could exacerbate existing water scarcity. Pakistan already faces a per capita water availability of ~1,000 cubic meters, close to the “water scarce” threshold. Water rationing, public health crises, and industrial slowdowns could occur, particularly in Punjab and Sindh provinces, which rely heavily on the Indus.

Energy Sector. Pakistan generates significant electricity from hydropower plants like Tarbela (3,478 MW) and Mangla (1,000 MW), which rely on consistent river flows from the Indus and Jhelum. Reduced or irregular water flows could lower power generation, worsening Pakistan’s energy crisis. For example, a 10% reduction in Tarbela’s water inflow could cut its output by hundreds of megawatts, affecting millions of households.

Economic. Energy shortages could disrupt industrial production and increase reliance on costly imported fuels, straining Pakistan’s foreign exchange reserves. A decline in crop production would reduce export revenues (e.g., rice and cotton) and increase food import costs, exacerbating Pakistan’s trade deficit. Reduced agricultural output could lead to job losses in rural areas, driving migration to urban centers and rising social unrest. Higher food and energy prices and potential infrastructure damage from flooding (if India releases water abruptly) could fuel inflation. Pakistan’s external debt (~$130 billion in 2025) limits its ability to fund mitigation measures. A 2023 World Bank study estimated that a 20% reduction in Indus water flows could shave 5-7% off Pakistan’s GDP over a decade.

Social and Political Fallout. Water shortages could spark protests, particularly in Sindh and Punjab, where water allocation disputes between provinces are already contentious. Provinces like Sindh, which rely on downstream flows, may accuse Punjab of hoarding water, exacerbating internal political divides.

 

India’s Justification and Legitimacy.

India’s justification and Legitimacy for holding in abeyance the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) hinges on the principle of a “fundamental change of circumstances,” as outlined in Article 62 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. New Delhi argues that Pakistan’s continued support for cross-border terrorism, especially following incidents like the April 2025 Pahalgam attack, violates the underlying premise of peaceful bilateral relations that formed the basis of the IWT in 1960. India contends that a country facilitating terrorist activity cannot expect continued cooperation on vital issues like water sharing. While the IWT lacks a unilateral withdrawal clause, India maintains that suspension, not withdrawal, can be a legitimate, proportionate response to persistent security threats.

 

Diplomatic and Legal Aspects

Pakistan’s Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif called the suspension an “act of war” and announced retaliatory measures, including suspending the 1972 Simla Agreement and closing the Wagah border.

Pakistan may seek World Bank mediation or international arbitration. The IWT lacks a unilateral exit clause, and India’s suspension may not be easily challenged under international law if framed as a response to terrorism (per Article 62, Vienna Convention). Experts argue India’s suspension is permissible under Article 62 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, citing a “fundamental change of circumstances” due to Pakistan’s alleged terrorism support for terrorism. The World Bank, a treaty signatory, has urged dialogue but cannot enforce compliance.

Pakistan may seek neutral expert mediation or arbitration, but India’s refusal to cooperate could render these mechanisms ineffective. Escalating the issue to the UN or other forums may gain Pakistan sympathy but will unlikely force India to reverse the suspension.

 

The Only Way out for Pakistan.

The only viable way for Pakistan to restore the Indus Waters Treaty is through diplomatic engagement coupled with tangible actions to address India’s core security concerns, particularly those related to cross-border terrorism. India’s decision, justified under the “fundamental change of circumstances” clause in international law, is rooted in accusations of Pakistan’s support for militant activities. Therefore, Pakistan would need to:-

  • Stop escalatory rhetoric (including regular and brash nuclear sabre rattling) and retaliatory actions, as these would only harden India’s stance.
  • Demonstrate a verifiable crackdown on terror infrastructure operating from its territory, especially groups targeting India.
  • Offer security guarantees and confidence-building measures that acknowledge India’s national security concerns to rebuild trust and initiate fresh dialogue.

Ultimately, Pakistan’s path to treaty restoration lies not just in legal appeals but in restructuring the political and security context in which the treaty was suspended. Only by addressing the root causes—especially terrorism—can the IWT be revived in a stable, sustainable way.

 

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Disclaimer:

Information and data included in the blog are for educational & non-commercial purposes only and have been carefully adapted, excerpted, or edited from reliable and accurate sources. All copyrighted material belongs to respective owners and is provided only for wider dissemination.

 

 

References:-

  1. Financial Times. “Undermining the Indus Waters Treaty imperils Indian security.” April 26, 2025.
  1. Reuters. “India suspends Indus Waters Treaty after Pahalgam terror attack.” April 23, 2025.
  1. Al Jazeera. “Pakistan calls Indus Treaty suspension ‘an act of war’.” April 24, 2025.
  1. The Hindu. “India halts hydrological data sharing with Pakistan under Indus Treaty.” April 25, 2025.
  1. BBC. “Water Wars? India wields Indus Treaty amid rising tensions with Pakistan.” April 27, 2025.
  1. Dawn. “Pakistan to seek World Bank mediation on Indus Treaty row with India.” April 28, 2025.
  1. Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA). Indus Treaty as a Strategic Lever: Implications for India’s National Security. Issue Brief, 2023.
  1. Rajagopalan, Rajeswari Pillai. India’s Water Diplomacy: Reclaiming the Strategic Narrative. Observer Research Foundation, 2023.
  1. Observer Research Foundation (ORF). India’s Options under the Indus Waters Treaty: A Strategic Overview. 2022.
  1. United States Institute of Peace (USIP). Resolving India-Pakistan Water Disputes: A Legal and Strategic Perspective. 2020.
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