Category: Geo-politics

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637: THE GEOPOLITICS OF FIGHTER EXPORTS AND JOINT VENTURES

 

My Article was published on the Indus International Research Foundation Website on 02 April 25.

 

Fighter aircraft exports and development are more than commercial transactions or technological endeavours. Fighter exports and joint ventures serve as key instruments of statecraft, influencing alliances, shaping military doctrines, and reinforcing spheres of influence. Beyond economic interests, fighter exports often signal political alignment, with buyers and sellers engaging in long-term defence cooperation that extends beyond individual transactions. Complex negotiations usually accompany the sale of advanced fighter jets, offset agreements, and technology transfer arrangements, which carry significant diplomatic and security implications. The United States, Russia, China, and European powers dominate this space, but emerging players like India, South Korea, and Turkey increasingly assert themselves. There is a need to explore the multifaceted dimensions of fighter exports and joint ventures, analysing their impact on global security, economic interests, and diplomatic manoeuvring.

 

The Strategic Significance of Fighter Aircraft Development Programs

Fighter aircraft represent the apex of military aviation, integrating state-of-the-art engineering, advanced technology, and substantial financial investment. These platforms are key instruments in modern warfare, providing air superiority, precision ground attack capabilities, and deterrence. The strategic significance of fighter jets extends well beyond their battlefield utility, influencing geopolitical alignments, economic landscapes, and technological advancements.

 

Power Projection. The export and co-development of fighter aircraft significantly enhance a nation’s ability to project power beyond its borders. Supplying fighter jets to allies, an exporting nation extends its strategic reach, ensuring its influence in key regions. Nations with advanced fighter capabilities can assert dominance over contested airspace, deter potential adversaries, and support allied operations with force projection.

 

Alliance Building. Defence agreements involving fighter jets are instrumental in solidifying alliances. The procurement of these aircraft often necessitates long-term agreements that go beyond a simple arms transaction. Training programs, maintenance support, and logistical cooperation ensure sustained engagement between supplier and recipient nations. For instance, the U.S. sale of F-35 fighters to NATO allies strengthens collective defence, while India’s collaboration with France on the Rafale program deepens bilateral ties.

 

Economic Impact. Fighter aircraft programs play a crucial role in economic development for exporting and recipient nations. Manufacturing these sophisticated platforms generates high-skilled jobs, fosters technological innovation, and stimulates the defence industry. For importing nations, participation in joint ventures or localised production can help build a domestic aerospace sector, reducing long-term dependence on foreign suppliers and fostering economic self-reliance.

 

Technological Sharing. Collaborative fighter programs provide an avenue for technological transfer, enabling recipient nations to develop indigenous capabilities. By engaging in co-development projects, such as India’s involvement with Russia on the Su-30MKI or Japan’s partnership with the U.K. and Italy on the next-generation fighter program, nations acquire critical knowledge in avionics, stealth technology, and aerospace engineering. This reduces reliance on foreign manufacturers and strengthens national security.

 

Geopolitical Dimensions of Fighter Exports

Fighter aircraft exports are deeply intertwined with the geopolitical strategies of major military powers. Beyond economic gains, these transactions serve as instruments of influence, shaping alliances, regional security dynamics, and global power structures. Exporting fighters enables nations to strengthen partnerships, enforce strategic conditions, and maintain regional balances of power.

 

Exporting Influence. Fighter aircraft exports are often tied to the exporting nation’s broader geopolitical objectives. The U.S. dominates global fighter exports, offering aircraft such as the F-16, F-15, and F-35. These sales typically include conditions that align recipient nations with U.S. strategic goals, such as interoperability with NATO forces and adherence to U.S.-led arms control policies. For example, selling F-35 fighters to NATO allies and Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states strengthens collective security frameworks and reinforces U.S. influence in these regions. On the other hand, Russian fighter exports, including the Su-30, Su-35, and MiG-29, play a crucial role in Moscow’s foreign policy. Russia leverages these sales to sustain its geopolitical clout in South Asia, Africa, and the Middle East. India’s long-standing acquisition of Su-30MKI fighters exemplifies this strategic relationship, ensuring continued defence cooperation between the two nations. China is emerging as a formidable player in the fighter export market. The JF-17 Thunder, co-developed with Pakistan, exemplifies Beijing’s ambitions to challenge U.S. and Russian dominance. With its affordability and modularity, the JF-17 has gained traction among developing nations seeking capable yet cost-effective fighter platforms.

 

Export Restrictions and Conditionality. Exporting nations often impose restrictions to safeguard their strategic interests and limit the recipient’s operational autonomy. Exporting nations usually restrict access to critical fighter technologies to prevent potential adversaries from gaining sensitive capabilities. This limitation affects recipient nations that seek to develop indigenous aerospace industries but must navigate restrictions on advanced avionics, stealth technology, and weapon systems. The U.S. enforces strict end-user agreements to regulate how exported fighters are used and resold. For instance, Turkey’s removal from the F-35 program following its purchase of Russia’s S-400 air defence system underscores the geopolitical stakes of such agreements.

 

Regional Balance of Power. Fighter aircraft exports significantly influence regional security landscapes. Exporting nations frequently calibrate their sales to maintain a delicate balance and prevent regional destabilisation. The U.S. sells advanced fighters like the F-15 and F-35 to Saudi Arabia and Israel. While supporting GCC states against Iran, Washington ensures that Israel retains a qualitative military edge through exclusive access to superior variants and additional defence systems. Russia’s fighter sales to India and China highlight its efforts to balance relationships with two regional powers with a complex strategic rivalry. By equipping both nations with advanced aircraft, Moscow maintains leverage while preventing either from becoming overly dependent on Western defence suppliers.

 

Joint Ventures: A Collaborative Approach.

Joint ventures in fighter aircraft development represent a strategic approach to balancing technological advancement, economic efficiency, and national security interests. Participating nations can foster technological independence by sharing costs, risks, and expertise while strengthening geopolitical alliances. These collaborations play a crucial role in shaping the global defence landscape.

 

Technology Sharing and Sovereignty. Joint fighter development programs enable nations to develop cutting-edge aircraft while enhancing domestic aerospace capabilities. Notable examples include. A collaboration between Germany, the UK, Italy, and Spain, the Eurofighter Typhoon exemplifies how nations can pool resources to produce a world-class multirole fighter. The program has enhanced European defence capabilities and reinforced industrial cooperation among partner nations. A joint project between Pakistan and China, the JF-17 Thunder allowed Pakistan to develop an affordable and capable fighter while gaining valuable experience in aircraft manufacturing. This partnership has strengthened Pakistan’s aerospace industry, reducing reliance on Western suppliers.

 

Geopolitical Complications. Despite their advantages, joint ventures are often complex and fraught with challenges. Competing interests among partner nations can lead to inefficiencies, delays, and disputes over work share. For instance, the Eurofighter program experienced significant delays due to disagreements over each partner’s production priorities and technological contributions. Nations involved in joint ventures may have differing operational requirements or export policies, leading to complications in decision-making. Varying national security interests can hinder smooth cooperation and affect the program’s long-term success.

 

Emerging Collaborations. New joint ventures reflect the evolving nature of global defence partnerships and the push for technological superiority. A Franco-German-Spanish initiative aimed at developing a 6th-generation fighter, FCAS underscores Europe’s desire for strategic autonomy in military aviation. The program will integrate next-generation technologies such as AI, stealth, and advanced networking capabilities. Led by the UK in collaboration with Italy and Japan, the Tempest program highlights the growing trend of non-U.S. defence collaborations. This initiative aims to develop a highly advanced fighter with state-of-the-art avionics, weaponry, and data fusion technologies, demonstrating a shift in defence cooperation beyond traditional alliances.

 

Challenges in Fighter Exports and Joint Ventures

Exporting fighter aircraft and international joint ventures in military aviation face significant challenges. These range from economic constraints and technological dependencies to political risks and intense competition. Each of these factors shapes the global fighter aircraft market and influences the success of such programs.

 

Economic Constraints. Modern fighter jets are prohibitively expensive, limiting their affordability for many nations. A single advanced multirole fighter can cost tens or even hundreds of millions of dollars, not including operational and maintenance expenses. Exporters often offer financing options, leasing arrangements, or government-backed subsidies to mitigate this. However, these financial mechanisms can strain national budgets and face domestic political scrutiny. For instance, India’s procurement of Dassault Rafale jets from France was marred by alleged controversy over pricing, alleged favouritism, and offset agreements. Such economic considerations can delay or cancel deals, affecting both export and importers.

 

Technological Dependencies. Fighter aircraft exports often create long-term dependencies on the supplying nation for maintenance, spare parts, and upgrades. This dependence extends to software updates, weapons integration, and operational training. The geopolitical implications of such dependencies can be significant, as the exporter retains leverage over the recipient. For example, many nations operating American-made fighters must seek U.S. approval for upgrades or modifications, restricting their operational autonomy. Similarly, India’s reliance on Russian aircraft like the Su-30MKI has led to logistical challenges due to The Russia-Ukraine war and Western sanctions on Russia, disrupting the supply of critical components.

 

Political Risks. Defence cooperation and fighter exports are susceptible to shifts in political leadership and international alliances. Changes in foreign policy or diplomatic disputes can abruptly halt ongoing programs. The United States’ decision to exclude Turkey from the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program after Ankara purchased the Russian S-400 missile system exemplifies how political disagreements impact military collaboration. Such disruptions affect the purchasing nation and have economic and strategic consequences for the supplier.

 

Export Competition. The global fighter jet market is fiercely competitive, with the U.S., Russia, China, and France among the key players. Nations engage in aggressive marketing, offering attractive offset deals, technology transfers, and financing packages to secure contracts. The competition is further intensified by geopolitical alignments, with countries often choosing suppliers based on broader strategic partnerships rather than purely technical or economic factors. Fighter exports are highly competitive, with nations like the U.S., Russia, China, and France vying for market dominance. This competition can lead to aggressive marketing tactics and the provision of offset deals to sweeten contracts.

 

The Future of Fighter Exports and Joint Ventures

The landscape of fighter exports and joint ventures is set to evolve significantly, driven by technological advancements, the rise of new defence players, and shifting geopolitical dynamics.

 

Sixth-Generation Fighters. The development of sixth-generation fighters will reshape the geopolitics of fighter exports. Nations investing in advanced capabilities such as artificial intelligence, stealth, and directed-energy weapons will dominate future markets. Programs like NGAD (U.S.), FCAS (Europe), Tempest (UK-Japan-Italy), and the HAL CATS Program highlight the race to define the next generation of air power. These aircraft will demand extensive collaboration and significant financial investments, potentially altering traditional supplier-recipient relationships.

 

Regional Players. Emerging defence producers like South Korea (KF-21 Boramae) and India (Tejas MK2, AMCA) are entering the global market, challenging established exporters. These nations aim to reduce reliance on imports while expanding their geopolitical influence through exports. Their ability to offer cost-effective alternatives and localised production incentives could shift market dynamics and disrupt the dominance of traditional suppliers like the U.S., Russia, and France.

 

Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles (UCAVs). The growing adoption of UCAVs presents a parallel trend in fighter exports. Nations like Turkey (Bayraktar TB2) and Israel (Heron, Harop) have already established themselves as leaders in this field, with significant geopolitical implications. As unmanned systems become more capable and cost-effective, they may replace or complement traditional manned fighters, leading to a worldwide shift in defence procurement strategies.

 

Realignments. As global power shifts, fighter exports and joint ventures reflect new alliances and rivalries. The U.S.-China competition, the rise of multipolarity, and regional conflicts will shape the market’s future dynamics. Countries will increasingly seek defence partnerships that align with their strategic interests, making flexibility and technology-sharing critical for successful export programs.

 

Conclusion

The geopolitics of fighter exports and joint ventures is a multifaceted domain where technology, economics, and strategy converge. As nations pursue advanced capabilities and seek to bolster their influence, fighter programs will continue to serve as instruments of diplomacy, deterrence, and power projection. The interplay of competition and collaboration in this field will shape the future of airpower and the broader contours of international relations.

 

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References and credits

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Disclaimer:

Information and data included in the blog are for educational & non-commercial purposes only and have been carefully adapted, excerpted, or edited from reliable and accurate sources. All copyrighted material belongs to respective owners and is provided only for wider dissemination.

 

References:-

  1. Bitzinger, R. A. (2008). “The Global Arms Trade: The Shifting Strategic Landscape.” Survival, 50(2), 55-68.
  1. Eriksson, M. (2021). “The Mirage of European Defence Autonomy: Fighter Jet Collaboration and Transatlantic Tensions.” Journal of Strategic Studies, 44(5), 767-789.
  1. Gilli, A., & Gilli, M. (2019). “Why China Has Not Caught Up Yet: Military-Technological Superiority and the Limits of Imitation, Reverse Engineering, and Cyber Espionage.” International Security, 43(3), 141-189.
  1. Taylor, T. (2013). “Offsets, Technology Transfer, and Defense Industrialization: The Case of India’s Fighter Jet Programs.” Defense & Peace Economics, 24(5), 453-472.
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  1. European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS). (2023). The Future of European Fighter Jet Collaboration: FCAS vs. Tempest.
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  1. China’s State Administration for Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defense (SASTIND). (2023). China’s Defense Industrial Reforms and Export Strategies.
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636: PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE IN UKRAINE: SUCCESS OR FAILURE

 

My Article was published in the News Analytics Journal of Mar 25.

 

 

Psychological warfare (psywar) aims to influence perceptions, morale, and decision-making, often targeting adversaries and domestic populations. In the context of the Russia- Ukraine conflict, Russia’s psywar likely seeks to demoralise Ukrainians, fracture their resistance, sow distrust in their leadership, and bolster domestic support within Russia for the war effort. An evaluation of Russia’s psychological warfare (psywar) in Ukraine would need an assessment of its objectives, tactics, and measurable impacts based on available evidence and recent developments.  This paper argues that while Russia’s psychological warfare has succeeded in shaping domestic narratives and straining Western unity, it has failed to break Ukrainian resistance or achieve a decisive strategic victory.

 

Historical Perspective of Russian Psychological Warfare

Russian psychological warfare (psywar) has a rich and intricate history, deeply ingrained in the nation’s strategic culture. From the Tsarist era to modern hybrid warfare, Russia has consistently employed psychological operations to manipulate perception, control narratives, and weaken adversaries. The roots of Russian psywar can be traced back to the early 20th century when the Bolsheviks effectively used propaganda to consolidate power during and after the Russian Revolution. Lenin and Trotsky understood that controlling information was just as crucial as military victories, leading to the institutionalisation of propaganda through organisations like Agitprop, which shaped Soviet political messaging.

During the early Soviet period, psywar techniques were used not only to suppress internal dissent but also to influence communist movements worldwide. The concept of “reflexive control,” developed in Soviet military thought, became a key element of Russian psywar, aiming to manipulate opponents into making decisions that ultimately benefit Russian interests. By the time of World War II, Soviet psychological operations had evolved into large-scale deception campaigns, including the use of maskirovka (military deception) to mislead Nazi Germany. Throughout the Cold War, the Soviet Union refined these methods, launching extensive “Active Measures” under the KGB to manage information and exploit societal divisions in Western nations.

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia, under Vladimir Putin, revived and modernised its psychological warfare strategies, adapting them to the digital age. The contemporary Russian approach to psywar, often called “information confrontation”, integrates cyber operations, media manipulation, and social engineering to achieve strategic objectives.

 

Russian Psywar during the Ukraine War

Russian psychological warfare in the context of the Ukraine war has been a multifaceted effort aimed at shaping perceptions both domestically and internationally. The multi-layered strategy integrates military, political, and information operations to shape perceptions, demoralise opponents, and influence global narratives.  Psychological warfare has played a central role in Russia’s strategy throughout the Ukraine war, aiming to weaken Ukrainian resistance, shape international perceptions, and manipulate domestic narratives. Russia has employed a mix of cyber operations, information management campaigns, battlefield deception, and psychological intimidation to erode Ukrainian morale and divide Western support.

One of the key elements of Russia’s psychological warfare has been its use of information management. Russian state media and social media bots have employed online platforms with narratives that neo-Nazis run Ukraine to accusations that NATO is using Ukraine as a puppet to attack Russia. These narratives justify the war to the Russian population, confuse Ukrainian citizens, and create divisions within Western democracies by amplifying anti-war and isolationist sentiments. Russian narratives have also sought to exploit war fatigue in Western nations, emphasising that financial and military support for Ukraine is futile, expensive, or escalatory.

One prominent example of Russia’s psychological warfare tactics is the ‘Doppelganger’ campaign initiated in 2022 by the Russian IT firm Social Design Agency (SDA). This operation aimed to undermine support for Ukraine by manipulating public opinion in countries like Germany, France, Italy, and the United Kingdom. The campaign involved creating news articles that presented a pro-Russian perspective on the conflict and deploying AI-powered bot networks to disseminate these narratives on social media platforms. These bots were programmed to engage with users, spreading Russian narratives and pro-Russian sentiments. The ‘Doppelganger’ campaign demonstrates how Russia uses digital platforms and AI to shape international perceptions and influence public opinion in its favour.

Cyber warfare has also been a critical psychological tool. Russian cyber groups have often launched cyber attacks on Ukrainian government institutions, banks, and critical infrastructure. Beyond disabling systems, these attacks serve a psychological function, creating uncertainty, fear, and the impression that Ukraine’s leadership cannot protect its citizens.  Russian cyber efforts extend beyond Ukraine, targeting Western institutions with cyber sabotage to weaken overall support for Kyiv.

 

All-Out or Restricted Psywar.

While Russia is undeniably engaged in psywar, it may not be pushing it to its fullest potential. A maximalist Russian psywar would have included massive global disinformation by flooding international media and social platforms with tailored narratives to isolate Ukraine diplomatically and erode Western support. It would have shut down Ukraine’s communication networks entirely (e.g., via cyber and electronic warfare) to prevent resistance messaging and sow chaos. Russia would have infiltrated Ukrainian society with agents or digital campaigns to fracture trust in leadership and incite internal dissent. Russia employed these tactics, but not at an all-out scale or intensity.

Russia isn’t indulging in a full-fledged war not because it’s unwilling but because strategy, resources, and context constrain it. The war’s hybrid nature means that psywar is a key component, but it’s subordinated to military and economic priorities rather than unleashed as a standalone juggernaut. Russia seems content with a steady, if not maximal, psychological pressure adequate to grind Ukraine down but not bold enough to gamble on total dominance.

Strategic Restraint or Compulsion.  A no-holds-barred psywar could provoke stronger NATO responses, like direct intervention or crippling sanctions beyond the current scope. Putin appears to calibrate efforts to avoid provoking direct NATO intervention strategically (e.g., nuclear rhetoric is loud but not yet acted upon). Escalating psywar abroad might require diverting resources from domestic propaganda, which keeps Putin’s regime intact. A complete external focus could weaken the internal control. A full-fledged psywar demands significant investment in cyberinfrastructure, media saturation, and personnel. Putin may believe conventional military gains suffice to force Ukraine into submission, reducing the need for an all-out psychological blitz.

 

Success or Failure

Despite relentless Russian strikes, Ukrainian resolve appears mixed. Reports from Kyiv indicate fatigue among civilians and soldiers, with some expressing doubts about a negotiated peace due to distrust in Russia. However, Ukraine’s counteroffensives and continued drone strikes on Russian territory demonstrate resilience and a refusal to capitulate. This suggests Russia has not fully broken Ukrainian will, though exhaustion is a growing factor after three years of war. It has partially succeeded in weakening civilian morale and straining resources but hasn’t achieved a decisive psychological collapse.

Russian psywar has aimed to undermine trust in President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s government. While Ukraine faces internal challenges, such as ammunition shortages and delayed Western aid, there’s no clear evidence of widespread distrust or collapse in governance.  The psychological toll on Ukrainians is undeniable. Studies from 2023-2024 highlight high rates of PTSD, anxiety, and depression exacerbated by displacement and infrastructure attacks. Yet, it hasn’t translated into mass surrender or acceptance of Russian dominance.

 

Impact on Putin’s Image

While the Western narrative often portrays Putin as weakened by the war in Ukraine, Russia’s psychological warfare has succeeded mainly in projecting him as an even stronger leader, both domestically and among some international audiences.

Russia has effectively presented the Ukraine war as a fight for national survival against the West, rallying both elites and the public behind Putin. The Russian narrative frames the war not as an invasion of Ukraine but as a defensive struggle against NATO and Western aggression. This narrative positions Putin as the leader defending Russian sovereignty and traditions against Western imperialism, liberalism, and decadence. State media constantly refers to the war as the “Great Patriotic War 2.0,” drawing parallels with WWII to reinforce the idea of national struggle. The Kremlin has portrayed Putin as the last stronghold against Western cultural and moral decay. Messaging around traditional values, national pride, and resistance to globalisation strengthens his appeal among conservative Russians and foreign audiences in the Global South.  The War has allowed Putin to eliminate political threats, tighten control over society, and silence opposition, reinforcing his image as an unchallenged ruler.

Western leaders expected economic collapse from sanctions, but Russia’s economic resilience has strengthened Putin’s image as a leader who can outmanoeuvre Western pressure. Despite unprecedented Western sanctions, Russia avoided a total economic collapse. Trade was rerouted through China, India, Turkey, and the Middle East, showing Putin’s ability to adapt and counter Western strategies. State propaganda framed sanctions as proof of Russia’s global importance. Putin positioned himself as the leader who could make Russia self-sufficient, reducing its reliance on the West.

 

Influence on Europe.

Russia’s psychological warfare has significantly influenced Europe’s collective response to the war in Ukraine, exploiting political, economic, and social vulnerabilities to create divisions and slow decision-making. While the European Union (EU) has managed to maintain a generally pro-Ukraine stance, Russian psy ops have repeatedly tested and weakened European cohesion on military aid, sanctions, and strategic policy.

 Exploiting Political Divisions in Europe. Russia has effectively deepened political polarisation within and among European nations by amplifying opposing narratives across the political spectrum. Right-wing nationalist movements have been targeted with anti-Ukraine rhetoric, portraying the war as an unnecessary financial burden. Simultaneously, left-wing anti-interventionist factions have been influenced to frame NATO and Western military aid as imperialist warmongering. Additionally, Russian information campaigns have sown doubts about Ukraine’s governance, corruption, and war prospects, eroding the moral justification for sustained European support. For example, pro-Russian political factions in Hungary, Slovakia, and parts of Germany have advocated for diplomatic negotiations with Russia over continued military aid to Ukraine. This has complicated EU-wide decision-making, as unanimous support is often required for major foreign policy measures. Far-right and populist parties in Hungary, Slovakia, and Italy have leveraged Russian-aligned narratives to challenge the EU consensus. Hungary’s Orbán, for instance, has stalled EU sanction packages (e.g., the 13th package in late 2024) by citing “peace” over confrontation, aligning with Kremlin talking points and fracturing policy cohesion.

 Weakening European Resolve on Military Aid. Russia has employed psychological pressure to deter European military assistance to Ukraine. Moscow frequently warns that Western arms supplies could escalate the conflict into a direct NATO-Russia war. President Vladimir Putin’s nuclear threats have had a chilling effect, particularly in Germany, where concerns over escalation delayed the provision of Leopard 2 tanks and later raised hesitations about supplying long-range Taurus missiles. Public opinion has also been a battleground for Russian influence. Moscow-backed media and social media campaigns have exaggerated the economic hardships caused by military aid, fuelling war fatigue. In Germany and France, protests calling for peace talks have been driven by narratives echoing Russian disinformation. In countries like France, polls from early 2025 show that 66% support EU aid to Ukraine, but 78% oppose troop deployment unless it is part of a peace deal. In Germany, scepticism about prolonged support grows amid economic pressures, with some voters echoing Russian claims of “war fatigue” amplified online. These divisions weaken the political will for a unified, robust response.

Economic Warfare and the Energy Weapon. Russia’s historical leverage over Europe’s energy supply has been a key psychological tool. The 2022 energy crisis, exacerbated by Russia’s gas cutoffs, heightened European economic fears. Russian psywar further exaggerated the risks of economic collapse, intensifying divisions within the EU. Under Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, Hungary has been a prominent example of how Russian energy influence can weaken EU unity. Orbán has repeatedly blocked or diluted Russian oil and gas sanctions, citing economic concerns. Additionally, Russia has cultivated business relationships in Germany, Italy, and Hungary to lobby against stronger sanctions, delaying EU consensus on measures such as price caps on Russian energy exports.

Encouraging Fractures in NATO and the EU. Russia has sought to drive a wedge between Europe and the United States by portraying Washington as manipulating the war for its strategic benefit. This narrative has traction among European leaders who advocate for greater strategic autonomy. French President Emmanuel Macron, for example, has suggested that Europe develop a more independent security framework rather than relying solely on NATO. Russian psyops have also exacerbated differences between Eastern and Western Europe. Poland and the Baltic states have been staunch supporters of Ukraine, pushing for aggressive military aid and sanctions. In contrast, France, Germany, and Italy have sometimes been more hesitant, leading to internal EU friction. Russia amplifies these divisions to slow collective decision-making, delaying much-needed aid to Ukraine.

 

Conclusion

Russia’s psychological warfare in Ukraine has proven to be a sophisticated and adaptive strategy that not only targets Ukraine’s internal stability but also seeks to fracture the unity of its Western allies. By deploying a combination of information management, cyber-attacks, and strategic political manoeuvres, Russia has managed to unsettle a coherent European response by amplifying divisions, fostering hesitation, and exploiting vulnerabilities. It hasn’t derailed EU support for Ukraine but has slowed and fragmented it.

Russia’s psywar has reinforced Putin’s strongman image by shaping domestic narratives, exploiting Western vulnerabilities, and asserting global influence. While it hasn’t overturned the Western perspective entirely, it has created a parallel reality where Putin’s strength is maintained and enhanced, particularly among Russian and non-Western audiences. Whether this perception holds as the war evolves remains uncertain, but for now, Russia’s psywar has undeniably kept Putin’s strongman myth alive and potent.

 

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Disclaimer:

Information and data included in the blog are for educational & non-commercial purposes only and have been carefully adapted, excerpted, or edited from reliable and accurate sources. All copyrighted material belongs to respective owners and is provided only for wider dissemination.

 

References:-

  1. Thomas, Timothy. 2021. “Russian Military Thought: Concepts of Psychological Operations.” Journal of Slavic Military Studies 34 (1): 1-24.
  1. NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence. 2022. “Russia’s Grand Strategy in the Information Space.” Riga: NATO StratCom COE.
  1. RAND Corporation. 2021. “Russian Information Warfare: The Role of Narrative and Propaganda.” Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation.
  1. European Council on Foreign Relations. 2022. “The Kremlin’s Playbook: Russia’s Information Operations in Europe.”
  1. Carnegie Europe. 2022. “Why Europe is Struggling to Counter Russian Information Warfare.” Brussels: Carnegie Europe.
  1. European Union External Action Service (EEAS). 2023. “Russia’s Disinformation Ecosystem and its Impact on Europe.”
  1. Chatham House. 2023. “Putin’s Strongman Image and the Role of Propaganda.” London: Chatham House.
  1. The Atlantic Council. 2023. “The Resilience of Putin’s Popularity Amid Western Sanctions.” Washington, D.C.: The Atlantic Council.
  1. The Wilson Center. 2022. “How Putin Weaponises Weakness Perception.” Washington, D.C.: The Wilson Center.
  1. Harding, Luke. 2023. Invasion: Russia’s Bloody War and Ukraine’s Fight for Survival. London: Guardian Faber.
  1. Kofman, Michael, and Rob Lee. 2024. “Assessing Ukraine’s Strategy Amidst Western Uncertainty.” War on the Rocks, February 10, 2024.
  1. The Guardian. 2024. “EU Divided Over Continued Support for Ukraine.” March 2024.
  1. NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence. Reports on Russian Information Warfare. Accessed March 2024.
  1. Brookings Institution. 2023. “The West’s Cognitive Dissonance on Russia: A Strategic Weakness.” Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution.

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618: INPUTS TO QUESTIONNAIRE ON CHINESE DAMS

 

1a: What’s the historical legacy of the trans-border Rivers between India and China?

    • The trans-border rivers between India and China, most notably the Brahmaputra (Yarlung Tsangpo in Tibet), the Indus, and the Sutlej, have long played a crucial role in shaping the historical and contemporary relationship between the two countries.
    • Their legacy is deeply intertwined with colonial-era geopolitics, water resource competition, and the evolving strategic tensions between India and China.
    • The Brahmaputra, Indus, and Sutlej rivers originate in Tibet, historically having fluid sovereignty claims before its integration into China in 1950.
    • British India recognised Tibet as an autonomous region, but the Chinese annexation of Tibet significantly altered the strategic importance of these rivers.
    • The British Raj was concerned about Chinese influence over the water sources and actively sought treaties and diplomatic manoeuvres (e.g., the 1914 Simla Accord, which China never fully recognised) to define border arrangements.
    • Despite British concerns, pre-1947 did not see active contestation over river resources since China lacked the technological and economic capability to alter water flows significantly.
    • After India’s independence and China’s annexation of Tibet (1950), both countries engaged in limited cooperation on water sharing.
    • However, the deterioration of relations in the 1950s, culminating in the 1962 Sino-Indian War, disrupted diplomatic communication on river management.
    • Unlike India and Pakistan (who signed the Indus Waters Treaty in 1960), China never agreed to a formal water-sharing agreement with India.

 

  •  1b: How does this legacy play in contemporary relations?
    • The legacy of these rivers plays a significant role in modern geo-strategic, economic, and environmental disputes between India and China.
    • China controls the headwaters of major rivers flowing into India but has no legally binding treaty on water sharing with India.
    • This gives China an asymmetrical advantage over India, raising fears of diversifying and strategically manipulating river flows.
    • China has constructed multiple dams on the Yarlung Tsangpo (Brahmaputra), including the Zangmu Dam, and plans a mega-dam at the Great Bend near Arunachal Pradesh.
    • India fears that Chinese upstream dams could reduce water flow, especially during dry seasons, affecting agriculture, livelihoods, and ecosystems in Assam and Arunachal Pradesh.
    • China officially states that these projects are run-of-the-river and do not significantly alter flows, but India remains wary.
    • In the event of a military conflict, India fears that China could weaponise water by artificially creating floods or droughts.
    • China has, at times, withheld hydrological data from India during monsoon seasons (e.g., in 2017 during the Doklam standoff), exacerbating flood risks in the northeastern states.
    • Existing mechanisms, such as the annual hydrological data-sharing agreement, are limited in scope and do not address more significant concerns over dam-building and strategic manipulation of river flows.
    • The historical legacy of colonial geopolitics and the asymmetry of water control continue to shape contemporary Sino-Indian relations, making trans-border rivers a critical flashpoint in their evolving rivalry.

 

2: How do dams today define and complicate the disputed border management between India and China?

      • Dams have become critical in the complex and disputed border management between India and China, influencing water security and strategic, military, and geopolitical dynamics.
      • These dam projects, primarily on trans-border rivers such as the Brahmaputra (Yarlung Tsangpo) and the Sutlej, intersect with the broader territorial disputes along the Line of Actual Control (LAC), exacerbating tensions.
      • Dams along the Sino-Indian border are not just hydropower and irrigation projects; they serve as strategic assets with potential military and geopolitical consequences.
      • China controls the headwaters of major rivers flowing into India, including the Brahmaputra and the Sutlej. This upstream control allows Beijing to dictate the volume and timing of water flow.
      • China’s ability to divert, manipulate, or withhold water during crises or conflicts gives it a non-conventional weapon against India.
      • During the 2017 Doklam standoff, China withheld hydrological data on the Brahmaputra, flooding Assam and reinforcing Indian fears of water weaponisation.
      • Any large-scale water diversion could create flashpoints for diplomatic and military escalation.
      • Dams near the disputed borders have also created security risks and military vulnerabilities. If targeted in a military conflict, these could lead to environmental and humanitarian disasters.
      • Dams are no longer economic or energy infrastructure; they are now geo-strategic tools shaping the border dispute.

 

3: Are there any particular dams by China that threaten India?

      • Several Chinese dam projects on trans-border rivers, particularly the Brahmaputra (Yarlung Tsangpo) and Sutlej rivers, pose potential threats to India.
      • The Great Bend Mega-Dam, a massive hydropower project, is planned at the Great Bend of the Yarlung Tsangpo, near where the river turns into the Brahmaputra and enters India. This project could be one of the largest hydropower plants in the world, with a capacity of 60 GW, nearly three times the size of the Three Gorges Dam. India fears the dam could reduce water flow into Arunachal Pradesh, impacting agriculture and drinking water supply. China could suddenly release excess water, leading to catastrophic floods in Assam and Arunachal Pradesh. The project is close to the disputed Arunachal Pradesh border, reinforcing China’s territorial claims over the region. India has raised strong diplomatic objections, but China has refused to provide assurances that it will not alter natural water flows.
      • China’s Zangmu Dam (510 MW), commissioned in 2015, is the first large-scale hydropower project on the Yarlung Tsangpo. It is part of a cascade of six dams, including Jiexu, Jiacha, and Dagu, which China is building upstream of Arunachal Pradesh. While officially a run-of-the-river dam, multiple reservoirs upstream could be used to control water release. China could store water in the dam during monsoons and release it suddenly, causing flash floods downstream in India.
      • Dagu, Jiexu, and Jiacha Dams. These three dams, built in succession along the Brahmaputra’s upper reaches, further increase China’s capacity to regulate and potentially divert the river’s flow before reaching India. The combined effect of multiple dams allows Beijing to control water release precisely, creating a hydrological choke point for India. These projects could permanently reduce water flow into India, especially in dry seasons.
      • Lalho Dam, completed in 2019, is built on a major tributary of the Yarlung Tsangpo, holding back over 295 million cubic meters of water. While it is not on the main course of the Brahmaputra, its operation reduces tributary inflow into the river. Less water reaching the Brahmaputra in Tibet means lower flow into Arunachal Pradesh and Assam. This dam is part of China’s broader plan to harness Tibetan water resources, raising fears of future large-scale diversions.
      • Proposed North-to-South Water Diversion Project (Long-Term Threat). China has long debated a massive water diversion project to transfer water from Tibet to its arid northern regions. If implemented, this project could significantly alter the flow of the Brahmaputra before it even reaches India.
      • China is also building smaller-scale hydropower projects on the Sutlej River (which flows from Tibet into Himachal Pradesh). These dams have not been widely publicised, but they could potentially affect seasonal water flow into India’s northern regions.

4 Are any specific Indian states more threatened by the Chinese dams on the border?

      • Several Indian states are particularly vulnerable to the impact of Chinese dams on trans-border rivers, with Arunachal Pradesh and Assam facing the highest risks.
      • Arunachal Pradesh is most directly threatened. It shares a long border with Tibet, and the Brahmaputra (Yarlung Tsangpo) enters India here. China’s Great Bend Mega-Dam and Zangmu Dam could alter or reduce water flow into Arunachal Pradesh. Sudden water releases from Chinese dams could flood Indian villages, disrupt agriculture, and damage infrastructure.
      • Assam faces severe economic and ecological Threats. The Brahmaputra enters Assam from Arunachal Pradesh and is vital to the state’s agriculture, fishing industry, and transportation. Assam has a history of devastating floods, and any Chinese dam activity upstream could worsen the situation. Assam faces catastrophic flooding if China releases excess water (as suspected in the 2000 and 2017 floods). If China holds back water, it could impact agriculture, drinking water, and hydropower production. The Brahmaputra, including the Majuli River Island and Kaziranga National Park, supports a rich ecosystem. Flow changes could harm biodiversity and fisheries. Reduced or erratic water flow threatens rice farming and fishing-dependent communities. Infrastructure Damage: Increased flood risks make roads, bridges, and urban areas more vulnerable.
      • Sikkim faces moderate risk, as it depends on tributaries of the Brahmaputra, including the Teesta River, which could be affected by China’s upstream water management. Though not directly on the Brahmaputra, Chinese water diversion projects could impact Sikkim’s river networks. If China diverts water from Tibetan rivers feeding into Sikkim, it could impact the Teesta and Rangit rivers. Many of Sikkim’s rivers are fed by Himalayan glaciers, which are melting due to climate change. Chinese dams could exacerbate water shortages in dry seasons.  Sikkim has multiple hydropower projects on the Teesta, which could suffer from erratic water flow.
      • Himachal Pradesh faces a more minor, indirect risk because the Sutlej River, which originates in Tibet, flows into it. Chinese dam-building on the upper Sutlej could reduce water flow into the state. India has reported fluctuations in the Sutlej’s water levels, which could be linked to upstream Chinese activity. Reduced Sutlej flow could affect irrigation and hydropower projects. Farmers and hydropower plants depend on steady river flow, which could be disrupted. Unlike Assam or Arunachal Pradesh, Himachal Pradesh faces a long-term risk rather than an immediate crisis.
      • Ladakh faces a lesser-known, potentially serious threat, as the Indus River, which originates in Tibet, flows into Ladakh. Chinese upstream projects could impact the Indus water flow, affecting Ladakh’s water availability. China has previously explored diverting Tibetan rivers to supply its drier northern provinces. Ladakh is an arid region, and any reduction in Indus water could harm local farming.
      • Arunachal Pradesh and Assam are the most threatened, with risks of floods, water shortages, and geopolitical disputes.
      • Sikkim and Himachal Pradesh face indirect threats, mainly related to water flow disruptions.
      • Ladakh could become a flashpoint, especially if China diverts the Indus tributaries.

5: Is ‘Dam for a dam’ the only way out between India and China?

      • A “dam for a dam” strategy, where India builds its dams to counter Chinese upstream projects, is not the only way to address the water security threats posed by China’s control over trans-border Rivers. While building dams can provide some leverage, it is neither a long-term solution nor a risk-free strategy.
      • Excessive dam-building could worsen floods by altering natural river flow. The Northeast is a seismically active zone, and excessive dam construction increases the risk of earthquakes and landslides.

6: What are your recommendations for India to counter China’s dam Aggression?

      • India must adopt a multi-pronged approach that includes diplomacy, technological advancements, international cooperation, and legal mechanisms.
      • Diplomatic engagement should try to reach a water-sharing agreement. India must push for bilateral negotiations on water flow guarantees, especially for the Brahmaputra. A possible framework could include year-round data sharing on water flows, a dispute resolution mechanism, and prohibitions on unilateral water diversion projects.
      • India should resort to technological and intelligence-based monitoring, using satellites, drones, and AI-based hydrological models to track Chinese dam activity in Tibet. Early warning systems could help predict and mitigate sudden water releases or drought-like conditions. Sensor networks along Indian rivers could provide real-time data on water levels, quality, and possible upstream activity.
      • India must work with Bangladesh, Bhutan, and Nepal, which depend on trans-border rivers. A joint water-sharing agreement with downstream countries can increase diplomatic pressure on China. India can engage global institutions like the UN Water Conference and Indo-Pacific Alliances (QUAD) to raise concerns over China’s water militarisation.
      • India could take the “China Dam Issue” to international forums such as the International Court of Justice (ICJ) (though China is unlikely to comply), UNESCO, and the Mekong River Commission (as precedents for cross-border river management). India can also push for a South Asian Water Treaty, similar to the Mekong region’s agreements.
      • Developing India’s water infrastructure, such as innovative water storage projects that can absorb excess water from floods and small-scale hydropower projects that reduce risk while ensuring water security.
      • Instead of relying on a reactionary “dam for a dam” approach, India should pursue a balanced mix of diplomacy, surveillance, legal pressure, and selective dam-building.
      • While building some dams is necessary, it should be part of a broader water security strategy.

 

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