Category: China

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532: REVERSE GLOBALISATION: CONTEMPORARY STRATEGIC ECONOMIC POLICIES & TRENDS

 

 

My Article published on the Indus International Research Foundation website on 14 Nov 24.

 

Inflation, public debt, and geopolitical tensions have shaped recent strategic economic policies. Governments are taking a cautious approach to monetary policies to gradually ease inflation, ensure fiscal sustainability, and promote economic growth. Internationally, the financial focus has increasingly turned to fostering resilience through reshoring, friend-shoring, and decoupling trade policies that diversify supply chains amid shifting global dynamics. In response to the fragility revealed during the pandemic and recent geopolitical tensions, nations are incentivising local and allied-country manufacturing to reduce reliance on single sources like China. These strategic shifts aim to fortify economies against future disruptions.

 

Strategic Economic Policies.

 

Strategic economic policies are initiatives and frameworks that governments use to shape their national economy in ways that promote long-term goals, enhance competitiveness, safeguard critical industries, and adapt to global economic shifts. These policies address specific economic, social, and political objectives, often encompassing trade, technology, workforce development, and environmental sustainability.  These include:-

 

    • Industrial Policy. Support for critical industries, such as renewable energy, semiconductors, or biotech, often through subsidies, tax incentives, or direct government investment. These policies aim to foster innovation and secure leadership in high-growth sectors.

 

    • Trade Policy. Tariffs, trade agreements, and export controls can protect domestic industries, open new markets, and safeguard national interests. Trade policy also includes mechanisms like friend-shoring and decoupling to strengthen alliances and reduce dependencies on rivals.

 

    • Innovation and R&D Policy. Government funding and tax incentives for research and development can accelerate technological advances and maintain a competitive edge in AI, 5G, and green tech sectors.

 

    • Workforce Development and Education. Investing in education and workforce training aligns skills with market needs, addressing tech, healthcare, and manufacturing gaps. This boosts employment and productivity in strategic industries.

 

    • Sustainability and Environmental Policy. Incentives for renewable energy, carbon taxes, and green investments are designed to transition the economy towards sustainability, address climate change, and capture economic benefits from emerging “green” industries.

 

    • Infrastructure Investment. Strategic investments in transportation, digital infrastructure, and energy grids support productivity and resilience. Recently, emphasis has grown on building secure digital infrastructure, including 5G networks and cyber security.

 

    • Capital and Investment Policy. Policies to attract foreign direct investment (FDI) in strategic sectors while protecting sensitive areas from foreign control, such as financial regulations or screening of FDI in national security sectors.

 

Strategic economic policies are especially significant in facing challenges like globalisation, geopolitical competition,  and technological disruption. They allow governments to take proactive measures that guide their economies toward resilient and sustainable growth.

 

Reverse Globalisation

 

“Reverse globalisation” refers to a slowdown or reversal of globalisation trends, where countries move away from increased international integration and, instead, emphasise national and regional independence. This shift is often driven by political changes, economic protectionism, supply chain disruptions, or cultural movements against global homogenisation. Several influences encourage reverse globalisation.

 

Economic Nationalism. Countries may favour domestic industries over foreign competition through tariffs, subsidies, or trade restrictions. Examples include the U.S.-China trade war and the push for “Made in [Country]” policies to boost local economies and jobs.

 

Supply Chain Reconfiguration. Recent supply chain vulnerabilities, especially highlighted during the COVID-19 pandemic, have driven companies to “reshore” or “nearshore” manufacturing. This shift is often motivated by the need for resilience and security rather than solely cost efficiency.

 

Immigration and Labour Policies. Reverse globalisation often includes stricter immigration policies, as seen in countries aiming to prioritise local employment. Countries might enact more stringent visa policies or limit foreign workers to reduce reliance on global labour.

 

Digital and Information Sovereignty. Reverse globalisation also affects technology and information policies, with countries creating data localisation laws and internet restrictions to safeguard digital sovereignty. Examples include China’s Great Firewall, the EU’s GDPR, and India’s data localisation requirements, all of which attempt to control information flows.

 

Political Populism and Nationalism. A rise in nationalism and populist politics has fuelled reverse globalisation. Leaders who emphasise “taking back control” often support policies that reduce international dependencies. Brexit is a prime example; the UK voted to leave the EU, a move partially driven by nationalist sentiments.

 

Environmental Concerns and Localism. Environmental movements argue that reducing global trade can lower carbon emissions by minimising the need for long-distance shipping and production. This has led to a push for local sourcing and sustainable production practices, sometimes aligning with anti-globalisation ideals.

 

Reverse globalisation reflects a complex recalibration rather than a complete abandonment of globalisation. The world remains interconnected in many essential ways, but often with a renewed focus on autonomy and resilience.

 

Recent Strategic Economic Policies

 

Recent economic policies indicate a broader trend toward economic resilience and diversification, with long-term strategies to sustain growth amidst uncertainty. Decoupling, friend-shoring and reshoring are strategic economic policies that reduce reliance on nations viewed as strategic competitors, especially in high-stakes areas like technology, energy, and critical supply chains.

 

Decoupling. “Decoupling” refers to reducing or severing economic interdependence between countries, particularly with rivals, to avoid vulnerabilities. It often focuses on critical industries like technology, energy, and defence. For example, in recent years, the U.S. and some of its allies have sought to decouple parts of their technology supply chains from China. This may involve encouraging companies to source components or raw materials from domestic or allied suppliers rather than potential strategic rivals. Decoupling involves measures like:-

 

    • Restricting Technology Transfer. Limiting the export or sharing of technology could enhance a competing nation’s capabilities.
    • Diversifying Supply Chains. Shifting manufacturing and sourcing from a competitor country to other nations or domestic markets often involves “friend-shoring.”
    • Restricting Investments. Regulating or prohibiting investments in specific sectors or companies within another nation.

 

Reshoring. Reshoring brings manufacturing and production activities back to a company’s home country or a region closer to home. This trend has gained traction recently as companies and governments seek to reduce their dependence on distant foreign suppliers, especially after the COVID-19 pandemic exposed vulnerabilities in global supply chains. Concerns about trade tensions, geopolitical risks, and the drive to secure critical industries (like semiconductors and pharmaceuticals) have further fuelled the reshoring movement. Key motivations for reshoring include supply chain resilience, local economic Incentives, better labour and quality control, sustainability, and consumer demand. For example, several countries are enacting policies to bolster semiconductor manufacturing domestically.

 

Friend-shoring. “Friend-shoring is an economic and trade strategy in which countries or businesses shift production and sourcing to nations with similar political values or solid diplomatic relations rather than relying on countries with potential geopolitical or economic conflicts. The goal is to enhance supply chain security, reduce reliance on politically unstable or adversarial regions, and build resilience by working with reliable partners. “Friend-shoring” is a more collaborative approach, aiming to secure critical supply chains by relocating them to nations with shared values or alliances. The idea is to build resilient networks within trusted partner countries to reduce risks from unpredictable or adversarial states. For instance, nations might establish manufacturing facilities or resource procurement operations in allied countries, creating a network of trade partners that align economically and politically. This strategy has gained traction as global supply chains have faced challenges from trade disputes, the COVID-19 pandemic, and regional tensions. It’s a middle ground between total globalisation and complete “reshoring” (bringing production back to the home country), allowing countries to balance security concerns with cost efficiency by collaborating with allied nations.

 

Nearshoring.  Nearshoring is a strategy where companies relocate their manufacturing or services closer to their primary market, often to neighbouring countries. This approach has gained traction due to its potential benefits and strategic advantages. By positioning suppliers closer to consumers, businesses can significantly shorten delivery times. This improves customer satisfaction and enhances inventory management by decreasing the time products spend in transit​Nearshoring can lead to reduced logistics and transportation costs, especially when compared to distant locations like China. Proximity allows companies to minimise shipping expenses and inventory holding costs. Many nearshoring destinations offer access to a skilled and competitive labour force. The workforce is generally well-trained and capable of meeting production standards, which can be crucial for maintaining quality while reducing costs.​ Nearshoring also helps diversify supply chains, reducing reliance on a single location. This is particularly important in times of geopolitical tensions or natural disasters.​

 

Decoupling aims to safeguard national security, protect sensitive industries, and reduce exposure to risks posed by economic interdependence with rival nations. However, the complex process can have widespread economic implications, affecting trade, innovation, and global supply chain resilience. Reshoring, friend-shoring, and nearshoring offer a compelling alternative to traditional offshore manufacturing. They reflect a broader trend toward regionalising supply chains and securing economic independence in an increasingly uncertain global landscape. These policies reflect a wider shift toward financial security and strategic resilience, prioritising political and security considerations in trade and supply chain decisions.

 

Your valuable comments are most welcome.

 

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References and credits

To all the online sites and channels.

 

References:

  1. Medhora Rohinton P, “Is Globalization in Reverse?” Centre for International Governance Innovation, 09 Feb 2017.
  1. Schneider-Petsinger Marianne, “The New Era of Reglobalisation.” Chatham House, 2023.
  1. Dhingra, S., & Sampson, T. “Brexit and the Future of Global Trade.” VoxEU.org.
  1. Cerdeiro, Diego A., Rui Mano, Johannes Eugster, Dirk V. Muir, and Shanaka J. Peiris. “Sizing Up the Effects of Technological Decoupling.” International Monetary Fund, March 12, 2021.
  1. Tellis, Ashley J. “Interdependence Imperiled? Economic Decoupling in an Era of Strategic Competition.” National Bureau of Asian Research, November 9, 2023.
  1. Golichowski, M., & Satapathy, N. (2024). “How reshoring is transforming the way supply chain models function”. EY Global.
  1. Weissman, R. “Is There Momentum for Reshoring in 2024?”, Octopart.
  1. Kraft, D. “Reshoring: Why It Matters and How Companies Are Adapting”. Harvard Business Review. (2024).
  1. Graham, N., & Rashid, M. “Is ‘friend-shoring’ really working?” Atlantic Council. (2023).
  1. Yellen, J. “Remarks on Friend-Shoring.” U.S. Department of the Treasury. (2022).

Disclaimer:

Information and data included in the blog are for educational & non-commercial purposes only and have been carefully adapted, excerpted, or edited from reliable and accurate sources. All copyrighted material belongs to respective owners and is provided only for wider dissemination.

 

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531: INDIA IN THE CROSSROADS OF TRUMP 2.0

 

 

Pics courtesy Internet

 

My Article Published on The EurasianTimes Website on 07 Nov 24.

 

Donald Trump’s return will have many implications for India regarding economics, security, and global alignments. Trump is more of a businessman and generally favours bilateral trade deals over multilateral ones. He may advocate a more transactional approach in his second tenure, focusing on trade deficits. His previous administration’s tariff policies targeted many trading partners, including India, which saw increased duties on certain exports. India might face pressure to expand its markets to American goods, particularly in the agriculture, pharmaceuticals, and technology sectors. Trump’s previous immigration policies impacted the H-1B visa program, which disproportionately affected Indian workers in the tech sector. A return to these policies could limit Indian talent mobility, impacting both individuals and companies. India’s IT sector might find the U.S. less accessible for skilled migration, though Trump has sometimes indicated support for highly skilled immigration.

 

 

Security Repercussions for India

Trump’s “America First” approach sometimes means stepping back from global commitments, including military engagements abroad. If the U.S. were to reduce its military presence in Asia, this could shift greater responsibility to regional players. While India is enhancing its military capabilities, a significant U.S. pullback from the region could embolden China or other adversarial forces, increasing security pressure on India. India’s security landscape will be affected in several ways, especially concerning regional stability, defence partnerships, and counterterrorism.

 

Increased Demand for Strategic Alignment with the U.S. A Trump victory could mean heightened expectations for India to align with U.S. policies in the region, which could be at odds with India’s traditionally non-aligned stance. India might face pressure to take more decisive stances on issues like Taiwan, South China Sea disputes, and participation in regional blocs led by the U.S. India may have to weigh its economic and diplomatic ties with other countries, particularly Russia, against the U.S. demands for closer alignment.

 

China-India-U.S. Dynamics. Trump’s “Indo-Pacific” strategy strongly focuses on containing China, and a second term would likely deepen this agenda, intensifying U.S.-China competition. India would likely be asked to take a more assertive role in regional security, particularly in the Indian Ocean. While India could benefit from U.S. support in balancing China’s influence, it also risks being pulled into a more intense, potentially destabilising rivalry, which might strain its resources and complicate diplomatic relations with China.

 

Impact on the Quad Alliance. Trump has supported the Quad (U.S., India, Japan, and Australia), seeing it as a counterweight to China’s influence. His re-election could lead to an expanded Quad agenda, including more security collaboration in the Indian Ocean and South China Sea. This might benefit India’s strategic standing but could also draw it into more confrontation with China. The Quad’s increased visibility may create additional security risks, with China potentially reacting aggressively in the region, impacting India’s borders and maritime security.

 

Pakistan Policy. Trump previously adopted a tough stance on Pakistan, particularly regarding terrorism financing and harbouring militant groups that target Afghanistan and India. He may again apply pressure on Pakistan to dismantle terrorist networks. This would align with India’s security goals, potentially reducing cross-border terrorism. However, any diplomatic tension between the U.S. and Pakistan could destabilise, making Pakistan lean more heavily toward China and impacting India’s security environment.

 

Afghanistan’s Security Dynamics. Trump had strongly advocated withdrawing U.S. forces from Afghanistan. While a complete withdrawal has already taken place, his potential re-election could mean a lack of further U.S. engagement in Afghan stability, especially in containing Taliban and extremist groups. For India, this would mean facing an increasingly Taliban-influenced Afghanistan, leading to higher security risks, especially if terror groups resurge in the region.

 

 

Repercussions on Military Cooperation

Trump’s administration fostered strong defence cooperation with India as part of a broader Indo-Pacific strategy to counterbalance China’s growing influence. However, Trump’s unpredictable alliance approach could lead India to exercise caution. The repercussions on military cooperation between the U.S. and India could be multifaceted, introducing new strategic dynamics.

Strengthened Defence Partnership. Trump’s administration previously prioritised India as a significant defence partner within the Indo-Pacific framework. A second term could intensify military cooperation. India may receive advanced technology and intelligence sharing, and joint exercises could increase frequency and complexity. However, this could also increase India’s security obligations in the Indo-Pacific, putting it on the front lines of any U.S.-China friction in the region.

 

Enhanced Defence Technology and Arms Transfers. Under Trump, the U.S. could prioritise India as a key buyer of advanced defence equipment, including drones, anti-missile systems, and surveillance technology. India has acquired U.S. assets like C-17 heavy lift aircraft, C-130 Special operation aircraft, Apache attack helicopter, Chinook heavy lift helicopter, and P-8I Poseidon surveillance aircraft. A second Trump term might accelerate such sales, particularly if the U.S. encourages India to purchase high-tech systems that enhance its capabilities against China.

 

Military Modernisation. Trump’s administration previously pushed for arms deals with India, and a second term could further expand India’s access to U.S. military technology. This could accelerate India’s modernisation efforts, potentially providing advanced systems and technologies. Trump’s administration might push for more defence manufacturing in India through programs like “Make in India.” The U.S. could support joint ventures and technology transfers to Indian companies, allowing India to produce components of high-tech defence systems locally. While this would strengthen India’s defence manufacturing sector, there might be strings attached, with the U.S. expecting greater access to India’s defence markets and influence over India’s arms export policies.

 

Counterterrorism and Intelligence Sharing. Trump’s stance on counterterrorism aligns with India’s interests, and military cooperation could extend to enhanced intelligence-sharing agreements. The U.S. has been a critical partner in sharing counterterrorism intelligence with India, which helps prevent potential terrorist attacks. India’s counterterrorism efforts could be bolstered if Trump maintains or deepens intelligence sharing. However, if his administration decides to limit or privatise specific intelligence-sharing mechanisms, India might face challenges acquiring timely information.

 

Cyber security and Space Warfare Collaboration. Trump has shown interest in cyber defence and space as critical domains of warfare. Cooperation in these fields could deepen under his presidency, with the U.S. assisting India in building its space-based surveillance and cyber security capacities. This could help India counter cyber threats from adversaries like China and strengthen satellite surveillance of sensitive border areas. However, tighter coordination in these domains might push India further into the U.S. strategic orbit, affecting its autonomy in setting space and cyber policies.

 

Joint Military Exercises and Training. Military exercises like the Malabar naval drills have seen increased engagement from all Quad members (U.S., India, Japan, and Australia), aiming to boost interoperability among the forces. With Trump in office, India may face opportunities for more profound joint training and exercises, extending into new domains like cyber and space warfare.

 

Conclusion. Trump’s second tenure could bring some alignment on shared geopolitical interests but might introduce new uncertainties, especially in trade and immigration policies. It could deepen the relationship between the U.S. and India regarding strengthened defence cooperation and intelligence, enabling India to access advanced defence technologies and participate more actively in joint exercises. However, India might face growing expectations to align with U.S. policies in Asia, potentially narrowing its strategic autonomy and requiring it to manage and navigate a delicate and complex regional security landscape. India must weigh these factors carefully, balancing cooperation with the U.S. against its regional interests.

 

Your valuable comments are most welcome.

 

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523: CHINA: CHALLENGES IN DEVELOPING NEXT-GENERATION FIGHTER ENGINES

 

 

My Article published on The EurasionTimes Website on 22 Oct 24.

 

China’s defence policies underscore its commitment to self-reliance and the relentless pursuit of advanced technology development, aiming to reduce dependence on foreign sources. The country’s defence industry, a critical component of its national strategy, stands as one of the largest and most advanced in the world. It is a testament to China’s significant investments in military modernisation and technological innovation, bolstering military readiness and asserting its global influence. The roots of China’s defence industry can be traced back to the 1950s, following the establishment of the People’s Republic of China. Over the decades, it has evolved from focusing on basic weaponry to a more sophisticated and diversified military production capability, with a strong emphasis on advanced technology. The industry is primarily state-owned and heavily regulated by the Chinese government.

 

Defence Aviation Industry. The military aviation sector is part of China’s broader defence industry and is critical for the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF). China’s military aviation industry has rapidly evolved over the past few decades, reflecting its growing emphasis on modernising its armed forces and enhancing its defence capabilities. The industry focuses on producing a range of military aircraft, including fighter jets, transport planes, helicopters, and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). The Chinese military has undertaken extensive modernisation efforts, including developing advanced fighter jets (Chengdu J-20 and J-31, fifth-generation stealth fighters). However, China faces several challenges in developing advanced fighter aircraft engines, which are critical for enhancing the capabilities of its military aviation.

 

Aero Engine Corporation of China. The Aero Engine Corporation of China (AECC) is a Chinese state-owned enterprise focused on developing, manufacturing, and servicing aircraft engines. It was officially established in August 2016 in response to China’s growing need to develop its indigenous aero-engine technology for military and civilian aircraft. The company merged parts of AVIC (Aviation Industry Corporation of China) and other related entities to consolidate China’s aerospace engine research, development, and production capabilities. Developing advanced Indigenous engines is a strategic priority for China, both for the defence sector and the expanding commercial aviation industry (e.g., China’s domestically developed C919 airliner). AECC aims to reduce China’s reliance on foreign engine manufacturers and to enhance China’s aerospace capabilities, especially in the context of its military modernisation and commercial aviation expansion.

 

Current State of Development. Historically, China has relied on foreign-sourced engines, and AECC is central to the effort to change that. AECC is focused on developing turbofan and turboprop engines for military jets, such as the WS-10 series (for fighter aircraft) and the WS-15 (for China’s next-generation stealth fighter). It is also developing high-bypass turbofan engines for commercial aircraft, aiming to rival global engine makers General Electric and Rolls-Royce.

 

    • WS-10 “Taihang” Engine. The 13-14 ton thrust WS-10, a product of several years of dedicated development, represents China’s first successful attempt at producing a modern turbofan engine for its advanced fighters. This achievement, intended for use in the J-10 and J-11 fighter jets, is a testament to China’s progress in engine development. While early versions faced reliability issues, newer variants, such as the WS-10B and WS-10C, have reportedly improved significantly in thrust and performance, instilling optimism about China’s future in aviation technology.

 

    • WS-13 “Tianshan” Engine. A turbofan engine (8.5-9 ton thrust), primarily designed for the FC-1/JF-17 fighter, a joint Chinese-Pakistani light fighter aircraft. The WS-13 is a lighter engine designed for smaller fighters and is an alternative to the Russian-made RD-93 engine used in earlier JF-17 models.

 

    • The WS-15 “Emei” Engine. A next-generation turbofan engine with an estimated 18 tons of thrust is a significant milestone in China’s fighter engine development. Designed to power the J-20 stealth fighter jet, the WS-15 is strategically important as it aims to provide the thrust and performance required for fifth-generation fighter jets, particularly for China’s J-20 stealth fighter. Its potential to achieve super cruise capability (sustained supersonic flight without afterburners) underscores the strategic implications of China’s advancements in fighter engine development. Despite facing delays and challenges in achieving the desired performance standards, the WS-15 represents a promising future for China’s military aviation capabilities (Timelines for the development of this engine are attached).

 

    • WS-18. It is a high-thrust turbofan engine for heavy transport aircraft like the Y-20 and may be used in future bomber or tanker aircraft. The WS-18 is intended to replace foreign engines in China’s large transport aircraft, such as the Y-20, which initially relied on Russian D-30KP engines.

 

    • WS-20 Engine. A high bypass turbofan engine designed for the Y-20 transport aircraft, the WS-20 represents another step in China’s efforts to enhance its engine technology and reduce reliance on imports.

 

China’s Challenges in Fighter Aircraft Engine Development. The complex process of developing reliable, high-performance aero engines presents a significant challenge for AECC. Multifaceted challenges encompassing technological, material, and geopolitical factors hinder China’s quest to catch up with global leaders in engine technology. While the country has made notable strides in recent years, overcoming these challenges is crucial for enhancing its military aviation capabilities and achieving greater self-sufficiency in defence technology.

 

    • Technological Challenges. Developing advanced jet engines involves advanced knowledge and complex engineering challenges, including materials science, aerodynamics, and thermodynamics. Achieving high thrust-to-weight ratios, fuel efficiency, and durability while maintaining stealth capabilities requires innovative design solutions, advanced materials, and cutting-edge technology that has taken years to develop.

 

    • Material Limitations. Engine components must withstand extreme temperatures and stresses. Developing high-performance materials that can endure these conditions is crucial. China needs to catch up in producing advanced alloys and composite materials required for next-generation engines. Advanced manufacturing methods, such as precision casting and 3D printing, are essential for creating complex engine parts. While China has progressed in this area, ensuring quality control remains challenging.

 

    • Reliability and Quality. Rigorous testing and quality assurance are vital to ensuring engine reliability. Despite advancements, Chinese engines have struggled with quality and reliability issues compared to their Western counterparts. Early versions of domestically produced engines, like the WS-10, experienced reliability issues that needed to be addressed through ongoing refinements and improvements. There have been concerns about durability and performance under extreme conditions.

 

    • Research and Development Challenges. Building a skilled workforce with expertise in aerospace engineering and related fields is critical. While China has many engineering graduates, there is a need for more specialised training and experience in aerospace propulsion systems. Although the Chinese government has significantly increased investments in aerospace R&D, various sectors still compete for resources. Prioritising engine development over other military technologies can be a challenge.

 

    • Dependency on Foreign Technology. Historically, China has relied on foreign technology and imports for advanced aircraft engines and critical engine components, especially from Russia. This dependency has limited China’s ability to develop fully indigenous capabilities in this crucial area. For instance, China’s early fighter jets, such as the J-11, used Russian engines (AL-31F), which affected operational independence. While efforts are underway to develop indigenous capabilities, breaking this dependency takes time. Attempts to acquire foreign technology through partnerships and joint ventures have often faced political hurdles, leading to limited access to advanced engine technologies.

 

    • Geopolitical Pressures. Geopolitical tensions, particularly with Western nations, lead to sanctions that limit China’s access to advanced aerospace technologies. This slows down development and innovation in the aviation sector. Competing with established aerospace powerhouses like the United States and Russia, which have decades of experience and technological advancements in engine development, poses another significant challenge.

 

    • Intellectual Property Concerns. Efforts to reverse-engineer foreign engines have raised intellectual property issues, leading to tensions with countries that view these actions as unfair competition.

 

Present Status. China has been making significant strides in developing indigenous fighter aircraft engines. The country aims to reduce its reliance on foreign-made engines, mainly from Russia, and to enhance its domestic military aviation capabilities. China’s fighter aircraft engine development has advanced significantly in recent years, reflecting the country’s growing ambitions in military aviation. Chinese engineers have made strides in materials science, advanced manufacturing techniques, and thrust vectoring technology, enhancing engine performance and reliability. China has sought to acquire foreign technology to bolster its capabilities. Collaborations with countries like Russia have facilitated knowledge transfer, especially in engine design and testing.

 

Future Prospects. China is likely to increase its investment in R&D to improve its engine technology further. The goal is to achieve greater self-sufficiency and enhance the performance of its fighter aircraft. The exploration of next-generation technologies, including AI-driven engine management systems, adaptive cycle engines, and environmentally sustainable fuels, could shape the future of Chinese military aviation. Developing advanced fighter aircraft engines is crucial for China’s military modernisation efforts. As tensions rise in the Asia-Pacific region, the ability to produce competitive engines will play a vital role in enhancing China’s defence capabilities.

 

Strategic Implications. China’s struggles with fighter aircraft engine development have strategic implications, particularly in its military modernisation efforts and aspirations to become a global aerospace leader. Achieving self-sufficiency in engine technology is crucial for ensuring operational independence and enhancing the capabilities of its air force. Continued efforts in this area will be essential for China to strengthen its military aviation capabilities and achieve its broader defence objectives.

 

Conclusion. China’s fighter aircraft engine development is critical to its broader military modernisation strategy. While significant progress has been made, ongoing challenges remain. The emphasis on indigenous production, technological innovation, and strategic partnerships will be essential for China to enhance its position in the global military aviation landscape. As the situation evolves, monitoring these developments will be crucial for understanding the implications for regional and global security dynamics.

 

Timeline of WS-15 Engine development.

Estimates vary on when WS-15 development began.

 1990: Preliminary steps initiated.

2005: The blueprint for the WS-15 began to materialise

2006: A preliminary image of the WS-15 engine emerged five years before the J-20 prototype was unveiled.

2010: The first WS-15 prototypes entered the ground testing phase

2012: The full-scale demonstration project was completed , and extensive trials followed.

2013: The WS-15 development program started achieving significant milestones.

July 2018: The Chinese academic overseeing aviation engine R&D in Beijing, Liu Daxiang, announced that WS-15 development was progressing rapidly and would be fully completed within three years.

2019: The Russian AL-31 powering the J-20 was replaced by the domestic WS-10C engine.

2021:  the WS-15 was nearing operational readiness.

2022: One WS-15 engine was flown on the jet along with another older version of the engine for testing purposes.

March 2023: The WS-15 engine achieved full operational capability. WS-15 project Chief Chang Young at the AECC Beijing Institute of Aeronautical Materials announced at the 7th Chinese Aviation Innovation and Entrepreneurship Competition (CAIEC) that the WS-15 engine is now ready for mass production.

29th June 2023:  Chengdu Aircraft Corporation (CAC) conducted the maiden flight of the new variant J-20 fighter, fitted with two WS-15 turbofan engines.

As of late August 2024, the Chinese WS-15 engine reportedly encounters several significant hurdles impacting its deployment and operational efficiency. One major issue involves supply chain disruptions related to the advanced alloys needed for the engine’s production.

 

Link to the Article

https://www.eurasiantimes.com/chinas-struggle-with-aero-engines-keep/

 

Your valuable comments are most welcome.

 

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References and credits

To all the online sites and channels.

References:-

  1. Adnan Moussa, “China’s WS-15. Does it challenge US dominance over fighter jet engine tech?” aljundi.ae, 01 Dec 23.
  1. Reuben Johnson, “China’s J-20 fighter seems to have a new homegrown engine, after years of struggle”, Air Warfare Global, 18 July 2023.
  1. Boyko Nikolov, “F-22 rival Chinese J-20 may have overcome engine setbacks”, Bulgarianmilitary.com, 10 Sep 2024.
  1. Alexander Holderness, Nicholas Velazquez, Jasmine Phillips, Gregory Sanders, and Cynthia Cook, “Powering Proliferation: The Global Engine Market and China’s Indigenisation” Brief CSIS, 21 Mar 2023.

Disclaimer:

Information and data included in the blog are for educational & non-commercial purposes only and have been carefully adapted, excerpted, or edited from reliable and accurate sources. All copyrighted material belongs to respective owners and is provided only for wider dissemination.

 

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