Tag: Yearbook 2024

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514: CONFLICTS, MILITARY SPENDING & ARMS TRANSFERS

 

 

The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) launched its Yearbook 2024 on 17 June. The yearbook contains the annual assessment of the state of armaments, disarmament, and international security.

 

Summarised excerpts from the yearbook:-

 

Conflict Trends

 

Although the number of states experiencing armed conflicts fell from 55 in 2022 to 52 in 2023, the estimated number of conflict-related fatalities worldwide rose from 153,100 in 2022 to 170,700 in 2023, reaching the highest level since 2019.

 

In 2023, four conflicts were categorised as major armed conflicts (i.e. conflicts involving 10,000 or more conflict related fatalities in the year), one more than in 2022: the civil wars in Myanmar and Sudan, and the Israel–Hamas and Russia–Ukraine wars.

 

The number of high intensity armed conflicts (i.e. conflicts involving 1000–9999 conflict related fatalities) also increased, from 17 in 2022 to 20 in 2023.

 

The Russia–Ukraine war continued throughout 2023 at a high cost to both sides. Russian air attacks continued, and Ukraine began to reply in kind, although not on the same scale. Both sides sought and received ammunition and weapons from their allies. There were no formal Russian–Ukrainian peace talks during the year, and the one noteworthy diplomatic success—the 2022 Black Sea Grain Initiative—unravelled in 2023.

 

In contrast to the stalemate in Ukraine, in September 2023, Azerbaijan secured a decisive victory in its long running conflict with Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh.

 

High intensity armed conflicts continued in Iraq, Syria and Yemen throughout the year.

 

Israel responded to the events of 7 October (the killing of over 1000 civilians and more than 350 Israeli soldiers and police, and the capture of around 240 hostages) by declaring a state of war for the first time since 1973. By the end of the year, more than 22,000 Palestinians had been killed in the ensuing air strikes or ground operations by Israel. Houthi forces in Yemen, claiming support for the Palestinians, started to attack commercial shipping in the Red Sea, prompting Western powers to dispatch warships to the area to address the threat.

 

Sub­Saharan Africa remained the region with the most armed conflicts, although many were low intensity conflicts (involving fewer than 1000 conflict-related fatalities), and levels of violence fluctuated considerably. There were decreases in conflict related fatalities in several countries experiencing high intensity armed conflict, including the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Nigeria and South Sudan. However, there were notable increases in conflict­related fatality rates elsewhere, including in Sudan (+537 per cent compared with 2022), Burkina Faso (+100 per cent) and Somalia (+28 per cent).

 

The fighting that erupted in Sudan on 15 April 2023 between forces led by rival military generals triggered a humanitarian crisis and resulted in an all-out civil war.

 

In the Sahel, a coup in Niger and a decision by Mali to expel United Nations peacekeepers added to regional tensions.

 

The Americas is the only region not to have had a major armed conflict in 2018–23. The two countries in the region with the highest number of conflict­related fatalities—Brazil and Mexico—primarily faced criminal rather than political violence in 2023. Criminal gang related violence also escalated significantly in Haiti during the year.

 

Despite the ongoing civil war in Myanmar, the overall conflict­related fatality rate for Asia and Oceania more than halved between 2021 and 2023. This was partly due to a continuing decline in conflict­related fatalities in Afghanistan following the return to power of the Taliban in 2021.

 

Military Spending

 

Estimated global military expenditure rose for the ninth consecutive year in 2023, surpassing $2.4 trillion, driven by the Russia–Ukraine war and broader geopolitical tensions.

 

The 6.8 per cent increase in total military spending in 2023 was the largest rise since 2009, pushing estimated world spending to the highest recorded level.

 

As a result, the global military burden {world military expenditure as a share of world gross domestic product (GDP)} rose to 2.3 percent.

 

Governments allocated 6.9 per cent of their budgets to the military or $306 per person.

 

Estimated military spending increased across all five geographical regions for the first time since 2009.

 

Spending by African countries rose the most (by 22 percent in 2023), while the smallest increase was in the Americas (2.2 percent).

 

The United States remained by far the largest military spender in the world. Its $916 billion expenditure was more than the combined spending of the nine other countries among the top 10 spenders and 3.1 times as large as that of the second biggest spender, China.

 

The trend for increased military spending by European states in response to Russia’s full scale invasion of Ukraine gained traction in 2023. 39 of the 43 countries in Europe increased military spending. The 16 per cent surge in total European expenditures was driven by a 51 per cent rise in Ukrainian spending and a 24 per cent rise in Russian spending, as well as by 10 of the 28 European members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) reaching or surpassing the 2 per cent of GDP spending target in 2023.

 

Estimated military expenditures in Asia and Oceania rose for the 34th consecutive year. Half of the regional total consisted of spending by China, which grew by 6.0 per cent to reach $296 billion in 2023. China’s spending influenced spending decisions in neighbouring countries and the broader region: in Japan, for example, spending rose by 11 per cent, the largest year­-on-­year spending increase since 1972.

 

Estimated military spending in the Middle East grew by 9.0 per cent in 2023, with increases in all three of the biggest spenders in the region: Saudi Arabia, Israel and Turkiye. The Israel–Hamas war was the main driver for the 24 per cent increase in Israel’s military expenditure.

 

Arms Transfer

 

Suppliers of Major Arms

 

In 2019–23, 66 states exported arms, but most were minor exporters. The 25 largest suppliers accounted for 98 per cent of the total volume of exports, and the top five (the United States, France, Russia, China, and Germany) accounted for 75 per cent.

 

The USA’s share of global exports has increased in recent years while Russia’s share has decreased. In 2019–23, the USA’s arms exports were 17 percent higher than in 2014–18, and its share of the global total increased from 34 to 42 percent. In contrast, Russia’s arms exports decreased by 53 per cent, and its share of the global total dropped from 21 to 11 per cent.

 

France’s exports rose by 47 percent between 2014–18 and 2019–23, making it the second largest exporter of major arms in 2019–23.

 

Known plans for future deliveries of major arms strongly indicate that the USA will remain unchallenged as the largest arms exporter in the coming years and that France will consolidate its position in second place. They also indicate that Russia’s arms exports may reduce even further, while some of the other current top 10 exporters are likely to remain steady or increase.

 

Recipients of Major Arms

 

In 2019–23, 170 states imported arms. The five largest importers were India, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Ukraine, and Pakistan, accounting for 35 percent of total arms imports.

 

Asia and Oceania received the largest volumes of major arms in 2019–23, accounting for 37 percent of the total, followed by the Middle East (30 percent), Europe (21 percent), the Americas (5.7 percent), and Africa (4.3 percent).

 

Between 2014–18 and 2019–23, the flow of arms to Europe increased by 94 per cent, while flows to all other geographical regions decreased: Africa (−52 per cent), Asia and Oceania (−12 per cent), the Middle East (−12 per cent) and the Americas (−7.2 per cent).

 

Many of the 170 importers are directly involved in armed conflict or in tensions with other states where the imported major arms play an important role.

 

Moreover, many exporters are direct stakeholders or participants in at least some of these conflicts and tensions, which partly explains why they are willing to supply arms, even when the supply seems to contradict their stated arms export policies. It is also noteworthy that, for most suppliers, arms exports are only a small part of the financial value of their total exports.

 

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)

 

The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) is an independent, international think tank based in Stockholm that provides research, data, and analysis on arms control, disarmament, military expenditure, and armed conflict. It was founded in 1966 by Alva Myrdal and Tage Erlander. SIPRI’s work is intended to help researchers, policymakers, and the public understand the state of the arms industry and the preconditions for a stable peace. 

 

SIPRI’s work is based on open sources and includes:

 

  • Databases. SIPRI’s Arms transfers, Arms industry, and Military expenditure databases provide data on nearly every country in the world.

 

  • Documents. SIPRI provides documents on arms embargoes since the 1950s and national reports on arms export controls.

 

  • Analysis. SIPRI researchers analyse the data to identify trends and potential impacts on global security. 

 

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Disclaimer:

Information and data included in the blog are for educational & non-commercial purposes only and have been carefully adapted, excerpted, or edited from reliable and accurate sources. All copyrighted material belongs to respective owners and is provided only for wider dissemination.

 

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NUCLEAR TRENDS, THREATS AND CHALLENGES

 

 

The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) released its highly anticipated 55th edition of the SIPRI Yearbook 2024 on 17 June 24. This comprehensive yearbook, a cornerstone in the field, presents the institute’s annual evaluation of the state of armaments, disarmament, and international security, with a specific focus on nuclear threats and challenges.

 

Key findings of the SIPRI Yearbook 2024 are that the number and types of nuclear weapons in development have increased as states deepen their reliance on nuclear deterrence.

 

Relevant Excerpts

 

The nine nuclear-armed states are the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France, China, India, Pakistan, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea) and Israel. The nuclear countries continued modernising their nuclear arsenals, and several deployed new nuclear-armed or nuclear-capable weapon systems in 2023.

 

 

Of the total global inventory of an estimated 12,121 warheads in January 2024, about 9585 are in military stockpiles for potential use. An estimated 3904 of those warheads are deployed with missiles and aircraft; the rest are in central storage. Around 2100 deployed warheads are kept in a high operational alert on ballistic missiles. Nearly all of these warheads belonged to Russia or the USA, but for the first time, China is believed to have some warheads on high operational alert.

 

While the global total of nuclear warheads continues to fall as Cold War-era weapons are gradually dismantled, regrettably, there is a year-on-year increase in the number of operational nuclear warheads.

 

India, Pakistan, and North Korea are all pursuing the capability to deploy multiple warheads on ballistic missiles, something Russia, France, the UK, the USA and—more recently—China already have.

 

Russia and the USA together possess almost 90 percent of all nuclear weapons. The sizes of their respective military stockpiles (i.e., useable warheads) seem to have remained relatively stable in 2023. In addition to their military stockpiles, Russia and the USA each hold more than 1200 warheads previously retired from military service, which they are gradually dismantling.

 

Russia. Russia is estimated to have deployed around 36 more warheads with operational forces than in January 2023. Transparency regarding nuclear forces has declined, and debates around nuclear-sharing arrangements have increased in saliency. Notably, there were several public claims made in 2023 that Russia had deployed nuclear weapons on Belarusian territory. However, there is no conclusive visual evidence that the actual deployment of warheads has taken place.

 

China. SIPRI’s estimate of the size of China’s nuclear arsenal increased from 410 warheads in January 2023 to 500 in January 2024, and it is expected to keep growing. For the first time, China may also now be deploying a small number of warheads on missiles during peacetime. Depending on how it decides to structure its forces, China could potentially have at least as many intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) as either Russia or the USA by the turn of the decade. However, its stockpile of nuclear warheads is still expected to remain much smaller than the stockpiles of either of those two countries.

 

United Kingdom. Although the UK is not thought to have increased its nuclear weapon arsenal in 2023, its warhead stockpile is expected to grow in the future due to the British government’s announcement in 2021 that it was raising its limit from 225 to 260 warheads. The government also said it would no longer publicly disclose its quantities of nuclear weapons, deployed warheads or deployed missiles.

 

France. In 2023, France continued its programmes to develop a third-generation nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) and a new air-launched cruise missile and refurbish and upgrade existing systems.

 

India. In 2023, India slightly expanded its nuclear arsenal and continued developing new nuclear delivery systems. India appears to be placing growing emphasis on longer-range weapons, including those capable of reaching targets throughout China.

 

North Korea. North Korea continues to prioritise its military nuclear programme as a central element of its national security strategy. SIPRI estimates that the country has now assembled around 50 warheads and possesses enough fissile material to reach a total of up to 90 warheads, both significant increases over the estimates for January 2023. While North Korea conducted no nuclear test explosions in 2023, it appears to have carried out its first test of a short-range ballistic missile from a rudimentary silo. It also completed the development of at least two types of land-attack cruise missiles (LACM) designed to deliver nuclear weapons.

 

Israel. Israel does not publicly acknowledge possessing nuclear weapons. It seems to be modernising its nuclear arsenal and upgrading its plutonium production reactor site at Dimona.

 

Global Security and Stability in Peril

 

The impacts of the wars in Ukraine and Gaza are visible in almost every aspect of the issues connected to nuclear, armaments, disarmament and international security.

 

Increasing Reliance on Nuclear Deterrence. Russia has continued to make threats regarding the use of nuclear weapons in the context of Western support for Ukraine. In May 2024, Russia carried out tactical nuclear weapon drills close to the Ukrainian border.

 

Setback to Nuclear Arms Control and Disarmament. Nuclear diplomacy suffered more significant setbacks in 2023.

 

    • In February 2023, Russia announced it was suspending its participation in the 2010 Treaty on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (New START)—the last remaining nuclear arms control treaty limiting Russian and US strategic nuclear forces. The USA also suspended the sharing and publication of treaty data as a countermeasure.

 

    • In November, Russia withdrew its ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), citing ‘an imbalance’ with the USA, which has failed to ratify the treaty since it opened for signature in 1996. However, Russia confirmed it would remain a signatory and continue participating in the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) work.

 

    • An informal agreement reached between Iran and the USA in June 2023 seemed to temporarily de-escalate tensions between the two countries, which had intensified over Iran’s military support to Russian forces in Ukraine. However, the start of the Israel–Hamas war in October upended the agreement, with proxy attacks by Iran-backed groups on US forces in Iraq and Syria ending Iranian–US diplomatic efforts.

 

    • The war also undermined efforts to engage Israel in the Conference on the Establishment of a Middle East Zone Free of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction.

 

Comments

 

    • While global nuclear destructive power is stable (if not decreasing) for the time being, the increase in the number of warheads on high op alert is a cause of concern. The number of warheads deployed on missiles and aircraft shows an upward trend.

 

    • The capability to deploy multiple warheads on missiles would enable a rapid potential increase in deployed warheads, as well as the possibility for nuclear-armed countries to threaten the destruction of significantly more targets.

 

    • Several nuclear-armed states are putting new emphasis on developing their arsenal of tactical nuclear weapons. The concern is about the early use of these weapons in a conflict.

 

    • Given that the USA and Russia possess 90% of the total global nukes, the Ukraine conflict (Russia – NATO/West conflict in a broader sense) is not safe. Reduction in their stockpile will make the world safer.

 

    • China is expanding its nuclear arsenal faster than any other country. China deploying nuclear warheads on missiles on op alert indicates a strategic shift and a possible change in its nuclear policy.

 

    • Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal has shown no change in numbers. However, Pakistan, too, has advanced its nuclear delivery systems. Considering its internal conditions and prevailing geo-political situation, fear of its nuclear weapons falling into the wrong hands remains.

 

    • The gradual reductions in nuclear stockpiles that characterised the post-Cold War period are over, and the world is sliding back into nuclear competition and arms race.

 

    • Cold War II has enhanced nuclear capabilities, reduced nuclear transparency, and increased reliance on nuclear deterrence.

 

    • The world is slowly moving one step closer to the speedier initiation of a nuclear exchange.

 

    • Launch due to accidental firing, miscalculation, or foolhardiness is worrisome. Mutually acceptable safety measures need to be implemented on priority.

 

    • Adequate security measures must be instituted to avoid these launch-ready weapons falling into the hands of non-state actors.

 

    • Nuclear weapons are once again (like in the Cold War era) playing a prominent role in international relations. Despite two years back, leaders of the five largest nuclear-armed states jointly reaffirmed that “a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought”.

 

    • Recent developments demonstrate the fragile nature of Nuclear Arms Control and Disarmament treaties. Fresh impetus is required to maintain the relevance of measures taken for Nuclear Disarmament:-

  

    • Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons 2017 prohibits the development, testing, production, acquisition, possession, or use of nuclear weapons.

 

    • The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) 1968 aims to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, promote cooperation in peaceful uses of nuclear energy and achieve nuclear disarmament.

 

    • Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), 1996, prohibits nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, outer space, and underwater.

  

    • The world is now in one of the most dangerous periods. Numerous sources of instability (political rivalries, economic inequalities, and ecological disruption) encourage and accelerate an arms race.

 

    • It is time for the nuclear powers and the multi-lateral organisations to step back and reflect together.

 

Addendum

 

India’s Nuclear Policy. India has adhered to a nuclear no-first-use (NFU) policy since 1999. The country’s stated doctrine from January 2003 includes a pledge not to use nuclear weapons first but with a significant caveat that nuclear weapons could be used if Indian forces are attacked with biological or chemical weapons. India reaffirmed in 2018 that it could also use nuclear forces to retaliate against attacks by non-nuclear weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

 

Recent Developments. In November 2019, India formally declared the operationalisation of its nuclear triad after the country’s first SSBN, INS Arihant, completed its first deterrence patrol.  In March 2024, India successfully conducted “Mission Divyastra” by launching Agni-V with multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicle (MIRV) technology. This placed India into a club of the few countries capable of delivering multiple nuclear warheads using a single missile.

 

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References and credits

To all the online sites and channels.

  1. SIPRI Year Book 2024.
  2. Eliana Johns, “We’re Entering A New Period”, Federation of American Scientists, 17 Jun 24.
  3. https://currentaffairs.khanglobalstudies.com/sipri-yearbook-report-2024/

Disclaimer:

Information and data included in the blog are for educational & non-commercial purposes only and have been carefully adapted, excerpted, or edited from reliable and accurate sources. All copyrighted material belongs to respective owners and is provided only for broader dissemination.