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670: COLD WAR 2.0: MILITARY ASPECTS AND IMPACT ON INDIAN SECURITY

 

My contribution to the book 

“Cold War 2.0 and India”

 

The world is witnessing the emergence of a new Cold War, often referred to as Cold War 2.0, primarily driven by intensifying geopolitical, economic, and technological rivalries between the United States and China, with Russia playing a significant role. Unlike the ideological battle of the original Cold War, this modern conflict is fuelled by strategic competition for global influence, military dominance, and economic control. Key drivers of Cold War 2.0 include China’s rise as a military and technological superpower, the US-led effort to counterbalance Beijing’s influence, and Russia’s challenge to Western dominance. Arms build-ups, strategic alliances, hybrid warfare, and advancements in emerging technologies like artificial intelligence, space warfare, and hypersonic missiles mainly characterise Cold War 2.0. For India, this renewed great-power rivalry presents both opportunities and challenges. Understanding the military dimensions of Cold War 2.0 is crucial and necessary for analysing its impact on global stability, the evolving nature of warfare, and the strategic recalibrations required for nations like India to safeguard their security interests.

 

Drivers of Cold War 2.0

The re-emergence of great power competition in the 21st century has led to a period characterised by heightened strategic rivalry between the United States and China, with Russia playing a significant but secondary role. Unlike the original Cold War, which was primarily an ideological struggle between capitalism and communism, this new iteration is driven by geopolitical, economic, technological, and military factors.  These factors have reshaped the global order and fuelled an environment of sustained strategic hostility, making Cold War 2.0 a defining feature of contemporary international relations.

One of the most significant drivers of Cold War 2.0 is the rise of China as a global superpower, challenging the longstanding dominance of the United States. Over the past four decades, China has undergone an economic and military transformation that has propelled it to the forefront of global politics. The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), China’s massive infrastructure and investment project spanning Asia, Africa, and Europe, has been a key instrument in expanding Beijing’s influence. While China claims that the BRI is purely an economic initiative, Western policymakers see it as a geopolitical tool to increase China’s leverage over developing nations. Furthermore, China’s military expansion, most notably in the South China Sea, has alarmed the United States and its regional allies. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has also aggressively pursued technological dominance, particularly in fields such as artificial intelligence, 5G, and quantum computing. The rapid ascendance of China as a comprehensive power has disrupted the global balance, triggering countermeasures from the United States, including trade restrictions, sanctions on Chinese technology firms, and strengthened military alliances in the Indo-Pacific. This great power rivalry, rooted in China’s challenge to U.S. hegemony, is a fundamental driver of Cold War 2.0.

The second major driver of this new Cold War is the resurgence of Russia as a revisionist state seeking to undermine Western influence and reassert its geopolitical ambitions. Although Russia lacks comparative economic power, it remains a formidable military force with vast energy resources and a willingness to engage in aggressive foreign policies.  The war in Ukraine has strengthened the perception of a new Cold War, with Russia aligning itself more closely with China, Iran, and North Korea to counterbalance Western power. Russia’s actions have not only escalated tensions with the United States and Europe but have also contributed to a broader global realignment, with countries being forced to take sides in this emerging bipolar struggle.

The erosion of American unipolarity and the fragmentation of the liberal international order have also played a crucial role in driving Cold War 2.0. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the United States emerged as the world’s sole superpower, ushering in a period of unchallenged American dominance. However, U.S. global influence has waned in recent years due to domestic political polarisation, costly military interventions, and economic challenges. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan drained American resources. They damaged its credibility, while the rise of populist movements and political divisions have weakened Washington’s ability to project unified global leadership. The decline of unipolarity has created a more competitive and unstable international system, where power is increasingly distributed among multiple actors, setting the stage for heightened strategic rivalry.

Economic decoupling and technological competition between the United States and China constitute another major driver of Cold War 2.0. The global economy, once characterised by deep interdependence, is now experiencing a shift toward fragmentation as Washington and Beijing seek to reduce their reliance on each other. The U.S. has imposed sweeping restrictions on Chinese technology firms, particularly in semiconductor manufacturing, artificial intelligence, and telecommunications, citing national security concerns. In response, China has accelerated its efforts to achieve self-sufficiency in critical industries, investing heavily in indigenous innovation and supply chain resilience. This technological decoupling is not just an economic issue—it has profound military and strategic implications, as control over emerging technologies will determine the balance of power in future conflicts. The race for supremacy in AI, quantum computing, cyber warfare, and space exploration is now a central battlefield in Cold War 2.0, with both sides striving to outmanoeuvre each other in the next frontier of global dominance.

Finally, the ideological and political divide between democratic and authoritarian systems has reinforced the divisions of Cold War 2.0. The United States and its allies promote liberal democracy, human rights, and a rules-based international order. Meanwhile, China and Russia advocate for state sovereignty, authoritarian stability, and non-interference in domestic affairs. The contrast between these governance models has led to intensified ideological competition, with both sides seeking to expand their influence globally. The U.S. has framed its rivalry with China and Russia as a struggle between democracy and autocracy, rallying allies to counter Beijing’s and Moscow’s influence in international institutions. Meanwhile, China’s “Global Security Initiative” aim to portray the West as a declining power, promoting an alternative world order.

 

Military Aspects of Cold War 2.0

The evolving geopolitical landscape of the 21st century has increasingly drawn comparisons to the original Cold War. The military dimension of Cold War 2.0 is particularly critical, as it shapes global security dynamics through arms races, power projection, strategic alliances, and hybrid warfare. The military aspect of this renewed competition manifests in several key areas.

One of the most visible military aspects of Cold War 2.0 is the modernisation and expansion of nuclear arsenals. While the U.S. and Russia still maintain the largest stockpiles of nuclear weapons, China’s rapid nuclear build-up has become a central concern for Western policymakers. Unlike during the first Cold War, when the U.S. and Soviet Union were the primary nuclear superpowers, the emergence of China as a third major nuclear player significantly altered the strategic calculus. Beijing has also been expanding its missile silos, developing hypersonic delivery systems, and pursuing advanced nuclear-powered submarines, signalling its intent to establish a more robust second-strike capability. At the same time, Russia’s suspension of the New START treaty, coupled with its threats of tactical nuclear weapon use in Ukraine, has reignited fears of a new nuclear arms race. The U.S., in response, is modernising its nuclear triad, investing heavily in next-generation intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), stealth bombers, and submarine-launched ballistic missiles. These developments indicate that nuclear deterrence strategies are again at the forefront of great power competition.

Beyond nuclear weapons, conventional military capabilities have also been undergoing significant transformation. The trend is towards increased investment in stealth aircraft, long-range precision strike systems, autonomous combat platforms, and integrated air and missile defence networks. For its part, China has undertaken one of the most extensive military modernisation programs in history. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has rapidly expanded its naval and air forces. Despite economic constraints, Russia has focused on asymmetric warfare strategies, leveraging advanced air defence systems, hypersonic missiles, and electronic warfare capabilities.

A defining feature of Cold War 2.0 is the race for military superiority in emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence (AI), quantum computing, and autonomous warfare. Unlike the first Cold War, where military advancements were primarily centred on nuclear and conventional weaponry, digital and cyber capabilities are expected to shape modern conflicts. AI-driven autonomous drones, robotic combat units, and cyber warfare tools have become central to military planning. Quantum computing, if fully realised, could render current encryption methods obsolete, drastically altering cyber defence strategies. The cyber domain has emerged as a battlefield, with state-sponsored cyber attacks targeting critical infrastructure, defence networks, and economic systems.  As nations develop offensive and defensive cyber capabilities, the risk of cyber escalation and strategic instability increases significantly.

Hybrid warfare, a strategy that blends conventional military tactics with cyber, economic, and information warfare, has also become a defining characteristic of Cold War 2.0. China employs hybrid tactics involving disinformation campaigns, cyber-attacks, and proxy militias, leveraging economic coercion, political influence operations, and grey-zone warfare. The U.S. and its allies have responded with countermeasures, including economic sanctions, cyber counteroffensives, and the strengthening of information warfare capabilities. Unlike the Cold War of the 20th century, where direct military confrontations were largely avoided, the modern iteration features a greater degree of low intensity. These asymmetric conflicts blur the line between war and peace.

 

Impact of Cold War 2.0 on Indian Security

The emergence of a second Cold War has profound implications for India’s security. One of the most immediate effects of Cold War 2.0 on India is the increased militarisation of the Indo-Pacific region. As the United States seeks to contain China’s growing military and economic influence, it has strengthened its ties with allies and partners. This has enhanced defence cooperation, intelligence sharing, and joint military exercises. It has drawn India into the broader US-China confrontation, making it a target for Chinese actions, such as aggressive border moves, cyber warfare, and economic coercion. The 2020 Galwan Valley clash between Indian and Chinese forces was a stark reminder of how geopolitical tensions manifest as direct security threats for India.

Another major concern is the growing China-Pakistan nexus, which has intensified in response to Cold War 2.0. China has significantly increased its defence, economic, and nuclear cooperation with Pakistan, which directly impacts India’s security. The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), a flagship project of Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), runs through Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK), challenging India’s territorial claims. China’s supply of advanced military hardware, including fighter jets, submarines, and missile systems, has strengthened Pakistan’s military capabilities, altering South Asia’s conventional and nuclear balance. There are also concerns that China could use Pakistan as a proxy to destabilise India.

India’s maritime security has also been affected as Cold War 2.0 extends into the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). China has expanded its naval footprint through bases in Djibouti and potential dual-use facilities in Sri Lanka, Pakistan (Gwadar), and Myanmar. The People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has increased its submarine patrols and surveillance activities near India’s maritime boundaries, challenging India’s dominance in its strategic backyard.

Technological competition in Cold War 2.0 also affects India’s security, particularly in artificial intelligence (AI), cyber security, and space warfare. The US and China are engaged in a technological arms race, and India must navigate this landscape carefully. Increased focus on Indigenous defence production under “Atmanirbhar Bharat” (self-reliant India) is a direct consequence of this competition.

Diplomatically, Cold War 2.0 presents India with both challenges and opportunities. While the US-India partnership has grown stronger, India remains cautious about being seen as a mere US ally. India has historically valued its strategic autonomy, as seen in its continued engagement with Russia despite Western pressure. India relies on Russian military hardware, including S-400 missile systems, and has resisted aligning too closely with US-led security pacts. However, this balancing act is becoming increasingly difficult as Cold War 2.0 escalates, forcing India to make difficult choices.

Economically, Cold War 2.0 presents risks for India’s trade and supply chain security. The US-China decoupling has disrupted global trade, affecting India’s access to key technologies, raw materials, and markets. The push for friend-shoring and near-shoring has led companies to diversify supply chains, offering India an opportunity to attract investments as an alternative manufacturing hub. However, China remains one of India’s largest trading partners, and an outright economic confrontation would be costly. India must, therefore, navigate a complex economic environment, securing its interests without alienating key partners.

 

Conclusion

Cold War 2.0 has fundamentally reshaped the global security landscape, with military competition emerging as a key aspect of great-power rivalry. Driven by China’s rise, Russia’s resurgence, and the United States’ efforts to maintain its strategic dominance, this new geopolitical contest is marked by military build-ups, shifting alliances, and technological arms races. The military developments have made the world more unstable, with regional conflicts and proxy wars serving as potential flashpoints for broader confrontations. For India, Cold War 2.0 presents both security threats and strategic opportunities. The growing China-Pakistan nexus and Beijing’s assertiveness along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) pose direct military challenges to India. The militarisation of the Indian Ocean, the threat of cyber warfare, and disruptions to global supply chains further complicate India’s security environment. To navigate this evolving conflict, India must bolster its military capabilities, strengthen regional partnerships, and maintain its strategic autonomy to avoid outright confrontation. As Cold War 2.0 continues to unfold, the global military balance will be shaped by how nations adapt to this new era of great-power competition, making it essential for India to proactively safeguard its national security while leveraging opportunities to enhance its geopolitical standing.

 

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References and credits

To all the online sites and channels.

Pics Courtesy: Internet

Disclaimer:

Information and data included in the blog are for educational & non-commercial purposes only and have been carefully adapted, excerpted, or edited from reliable and accurate sources. All copyrighted material belongs to respective owners and is provided only for wider dissemination.

 

 

References:-

Khosla Anil, “Cold War Redux: Military Aspects of Cold War 2.0”, 16 Dec 24, https://55nda.com/blogs/anil-khosla/2024/12/16/558-cold-war-redux-military-aspects-of-cold-war-2-0/

Allison, Graham. Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap? Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2017.

Kaplan, Robert D. The Return of Marco Polo’s World: War, Strategy, and American Interests in the Twenty-First Century. Random House, 2018.

Mearsheimer, John J. The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. Updated ed., W.W. Norton & Co., 2014.

Gady, Franz-Stefan. “The Future of High-End Warfare: What the Next US-China Conflict Could Look Like.” The Diplomat, 2023.

Doshi, Rush. The Long Game: China’s Grand Strategy to Displace American Order. Oxford University Press, 2021.

Mazarr, Michael J., et al. Understanding the Emerging Era of International Competition: Theoretical and Historical Perspectives. RAND Corporation, 2018.

Nye, J. S. (2012). The future of power in the 21st century. Foreign Affairs, 91(2), 90–104.

Menon, Shivshankar. India and Asian Geopolitics: The Past, Present. Brookings Institution Press, 2021.

Pant, Harsh V. The US Pivot and Indian Foreign Policy: Asia’s Evolving Balance of Power. Palgrave Macmillan, 2015.

Shankar, Arvind. “India’s Role in a Fragmented Global Order.” The Print, 2023.

Mohan, C. Raja. Samudra Manthan: Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Indo-Pacific. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2012.

Singh, Abhijit Iyer-Mitra. “The Impact of US-China Rivalry on India’s Defence Strategy.” Observer Research Foundation, 2023.

Rajagopalan, Rajeswari Pillai. Space and Nuclear Deterrence in Indo-Pacific: A New Strategic Triangle. Observer Research Foundation, 2022.

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658: RARE EARTH AS RARE WEAPON: INDIA’S OPPORTUNITY, AND CHALLENGE

 

My Article was published on the Eurasian Times website

on 21 Apr 25.

 

On 04 April 2025, China imposed export controls on seven REEs (samarium, gadolinium, terbium, dysprosium, lutetium, scandium, and yttrium) and rare earth magnets, requiring special export licenses. This move, a retaliation to U.S. tariffs as high as 145%, has halted shipments from Chinese ports, severely impacting U.S. industries like defence, electric vehicles, and medical technology.

The U.S. relies heavily on China for REEs, with over 50% of its critical minerals sourced there. China’s restrictions threaten U.S. defence (F-35 jets, missiles), tech (smartphones, AI chips), and healthcare (MRI machines, cancer treatments). Analysts warn of shortages, price hikes, and delays, with some companies facing permanent supply cuts.

Rare earth elements (REEs), a group of 17 chemically similar elements including scandium, yttrium, and the 15 lanthanides, are critical to modern technology. Often dubbed the “vitamins of modern industry,” REEs are indispensable, from smartphones and electric vehicle batteries to advanced military systems and renewable energy infrastructure. However, their supply chain is heavily concentrated, with China dominating global production and processing. This dominance has transformed rare earths into a potent geopolitical tool, particularly in trade wars, most notably between the United States and China.

For India, a country rich in rare earth potential but limited in production and processing capacity, this presents an urgent strategic opportunity and a daunting set of challenges. As the global balance of power shifts, New Delhi must rethink its resource security strategy, especially in the context of the U.S.-China rivalry and the growing importance of resilient supply chains.

 

Rare Earths: Strategic Importance

Rare earth elements comprise a group of 17 chemically similar metals: the 15 lanthanides, scandium, and yttrium. Despite their name, these elements are relatively abundant in the Earth’s crust but rarely found in concentrated forms economically viable to mine. Their unique magnetic, luminescent, and electrochemical properties make them indispensable to various high-tech applications.

    • Neodymium is essential for high-performance magnets in electric motors, drones, and wind turbines.
    • Europium and terbium are used in fluorescent and LED lighting.
    • Lanthanum is used in camera lenses and hybrid vehicle batteries.
    • Yttrium finds applications in radar and superconductors.
    • Gadolinium and terbium are critical for military sensors, sonar systems, and advanced imaging technologies.
    • Cerium and lanthanum are used in catalysts for refining petroleum.

The global demand for REEs has surged with the rise of green technologies and digital economies. The International Energy Agency projects that demand for specific REEs, like neodymium, could increase tenfold by 2040 to meet net-zero emissions goals. As of 2022, the global rare earth market was valued at approximately USD 3.9 billion, and is expected to reach USD 9.6 billion by 2030, growing at a CAGR of over 10% annually due to rising demand from clean energy and defence sectors (Fortune Business Insights, 2023).

 

China’s Dominance in the Global Rare Earth Chain

China’s strategic approach to rare earths began in the 1980s. Offering low prices and absorbing environmental costs drove many competitors out of the market, especially in the U.S., Australia, and India. 1992 Deng Xiaoping famously stated, “The Middle East has oil. China has rare earths.” This foresight has translated into geopolitical leverage.

According to the U.S. Geological Survey, in 2022, China accounted for approximately 70% of global rare earth mining, over 90% of refining and processing, and 90% of rare earth permanent magnet manufacturing (International Energy Agency, 2021). This concentration gives China significant leverage in international trade disputes.

 

Rare Earths in Trade War

The U.S.-China trade war, which escalated in 2018 under the Trump administration, saw tariffs, export controls, and technological decoupling dominate bilateral relations. Rare earths quickly emerged as a flashpoint. In 2010, China briefly restricted rare earth exports to Japan during a territorial dispute, causing global prices to spike and exposing the risks of supply chain dependence. This incident foreshadowed China’s willingness to use REEs as a bargaining chip.

In 2019, amid escalating trade tensions, Chinese state media hinted at curbing rare earth exports to the United States. President Xi Jinping’s visit to a rare earth processing facility in Jiangxi province was widely interpreted to signal China’s readiness to leverage its dominance. The U.S., heavily reliant on Chinese REEs for commercial and military applications, faced a stark vulnerability. For example, the F-35 fighter jet program depends on rare earth magnets, and any disruption could halt production.

China’s control extends beyond raw materials to the processing and manufacturing of REE-based components. Even if other countries mine rare earths, they often send them to China for refining due to its advanced infrastructure and lower costs. This creates a choke point that China can exploit during trade disputes. In 2023, China introduced export controls on certain rare earth technologies, further tightening its grip and prompting concerns about supply chain security. On April 4, 2025, China imposed new export restrictions on seven critical medium and heavy rare earth elements.

 

Economic and Geopolitical Implications

The weaponisation of rare earths has far-reaching consequences. For importing nations, supply disruptions can cripple industries, inflate costs, and delay technological advancements. In 2010, Japan’s automotive and electronics sectors faced production delays due to China’s export restrictions. Similarly, a sustained cut off to the U.S. could disrupt everything from consumer electronics to defence manufacturing.

For China, rare earths are a double-edged sword. While they provide leverage, overusing this tool risks alienating trading partners and accelerating efforts to diversify supply chains. China’s domestic demand for REEs is also rising, particularly for its electric vehicle and renewable energy sectors, which could limit its ability to restrict exports without harming its economy.

Globally, the rare earth trade war underscores the fragility of critical mineral supply chains. Countries like Australia, Canada, and the European Union have recognised the need for resilience, but building alternative supply chains requires significant investment and time. Environmental regulations and high capital costs further complicate efforts to scale up mining and processing outside China.

 

India’s Untapped Potential

India is not immune to this dynamic. Although it holds the fifth-largest rare earth reserves in the world, estimated at 6.9 million tonnes (USGS, 2023), India contributes only around 1% of global rare earth production. This is due to regulatory, environmental, and infrastructure barriers.

Opportunities for India. The U.S. and its allies actively seek to reduce their reliance on China for REEs. This allows India to become an alternative supplier, particularly in downstream value chains like magnets, batteries, and high-end components. A robust rare earth industry could enhance India’s economic security and bargaining power in international diplomacy. It can also reduce import dependency for key sectors such as defence and renewable energy. Developing a domestic rare earth value chain can create high-skilled jobs and foster innovation in materials science, metallurgy, and green technologies, which are critical for India’s future economic growth. India’s monazite deposits are rich in thorium, a potential future fuel for nuclear reactors. While radiological concerns complicate extraction, if thorium-based reactors become viable, they could offer a strategic advantage.

India’s Approach. India’s rare earth sector is primarily led by Indian Rare Earths Limited (IREL), a public sector entity under the Department of Atomic Energy. The National Critical Minerals Mission, launched in 2024, aims to bolster domestic production. IREL plans to quadruple its mining capacity to 50 million tonnes annually by 2032, increasing REE output from 5,000 to 15,000 tonnes. Investments in processing and separation facilities aim to address India’s lag in midstream capabilities, though technical expertise remains a bottleneck.

    • Policy Reforms and Liberalisation. In 2023, India initiated policy changes to attract private players into critical mineral exploration. The Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Amendment Act now allows private companies to bid to explore critical minerals, including REEs (Ministry of Mines, 2023). This is a significant shift from the earlier state-dominated regime.
    • Bilateral and Multilateral Cooperation. India has begun forging rare earth supply chain partnerships with like-minded democracies. Under the India-Australia Critical Minerals Investment Partnership, India has committed to co-invest in Australian REE projects. It also explores partnerships with the U.S., Japan, and the EU under the Mineral Security Partnership (MSP).
    • Research and Development. India has stepped up R&D through institutions like the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC) and the Council of Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) to develop indigenous REE extraction and separation technologies. Still, the gap in advanced metallurgy and processing know-how remains wide.
    • Strategic Stockpiling. India is considering creating strategic reserves for critical minerals similar to those for crude oil. This would buffer supply disruptions, although implementation remains in the early stages.

Challenges Ahead. REE extraction is environmentally damaging and involves toxic waste. India lacks the robust regulatory and technological frameworks to mitigate these hazards, especially given the proximity of mineral-rich areas to ecologically sensitive zones. While mining is a start, the real value lies in processing and manufacturing advanced REE products like permanent magnets. India currently lacks world-class facilities and expertise in this area. Despite recent reforms, bureaucratic red tape, conflicting regulations, and slow implementation continue to plague India’s mining sector. A coherent, industry-friendly policy framework is essential. India’s non-aligned posture and cautious diplomacy can sometimes limit its ability to align with Western-led initiatives fully. Balancing its strategic autonomy while engaging in rare earth diplomacy will be delicate.

 

Recommendations

Establish a National Critical Minerals Mission, modelled on the success of the Solar Mission, which can bring together ministries, PSUS, private firms, and academia to develop a holistic roadmap.

Encourage joint ventures and public-private partnerships with technologically advanced nations, which can help overcome India’s processing deficiencies.

Incentivise Green Mining and Processing, to ensure sustainability, the use of cleaner technologies and strict environmental guidelines must be incentivised.

Invest in specialised training for mineral extraction, metallurgy, and environmental management to create a workforce for the REE sector.

Prioritise Mining and Processing, focusing on developing mining and midstream capabilities before investing in magnet production and leveraging international partnerships for technology.

Incentivise Private Investment by offering tax breaks and subsidies to attract private capital, addressing IREL’s monopoly legacy.

Expand Strategic Reserves and increase REE stockpiles to buffer against supply disruptions, learning from China’s 2024 embargo.

 

Conclusion

Rare earths are no longer just a matter of economic competitiveness but a pillar of strategic autonomy.  They have become a powerful weapon in the U.S.-China trade war, reflecting the broader struggle for technological and financial supremacy. China’s dominance in the REE supply chain gives it significant leverage but also exposes the vulnerabilities of importing nations. Diversifying, recycling, and innovating are critical to reducing this dependence; however, they require time, investment, and international cooperation. As the world transitions to a greener, tech-driven future, securing a stable supply of rare earths will remain a geopolitical priority. The outcome of this struggle will shape trade relations and the global race for technological leadership.

For China, rare earths are a weapon; for the United States, a vulnerability; and for India, an opportunity. By seizing this moment, India can transform its rare earth sector from a dormant asset into a force multiplier, positioning itself as a consumer and a producer of the materials that will define the 21st century. India’s rare earth diplomacy and trade warfare strategy hinge on leveraging its vast reserves, forging international partnerships, and navigating geopolitical complexities. Opportunities to reduce global reliance on China, boost economic growth, and advance technology are significant, but technical, environmental, and financial challenges persist. By prioritising mining and processing, incentivising private investment, and deepening global alliances, India can establish itself as a pivotal player in the REE supply chain, aligning with its ambition to become a developed nation by 2047.

 

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Rare Earth As Rare Weapon! Amid US-China ‘Nasty’ Trade War, How Can India Use It’s ‘Dormant Asset’ To Assert Dominance

 

References and credits

To all the online sites and channels.

Pics Courtesy: Internet

Disclaimer:

Information and data included in the blog are for educational & non-commercial purposes only and have been carefully adapted, excerpted, or edited from reliable and accurate sources. All copyrighted material belongs to respective owners and is provided only for wider dissemination.

 

 

References:-

  1. Mancheri, N. A., Sundaresan, L., & Chandrashekar, S. (2019). India’s Rare Earths Industry: Challenges and Opportunities. Institute for South Asian Studies.
  1. Ministry of Mines, Government of India. (2023). Critical Minerals Strategy and MMDR Amendments. https://mines.gov.in
  1. Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC). (2022). Thorium and Rare Earth Research. https://barc.gov.in
  1. Niti Aayog (2021). Strategy on Resource Efficiency in Rare Earths and Critical Minerals.
  1. Mineral Security Partnership (MSP). (2024). Overview of Global Cooperation on Critical Minerals. https://www.state.gov/mineral-security-partnership
  1. Press Information Bureau (2023). Government Notifies Critical Minerals List; Amends Mines and Minerals Act.
  1. Fortune Business Insights (2023). Rare Earth Elements Market Size, Share & Industry Analysis.
  1. International Energy Agency (2021). The Role of Critical Minerals in Clean Energy Transitions.
  1. US Geological Survey. (2023). Mineral Commodity Summaries: Rare Earths. https://pubs.usgs.gov
  1. Global Times (2019). China is ready to weaponise rare earths in a trade war.
  1. U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO). (2020). Defence Industrial Base: DOD Efforts to Assess and Mitigate Rare Earth Risks.
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648: SAINT MARTIN’S ISLAND: A STRATEGIC GEM IN THE BAY OF BENGAL

 

My article published on the IIRF website

on 14 Apr 25.

 

Nestled in the northeastern Bay of Bengal, Saint Martin’s Island, known locally as Narikel Jinjira or Daruchini Dwip, is a small coral island spanning just three square kilometers. This unassuming landmass holds outsized geopolitical significance, located approximately nine kilometers south of Bangladesh’s Cox’s Bazar-Teknaf peninsula and eight kilometers west of Myanmar’s northwest coast. Despite its modest size and population of around 3,700, the island’s strategic location near critical maritime routes and its proximity to the Bangladesh-Myanmar maritime border have drawn the attention of regional and global powers, including the United States, China, India, and others.

 

Historical Context and Sovereignty

Saint Martin’s Island has a rich history intertwined with regional geopolitics. Millennia ago, it was an extension of the Teknaf peninsula, but rising sea levels submerged parts of the land, creating the island as it exists today. Named after Saint Martin by British colonial authorities in the 19th century, it was previously called Jazira by Arabian merchants who settled there in the 18th century. The island became part of British India in 1900, Pakistan after the 1947 partition, and Bangladesh following its independence in 1971. A 1974 agreement between Bangladesh and Myanmar, later affirmed by the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) in 2012, solidified Bangladesh’s sovereignty over the island, despite occasional tensions with Myanmar over maritime boundaries.

The island’s economy is modest, primarily driven by fishing, rice cultivation, coconut farming, and seaweed harvesting. Tourism is gaining traction due to its pristine beaches and coral reefs. However, its strategic value far outweighs its economic contributions, making it a focal point in South Asian geopolitics.

 

Strategic Location in the Bay of Bengal

Saint Martin’s Island’s location is its most defining asset. Situated near the mouth of the Naf River and close to the maritime boundary between Bangladesh and Myanmar, it lies at the crossroads of vital sea lanes in the Bay of Bengal. The bay is a critical maritime zone connecting the Indian Ocean with Southeast Asia and serving as a gateway to the Indo-Pacific. It hosts some of the world’s busiest shipping routes, including those passing through the Strait of Malacca, a chokepoint for global trade, particularly for energy supplies. Control over Saint Martin’s Island offers a vantage point for monitoring maritime traffic, conducting surveillance, and projecting naval power in this strategically significant region.

The island’s proximity to the Matarbari Deepsea Port, currently under development in Bangladesh with Japanese investment, further amplifies its importance. The port is set to enhance Bangladesh’s role in regional trade, and Saint Martin’s Island could serve as a complementary outpost for securing maritime routes. Additionally, the island falls within Bangladesh’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), granting access to marine resources like fish, oil, and gas, which adds an economic dimension to its strategic value.

 

Environmental and Economic Significance

Beyond its geopolitical role, Saint Martin’s Island is an ecologically sensitive area. As Bangladesh’s only coral island, it supports diverse marine life, including coral reefs, sea turtles, and various fish species. However, environmental degradation poses a threat—studies estimate that 70% of its coral reefs were lost between 1980 and 2018 due to anthropogenic factors like overfishing and pollution. Conservation efforts are critical to preserving this biodiversity, which also underpins the island’s tourism potential and fishing-based economy.

Tourism is a growing sector, with the island attracting visitors for its natural beauty and cultural heritage. However, a nine-month tourist restriction starting February 1, 2025, has been imposed to address environmental concerns and regional tensions, particularly with Myanmar. The island’s isolation during the rainy season, when rough seas cut off access to the mainland, underscores its vulnerability and strategic significance as a self-contained outpost.

 

Interests of World Powers

The Bay of Bengal has emerged as a theater of great power competition, and Saint Martin’s Island is a pawn in this geopolitical chessboard. The interests of major powers—particularly the United States, China, and India—stem from the region’s growing importance in global trade and security.

United States. The United States views the Bay of Bengal as a critical component of its Indo-Pacific Strategy, aimed at countering China’s growing influence. Allegations by former Bangladeshi Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina in 2024 suggested that the U.S. sought control over Saint Martin’s Island to establish a military base or airbase, a claim denied by Washington. Such a presence would allow the U.S. to monitor Chinese naval activities, secure shipping lanes, and strengthen its strategic posture in the Indo-Pacific. The island’s proximity to the Strait of Malacca makes it an ideal site for surveillance and power projection. While the U.S. has officially dismissed these claims, the island’s strategic value aligns with its broader objectives, including partnerships like the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) with India, Japan, and Australia.

China. China’s expanding presence in the Indian Ocean, driven by its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), has heightened its interest in the Bay of Bengal. Beijing has invested heavily in regional infrastructure, including Bangladesh’s Cox’s Bazar port and a submarine base near Dhaka. Saint Martin’s Island could be a strategic foothold for China to monitor maritime routes and counter U.S. and Indian influence. Reports of Chinese intelligence facilities on Myanmar’s Coco Island, near the Strait of Malacca, underscore Beijing’s ambitions in the region. Control over Saint Martin’s Island would enhance China’s ability to project power and secure its energy imports, which rely heavily on these sea lanes.

India. As a regional power, India is vested in maintaining influence over the Bay of Bengal, which it considers part of its strategic backyard. Saint Martin’s Island’s proximity to India’s Andaman and Nicobar Islands, a key military outpost, makes it a concern. India is wary of foreign powers—particularly China or the U.S.—establishing a presence on the island, which could undermine its regional dominance. New Delhi has supported Bangladesh’s sovereignty over the island and provided economic and military assistance to counterbalance Chinese influence. Any foreign control over Saint Martin’s Island could serve as a “checkpoint” for India’s maritime activities, heightening tensions.

Other Actors. Myanmar’s proximity to Saint Martin’s Island has led to occasional tensions, including cross-border firing and disputes over maritime boundaries. The ongoing conflict in Myanmar’s Rakhine State, involving the Arakan Army, has spilled over into the island’s waters, raising security concerns for Bangladesh. Japan’s investment in the Matarbari port also reflects its interest in the region’s economic potential, which is indirectly tied to the island’s strategic location.

 

Geopolitical Tensions and Allegations. Saint Martin’s Island has been at the center of political controversies in Bangladesh. Sheikh Hasina’s 2024 claims that her ouster was linked to U.S. pressure over the island sparked widespread debate. She alleged that foreign powers sought to lease or control the island, a narrative her son later disputed. These accusations reflect the island’s role as a lightning rod for sovereignty, foreign influence, and regional security discussions.

 

Conclusion

Saint Martin’s Island may be small, but its strategic location in the Bay of Bengal makes it a coveted prize for world powers. Its proximity to vital maritime routes, economic potential, and environmental significance amplify its importance in a region of great power competition. The United States, China, and India, among others, recognise the island’s value as a potential outpost for surveillance, power projection, and securing trade routes. For Bangladesh, maintaining sovereignty over Saint Martin’s Island is a matter of national pride and a strategic necessity. As geopolitical tensions rise in the Indo-Pacific, this tiny coral gem will likely remain a focal point of intrigue and contestation, underscoring the complex interplay of power, sovereignty, and strategy in the modern world.

 

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Saint Martin’s Island: A Strategic Gem in the Bay Of Bengal (by Air Marshal Anil Khosla)

 

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References:-

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