My article was published on the “Life of Soldier” website
on 14 Jun 25.
India’s national security strategy has been profoundly shaped by the persistent threat of Pakistan-sponsored terrorism, particularly in the contested region of Kashmir. For decades, Pakistan has been employing terrorism as a state policy to destabilise India, primarily through proxy groups like Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM), and Hizbul Mujahideen. In response, India has transitioned from a policy of strategic restraint to one of punitive deterrence, aiming to impose significant costs on Pakistan for its support of terrorist activities.
Necessity for Change of Approach. The origins of Pakistan-sponsored terrorism against India lie in the 1947 invasion of Jammu and Kashmir by tribal militias backed by Pakistan, sparking the first Indo-Pakistani war. Over the decades, Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) has been implicated in supporting militant groups targeting India, with major attacks including the 2001 Parliament attack, the 2008 Mumbai attacks, the 2016 Uri attack, and the 2019 Pulwama bombing. Pakistan’s overt nuclearisation in 1998 emboldened its strategy, as it leveraged its nuclear arsenal to shield its proxy warfare, believing India would refrain from conventional retaliation due to the risk of nuclear escalation. This dynamic allowed Pakistan to exploit the sub-conventional space, sustaining low-intensity conflict without triggering full-scale war. India’s initial restraint, while diplomatically prudent, failed to deter Pakistan’s persistent sponsorship of terrorism, necessitating a shift toward a more assertive approach.
Evolution of Punitive Deterrence
In the last decade, India began adopting punitive deterrence, a strategy designed to deter Pakistan by demonstrating a willingness to escalate in response to terrorist provocations. This approach combines conventional military actions, diplomatic pressure, and economic measures to raise the costs of Pakistan’s actions, challenging its reliance on nuclear deterrence to shield proxy warfare.
2016 Surgical Strikes. The Uri attack, which killed 19 Indian soldiers, prompted India to conduct surgical strikes across the Line of Control (LoC) targeting terrorist launch pads in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK). These strikes marked a shift from restraint, signalling India’s readiness to respond militarily. However, their limited scope had a modest impact on Pakistan’s strategic behaviour.
2019 Balakot Airstrikes. The Pulwama attack, led to airstrikes on a JeM training camp in Balakot, Pakistan. As the first Indian airstrikes on Pakistani soil since 1971, Balakot represented a significant escalation, demonstrating India’s willingness to cross the LoC and strike deep inside Pakistan. The operation temporarily reduced terrorist activity in Kashmir.
Operation Sindoor (2025). Launched on May 7, 2025, in response to the April 22, 2025, Pahalgam attack that killed 26 civilians, Operation Sindoor was a high-intensity military operation targeting nine terrorist facilities in Pakistan and PoK. Unlike previous operations, Sindoor was publicly declared, reinforcing India’s commitment to punitive deterrence and challenging Pakistan’s nuclear blackmail. The operation’s scale and transparency marked a doctrinal shift toward mainstreaming conventional retaliation as a response to terrorism.
Strategic Framework and Analysis of Punitive Deterrence
India’s policy of punitive deterrence is a strategic doctrine aimed at dissuading Pakistan from sponsoring cross-border terrorism by imposing credible costs through calibrated military responses. Rooted in the need to break the cycle of provocation and restraint, this policy combines political resolve, precision strikes, and international diplomatic engagement to establish red lines. As exemplified by earlier responses, it marks a shift from reactive to proactive counter-terrorism. This framework underscores India’s intent to reshape adversary behaviour, strengthen national security, and reinforce deterrence without escalating into full-scale war, thereby maintaining strategic stability in South Asia. India’s punitive deterrence policy has several facets.
Conventional Response to Sub-Conventional Threats. India now treats Pakistan-sponsored terrorism as an act of aggression equivalent to conventional warfare, justifying military retaliation. Operation Sindoor framed Pakistan’s proxy attacks as the initiation of hostilities, placing the burden on Pakistan to prevent such actions to avoid escalation.
Public Declaration of Intent. By openly announcing Operation Sindoor, India established a “tripwire strategy,” setting clear red lines to deter future attacks. This transparency strengthens domestic support and signals resolve to international audiences, reducing Pakistan’s ability to deny involvement.
Targeting Terrorist Infrastructure. India focuses on disrupting terrorist networks, including training camps and launch pads, while avoiding civilian targets. Operation Sindoor’s inclusion of air bases marked a bold escalation, signalling that India could target strategic assets if provoked.
Diplomatic and Economic Pressure. India has complemented military actions with non-kinetic measures. Post-Pahalgam, India suspended the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT), demanding that Pakistan cease terrorism as a condition for reinstatement. India has also isolated Pakistan diplomatically, condemning its actions at the United Nations and multi lateral organisations.
Psychological Deterrence. By targeting air bases and demonstrating escalation dominance, India aims to undermine Pakistan’s confidence in its nuclear shield, forcing its military to reassess the costs of proxy warfare.
Legitimacy India’s airstrikes during Operation Sindoor were firmly rooted in international law and the UN Charter, which upholds the right to self-defence. The operation targeted terror camps of Jaish-e-Mohammed and Lashkar-e-Taiba in Pakistan and PoK. India presented a detailed dossier, backed by satellite imagery and intelligence inputs, confirming the presence and activity of terror infrastructure. The precision of the strikes, aimed at minimising civilian casualties, further reinforced India’s commitment to lawful action. These elements collectively underscored the legitimacy and proportionality of India’s response.
Acceptance and Reactions. Operation Sindoor elicited varied international reactions. The United States and European Union expressed concern over escalation risks but acknowledged India’s right to self-defence, urging both nations to exercise restraint. China, Pakistan’s ally, condemned the operation as a violation of sovereignty, while Russia adopted a neutral stance, advocating dialogue. The UN Security Council’s failure to issue a unified statement highlighted the global divide, with India leveraging its growing geopolitical clout to deflect criticism. India’s rejection of third-party mediation, insisting on bilateral resolution, underscored its assertive diplomatic posture.
Challenges and Limitations. India’s punitive deterrence policy faces significant challenges.
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- Escalation Risks. Targeting air bases in Operation Sindoor raised fears of nuclear escalation, given Pakistan’s low nuclear threshold. While a ceasefire was achieved, the operation highlighted the delicate balance India must maintain to avoid catastrophic conflict.
- Commitment Traps. Public declarations create domestic expectations, where failure to respond to future attacks could erode government credibility. This dynamic risks forcing India into disproportionate responses to minor provocations.
- Pakistan’s Resilience. Pakistan’s military views anti-India violence as a core strategic objective, making it resistant to deterrence. Despite economic pressures and FATF scrutiny, Pakistan resumed proxy attacks as conditions improved.
- International Dynamics. Western calls for restraint, driven by nuclear fears, allow Pakistan to deflect accountability. India’s unilateral approach risks diplomatic isolation if not balanced with strategic outreach.
- Attribution Challenges. Pakistan’s denials and the difficulty of conclusively linking attacks to its state apparatus complicate India’s justification for retaliation. Operation Sindoor’s preemptive approach reflects a shift toward acting on intent rather than exhaustive evidence, but it invites criticism.
Effectiveness and Outcomes. The policy’s effectiveness is mixed. The Balakot strikes reduced terrorist activity from 2019 to 2024, but the resurgence of attacks thereafter, including Pahalgam, indicates deterrence was not sustained. Operation Sindoor re-established India’s resolve, with the ceasefire suggesting Pakistan may recalibrate its strategy. However, the ideological commitment of Pakistan’s military to proxy warfare remains a persistent challenge. The policy has created a distinct operational space below the nuclear threshold, allowing India to impose costs without triggering all-out war.
Future Implications. For India’s policy of punitive deterrence to remain effective in the future, several strategic actions are essential. First, India must maintain credible military capabilities, including precision strike assets, advanced surveillance systems, and real-time intelligence networks to enable swift, proportionate responses. Second, seamless civil-military coordination and decision-making agility are critical to capitalise on narrow windows of opportunity. Third, India must invest in modern technologies such as unmanned systems, AI-driven targeting, and cyber capabilities to expand its deterrence toolkit. On the diplomatic front, continuous engagement with global powers is necessary to reinforce the legitimacy of India’s actions under international law and counter Pakistan’s disinformation campaigns. Furthermore, India should proactively expose terror infrastructure through satellite imagery and dossiers, shaping global opinion. Finally, internal resilience through adequate border security, counter-infiltration measures, and societal preparedness is vital to blunt future attacks. Together, these measures will sustain deterrence, minimise escalation risks, and reinforce India’s strategic credibility.
Conclusion
India’s policy of punitive deterrence marks a paradigm shift from strategic restraint to assertive coercion in countering Pakistan-sponsored terrorism. From the 2016 surgical strikes to the Balakot airstrikes and Operation Sindoor, India has demonstrated its willingness to escalate militarily, diplomatically, and economically to deter Pakistan’s proxy warfare. While effective in signalling resolve and disrupting terrorist infrastructure, the policy faces challenges in managing escalation risks, sustaining deterrence, and navigating international dynamics. As India refines its approach, balancing military decisiveness with diplomatic engagement will be critical to securing long-term stability and countering Pakistan’s use of terrorism as a tool of statecraft.
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OP SINDOOR: INDIA’S POLICY OF PUNITIVE DETERRENCE AGAINST PAKISTAN-SPONSORED TERRORISM
OP SINDOOR: INDIA’S POLICY OF PUNITIVE DETERRENCE AGAINST PAKISTAN-SPONSORED TERRORISM
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To all the online sites and channels.
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Disclaimer:
Information and data included in the blog are for educational & non-commercial purposes only and have been carefully adapted, excerpted, or edited from reliable and accurate sources. All copyrighted material belongs to respective owners and is provided only for wider dissemination.
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