668:DIPLOMATIC EARTHQUAKE: SHIMLA AGREEMENT TEETERS ON THE EDGE

 

My article was published on The EurasianTimes website on 04 May 25.

 

The Shimla Agreement, signed on July 2, 1972, between India and Pakistan, is a cornerstone of South Asian diplomacy. Forged in the aftermath of the 1971 Indo-Pakistani War, which led to the creation of Bangladesh, the agreement aimed to establish a framework for peaceful bilateral relations and normalise ties between the neighbours. Signed by Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and Pakistani President Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in Shimla, Himachal Pradesh, the treaty sought to end hostilities, resolve disputes peacefully, and lay the groundwork for cooperation.

On April 24, 2025, Pakistan’s National Security Committee (NSC), its top civil-military decision-making body, announced the suspension of the 1972 Shimla Agreement, alongside other bilateral agreements with India, in retaliation for India’s suspension of the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) on April 23, 2025. This escalation was triggered by the Pahalgam terror attack in Jammu and Kashmir on April 22, 2025, which killed 26 civilians, including two international tourists. The suspension of the Shimla Agreement has thrust it back into the spotlight.

The suspension reignited debates about the Shimla Agreement’s historical significance. In 1972, Indira Gandhi faced criticism from opposition parties, notably the Jan Sangh (predecessor to the BJP), for not converting the ceasefire line into an international border. Atal Bihari Vajpayee, then a prominent opposition leader, protested in Shimla against the agreement, arguing it conceded too much to Pakistan.

 

The Treaty

The Shimla Agreement emerged from the geopolitical upheaval of the 1971 Indo-Pakistani War. The war was triggered by Pakistan’s brutal suppression of the Bangladesh Liberation Movement in East Pakistan, leading to a humanitarian crisis and the displacement of millions of refugees into India. India’s military intervention, supporting the Mukti Bahini (freedom fighters), resulted in a decisive victory, with the surrender of over 93,000 Pakistani soldiers and the creation of Bangladesh.

The war left Pakistan diplomatically and militarily weakened, necessitating negotiations to address post-war issues such as prisoner repatriation, territorial disputes, and the future of bilateral relations. After intense negotiations, the agreement was signed at Barnes Court (now Raj Bhavan) in Shimla. A key sticking point was the status of Kashmir, with India insisting on bilateralism and Pakistan seeking flexibility to internationalise the issue. Personal diplomacy between Gandhi and Bhutto, including late-night discussions, facilitated a compromise that emphasised peaceful coexistence while sidestepping a definitive resolution on Kashmir.

 

Provisions of the Shimla Agreement

The concise Shimla Agreement contains six key provisions to foster peace and cooperation. These provisions are rooted in sovereignty, bilateralism, and non-interference.

    • Bilateral Resolution of Disputes. Both nations committed to resolving all disputes, including the Kashmir issue, through peaceful bilateral negotiations, explicitly rejecting third-party mediation, such as from the United Nations. This clause has been a cornerstone of India’s foreign policy, emphasising that Kashmir is a bilateral matter.
    • Establishment of the Line of Control (LoC). The December 17, 1971, ceasefire line was formalised as the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir. Both sides agreed to respect the LoC without unilateral alterations, irrespective of their differing legal interpretations. This provision aimed to stabilise the volatile Kashmir region by establishing a de facto boundary.
    • Respect for Sovereignty and Territorial Integrity. India and Pakistan pledged to respect each other’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence and refrain from interference in internal affairs. This clause sought to prevent destabilising actions, such as supporting insurgencies or hostile propaganda.
    • Non-Use of Force. Both countries agreed to refrain from the threat or use of force against each other’s territorial integrity, aligning with the principles of the United Nations Charter. This provision aimed to de-escalate military tensions and promote peaceful coexistence.
    • Normalisation of Relations. The agreement outlined steps to normalise relations, including resuming communications, trade, cultural exchanges, and people-to-people contacts. It also facilitated the repatriation of prisoners of war and civilians detained during the conflict, marking a humanitarian gesture.
    • Recognition of Bangladesh. While not explicitly stated, the agreement paved the way for Pakistan’s eventual diplomatic recognition of Bangladesh as a sovereign nation, resolving a major point of contention post-1971.

Additionally, the agreement included provisions for future meetings between the heads of government to further peace efforts and address unresolved issues. India returned over 13,000 km² of captured Pakistani territory, demonstrating goodwill.

 

Relevance of the Shimla Agreement

The Shimla Agreement remains a pivotal reference point in India-Pakistan relations, shaping diplomatic and strategic interactions for over five decades. Its relevance can be assessed across several dimensions:-

Bilateralism as a Diplomatic Framework. India’s foreign policy bedrock has been the emphasis on bilateral dispute resolution. India has consistently cited the agreement to counter Pakistan’s attempts to internationalise the Kashmir issue at forums like the United Nations. The agreement’s rejection of third-party mediation aligns with India’s stance that external involvement, particularly from Cold War superpowers or the UN, complicates rather than resolves bilateral issues.

Stabilisation of the Line of Control. The formalisation of the LoC provided a pragmatic mechanism to manage the Kashmir dispute. Despite frequent ceasefire violations, the LoC remains the de facto boundary, guiding peace talks and ceasefire agreements. Its recognition through decades of practice has given it international legitimacy, even after the agreement’s suspension.

Humanitarian and Diplomatic Aspect.  The agreement facilitated the repatriation of prisoners of war and civilians, addressing immediate post-war humanitarian concerns. It also set the stage for Pakistan’s recognition of Bangladesh, reducing a major source of regional hostility. These outcomes underscored the agreement’s role in de-escalating tensions and fostering dialogue, highlighting its humanitarian and diplomatic achievements.

Challenges to Implementation. Despite its noble intentions, the agreement’s vision of normalised relations has been elusive. Persistent mistrust, cross-border terrorism, and differing interpretations of the Kashmir issue have hindered progress. Pakistan’s attempts to internationalise Kashmir and incidents like the 1999 Kargil War and the 1984 Siachen conflict violated the agreement’s spirit, underscoring its fragility.

 Contemporary Context. The agreement’s relevance has been tested by evolving geopolitical dynamics, including the nuclearisation of both nations’ post-1998 and India’s abrogation of Article 370 in 2019, which revoked Jammu and Kashmir’s special status. Pakistan’s suspension of the agreement in 2025 further questions its efficacy, yet India upholds bilateralism as a guiding principle.

 

Repercussions of the Suspension

On April 24, 2025, Pakistan announced the suspension of the Shimla Agreement. This move, coupled with the closure of the Wagah border, trade suspension, and airspace restrictions, marks a significant escalation in bilateral tensions. The suspension’s repercussions are multifaceted.

Symbolic and Diplomatic Impact. Pakistan’s suspension is mainly symbolic, as the agreement’s practical relevance has diminished due to repeated violations. The bilateral dialogue mechanism envisioned under the deal has been dormant, with high-level talks suspended after major incidents like the 2019 Pulwama attack. The suspension formalises Pakistan’s shift toward internationalising the Kashmir issue, potentially seeking involvement from the UN, China, or the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC).

Strategic Implications for the LoC. The suspension raises concerns about the LoC’s status. Pakistan’s non-recognition of the LoC as a de facto border could lead to increased ceasefire violations or attempts to alter the status quo, as seen in past conflicts like Kargil. However, the LoC’s international recognition and India’s military preparedness mitigate immediate tactical consequences.

Regional Stability. The suspension undermines regional stability, particularly in the context of nuclear-armed neighbours. It could escalate diplomatic and military brinkmanship, derailing prospects for dialogue. The closure of cross-border routes and trade further isolates Pakistan economically. At the same time, India’s global diplomatic offensive could weaken Pakistan’s international standing.

Legal and International Perspectives. In international law, the suspension’s impact is limited. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) sets a high bar for treaty termination due to “fundamental changes in circumstances,” and the Shimla Agreement’s “best endeavour clauses” are not strictly binding. The LoC’s status as a de facto border is unlikely to be challenged internationally, and India’s position on bilateralism remains robust. Pakistan’s move may invite criticism for violating international commitments, strengthening India’s narrative of Pakistan’s unreliability.

India’s Strategic Advantage. The suspension paradoxically benefits India by removing diplomatic constraints. India can pursue a harder line against cross-border terrorism, revisit claims over Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir (PoK), and intensify diplomatic efforts to isolate Pakistan. The absence of the agreement may also prompt India to reassess other bilateral treaties, such as visa regimes and trade agreements, aligning them with national security interests.

Challenges and Future Prospects. The Shimla Agreement’s suspension highlights its unfulfilled potential. Deep-seated mistrust, domestic political pressures, and external influences, such as Pakistan’s alignment with China, have consistently undermined its objectives. The lack of a dispute resolution mechanism within the agreement limited its enforceability, and differing interpretations of Kashmir’s status fuelled tensions. Reviving bilateral dialogue will require confidence-building measures, such as ceasefire adherence and counter-terrorism cooperation, though the current diplomatic freeze makes this unlikely.

 

Conclusion

The Shimla Agreement of 1972 was a bold attempt to reset India-Pakistan relations after a devastating war. Its provisions for bilateralism, the LoC, and peaceful coexistence provided a framework for stability, but its implementation was hampered by mistrust and violations. While the agreement remained a diplomatic touchstone for decades, its suspension in 2025 reflects its diminished practical relevance. The repercussions, while symbolic, open the door to heightened tensions and strategic recalibrations, particularly for India. The suspension, Pakistan’s “strategic mistake”, handed India a diplomatic advantage. India can now justify retaliatory measures, such as surgical strikes or economic sanctions, without being bound by the agreement’s constraints. As South Asia navigates this crisis, the Shimla Agreement serves as both a reminder of peace’s fragility and a lesson in reconciling historical grievances.

 

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Diplomatic Fiasco For Pakistan: Why Suspension Of 1972 Simla Agreement Is An Open Invitation To India To Seize Pak-Occupied Kashmir: OPED

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Information and data included in the blog are for educational & non-commercial purposes only and have been carefully adapted, excerpted, or edited from reliable and accurate sources. All copyrighted material belongs to respective owners and is provided only for wider dissemination.

 

 

References:-

  1. Simla Agreement, July 2, 1972. Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India.
  1. Bhutto, Zulfikar Ali. “Simla Agreement.” Bhutto.org.
  1. “The Shimla Agreement: Background, Provisions, and Contemporary Relevance.” Sanskriti IAS, April 25, 2025.
  1. “Pakistan Suspends 1972 Simla Agreement: What Is It and What Will Be the Impact on LoC.” The Times of India, April 26, 2025.
  1. “Simla Agreement (1972) | Significance, Provisions, Impact, & Challenges.” Britannica, April 27, 2025.
  1. “Pakistan’s Suspension of Shimla Agreement: A Symbolic Move with Limited Impact.” India Sentinels, April 28, 2025.
  1. “Indus Waters Treaty, Simla Agreement ‘in Abeyance’: What This Means.” The Indian Express, April 26, 2025.
  1. “Shimla Agreement 1972 to 2025: From Peace Treaty to Breakdown.” StudyIQ, April 25, 2025.

Bibliography:-

  1. Ganguly, Sumit. Conflict Unending: India-Pakistan Tensions since 1947. Columbia University Press, 2002.
  1. Schofield, Victoria. Kashmir in Conflict: India, Pakistan and the Unending War. I.B. Tauris, 2010.
  1. Snedden, Christopher. Understanding Kashmir and Kashmiris. Hurst & Company, 2015.
  1. Wirsing, Robert G. India, Pakistan, and the Kashmir Dispute: On Regional Conflict and Its Resolution. St. Martin’s Press, 1994.
  1. “Simla Agreement 1972 for UPSC Exam: Know Main Points of Simla Agreement between India and Pakistan.” Jagran Josh, April 24, 2025.
  1. “What Is the Simla Agreement? Check Key Changes After Suspension.” Jagran Josh, April 25, 2025.
  1. “Explained: What Is India-Pak Simla Agreement and Why It Still Matters.” Business Standard, April 24, 2025.
  1. “Simla Agreement 1972: Why It Was Signed and What Pakistan’s Suspension Means for India.” Business Today, April 24, 2025.

665: DESPERATE MEN DO DESPERATE THINGS IN DESPERATE SITUATIONS: PAKISTAN ARMY CHIEF PLAYING WITH FIRE

 

My article was published on The EurasianTimes website

on 01 May 25.

 

The recent terrorist attack in Phalgam, Jammu and Kashmir, has once again brought the spotlight on Pakistan’s deep state and its time-tested strategy of using militant proxies to pursue its strategic aims in the region. Coming at a time when Pakistan is facing extraordinary internal and external pressures, the timing and nature of the attack raise pressing questions about the motives behind this provocation and the extent to which the current military leadership may be resorting to desperation-driven tactics. The phrase “desperate men do desperate things in desperate situations” encapsulates the narrative that Munir, grappling with Pakistan’s cascading crises, resorted to terrorism to unify a fractured nation and reassert military dominance. The question remains whether it is a calculated move or a strategic blunder that would result in a bigger crisis.

 

Desperate Act

On April 22, 2025, the serene Baisaran Valley in Pahalgam became the site of a horrific terror attack. Armed militants, later identified as members of Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), stormed a tourist campsite, killing 26  civilians, predominantly Hindu tourists. The attackers, wielding M4 carbines and AK-47s, verified victims’ religious identities before executing them, marking the deadliest assault in the region since the 2008 Mumbai attacks. The Pahalgam attack was no ordinary act of terrorism. Its precision, weaponry, and targeting suggest sophistication beyond typical militant operations. The attackers, led by Hashim Musa, a former Pakistan Army para-commando dismissed from service, infiltrated deep to strike a tourist hotspot 100 kilometres from the Line of Control (Loc).

The attack in Phalgam was a brazen act of desperation, targeting unarmed, innocent tourists in a relatively stable and tourist-frequented part of Kashmir. The use of high-grade weaponry and coordinated execution points toward sophisticated planning, likely beyond the capabilities of isolated local cells. Indian officials allege the attack was planned by Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), with direct oversight from Munir. A key piece of evidence is Musa’s background. Sources claim he was “loaned” by Pakistan’s Special Service Group (SSG) to Let, and the attackers’ weaponry, M4 carbines, are rare in militant hands, further pointing to state backing.

The attack’s communal nature adds another layer. The militants spared Muslim tourists, targeting Hindus in a deliberate bid to inflame religious tensions. This aligns with Munir’s April 16, 2025, speech, where he emphasised Pakistan’s Islamic identity and the Two-Nation Theory, framing India as an existential threat. The timing—six days after the hate speech—suggests a deliberate signal to terror groups. The Resistance Front (TRF), a LeT offshoot, initially claimed responsibility but later retracted, a move Indian analysts attribute to Pakistan’s attempt to distance itself from the backlash.

 

Desperate Situation

Under General Asim Munir, the Pakistan Army faces a precarious state that is a unique and combustible blend of crises, a collapsing economy, surging insurgencies, and eroding public trust in the military.

Economic Collapse. Pakistan’s GDP growth is under 2%, inflation is soaring past 20%, and the Pakistani rupee is plummeting. A $7-billion IMF loan, secured in 2024, imposes austerity measures that have sparked nationwide protests. The Karachi Stock Exchange crashed 3% in a single day post-Pahalgam, reflecting investor fears of regional instability. Pakistan’s economy is on life support, with an IMF deal hanging by a thread and foreign reserves dipping dangerously low. The economic hardship is palpable across society, eroding public faith in national institutions.

 Political Instability. Politically, Pakistan is a tinderbox. The 2023 arrest of former Prime Minister Imran Khan, widely seen as orchestrated by the military, has galvanised his Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) party. The military’s overt role in political engineering has backfired, leading to widespread public discontent and intra-elite fragmentation. Mass protests, often met with brutal crackdowns, have eroded the military’s legitimacy. Social media campaigns like #ResignAsimMunir, despite Pakistan’s ban on X, highlight Munir’s unpopularity. Analysts describe the military’s public support as at its lowest since the 1971 Bangladesh liberation, when Pakistan lost its eastern wing. For Munir, appointed Army Chief in November 2022, these crises threaten his leadership and the military’s grip on power.

Institutional Crisis. Militarily, Pakistan is under siege. The Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) has intensified attacks in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa, including a March 2025 train hijacking that killed several passengers. In Balochistan, separatist groups like the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) target Chinese-funded CPEC projects, undermining Pakistan’s strategic ties with Beijing. The military, once revered as the nation’s protector, struggles to contain these threats, with over 1,200 security personnel killed in 2024 alone. For perhaps the first time in decades, the Pakistan Army’s credibility is under sustained attack. Retired officers have voiced dissent, and social media campaigns have openly criticised the top brass—something previously unthinkable.

 Strategic Isolation. Once seen as a pivotal state in the U.S.-China rivalry, Pakistan is increasingly isolated. China’s Belt and Road investments have slowed, while Gulf nations redirect capital elsewhere. Washington remains wary, and New Delhi has successfully lobbied global forums to pressure Islamabad on terror financing.

 

Desperation Levels and Motives

The narrative of Munir’s desperation hinges on his need to reverse the military’s declining fortunes. With Pakistan unravelling, the Army Chief faces pressure to reassert control. Possible motives for orchestrating the Pahalgam attack include the following:-

Rallying Domestic Support. By reigniting the Kashmir issue, Munir seeks to unify Pakistanis under the military’s narrative of India as the eternal enemy. The military has historically used anti-India sentiment to deflect domestic criticism, as seen after the 1999 Kargil War and the 2016 Uri attack. With protests and insurgencies eroding public trust, a high-profile attack could galvanise nationalist fervour.

Disrupting India’s Kashmir Narrative. The region has seen relative stability since India revoked Article 370 in 2019, stripping Jammu and Kashmir of its autonomy. Record tourism (2 million visitors in 2024), successful elections, and infrastructure development have undermined Pakistan’s claim to Kashmir. The Pahalgam attack, targeting tourists, aims to deter visitors, disrupt normalcy, and revive Pakistan’s relevance in the dispute.

Risking Controlled Escalation. A limited conflict with India could restore the military’s image as Pakistan’s protector. Past crises, like the 2019 Pulwama attack, saw Pakistan weather Indian airstrikes while rallying domestic support. Munir may have calculated that India’s response—diplomatic measures, border skirmishes—would remain containable, avoiding all-out war given both nations’ nuclear arsenals.

 

Calculated Act or Strategic Miscalculation?

General Munir, a former ISI chief, is acutely aware of the strategic value and political risk of cross-border terrorism. His tenure began with promises of internal reform and a clean break from overt politicking. However, Munir has returned to the tried-and-tested path of external diversion under mounting internal pressures and the erosion of military dominance in domestic affairs.

A terrorist attack in Kashmir achieves several aims simultaneously: it unites domestic opinion around a perceived external threat, deflects criticism from internal dysfunction, and tests India’s threshold for retaliation. It may also galvanise the rank and file within the army, reasserting its role as the sole guardian of Pakistan’s ideological and territorial integrity.

The attack has plunged India-Pakistan relations into crisis. India responded with punitive measures: suspending the Indus Waters Treaty, closing borders, expelling diplomats, and cancelling Visas.  Small-arms fire along the LoC has escalated, with Pakistan closing its airspace to Indian flights. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi vowed a “befitting reply,” raising speculation of Military action.

 

India’s Options

India faces a complex decision matrix. A kinetic response, such as surgical strikes or air raids like Balakot in 2019, may yield short-term political dividends, especially if the Pakistan Army is seeking precisely such a reaction to rally domestic support. Conversely, restraint may embolden further provocations, especially if it is perceived as a lack of resolve. Therefore, India must pursue a calibrated strategy that combines tactical counter-terror operations with strategic multi-domain actions.

India’s response will be shaped by the need to address domestic outrage, signal strength to Pakistan, and manage international pressure to avoid escalation between the two nuclear-armed states.  The response is likely to be multi-pronged in several domains.

Diplomatic Offensive. India has already accused Pakistan of sponsoring terrorism, with Prime Minister Narendra Modi calling Pakistan a “rogue state” at the UN and vowing to pursue attackers “to the ends of the earth.” India will likely intensify efforts to diplomatically isolate Pakistan by raising the issue in international forums like the UN, G20, or bilateral talks with allies like the US, UK, and France.

Severing Diplomatic Ties. India has already expelled Pakistani diplomats and may further downgrade diplomatic ties, potentially recalling its high commissioner from Islamabad or imposing additional visa restrictions.

Economic and Trade Restrictions. India has suspended the Indus Waters Treaty, a significant move signalling economic retaliation. Further steps could include tightening trade restrictions or pushing for international financial scrutiny of Pakistan, leveraging India’s influence with institutions like the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), where Pakistan has faced grey-listing for terrorism financing concerns.

Cultural and Sporting Bans. To sustain domestic momentum against Pakistan, India may reinforce existing bans on cultural exchanges, sports events, and media collaborations.

Strategic Military Posturing.  India is likely to increase military deployments along the Line of Control (LoC) and international border, as implied by Modi’s “complete operational freedom” grant to the armed forces.

Surgical Strikes or Targeted Operations. India’s response to the 2019 Pulwama attack—a surgical airstrike on a Jaish-e-Mohammed camp in Balakot, Pakistan—sets a precedent. A similar operation targeting an appropriate target in Pakistan is possible.

Escalation of Skirmishes. Intermittent cross-border firing along the LOC, reported since the attack, may intensify. If not controlled, these skirmishes may escalate to a full-fledged war.

 

A Dangerous Game of Desperation

The Phalgam attack is not an isolated incident—it is a symptom of deeper rot within Pakistan’s civil-military structure. It underscores the Pakistan military’s enduring reliance on terrorism to counter internal and external pressures. But the diminishing returns of this strategy, combined with growing international scrutiny and a more assertive India, make this a dangerous game.

Desperate men in desperate institutions often resort to desperate measures. For Pakistan’s military, external provocation has long served as a tool to distract, deflect, and dominate. The costs may outweigh the benefits if General Munir pivots back to cross-border militancy as a pressure valve. Whether driven by Munir’s desperation or institutional strategy, the operation has reignited India-Pakistan tensions, risking escalation in a nuclear-armed region.

India must remain wise enough not to be baited, yet take appropriate multi-pronged, multi-domain retaliatory action, stay alert, agile, and strategically ready to counter these designs. India would be willing to climb the escalatory ladder, as Indian patience has run out, and a red line has been crossed this time. Once again, regional peace teeters on the edge of a dangerous gamble from across the border.

 

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References and credits

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Disclaimer:

Information and data included in the blog are for educational & non-commercial purposes only and have been carefully adapted, excerpted, or edited from reliable and accurate sources. All copyrighted material belongs to the respective owners and is provided only for wider dissemination.

 

References:-

1. The Hindu, “Tourism Terror Targeted: Pahalgam Massacre,” April 23, 2025. https://www.thehindu.com

2. Indian Express, “How Pakistan’s Proxy War Is Mutating,” April 2025.

3. Dawn (Pakistan), “General Munir’s Gamble: What the Army’s Silence Hides,” April 25, 2025.

4. Reuters, “India Accuses Pakistan of Orchestrating Deadly Kashmir Attack,” April 2025.

5. Al Jazeera, “Terror Returns to Kashmir: Who Gains?” April 24, 2025.

6. Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA), India – Dossiers on LeT, TRF, ISI

Home Page

7. RAND Corporation Reports – “Proxy Warfare and Strategic Risk in South Asia” (2021). https://www.rand.org

8. Brookings Institution – “The Pakistan Army’s Strategic Calculus in a Post-Imran Era” (2024), https://www.brookings.edu

9. Carnegie India – “Pakistan’s New Military Doctrine: Continuity or Crisis?” (2023).

10. Observer Research Foundation (ORF), India – Reports on terrorism, India-Pakistan conflict cycles, https://www.orfonline.org

11. Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) – “Pakistan’s Internal Security Collapse” (2024), https://www.cfr.org

12. Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India – Official statements on the Phalgam attack and diplomatic responses. https://www.mea.gov.in

13. United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Briefings – Historical and recent discussions on Pakistan-sponsored terrorism. https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/

14. Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR), Pakistan – Official statements from Pakistan’s military. https://www.ispr.gov.pk/

619: PAKISTAN TRAIN HIJACK: START OF A LARGER CRISIS?

 

My Article was published on the Eurasian Times Website

on 12 Mar 25.

 

On March 11, 2025, separatist militants attacked the Jaffar Express passenger train in Balochistan’s Bolan district, Pakistan. The train, carrying approximately 500 passengers, was en route from Quetta to Peshawar when it was ambushed in a tunnel. The assailants detonated explosives on the railroad track and engaged in gunfire with onboard security personnel. The Baloch Liberation Army (BLA), designated as a terrorist organisation by both Pakistan and the United States, claimed responsibility for the assault. They asserted that they had taken security forces and civilians hostage, using women and children as human shields. Authorities face challenges accessing the remote, mountainous area to conduct rescue operations. ​

Reports on the number of hostages vary, with some sources estimating 182 while others suggest the initial number could exceed 400. The BLA later claimed to have released civilian passengers—including women, children, and Baloch citizens—but retained active-duty military and security personnel. Conflicting accounts also exist regarding casualties, with the BLA alleging deaths among security forces, though exact figures remain unconfirmed.

The crisis remains ongoing, with tensions high between the BLA and Pakistani authorities. The government and military face the challenge of resolving the standoff without further loss of life, while the BLA’s threats add urgency to the situation. The incident underscores the persistent unrest in Balochistan and the complexities of addressing the region’s separatist movements.

 

BLA Origin and Background. The Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) is an ethno-nationalist militant group that seeks an independent Balochistan, citing political marginalisation, economic exploitation, and human rights abuses by the Pakistani state. Its origins are deeply rooted in the broader Baloch nationalist movement, which began when Pakistan annexed the princely state of Kalat in 1948 despite resistance from its ruler, Mir Ahmad Yar Khan. This led to the first Baloch insurgency, followed by successive uprisings in 1958-59, 1973-77, and post-2000, each met with Pakistani military crackdowns. The modern BLA is believed to have formed in the late 1990s or early 2000s, allegedly led by Baloch separatist leaders such as Hyrbyair Marri and Balach Marri. The growing militarisation of Balochistan fueled its emergence, enforced disappearances, and the assassination of nationalist leaders, notably Nawab Akbar Bugti, in 2006. Initially, the BLA targeted Pakistani security forces, gas pipelines, and government installations, but in the 2010s, it expanded its focus to attacking Chinese interests, particularly the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). High-profile attacks include the 2018 Karachi consulate bombing, the 2019 Gwadar Pearl Continental attack, and the 2022 Karachi University suicide bombing targeting Chinese nationals. Pakistan has banned the BLA and designated it as a terrorist organisation, accusing India’s RAW and Afghan intelligence of supporting it, though India denies involvement. The BLA has since fragmented into factions like the Majeed Brigade, known for its suicide attacks and high-profile operations.

 

Pakistan’s Strategy to Deal with the Baloch Problem. Pakistan has adopted a military-centric approach to address the Baloch insurgency, using a combination of force, intelligence operations, and economic incentives. The Pakistan Army and intelligence agencies (ISI and MI) have led counterinsurgency campaigns, conducting large-scale military operations, airstrikes, and search-and-kill missions against Baloch militant groups like the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA). Reports suggest enforced disappearances, extrajudicial killings, and torture of suspected militants and activists, which have further fuelled resentment. To counter separatist narratives, Pakistan has also sought to integrate Balochistan into national development programs. Projects under the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), including Gwadar Port, are promoted as economic solutions, but many Baloch nationalists argue they benefit outsiders while displacing locals. The government has also offered amnesty programs, urging militants to surrender in exchange for reintegration and financial incentives. Diplomatically, Pakistan has labelled Baloch insurgents as foreign-backed terrorists. Security forces have intensified border controls and cracked down on pro-Baloch political groups and media outlets. However, these actions have failed to neutralise the insurgency, as groups like the BLA’s Majeed Brigade continue attacks, mainly targeting Pakistani forces and Chinese interests in the region.

 

Past Incidents Worldwide. Throughout history, militant groups have targeted trains for hijackings or attacks as part of their insurgencies. During the Nicaraguan Contra War (1980s), the leftist Sandinista rebels hijacked and ambushed trains carrying military supplies, disrupting government forces. In Russia, Chechen militants and North Caucasus insurgents targeted trains, including the 2009 Nevsky Express bombing, which killed dozens and highlighted vulnerabilities in railway security. Closer at home, in 1982, Naxalite rebels in India hijacked a train in Bhusaval, Maharashtra, using it as a platform to protest government policies. Naxalites have also derailed and bombed trains, particularly in Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, and Odisha, as part of their guerrilla warfare.  These historical cases show how trains remain a strategic target for militants aiming to spread terror and weaken state control.

 

Likely Future Consequences.

This incident underscores the ongoing security challenges in Balochistan and reflects the BLA’s capacity to orchestrate significant attacks. It marks a serious escalation in the Baloch insurgency and could have far-reaching consequences for Pakistan’s security, economy, and regional stability. The incident demonstrates the BLA’s growing operational capability, suggesting that future attacks could target critical infrastructure, transport networks, and Chinese-backed projects like CPEC. In response, Pakistan is likely to intensify military operations, search-and-destroy missions, and intelligence-based crackdowns in Balochistan. However, such actions may exacerbate local grievances, leading to further radicalisation and recruitment into militant ranks. The potential future consequences of this incident are grave, emphasizing the need for immediate action and the audience’s understanding of the gravity of the situation.

Politically, the hijacking may prompt increased state suppression of Baloch political movements, fuelling more unrest. It could also heighten diplomatic tensions, as Pakistan is likely to accuse India (RAW) of supporting Baloch insurgents, increasing hostilities between the two nations. Additionally, the attack raises serious security concerns for Chinese investments, potentially discouraging future economic cooperation and funding for CPEC projects. Foreign investors may reconsider their commitments if such incidents continue, further straining Pakistan’s fragile economy. The incident could have significant economic implications, potentially discouraging foreign investment and economic cooperation and undermining the potential benefits of CPEC for regional development.

In the long term, the train hijacking could push the Baloch insurgency towards more sophisticated urban warfare tactics, creating sustained instability that Pakistan’s current military approach may struggle to contain.

 

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