571: THE BOOMERANG EFFECT: WHEN MILITANT GROUPS TURN ON THEIR SPONSORS

 

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My Article Published in the Life of Soldiers (a premier monthly defence magazine) on 30 Dec 24.

 

The Wagner Group, a Russian private military company, played a significant role in the Russia-Ukraine conflict, particularly in the battle for Bakhmut. In May 2023, Wagner forces captured Bakhmut for Russia after intense fighting. In June 2023, tensions between Wagner’s leadership and the Russian military culminated in a brief mutiny led by Yevgeny Prigozhin, Wagner’s chief. The rebellion ended with an agreement brokered by Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko, and charges against Prigozhin were later dropped. Following Prigozhin’s controversial death in a plane crash in August 2023, the future of Wagner became uncertain. By October 2023, elements of the group were integrated into Russia’s National Guard, Rosgvardia, indicating a restructuring under state control.

 

Boomerang Effect.

 

The phenomenon where militant groups turn on their sponsors is often called the “boomerang effect.” This happens when organisations or groups created, funded, or supported by a state or another actor shift their allegiances or use their skills and resources against their former backers. The reasons for this shift can be complex and multifaceted, involving ideological differences, changing power dynamics, or disillusionment with their sponsors’ objectives. Contributing factors are as follows:- 

 

Ideological Divergence. Initially, militant groups are often created with shared goals and objectives aligned with their sponsors. However, as they gain strength and experience, they may develop their agendas. Differences in ideology can lead to clashes, especially if the militants feel their sponsors are manipulating them for geopolitical gain.

 

Loss of Control. Sponsors often lose control over the militants they support. As these groups gain legitimacy and power, they may increasingly act independently, pursuing their objectives, which might not align with those of their sponsors. This can lead to a strategic shift where militants view their sponsors as obstacles rather than allies.

 

Disillusionment and Frustration. Sometimes, militants feel let down by their sponsors. They may believe that their resources or support are inadequate or misdirected. This frustration can lead to losing loyalty, with groups turning against their sponsors.

 

Changing Power Dynamics. As the geopolitical landscape changes, so too can militants’ strategic interests. They may switch sides in pursuit of more favourable conditions, especially when they see greater opportunities to achieve their goals with a different sponsor or on their own.

 

The Wagner Group Story

 

Wagner Group, a Russian private military contractor (PMC), provides a recent example of a sponsored organisation turning against its sponsor. Initially backed by the Russian government, Wagner became a powerful, semi-autonomous entity with ambitions and interests, ultimately leading to a public confrontation with the Russian state.

 

Background. The Wagner Group was founded around 2014 by Dmitry Utkin, a former Russian military officer, and Yevgeny Prigozhin, a businessman with close ties to the Kremlin. It served as a proxy force for Russian interests in global hotspots, allowing Russia to exert influence without direct military involvement or the political risk of deploying official troops. Wagner operated in Syria, Libya, the Central African Republic, and other countries, carrying out missions aligned with Russian geopolitical interests and reportedly receiving support and resources from the Russian state, including training facilities and equipment.

 

Tensions Leading to Conflict. As Wagner’s activities grew, so did its autonomy and influence. Wagner played a significant role in the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, taking on critical combat roles. However, Prigozhin became increasingly outspoken about the Russian military’s failings, explicitly criticising the Ministry of Defence’s handling of the war. Wagner’s leadership grew resentful, accusing Russian military officials of incompetence, neglecting logistical support, and underestimating Wagner’s sacrifices on the front lines.

 

The Wagner Rebellion of 2023. This tension culminated in a dramatic turn in June 2023, when Wagner launched an armed rebellion against the Russian military leadership. Prigozhin led his forces into the Russian city of Rostov-on-Don, seizing an army headquarters, and then began an advance toward Moscow. Prigozhin demanded changes in the Russian military leadership, mainly targeting Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu and General Valery Gerasimov. Although it was ultimately short-lived, this direct challenge to the Kremlin marked a sharp break with their previous sponsor, the Russian state. The rebellion ended after negotiations, reportedly brokered by Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko. Prigozhin agreed to stand down in exchange for a safe passage to Belarus, and Wagner’s forces withdrew. However, the incident exposed significant rifts between Wagner and the Russian government, highlighting how sponsorship of militant or paramilitary organisations can backfire when these groups gain enough power to pursue their agendas.

 

Aftermath and Fallout. The fallout from the rebellion was significant. Prigozhin’s death in a plane crash in August 2023 was widely speculated to have been orchestrated by elements within the Russian state. Wagner’s operations were subsequently restructured, with many members reportedly re-assigned or integrated into other units more directly controlled by the Russian government.

 

Lessons and Analysis. The Wagner Group’s rebellion is a cautionary tale about the risks of using paramilitary organisations for state purposes. Once such groups gain power, resources, and a sense of autonomy, they can become difficult to control, and their interests may diverge from those of their original sponsor. In Wagner’s case, the group’s loyalty to Prigozhin and its operational independence contributed to a volatile situation where, ultimately, Wagner’s ambitions turned against the very state that enabled its rise.

 

Boomerang Effect: Notable Instances

 

Several historical examples exist of militant organisations that initially received sponsorship from governments or other entities but later turned against their sponsors. This phenomenon often results from shifting political dynamics, ideological conflicts, or changes. in militant groups’ objectives.

 

Al-Qaeda and the United States. During the 1980s, the United States, along with Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, provided financial and military support to Afghan mujahideen fighters to combat the Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan. Many of these fighters, including Osama bin Laden, received resources and training indirectly through the CIA’s Operation Cyclone. After the Soviet withdrawal, some of these fighters, including bin Laden, formed Al-Qaeda. Al-Qaeda grew increasingly antagonistic toward the United States, particularly due to its military presence in the Middle East and its support for governments seen as oppressive or contrary to Islamic principles. This hostility culminated in the September 11, 2001 attacks, marking a complete break from their former indirect sponsor.

 

The Taliban and Pakistan. Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) supported the formation of the Taliban in the 1990s, seeing them as a potential ally to ensure a friendly government in Afghanistan, which would provide Pakistan with strategic depth against India. While the Taliban still maintains some ties with Pakistan, there have been periods of tension. Taliban-linked groups, such as the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), have turned against the Pakistani state, conducting attacks within Pakistan. The TTP aims to overthrow the Pakistani government and establish a stricter interpretation of Islamic law, which has led to significant violence and conflict within Pakistan itself.

 

Hamas and Israel. During the early years of the Palestinian resistance, Israel indirectly supported groups that would later form Hamas, aiming to create a counterbalance to the secular Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) led by Yasser Arafat. This was based on the notion that Islamist movements could divide the Palestinian resistance, making it easier to manage. Hamas eventually became a formidable opponent to Israel, adopting a hardline stance and engaging in numerous conflicts with the Israeli state. Today, Hamas is a prominent political and militant force in Gaza and has carried out attacks against Israeli targets, becoming one of Israel’s most persistent adversaries.

 

The Islamic State (ISIS) and the Gulf States. During the Syrian Civil War, several Gulf States, including Qatar and Saudi Arabia, provided funding and weapons to Sunni rebel groups to oppose the Assad regime in Syria. Some of these groups either merged with or evolved into extremist groups like ISIS. Although Gulf States may not have directly funded ISIS, their support for anti-Assad rebels indirectly bolstered ISIS’s power. Once ISIS gained control of territory and declared a caliphate, it posed a threat to all governments in the region, including those in the Gulf. ISIS targeted these governments rhetorically and sometimes directly, seeing them as illegitimate and corrupt.

 

M23 Rebels and Rwanda. The M23 rebel group in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) was reportedly supported by neighbouring Rwanda, which viewed them as a means to secure influence in the DRC and counter the presence of anti-Rwandan Hutu militias. Over time, M23 developed its political ambitions, creating sporadic tensions with Rwanda. Although the relationship between Rwanda and M23 is complex and fluctuates, there have been instances where M23 acted independently, with a leadership not fully aligned with Rwanda’s objectives.

 

Fatah al-Islam and Syria. Syria was alleged to have supported Fatah al-Islam, a militant group in Lebanon, to destabilise the Lebanese government, particularly during times of political tension between Syria and Lebanon. Fatah al-Islam later became a problem for Syria and the broader region. The group’s activities and increasing autonomy led to clashes with the Lebanese government and other regional actors, pushing them further away from Syrian influence.

 

 

Conclusion

These examples illustrate how sponsorship of militant groups is fraught with inherent risks and unintended consequences. Such alliances with unpredictable partners often backfire as these organisations evolve ideologically, gain independence, or shift their focus based on changing political landscapes.  The short-term gains can lead to long-term instability, undermining the sponsor’s original goals and threatening regional and global security. They are stark reminders of the dangers of using militancy as a proxy for power, underscoring the need for more sustainable and ethical approaches to conflict resolution and statecraft.

 

 

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References and credits

To all the online sites and channels.

References:

  1. Byman, Daniel. “Friends Like These: Counterinsurgency and the War on Terrorism.” International Security, vol. 31, no. 2, 2006, pp. 79–115.
  1. Crenshaw, Martha. “The Causes of Terrorism.” Comparative Politics, vol. 13, no. 4, 1981, pp. 379–399.
  1. Weinberg, Leonard, and William L. Eubank. “State-Sponsored Terrorism: A Reassessment.” Terrorism and Political Violence, vol. 2, no. 1, 1990, pp. 287–302.
  1. Piazza, James A. “Incubators of Terror: Do Failed and Failing States Promote Transnational Terrorism?” International Studies Quarterly, vol. 52, no. 3, 2008, pp. 469–488.
  1. Coll, Steve. Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001. New York: Penguin Press, 2004.
  1. Mamdani, Mahmood. Good Muslim, Bad Muslim: America, the Cold War, and the Roots of Terror. New York: Pantheon Books, 2004.
  1. Gerges, Fawaz A. The Far Enemy: Why Jihad Went Global. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005.
  1. Kepel, Gilles. Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002.
  1. Rashid, Ahmed. Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil, and Fundamentalism in Central Asia. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2000.
  1. Gunaratna, Rohan. Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror. New York: Columbia University Press, 2002.
  1. Katzman, Kenneth. Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy. Congressional Research Service Report, 2021.
  1. Jones, Seth G. In the Graveyard of Empires: America’s War in Afghanistan. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2009.
  1. Norton, Augustus R. Hezbollah: A Short History. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007.
  1. Fair, C. Christine. In Their Own Words: Understanding Lashkar-e-Taiba. New York: Oxford University Press, 2018.
  1. Galeotti, Mark. Putin’s Wars: From Chechnya to Ukraine. London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2022.
  1. Nixey, James. The Weaponisation of Everything: Russia’s Hybrid Warfare in the 21st Century. London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2021.
  1. Marten, Kimberly. Warlords and Coalition Politics in Post-Soviet States. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2012.
  1. Marten, Kimberly. “The Puzzle of Russian Behavior in Deir Al-Zour.” War on the Rocks, 2018.
  1. Galeotti, Mark. “Russia’s Private Military Companies: The Example of Wagner.” RUSI Journal, vol. 164, no. 1, 2019, pp. 20–28.
  1. MacFarquhar, Neil, and Eric Schmitt. “Inside the Wagner Group’s Mutiny Against the Kremlin.” The New York Times, June 2023.
  1. Seddon, Max. “The Wagner Group Mutiny: What It Tells Us About Putin’s Russia.” Financial Times, July 2023.
  1. Galeotti, Mark. “The Russian Way of War: From Chechnya to Ukraine.” Foreign Affairs, 2022.

Disclaimer:

Information and data included in the blog are for educational & non-commercial purposes only and have been carefully adapted, excerpted, or edited from reliable and accurate sources. All copyrighted material belongs to respective owners and is provided only for wider dissemination.

560:OPERATION BASHAN ARROW: ISAREL’S STRATEGIC NEED OR OPPORTUNISM

 

Pics Courtesy Net

 

My Article published on the EurasianTimes Website on 16 Dec 24.

 

Operation Bashan Arrow, a pivotal Israeli military campaign, commenced in a volatile and fractured Syria on 08 December 2024. Named after the ancient biblical region of Bashan, which included parts of the modern-day Golan Heights, the operation targeted the dismantling of Syrian military capabilities following the fall of the Assad regime. The operation has profound implications for regional stability, geopolitics, and military strategy.

 

Background and Objectives. The fall of Bashar al-Assad’s government in late 2024 led to a chaotic power vacuum. This collapse came amidst years of internal strife, international intervention, and the rising influence of extremist factions like Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). For Israel, the disintegration of the Assad regime posed both risks and opportunities. The risk was the proliferation of advanced weapons to hostile actors, especially Iranian proxies and extremist groups. The opportunity was to secure the strategically vital Golan Heights further and neutralise long-standing threats from the Syrian military. Israel launched Operation Bashan Arrow to prevent advanced weaponry, including missiles and aircraft, from falling into hostile hands, notably Iranian-backed militias or extremist groups. This was critical for securing the Israeli-Syrian border and neutralising threats to Israel’s northern front.

 

Execution of the Operation. The Israeli Air Force (IAF) deployed an unprecedented 350 aircraft, about half the Israeli Air Force, conducting hundreds of sorties across Syria. It was one of its most comprehensive air campaigns in history. Key targets included military bases, air defence systems, missile stockpiles, and command centres in Damascus, Tartus, Homs, and Latakia. The operation obliterated Syrian air capabilities, including MiG-29 fighter jets and cruise missiles. Simultaneously, the Israeli Navy targeted Syria’s naval fleet, destroying 15 missile-equipped vessels at the al-Beida and Latakia ports. This eliminated maritime threats, securing Israel’s coastal borders and reducing risks to international shipping lanes. On land, Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) moved to establish a buffer zone in the demilitarised area along the Golan Heights. The IDF denied crossing into core Syrian territory, maintaining operations within the zone to prevent spillover effects from the conflict. Operation Bashan Arrow was a comprehensive demonstration of the effectiveness of coordinated multi-domain operations. Israel’s use of air, naval, and ground forces, combined with intelligence-driven targeting, underscores the evolution of military strategy in asymmetric conflicts.

 

Strategic and Tactical Impact. Operation Bashan Arrow dismantled 70–80% of Syria’s military assets. The destruction of strategic stockpiles prevented terrorist organisations from utilising advanced weaponry. Notably, this operation has significantly shifted the balance of power in the region. Iran, a key backer of Assad, now faces reduced influence in Syria, while Israel solidifies its strategic position. However, this could push Iran to intensify its proxy activities elsewhere, such as in Lebanon or Iraq.

 

Regional and International Reactions. The operation drew criticism from Arab nations and international observers, who accused Israel of overreach and destabilisation. The concerns of the international community were palpable, with Arab states condemning the operation, particularly the IDF’s occupation of the buffer zone. They viewed it as a violation of Syrian sovereignty, even in the absence of a stable Syrian government. Qatari media labelled it an “escalation” and accused Israel of exploiting Syria’s disarray. The United Nations expressed grave concerns over regional instability, urging de-escalation to foster a political transition in Syria. Geir Pedersen, the UN envoy to Syria, emphasised the need for de-escalation to facilitate Syria’s political transition. Critics argued that Israel’s actions could further complicate humanitarian efforts in the region.

 

Regional Security and Israel’s Position. For Israel, the operation underscored its military superiority and willingness to act unilaterally for national security, even at the risk of provoking a backlash from neighbouring countries and militant groups. The campaign also demonstrated the Israeli military’s advanced capabilities in air, sea, and cyber warfare.

 

Challenges and Future Implications. While the operation was a tactical success, it strained Israel’s relations with the international community at large. The creation of a buffer zone may temporarily stabilise the border but could invite retaliatory actions from groups opposed to Israel’s presence. With significant infrastructure destroyed, Syria faces additional challenges in rebuilding. This could prolong instability and make the country more vulnerable to external manipulation by regional powers. Additionally, HTS’s rise complicates Israel’s security calculus, as the group with an Islamist ideology creates uncertainty about pragmatic coexistence with Israel. The long-term implications of these developments are complex and uncertain, adding a layer of gravity to the situation.

 

Conclusion. Operation Bashan Arrow represents a defining moment in Middle Eastern geopolitics; it reflects the complexities of modern warfare and the Middle East’s geopolitical challenges. By neutralising Syrian military capabilities, Israel has secured its borders in the short term. However, the operation’s long-term ramifications for regional stability are yet to be fully understood. As Syria grapples with reconstruction and a new political reality, Israel would have to navigate a complex web of alliances and adversaries to maintain its strategic edge. The operation’s impact on the balance of power in the region and the potential for increased proxy activities by Iran in other countries underscores the need for continued analysis and vigilance.

 

Your valuable comments are most welcome.

 

Link to the article on the website:-

https://www.eurasiantimes.com/op-bashan-arrow-how-350-israeli-fighte/

 

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References and credits

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References:-

  1. Jerusalem Post. “Israel destroys 80% of Assad’s army in Syria.” December 2024.
  2. All Israel News. “IDF strikes 320 targets in Syria during Operation Bashan Arrow.” tps://allisrael.com/idf-we-destroyed-up-to-80-of-syr

​3. Middle East Monitor. “Operation Bashan Arrow and its implications.”

UN Reports on the Middle East, December 2024

  1. Times of Israel, “IDF announces conclusion of Operation Bashan Arrow, says Syria no longer a threat”.
  1. Haaretz, “Israel’s bold military campaign: What Bashan Arrow means for the region”. Dec 2024.
  1. UN Reports on the Middle East, “Regional stability in question after Israeli strikes in Syria”, December 2024.
  1. Al Jazeera, “Israel’s strikes in Syria spark Arab world criticism”, Dec 2024.
  1. BBC News, “Syria in turmoil: The aftermath of Assad”, Dec 2024.
  1. Jane’s Defence Weekly, “Israel’s Operation Bashan Arrow: A case study in air supremacy”, Dec 2024.
  1. Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), “Preemptive Defense: Israel’s new doctrine in Operation Bashan Arrow”, Dec 2024.

Disclaimer:

Information and data included in the blog are for educational & non-commercial purposes only and have been carefully adapted, excerpted, or edited from reliable and accurate sources. All copyrighted material belongs to respective owners and is provided only for wider dissemination.

551: SYRIAN CRISIS: GEOPOLITICAL UNCERTAINTIES

 

Syria - Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect

 

My Article published on the EurasianTimes Website on 08 Dec 24.

 

The Syrian crisis has escalated significantly, with opposition forces making substantial territorial gains. Syrian rebels have declared that Damascus is “free,” claiming Bashar al-Assad has fled the capital. The rebels earlier claimed to have entered the capital and taken control of the notorious Saydnaya Military Prison north of Damascus.  Reportedly, scenes of chaos are unfolding everywhere in Damascus as Syrian rebel forces continue their lightning advance into the capital city.

 

Syrian Prime Minister Mohammad Ghazi al-Jalali has said, “We are ready to cooperate with any leadership the people choose, offering all possible support to ensure a smooth and systematic transition of government functions and preserve state facilities.” The militant leader of Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham (HTS), the leading group driving the country’s armed opposition, released a statement calling on rebel forces to leave state institutions unharmed.

 

The Syrian conflict is experiencing a significant shift. This resurgence follows years of relative stalemate since the 2020 Idlib ceasefire. These developments have potential geopolitical ramifications, including challenges for Assad’s allies like Russia and Iran.

 

Syria’s Rebel Groups. The Syrian opposition consists of a diverse array of rebel groups and factions. These groups have varying degrees of influence and control across Syria. They are often linked to regional sponsors such as Turkey, the U.S., and the Gulf States. Syria’s rebel coalition consists of Islamist and moderate factions who, despite their differences, are united in fighting the Assad regime. The fragmentation among these groups complicates negotiations and challenges international peace efforts.

 

    • Hayat Tahrir Al Sham (HTS). The most prominent and formidable group is HTS, also known as the Organisation for the Liberation of the Levant. HTS was founded by Abu Mohammad al-Jolani, a military commander who gained experience as a young fighter for al Qaeda against the United States in Iraq. He created Jabhat al-Nusra, al Qaeda’s Syrian affiliate, and operated the group until a public split with in 2016 over ideological differences and opposition to ISIS. Jolani formed HTS in 2017. Despite Jolani’s effort to distance HTS from al Qaeda and ISIS, the US and other Western countries designated it a terrorist organisation in 2018 and placed a $10 million bounty on him.

 

    • The Syrian National Army (SNA). The Syrian National Army (SNA) is a coalition of various Syrian rebel factions, predominantly supported by Turkey, established in 2017. It was formed to consolidate opposition forces and strengthen their position against the Assad regime and Kurdish forces in Syria. The SNA has been active in northern Syria, especially in regions like Afrin and Azaz, and is involved in conflict zones such as Idlib. The group’s formation reflects Turkey’s influence in Syrian affairs and its aim to curb the Kurdish YPG’s influence.

 

    • Syrian Democratic Forces. The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) is a multi-ethnic alliance of Kurdish, Arab, and other minority groups fighting against ISIS and other jihadist factions in Syria. It was established in 2015 with the support of the U.S. to provide stability in the region and counter ISIS’s control over significant parts of north-eastern Syria. The SDF has played a crucial role in the fight against ISIS.

 

    • Free Syrian Army (FSA). The Free Syrian Army (FSA) is a loose coalition of rebel groups that emerged during the early stages of the Syrian civil war in 2011. It initially sought to overthrow the Assad regime but has since evolved into a broad-based opposition force with various factions, ranging from moderate to Islamist groups. The FSA is backed by Turkey, the U.S., and several Gulf states and has played a significant role in the conflict, particularly in the northern and southern regions of Syria. Its influence has fluctuated due to internal divisions and competition from other groups like Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS).

 

    • Druze. In Syria’s south, fighters from the country’s Druze religious minority have also joined the fight. Druze are fighting in the southern city of as-Suwayda, which neighbours the Daraa province, where opposition forces claim to have taken control of Daraa city.

 

Geopolitical Consequences

 

Internal Power Struggle. Assad’s core territory is now fragmented. Losing Aleppo and Hama removes critical industrial and economic hubs. With the fall of Damascus, dwindling resources, and troop morale collapsing, Assad’s ability to mount counteroffensives is limited. This creates a vacuum, increasing the likelihood of factional infighting within his loyalist base or between foreign backers like Russia and Iran.

 

Regional Implications. Turkey gains in influence as its backed forces expand control. This supports Ankara’s goal of creating a buffer zone along its border to prevent Kurdish dominance. However, Turkey risks overextending itself as it juggles domestic instability and its role in NATO. Assad’s setbacks reduce Iran’s access to key routes for its “Shia Crescent” strategy, complicating support to Hezbollah in Lebanon. Iran might escalate direct military involvement, which could further drain its economy. Moscow’s efforts to maintain its naval base in Tartus and airbase in Latakia are under threat. Increased instability could undermine Russia’s ability to project power in the region, exposing it to higher costs and reduced influence. With Assad and Iran weakened, Israel may exploit the opportunity to target Hezbollah and Iranian forces in Syria, potentially leading to broader regional skirmishes.

 

Humanitarian Crisis. The opposition’s rapid advance has displaced hundreds of thousands, with more expected to flee as conflict zones expand. The UN and NGOs are struggling to provide aid, with many areas inaccessible. Neighbouring countries like Turkey and Jordan, already hosting millions of refugees, face additional strain, risking social and political unrest. In Europe, renewed refugee flows could exacerbate political divides over immigration, impacting EU cohesion and policy-making.

 

International Dynamics. The U.S. might aim to position the opposition for a post-conflict settlement, countering Russian and Iranian influence. However, this risks deepening U.S.-Russia tensions. The conflict’s escalation might draw in Saudi Arabia and Gulf allies on the side of opposition forces, intensifying competition with Iran. Meanwhile, though less directly involved, China may push for diplomatic solutions to protect its regional Belt and Road interests. The crisis could dominate discussions at the UN, with calls for new peace talks. However, divisions among global powers might stymie meaningful resolutions.

 

India and the Syrian Crisis: Challenges and Opportunities

 

Geopolitical Neutrality: Balancing Relationships.  India should push for negotiations and political solutions through international bodies, supporting initiatives for a ceasefire and political settlement while avoiding direct involvement in military action. India needs to maintain a nuanced diplomatic approach with significant powers involved in Syria—particularly the U.S., Russia, and Iran. It should avoid becoming overly dependent on any nation’s stance to protect its strategic interests.  Active participation in forums like the UN and BRICS can provide a platform for influencing discussions on Syria without directly taking sides.

 

Energy Security. To protect against potential supply disruptions from the Middle East, India must maintain and expand its strategic oil reserves, such as the Strategic Petroleum Reserves. Establishing relationships with non-Middle Eastern suppliers (e.g., Russia, Africa) can also provide alternatives. Strengthening ties with key oil-producing nations in the Gulf (e.g., Saudi Arabia, UAE) is vital. This can include trade agreements and economic partnerships to ensure stability in energy supply routes.

 

Humanitarian Aid. India could use humanitarian aid to bolster its image as a responsible global player and reinforce its commitment to international peace and security.  It could expand financial and material support to affected populations in Syria through UN channels and bilateral assistance programs. This can include funding for healthcare, food, shelter, and education for displaced people. Collaboration with international partners to invest in rebuilding infrastructure, health, and education systems in conflict-affected areas can provide stability and foster goodwill.

 

The Syrian crisis has brought significant geopolitical uncertainties to the forefront, with wide-reaching implications for global powers and regional stability. As the conflict evolves, it poses complex challenges. The outcome of the Syrian conflict will shape the region’s future and impact India’s strategic positioning in a rapidly changing global landscape. Balancing these risks while maintaining neutrality will be key for India as it seeks to safeguard its national interests.

 

Your valuable comments are most welcome.

 

Link to the article on the website:

https://www.eurasiantimes.com/bashar-al-assad-iranian-embassy-stormed-in-damascus-syrian-state-tv-declares-fall-of-assad-regime/

 

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