504: HELLSCAPE VS DRAGONSCAPE: BATTLE OF AUTONOMOUS MACHINES

 

 

 

My Article published on the Newsanalytics Journal

 

 

China’s rise as a global power is multifaceted, encompassing economic growth, technological advancements, military modernisation, and increasing geopolitical influence. However, in some ways, the Chinese seem to be in a medieval thought process. Their aspirations are guided by the principle that “a strong empire expands and a weaker empire shrinks”. China’s expansionist strategies are driven by securing its national interests, asserting its status as a global power, and reshaping the international order, favouring its long-term strategic goals. These efforts, however, lead to tensions and pushback from other nations, contributing to a complex and often contentious international environment.

 

One China Policy. The “One China Policy” is a cornerstone of diplomatic relations between China and other countries. It asserts that there is only one China, and Taiwan is an inseparable part of it. This policy is crucial to understanding China’s foreign relations, particularly with the United States and other Western countries. Beijing regards Taiwan as part of China to be reunited at any cost. Taiwan has developed a distinct identity with a democratic political system, vibrant civil society, and robust economy, differing significantly from mainland China. Taiwan seeks peaceful relations with mainland China but resists unification under the terms proposed by Beijing. Many Taiwanese prefer maintaining the status quo rather than pursuing formal independence or unification. The One China Policy is a sensitive issue in U.S.-China relations. The U.S. acknowledges the One China Policy but maintains ties with Taiwan through the Taiwan Relations Act (1979), allowing commercial, cultural, and other exchanges. The US is the island’s biggest supplier of arms. In recent years, tensions have escalated due to factors such as the PRC’s military activities near Taiwan, increased U.S. support for Taiwan, and Taiwan’s efforts to gain greater international recognition.

 

Unification Plans. China is increasingly getting ready for the unification of Taiwan. It is reported that Beijing has increased its defence budget in recent years and is the second highest behind the US. China is building its military and nuclear arsenal at a rapid pace. PLA has commissioned over 400 new fighter jets and 20 warships in the last few years and doubled its ballistic and cruise missile inventory. China is also building a fourth amphibious landing craft. Xi has called for China to build a “world-class military” by 2027 when the PLA marks 100 years since its founding. These signs suggest the country is sticking to its ambitions of reuniting the self-ruled island with China “by force if necessary.”

 

Salami Slicing and Cabbage Strategy. China believes in Sun Tzu’s philosophy of subduing the enemy without fighting. It prefers salami-slicing rather than overt aggression, i.e., gaining strategic advantage through a steady progression of small actions. It limits adversaries’ options by baffling their plans and making it problematic for them to develop a response. Beijing will continue to apply military and economic pressure and public messaging and influence activities while promoting long-term cross-strait economic and social integration to induce Taiwan to move toward unification. PLA also uses the “cabbage strategy” to seize control of islands. This strategy involves surrounding and wrapping the island in successive layers of Chinese naval ships, China Coast Guard ships, and fishing boats and cutting off the island from outside support.

 

Grey Zone Activities. Beijing’s recent military and ‘grey-zone’ manoeuvres near Taiwan have raised the spectre of a potential conflict. These actions include repeated war games, simulations, combat training, aerial and sea incursions, and encirclement of the island nation. The Chinese forces have conducted military drills around Taiwan and claim that they can impose and maintain a blockade on an island using different types of drones. At the same time, the warships and submarines prowled the surrounding waters. The Chinese actions prompted the USA to announce its new strategy dubbed “Hellscape.”

 

 

US Hellscape Strategy. The strategy assumes that China, learning from the Russian stalemate in the Ukraine war, will launch a mass drone and missile attack to overwhelm Taiwan with little warning. In this scenario, when the Chinese invasion fleet moves out from its ports to sail towards Taiwan to cross the 100-mile (160-kilometre) wide Taiwan Straits, the US military will flood the waterway with thousands of swarm unmanned underwater and surface vessels, apart from kamikaze drones and loitering munitions. The intention is to turn the Taiwan Strait into an unmanned hellscape, making the life of the invading Chinese fleet miserable, to harass, distract, and delay them, creating a barrier and buying crucial time for the U.S. and its allies to respond. The recent Ukrainian strategy inspires this strategy, but the US will use a lot of artificial intelligence and machine learning to detect, identify, and harass the Chinese ships crossing the straits. The US plans to deploy many cheap, unmanned drones across multiple domains—air, sea, and land. The drones are designed to function autonomously, even in environments with limited or disrupted communications, and succeed independently on the battlefield. The idea is to counter China’s advantage of mass (i.e., ships, missiles, and drones) with smarter mass, creating an asymmetric advantage.

 

Replicator Programme. The US has already started to work on its hellscape strategy plan. The US Department of Defense (DoD) has given a billion dollars to a program called “Replicator.” This program will build swarms of thousands of UUVs, USVs, and loitering munitions within the next two years. These cost-effective, dependable drones would be produced close to the battlefield at a fraction of the cost of traditional weapons systems. The targeting data across the theatre is also being integrated through the Assault Breaker II programme of the Defence Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA).

 

 

The strategy of Mass vs Smarter Mass. The United States military strategy often incorporates overwhelming force (mass) and advanced technology, which can create a “hellscape” for adversaries. This approach leverages the U.S.’s technological edge and substantial military resources to achieve rapid and decisive victories in conflicts. In this case, China is no pushover and has comparable technological prowess. The success of their respective strategies would depend on technologically advanced autonomous platforms. It is bound to create an arms race between the two camps. The strategy’s success also relies on the speed of subsequent response by the US and its allies.

 

Ramifications. Taiwan is in a crucial geopolitical location in East Asia, making it a significant point of interest for regional and global powers. The USA’s Hellscape strategy and the Chinese plan to counter it have stimulated a “war of words” with a highly contentious and hostile exchange of rhetoric and aggressive, inflammatory, and vitriolic language. A potential war over Taiwan would indeed be complex and potentially catastrophic, with far-reaching consequences for the involved parties and the world.

 

    • The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is one of the world’s largest and rapidly modernising militaries. A conflict involving China would likely involve advanced weaponry, cyber warfare, and significant military assets. Taiwan has a well-equipped and highly motivated military, with substantial investments in defence technologies and support from allies like the United States. The U.S. has a longstanding commitment to Taiwan’s defence through the Taiwan Relations Act. Any conflict would likely draw in U.S. military forces and other regional allies, escalating the situation.

 

    • Taiwan is a major global technology and manufacturing player, particularly in semiconductors. A conflict could disrupt international supply chains and have severe economic repercussions worldwide. The economies of East Asia are highly interconnected, and a war could destabilise the entire region.

 

    • Both sides will likely engage in cyber warfare, targeting critical infrastructure, communication networks, and financial systems, which could have widespread and long-lasting effects.

 

    • While less likely, any escalation involving nuclear-armed states like the United States and China carries the risk of a nuclear confrontation, which would have devastating consequences.

 

 

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References and credits

To all the online sites and channels.

  1. Swarajya Staff, “Can China Counter United States’ ‘Hellscape’ Plan When Invading Taiwan?” Swarajya website, 13 Jun 2024.
  1. FP Staff, ”What is the ‘Hellscape’ strategy the US is planning to use on China if it invades Taiwan?” First Post website, 11 Jun 2024.
  1. Keoni Everington, “US plans ‘hellscape’ of drones if China invades Taiwan”, Taiwan News website, 11 Jun 2024.
  1. John Grady, “‘Hellscape’ Swarms Could Be as Cost Effective Taiwan Defense”, USNI News, 02 July 2024.
  1. Joe Saballa, “China ‘on Track’ for Potential Taiwan Invasion by 2027”, The Defence Post website, 22 Mar 2024.
  1. Jesse Johnson, “China on track to be ready to invade Taiwan by 2027,” The Japan Times website, 21 March 2024.
  1. Abhinav Singh, “China plans to use drones to blockade Taiwan after the US unveils ‘Hellscape’ strategy”, Wion website, 07 Jul 2024.
  1. Ujjwal Shrotryia, “US Has A Nasty Surprise For China If It Tries To Invade Taiwan — Hellscape”, Swarajya website, 11 Jun 24.

 

Disclaimer:

Information and data included in the blog are for educational & non-commercial purposes only and have been carefully adapted, excerpted, or edited from reliable and accurate sources. All copyrighted material belongs to respective owners and is provided only for wider dissemination.

US REPORT ON CHINA 2023: UNDERSTANDING CHINA’S STRATEGY

CHINA’S NATIONAL STRATEGY

 

  • The PRC’s national strategy is to achieve “the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” by 2049. The strategy is a determined pursuit of political, social, and military modernity to expand the PRC’s national power, perfect its governance, and revise the international order in support of the PRC’s system of governance and national The PRC views the United States as deploying a whole-of-government effort meant to contain the PRC’s rise, which presents obstacles to its national strategy.

 

  • The PRC characterizes its view of strategic competition in terms of a rivalry among powerful nation states, as well as a clash of opposing ideological systems. PRC leaders believe that structural changes in the international system and a confrontational United States are the root causes of intensifying strategic competition between the PRC and the United States.

 

In March 2023, Xi Jinping told delegates to the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference that “Western countries led by the United States have implemented comprehensive containment, encirclement and suppression against us, bringing unprecedented severe challenges to our country’s development.”

 

  • The PRC’s strategy entails deliberate and determined efforts to amass, improve, and harness the internal and external elements of national power that will place the PRC in a “leading position” in an enduring competition between systems.

 

  • In the 20th Party Congress Political Work Report, the CCP expanded on its calls to prepare for an increasingly turbulent international climate, while reporting it had “enhanced” the PRC’s security on all fronts and “withstood political, economic, ideological, and natural risks, challenges, and trials.”

 

FOREIGN POLICY

 

 

  • The PRC’s foreign policy seeks to build a “community of common destiny” that supports its strategy to realize “the great rejuvenation of the Chinese ” The PRC’s ambition to reshape the international order derives from the objectives of its national strategy and the Party’s political and governing systems.

 

  • Beginning late 2022 Beijing launched a diplomatic ‘charm offensive’ targeting European countries in an apparent effort to improve perceptions of Beijing following years of ‘wolf warrior’ diplomacy and COVID isolation.

 

  • In April 2022, Xi Jinping announced the Global Security Initiative (GSI). Echoing the previous year’s rollout of the Global Development Initiative (GDI), Beijing has promoted GSI extensively and attempted to insert GSI language into multilateral forums and documents.

 

  • Russia’s war on Ukraine in February 2022 represented a major, unexpected challenge for the PRC as it sought to react to the largest military conflict in Europe since the end of World War. As Beijing deliberates the scale and scope of materiel commitments to Russia’s war on Ukraine, it probably will seek to balance its strategic partnership with Russia while avoiding reputational or economic costs that could result from its assistance.

 

ECONOMIC POLICY

 

 

  • At the end of 2022, China abruptly reversed its zero-COVID The decision to implement China’s reopening took most by surprise and was probably triggered by country-wide protests against the PRC’s zero-COVID policies, economic pressures, and fiscal difficulties for local governments.

 

  • The 20th Party Congress emphasized the importance of quality growth rather than the speed of growth. General Secretary Xi also highlighted “common prosperity,” more equitable access to basic public services, a better multi-tiered social security system, and cultural and green developments as a few of the PRC’s economic initiatives.

 

  • The PRC’s ongoing military modernization objectives are commensurate with and part of China’s broader national development aspirations.

 

CHINA’S BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE (BRI)

 

 

  • The PRC uses BRI to support its strategy of national rejuvenation by seeking to expand global transportation and trade linkages to support its development and deepen its economic integration with nations along its periphery and beyond.

 

  • In 2022, BRI projects saw mixed economic outcomes, experiencing both growth and decline. However, overall spending on BRI projects remained consistent with the previous year and Beijing continued to prioritize public health, digital infrastructure, and green energy.

 

  • Overseas development and security interests under BRI will drive the PRC towards expanding its overseas security relationships and presence to protect those interests.

 

MILITARY-CIVIL FUSION (MCF) DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY

 

 

  • The PRC pursues its Military-Civil Fusion (MCF) (军民融合) Development Strategy to “fuse” its security and development strategies into its Integrated National Strategic System and Capabilities in support of China’s national rejuvenation goals.

 

  • The PRC’s MCF strategy includes objectives to develop and acquire advanced dual-use technology for military purposes and deepen reform of the national defense science and technology industries and serves a broader purpose to strengthen all of the PRC’s instruments of national power.

 

  • Since early 2022, the CCP appears to have been deemphasizing the term “Military Civil Fusion” in public, in favor of “integrated national strategic systems and capabilities.”

 

 

COMING UP: DETAILED ANALYSIS WITH INDIAN PERSPECTIVE

 

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US REPORT ON CHINA 2023: EXCERPTS DEF POLICY & MIL STRATEGY

strategy

 

DEFENSE POLICY AND MILITARY STRATEGY

 

 

  • In 2022, the PRC’s stated defense policy remained oriented toward safeguarding its sovereignty, security, and development interests, while emphasizing a greater global role for itself. The PRC’s military strategy remains based on the concept of “active defense” (积极防御).

 

  • PRC leaders stress the imperative of strengthening the PLA into a “world-class” military by the end of 2049 as an essential element of its strategy to rejuvenate the PRC into a “great modern socialist country.”

 

  • In October 2022, Xi secured his third term as the general secretary of CCP at the Party Congress and his appointment of loyalists to top positions in the CMC probably will enable Xi to expand upon military modernization and operational goals during his next 5-year term.

 

  • During his October 2022 speech at the opening ceremony of the 20th Party Congress, Xi reaffirmed his commitment to the PLA’s 2027 milestone for modernization to accelerate the integrated development of mechanization, informatization, and intelligentization of the PRC’s armed forces. If realized, this capability milestone could give the PLA the capacity to be a more credible military tool for the CCP’s Taiwan unification efforts.

 

  • In 2022, the PLA continued discussing a new “core operational concept,” called “Multi- Domain Precision Warfare (多域精确战)” (MDPW). MDPW is intended to leverage a C4ISR network that incorporates advances in big data and artificial intelligence to rapidly identify key vulnerabilities in the S. operational system and then combine joint forces across domains to launch precision strikes against those vulnerabilities.

 

  • COVID-19 mitigation measures and multiple outbreaks throughout 2022 probably did not significantly impact PLA combat readiness.

 

FORCES, CAPABILITIES, AND POWER PROJECTION

 

 

  • The PLA has sought to modernize its capabilities and improve its proficiencies across all warfare domains so that, as a joint force, it can conduct the full range of land, air, and maritime as well as nuclear, space, counterspace, electronic warfare (EW), and cyberspace operations.

 

  • The PLA’s evolving capabilities and concepts continue to strengthen the PRC’s ability to “fight and win wars” against a “strong enemy (强敌)” (a likely euphemism for the United States), counter an intervention by a third party in a conflict along the PRC’s periphery, and project power globally.

 

  • People’s Liberation Army Army (PLAA). The PLAA continues to modernize equipment and focus on combined arms and joint training in effort to meet the goal of becoming a world class military. The PLAA demonstrated a new long-range fire capability in the PLA military response to the August 2022 U.S. Congressional Delegation (CODEL) visit to Taiwan. The PLAA continues to incorporate a twice a year conscript intake. The long-term effects of the policy are not clear.

 

  • People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN). The PRC has numerically the largest navy in the world with an overall battle force of over 370 ships and submarines, including more than 140 major surface The PLAN is largely composed of modern multi-mission ships and submarines. In 2022, the PLAN launched its third aircraft carrier, CV-18 Fujian.

 

‒  It also commissioned its third YUSHEN class Amphibious Assault Ships (LHA) and has likely begun construction on a fourth as of early 2023. In the near-term, the PLAN will have the ability to conduct long-range precision strikes against land targets from its submarine and surface combatants using land-attack cruise missiles, notably enhancing the PRC’s power projection capability.

 

‒  The PRC continues to challenge foreign military activities in its exclusive economic zone (EEZ) in a manner that is inconsistent with the rules of customary international law as reflected in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. At the same time, the PLAN conducts activities in the EEZs of other countries, including the United States, Australia, Philippines, Vietnam, and Malaysia.

 

  • People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) and PLAN Aviation. The PLAAF and PLAN aviation together constitute the largest aviation force in the Indo-Pacific region. The PLAAF is rapidly catching up to western air The PLAAF continues to modernize with the delivery of domestically built aircraft and a wide range of UASs. In October 2019, the PLAAF signaled the return of the airborne leg of its nuclear triad after the PLAAF publicly revealed the H-6N as its first nuclear-capable air-to-air refuelable bomber.

 

  • People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF). The PLARF is advancing its long-term modernization plans to enhance its “strategic deterrence” The PRC is developing new ICBMs that will significantly improve its nuclear-capable missile forces and will require increased nuclear warhead production, partially due to the introduction of multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV) capabilities.

 

The PRC may be exploring development of conventionally-armed intercontinental range missile systems. If developed and fielded, such capabilities would allow the PRC to threaten conventional strikes against targets in the continental United States, Hawaii, and Alaska.

 

  • Strategic Support Force (SSF). The SSF is a theater command-level organization established to centralize the PLA’s strategic space, cyberspace, electronic, information, communications, and psychological warfare missions and The SSF’s Network Systems Department (NSD), sometimes referred to as the Cyberspace Force (CSF; 网络空间部队), is responsible for information warfare with an integrated mission set that includes cyberspace warfare, technical reconnaissance, electronic warfare, and psychological warfare. The PLA SSF’s Space Systems Department (SSD), sometimes referred to as the Aerospace Force (ASF; 航天部队), is responsible for military space operations. The PRC continues to develop counterspace capabilities—including direct-ascent anti-satellite missiles, co-orbital satellites, electronic warfare, and directed-energy systems—that can contest or deny an adversary’s access to and operations in the space domain.

 

  • Joint Logistic Support Force. The JLSF is concentrating its efforts on improving joint strategic and campaign-level logistic efficiencies through training and integrating civilian products and services. The JLSF supports multimodal transportation methods to facilitate the movement of PLA forces and equipment for training.

 

  • Special Operations Forces (SOF). Despite unilateral and multilateral training, all of China’s SOF units lack real-world combat experience. China’s SOF does not have a national-level special operations command to oversee all of China’s SOF activities. Despite an emphasis to conduct joint training, theater commanders have no authority over PAP units, making it difficult to incorporate PAP SOF into PLA training exercises.

 

JOINT CAPABILITIES IN DEVELOPMENT

 

 

  • The PLA is aggressively developing capabilities to provide options for the PRC to dissuade, deter, or, if ordered, defeat third-party intervention in the Indo-Pacific region, and to conduct military operations deeper into the Indo-Pacific region and globally.

 

  • The PLA has undertaken important structural reforms and introduced new military doctrine to strengthen joint operations and is testing joint capabilities in and beyond the First Island Chain (FIC).

 

JOINT CAPABILITIES FOR COUNTERINTERVENTION

 

 

  • The PRC’s counter-intervention strategy aims to restrict the United States from having a presence in the East and South China Sea regions—within the FIC—and increasingly to hold at risk U.S. access in the broader Indo-Pacific region.

 

  • Long-Range Precision Strike and Supporting ISR. PLA texts state that precision attack in all warfare domains is critical in modern war. PLA writings state that precision weapons are not only force multipliers, but also a means of “war control” to prevent escalation.

 

  • Integrated Air Defense System (IADS). The PRC has a robust and redundant IADS architecture over land areas and within 300 nm (556 km) of its coast that relies on an extensive early warning radar network, fighter aircraft, and a variety of SAM The PRC has also placed radars and air defense weapons on outposts in the SCS, further extending the range of its IADS.

 

  • Hypersonic Weapons. The PRC’s deployment of the DF-17 HGV-armed MRBM will continue to transform the PLA’s missile The system is possibly intended to replace some older SRBM units and is intended to strike foreign military bases and fleets in the Western Pacific, according to a PRC-based military expert.

 

COMING UP: DETAILED ANALYSIS WITH INDIAN PERSPECTIVE

 

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References and credits

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Disclaimer:

Information and data included in the blog are for educational & non-commercial purposes only and have been carefully adapted, excerpted, or edited from sources deemed reliable and accurate. All copyrighted material belongs to respective owners and is provided only for purposes of wider dissemination.