190: BOOK REVIEW: THE POLITICS OF SOUTH CHINA SEA DISPUTES

Published by Book review literary Trust

BOOK REVIEW

THE POLITICS OF SOUTH CHINA SEA DISPUTES

By Nehginpao Kipgen

Review by: Air Marshal Anil Khosla (Retd) PVSM, AVSM, VM

 

The South China Sea is a semi-enclosed area measuring 3.6 million square kilometres in the Pacific Ocean. It spreads from Straits of Malacca and Karimata to Taiwan straits and is bordered in the north   by China and Taiwan, the Philippines in the east, Brunei and Malaysia in    the south, and Vietnam in the west. It contains numerous islands, rocks and reefs. Major ones being Spartley islands, Paracel islands, Pratas and Natuna islands and the Scarborough shoal. The area is believed to contain rich reserves of oil, natural gas, minerals and fishery stocks. The region is considered to be a centre of future economic growth in East Asia and is also sometimes called a “second Persian Gulf”. Major sea routes of shipping pass through this area. The strategic location and the abundant resources make it a subject of interest and concern for littoral states and the international community. The security issues around it always remain in focus and it is considered to be one of the flashpoints.

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183: Taliban’s Runover: Some Factors

 

Setting and Population Density Pattern. 

  • Afghanistan’s overall population density is only about 148 people per square mile / 57 people per square kilometer (Indian population density is 1202 per square mile / 464 per square kilometer).

 

  • Even in the populated areas of Afghanistan, people are quite spread out, with only 26 percent of the population living in urban centres. This dispersed population pattern, is a challenge for the state army to defend while, it favours the Taliban’s quick-moving offensive.

 

Taliban Strategy.

  • Following the withdrawal of Western forces, the Taliban swiftly and easily occupied vast swaths of sparsely populated territory. They then used that territory to launch coordinated and fast-moving offensives.

 

  • Instead of traditional tools of warfare (like artillery and armour), the Taliban moved quickly in weaponised pickup trucks to defeat dug-in defensive They forced The Afghan forces to retreat from outposts and checkpoints to (safety of) urban areas, thereby ceding control of supply lines and major highways. This allowed Taliban forces to surround and isolate urban centers.

 

  • Local officials were quick to accept Taliban control because they had little allegiance to the central government and knew that Afghan forces were unwilling (and unable) to defend their areas from Taliban

 

Taliban Advantages.

  • Taliban enjoyed a presence throughout the country, allowing them to pressure the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces in multiple locations.

 

  • The Taliban were able to conduct lightning offensives across many fronts, which fatally stressed the limited cohesion of the Afghan National Defense and Security.

 

Afghan Security Force: Challenges

  • Low force-to-space ratios meant that defenders had significant ground to cover and had to move swiftly and in a coordinated fashion to stand any chance of successfully countering Taliban threats from many The Afghan security forces were not geared up to these tasks.

 

  • The Afghan military lacked the capacity and cohesion required to stand firm and defend against fast-moving offensives across many fronts.

 

  • Afghan forces had always been heavily dependent on S. air support for troop movement, re-supply, and combat operations. In absence of the air support, the Afghan military was unable to regroup or move units around quickly.

 

  • Afghan forces were hampered by lack of cohesion, leadership, motivation, and limited training & mobility.

 

Outcome.

  • The weaknesses of the Afghan security forces, combined with the low force-to-space ratios generated by Afghanistan’s terrain and its population distribution, made a quick Taliban victory a reality.

 

  • Taliban rarely had to use force because they could leverage their geographic reach to intimidate local leaders and convince defenders to flee or surrender.

 

Lessons

  • Understanding Local conditions is Important.

 

  • One solution does not work for every problem.

 

  • Psychological (Mind) factor of any armed is important.

 

  • Besides Equipment and training, motivation and leadership is equally important.

 

There is much more to it – More coming up

 

Questions

Has the western world really understood Afghanistan?

Is the fight against terrorism being orchestrated correctly?

 

Titbit

Afghanistan is called graveyard of empires.

Britishers came and failed

Russians tried and failed.

Yanks tried for long and failed.

 

Random Thoughts

Now it is Chinese turn

(Chinese are too smart to burn their hands – they will let Pakistan do Their dirty work)

Pakistan is playing with a two edged sword.

will the nurtured snake bite back

 

Suggestions and Value additions are most welcome

 

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References

https://warontherocks.com/

https://www.independent.co.uk/voices/afghanistan-taliban-uk-war-troops-b1902270.html

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2021-08-17/why-taliban-won

https://cissm.umd.edu/research-impact/publications/worst-case-scenario-assessing-impact-complete-isaf-military-withdrawal

https://www.wsj.com/articles/afghanistan-army-collapse-taliban-11628958253

https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/exclusive-taliban-advances-afghan-military-overhauls-war-strategy-limit-losses-2021-07-22/

https://www.factcheck.org/2021/08/timeline-of-u-s-withdrawal-from-afghanistan/?utm_source=email&utm_medium=social&utm_campaign=social-pug

175: China’s Active Defence Strategy

 

Genesis. China’s Active defence Strategy appeared first time in  MAO’s writings in the year 1936. However, its meaning has been changing from time to time along with the war fighting philosophy of China.

 

Changes in War Fighting Philosophy. War fighting Philosophy of China has changed with the era of person in power. Over the years the changes are as follows:-

 

  • Mao Zedong – Final War (with reference to world wars)
  • Ding Xiaoping – Local War (Shift from world war to limited wars)
  • Jing Zemin – Local war with Hi Technology.
  • Hu Jintao – Informatised Local War (Network centric war)
  • Xi Jinping – Informatised and intelligentised war (Unrestricted War – including elements of hybrid and unconventional warfare even in the Grey Zone).

 

Initial Connotation. When the idea was conceived initially it meant allowing the enemy to come into own territory, in area of own choice and up to pre decide depth. Allow the enemy’s logistics supply lines get stretched out and dry down and at an opportune moment attack and defeat him. It was sort of offensive defence.

 

Present Framework. China articulates its Active Defence response as:

“China would never invade or expand, at the same time would never permit any piece of Chinese territory to separate from China & PLA will strike after enemy has attacked”.

 

Analysis & Implications

  • There is always a gap between what china preaches and practices. China although states that she will not expand, but is driven by the baser instinct of expansionism, considering herself as an empire state rather than nation state.

 

  • China decides as to what is part of China, by staking claims and producing conveniently select and doctored historical and legal documents.

 

  • China has left definition of enemy attack intentionally vague. It is not limited to military attack by kinetic means. It may include any action by the adversary which is against the interest of China.

 

  • In other words China decides what enemy attack is, and reserves the right to respond in a way it feels is appropriate.

 

  • It means China will always have the initiative and will have the legitimacy (in her opinion) for her actions.

 

  • China justifies her approach to this active defence strategy as strategically defensive but operationally offensive.

 

  • In tune with her war fighting philosophy of unrestricted warfare, the attack on enemy would be any domain (land, air, sea, cyber, space, electronic, information, psychological or even nuclear). It could use everything and anything as a weapon from the instruments of national power (DIME).

 

  • This strategy coupled with China’s practiced strategic approach of “achieving objectives without firing a shot”, would mean that China would continue to perpetuate grey zone warfare (inclusive of hybrid and unconventional warfare).

 

  • China’s formation of Strategic Support Force as a separate service, is in tune with the above mentioned strategy and actions.

 

Bottom Line

 There is an urgent need for reorientation and gearing up (not only by military) to deal with these challenges.

 

Question

Are we doing it?

 

YOUR SUGGESTIONS & VIEWS ARE MOST WELCOME

 

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