Tag: military

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WHAT IS COOKING IN THE DRAGON’S MILITARY CAULDRON

 

Pic Courtesy: Internet (Freepik)

 

The Purge

 

The PLA Central Military Commission (CMC) underwent a reshuffle in 2022 following the 20th National Party Congress, and a new cabinet and defence minister were appointed in early 2023 at the 14th National People’s Congress in Beijing. A number of these officials, hand-picked by President Xi Jinping for their positions in the CMC, have since been implicated in an anti-corruption investigation in China.

 

The PLA Rocket Force (PLARF). PLARF oversees China’s land-based nuclear missiles and the Equipment Development Department. PLARF’s commander and its political commissar were replaced in August 2023. Vice Admiral Wang Houbin (PLAN) replaced the PLARF commander and General Xu Xisheng (former deputy political commissar of the Southern Theatre Command) replaced the PLARF political commissar. Both replacements were drawn from outside the PLARF.

 

Defence Minister. Defence Minister Li Shangfu was ousted from his role. General Li previously served as the head of the PLA’s Equipment Development Department. The Equipment Development Department stated on its social media account that it was investigating corruption allegations related to procurement bids and the formation of private cliques within the armed forces at high levels that resulted in cronyism and a lack of focus on the core task of building combat readiness. Former defence minister Wei Fenghe (formerly commanded the PLARF) also disappeared from public view, reportedly under investigation.

 

Comments.

 

    • Corruption alone is an unlikely explanation for the removal by Xi of top military officials that he had appointed just months earlier, raising the possibility that intelligence leaks may have triggered the action.

 

    • The leadership changes also suggest that despite Xi’s calls for absolute loyalty and a zero-tolerance approach to corruption, problems within the PLA persist.

 

 

PLA Army.

 

PLA Army is studying and analysing the lessons emerging out of the Ukraine war. Some of the areas, being looked into are as follows:-

 

    • The heavy use of UAVs by both Russia and Ukraine is likely behind the higher prominence accorded to the discussion of the concept of ‘low altitude control and dominance’ by the PLA Army.

 

    • The protracted nature of the fighting in Ukraine is likely to drive the PLA Army to re-examine operational plans for long-term industrial and logistic sustainment, as well as for casualty evacuation and treatment.

 

    • Review of the recruitment process, and policies related to conscription and reservists. In 2023, the PLA revised its existing regulations covering the recruitment of civilian and military personnel, including conscripts.

 

    • Russia’s struggles to mobilise personnel for service in Ukraine would influence the CMC’s ability to conduct wartime mobilisation.

 

    • In 2023, the PLA continued to roll out new armour, artillery and air-defence platforms to its combined arms units, and the re-equipment of combined arms regiments in Xinjiang Military District now appears to be nearing completion.

 

    • PLA is continuing the re-equipment of aviation brigades with the Z-20 medium helicopter, with priority to PLA Army’s air assault formations assigned to the Eastern and Western theatre commands, as well as the Xinjiang and Tibet military districts.

 

Comments

 

    • Given the scale of a 2017 army reorganisation, a new round of major force-structure changes within the regular service is unlikely in the short term.

 

    • The PLA Reserve Force may attract greater attention.

 

    • A review of the recruitment process seems to be aimed at the goal of enlisting and retaining greater numbers of high-quality recruits, particularly college graduates and those with key scientific and engineering skill sets.

 

    • Significant changes to the army’s re-equipment plan are unlikely before the start of the next five-year plan in 2026.

 

PLA Navy.

 

Assertiveness. China’s naval and maritime security arms became increasingly assertive in their activities. China’s navy increased operations in the waters around Taiwan, while the Chinese coast guard undertook activities that bordered on aggressiveness. Beijing’s maritime militia assets, which purport to be part of its fishing fleet, conducted operations in the waters disputed with the Philippines around the Spratly Islands and in Vietnam’s exclusive economic zone.

 

Force Development.

 

    • Surface Ships. The PLAN in 2023 added the eighth Type-055 (Renhai) cruiser to its operational fleet along with additional Type-054A frigates. It also launched its new Type-054B frigate, which appears to be larger and considerably more capable. The new frigate promises to be a major addition to the PLAN’s blue-water fleet as a component of future task-group deployments.

 

    • Aircraft Carrier. China is progressing with its third indigenous aircraft carrier, the Fujian (Type-003). It is claimed to be more potent and capable than the existing Liaoning (Type-001) and the Shandong (Type-002) aircraft carriers. The new carrier is expected to be commissioned in 2025.

 

    • Submarines. PLAN’s focus has increased towards developing sub-surface forces. Those efforts include the development of the new-generation Type-095 nuclear-powered attack submarine and Type-096 nuclear-powered ballistic-missile submarine. It is assessed that the PLAN has equipped its Type-094 ballistic missile boats with a longer-range submarine-launched ballistic missile, the JL-3 (CH-SS-N-20). That would represent a significant step up in capability.

 

    • Amphibious Capability. PLA Navy appears to be strengthening its LHD forces. It launched the fourth Type-075 Yushenclass LHD in December. The navy has also added at least two new Zubr-class air-cushion landing craft to its inventory, as well as other landing craft.

 

Force Deployment. PLAN is expanding its pattern of long-range deployments.

 

    • The PLA Navy continued to develop its bluewater deployment capabilities, including with more significant formations. Units led by Type-075 (Yushen) amphibious assault ships (LHDs) made two forays into the Western Pacific, including waters near Japan.

 

    • PLA Navy also gradually pushed carrier operations further out with the Liaoning and Shandong sailing out towards Guam and undertaking more intense air operations. The PLAN, in September 2023, carried out a further large-scale carrier exercise in the Western Pacific.

 

    • The PLAN carried out exercises with Russia and Iran and with Russia and South Africa, port visits in the United Arab Emirates and Pakistan, and a rare foray to Africa’s Atlantic coast with a port visit to Nigeria. Another set of manoeuvres with Russia off Alaska in August 2023 further underscored that the.

 

 

Comments.

 

    • The PLAN is now regularly and widely hyped as ‘the world’s largest navy’.

 

    • While the PLAN’s fleet has evolved to be more modern, it still lags behind the US Navy in terms of total tonnage and capability. The gap seems to be narrowing.

 

    • PLAN, despite its increasing emergence in the world’s oceans, is still significantly concentrated in waters closer to home.

 

PLA Air Force

 

The PLA Air Force (PLAAF) received considerable numbers of combat aircraft in 2023, in part from an unexpected source. Along with the new-build Chengdu J-10C Firebird, Shenyang J-16 Flanker N and Chengdu J-20 multi-role fighter aircraft, the service received upward of 200 tactical combat aircraft from the PLAN. Many of the transferred aircraft are unlikely to be retained in the medium term. The initial version of the Xi’an JH-7, the JH-7 Flounder A, as well as the even older Shenyang J-8 Finback, may be retired.

 

Maritime Air. The PLAN appears to be divesting itself of almost all its land-based multi-role fighters, ground attack aircraft, bomber aircraft and numerous air bases. The PLAAF appears to be taking on the roles of the transferred formations. The PLA Air Force would, therefore, be responsible for land-based maritime strike tasks, requiring considerable coordination with the PLAN. The addition of the PLAN aircraft will bolster the PLAAF’s inventory of modern aircraft types.

 

J-20 Aircraft.  The J-20 heavy multi-role fighter is the premier combat aircraft in PLAAF service, introduced in 2017–18. China had built around 200 J-20s by the fourth quarter of the year and operates six operational brigades equipped with it.  An upgraded J-20 is undergoing flight tests. The aircraft’s forward fuselage has been modified with a revised cockpit profile and a raised fuselage section to the rear of the cockpit. The aircraft may have been fitted with the Shenyang WS-15 afterburning turbofan engine. The WS-15 offers more power than the previously used Shenyang WS-10.

 

Other Aircraft.

 

    • The PLAAF continued to induct Shenyang’s two-seat J-16 Flanker aircraft, enhancing its long-range surface-attack capability. As an air-to-air platform, it is likely to carry under development PL-17 (CH-AA-X-12) very long-range air-to-air missile.

 

    • PLAAF’s low-observable bomber, the Xi’an H-20 continues to be under development.

 

    • The roles of the PLAAF bomber force continued to expand. The Xi’an H-6 carries the air-launched Mach 3+ WZ-8 reconnaissance UAV that, post-release, climbs to an altitude of up to 100,000 feet to fly its mission profile. The WZ-8 has now entered service.

 

Comments

    • There is an important lesson to be learnt (Indivisibility of airpower) from China’s reorganisation and placing all the air assets and roles under the PLAAF.

 

    • China’s aviation industry is well established.

 

    • PLAAF is expanding rapidly in numerical strength.

 

    • Doubts still exist about the stated and claimed capabilities of its aircraft.

 

PLA Rocket Force

 

The PLA Rocket Force (PLARF) has been enhancing and expanding its capabilities across all ranges, at varying qualitative and quantitative paces. The PLARF’s capabilities are evolving most rapidly through the introduction of intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) to replace some medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) that are being retired.

 

DF-26 with Swappable Warheads. Variants of the DF-21 (CH-SS-5) MRBM, including the nuclear-armed DF-21A (CH-SS-5 Mod 2) and conventional DF-21C (CH-SS-5 Mod 4), are being swiftly replaced by the longer-range DF-26 (CH-SS- 18) IRBM. The DF-26 is designed to allow crews to rapidly swap conventional and nuclear warheads and to conduct precision strikes against land and maritime targets up to the second island chain.

 

Hypersonic Glide Vehicle (HGV). The PLARF is also developing and inducting an IRBM armed with a hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV) that appears to be similar to the DF-26 and is known as the DF-27 (CH-SS-X-24).  The PLARF is re-equipping some of its brigades (in eastern China) with the DF-17 (CH-SS-22) medium-range missile carrying an HGV. The DF-17’s HGV is more manoeuvrable and therefore more capable of evading adversary missile defences than traditional ballistic missiles of similar ranges. Its features suggest the weapon was developed to strike high-value targets such as air and missile defences at the outset of a conflict, opening the way for less manoeuvrable systems to reach their objective with a lower probability of being intercepted.

 

ICBMs with MIRV. China continues to modernise its intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) forces. The DF-41 (CH-SS-20) is the PLARF’s newest ICBM and is equipped with multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs), thereby providing China with a higher number of warheads with a smaller force. The DF-41 brigades will be equipped with fewer launchers than with the DF-31.

 

Enhancement of Survivability and Responsiveness. PLARF is upgrading the DF-31A (CH-SS-10 Mod 2) to the more mobile and responsive DF-31AG configuration with an integrated transport erector launcher that is off-road capable. The PLARF is also expanding a small number of silos for the older DF-5 (CH-SS-4) ICBM at several locations. A 2021 report also revealed that China was building three large ICBM silo fields (in the. western part of the country), to enhance survivability and responsiveness.

 

Comments.

 

    • The DF-26’s so-called hot-swappable warhead would introduce a potential escalation dilemma, adversaries targeted with the weapon may be unsure if they are under nuclear or conventional attack before the warhead detonates.

 

    • Hypersonic weapons and MIRV capability will change the dynamics of warfare and start a new arms race.

 

    • China may be moving from a stated policy of nuclear no-first-use and a minimum credible deterrent to a launch-on-warning posture.

 

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References and credits

The International Institute for Strategic Studies, “The Military Balance 2024”.

To all the online sites and channels.

Disclaimer:

Information and data included in the blog are for educational & non-commercial purposes only and have been carefully adapted, excerpted, or edited from sources deemed reliable and accurate. All copyrighted material belongs to respective owners and is provided only for purposes of wider dissemination.

References:-

The International Institute for Strategic studies, “The Military Balance 2024”.

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US REPORT ON CHINA: EXCERPTS WESTERN THEATRE COMMAND & INDIA

WESTERN THEATER COMMAND

 

Key Takeaways

 

  • The Western Theater Command is oriented toward India and counterterrorism missions along China’s Central Asia borders.

 

  • The Western Theater Command focuses on Xinjiang and Tibet Autonomous Regions, where the CCP perceives a high threat of separatism and terrorism, particularly among Uyghur populations in Xinjiang.

 

  • Since early May 2020, sustained tensions along the India-China border have dominated the Western Theater Command’s attention, including at least one border clash in December 2022 along the PRC border with India’s Arunachal Pradesh state that injured multiple soldiers.

 

The Western Theater Command is geographically the largest theater command within the PRC and is responsible for responding to conflict with India and what the PRC refers to as “terrorist threats” in western China. PLA units located within the Western Theater Command include 76th and 77th Group Armies and ground forces subordinate to Xinjiang and Xizang Military Districts; three PLAAF bases, one transportation division, one flying academy, and one PLARF base.

 

Within China, the Western Theater Command focuses on Xinjiang and Tibet Autonomous Regions, where the CCP perceives a high threat of separatism and terrorism, particularly among Uyghur populations in Xinjiang. According to the U.S. Department of State’s 2022 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, in the PRC, “genocide and crimes against humanity occurred during the year against the predominantly Muslim Uyghurs and other ethnic and religious minority groups in Xinjiang.” Authorities were reported to have arbitrarily detained more than one million ethnic Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and other Muslims in extrajudicial internment camps designed to erase religious and ethnic identities. Although PRC government officials justified the camps under the pretense of “combatting terrorism, separatism, and extremism,” information from the international community, including the UN, refute such justifications. Moreover, oppression of Muslim Uyghurs and other ethnic and religious minority groups in Xinjiang is likely used by extremist organizations as a propaganda and recruiting tool, generating new threats to the region.

 

Since early May 2020, sustained tensions along the India-China border have dominated the Western Theater Command’s attention. Differing perceptions between India and the PRC regarding border demarcations along the LAC, combined with recent infrastructure construction on both sides, led to multiple clashes, an ongoing standoff, and military buildups along the shared border. In response to a skirmish in June 2020 between PRC and Indian patrols in Galwan Valley, the most violent clash between the two countries in 45 years, the Western Theater Command implemented a large-scale mobilization and deployment of PLA forces along the LAC. Commander-level negotiations meant to reduce tensions continued in December 2022 with the 17th round of talks. The Western Theater Command’s deployments along the LAC will likely continue through 2023.

 

2022 Western Theater Command Leadership

 

 

Commander– General Wang Haijiang [汪海江] Previous position: Commander, Xinjiang Military District DOB: July 1963

Age: 59

Birthplace: Anyue County, Ziyang, Sichuan Province

Education: Unknown

 

Political Commissar– General Li Fengbiao [李凤彪] Previous position: Commander, Strategic Support Force DOB: October 1959

Age: 63

Birthplace: Anxin County, Baoding, Hebei Province

Education: Xinyang Army Infantry School; received a Master’s degree in strategic studies from National Defense University

 

Chief of Staff– Major General Li Zhonglin [李中林]

Previous position: Commander, 71st Group Army, Eastern Theater Command Army

DOB: Unknown

Age: Unknown Birthplace: Unknown Education: Unknown

 

PLA Force Laydown in Western Theater Command

 

INDIA 

 

Key Takeaways

 

  • In 2022, the PLA increased the deployment of forces and continued infrastructure build up along the LAC.

 

  • Negotiations between India and the PRC made minimal progress as both sides resisted losing perceived advantages on the border.

 

Beginning in May 2020, PRC and Indian forces faced off in clashes with rocks, batons, and clubs wrapped in barbed wire at multiple locations along the LAC. The resulting standoff triggered the buildup of forces on both sides of the disputed border. Each country demanded the withdrawal of the other’s forces and a return to pre-standoff conditions, but neither China nor India agreed on those conditions. The PRC blamed the standoff on Indian infrastructure construction, which it perceived as encroaching on PRC territory, while India accused China of launching aggressive incursions into India’s territory. On 15 June 2020, patrols violently clashed in Galwan Valley and resulted in the death of approximately 20 Indian soldiers and four PLA soldiers. This incident was the deadliest clash between the two since the 1962 Sino-Indian War. (Actually this incident was the deadliest clash between the two since 1967 clash at Nathu la with nearly 500 causalities).

 

Following the 2020 clash, the PLA has maintained continuous force presence and continued infrastructure build up along the LAC.

 

  • In 2022, China continued to develop military infrastructure along the LAC. These improvements include underground storage facilities near Doklam, new roads in all three sectors of the LAC, new villages in disputed areas in neighboring Bhutan, a second bridge over Pangong Lake, a dual-purpose airport near the center sector, and multiple helipads.

 

  • In 2022, China deployed one border regiment, supported by two divisions of Xinjiang and Tibet Military Districts with four combined arms brigades (CAB) in reserve in the western sector of the China also deployed as many as three light-to-medium CABs in the eastern sector from other theater commands and an additional three CABs in the central sector of the LAC. Although some elements of a light CAB eventually withdrew, a majority of the deployed forces remain in place along the LAC.

 

  • On July 17th, China and India held the 16th round of Corps Commander-level talks focusing on the resolution of border disagreements in the western sector of the LAC. Both sides agreed to withdraw forces from the Gogra-Hotsprings area of the LAC and to maintain dialogue through military and diplomatic channels to reach a mutually acceptable solution to the remaining border issues. Two previous rounds of Corps Commander-level talks in March and January made no progress to resolve the China-India border dispute.

 

  • On September 8th, Chinese and Indian forces began to withdraw from the Gogra-Hotsprings area along the western sector of the LAC. This withdrawal was the direct result of the 16th round of Corps Commander-level talks held in July.

 

  • On October 14th, representatives from China and India attended a virtual 25th Meeting of Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination (WMCC). Both sides lauded the recent withdrawal of forces from the border and agreed to take measures to reduce border tension and shift from emergency response to regular management of the border areas. The 24th WMCC was held on 31 May with no significant progress being made to disengage from the western sector of the LAC.

 

  • On 9 December, hundreds of Chinese and Indian forces clashed along the eastern sector of the LAC near the Yangtse area of Tawang, Both sides previously agreed to not use firearms along the border—instead they use sticks and clubs as weapons—however both Chinese and Indian forces sustained injuries. Media reports described the skirmish as the worst since the 2020 Galwan Valley incident.

 

  • On 20 December, China and India held the 17th round of Corps Commander-level talks at the Chushul-Moldo border meeting point in This round of talks was not announced—unlike previous talks—and came 10 days after Chinese and Indian forces clashed along the eastern sector of the LAC near the Yangtse area of Tawang, India. No agreements were made during this meeting and both sides pledged to continue dialogue through military and diplomatic channels.

 

COMING UP: DETAILED ANALYSIS WITH INDIAN PERSPECTIVE

 

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US REPORT ON CHINA 2023: EXCERPTS DEF POLICY & MIL STRATEGY

strategy

 

DEFENSE POLICY AND MILITARY STRATEGY

 

 

  • In 2022, the PRC’s stated defense policy remained oriented toward safeguarding its sovereignty, security, and development interests, while emphasizing a greater global role for itself. The PRC’s military strategy remains based on the concept of “active defense” (积极防御).

 

  • PRC leaders stress the imperative of strengthening the PLA into a “world-class” military by the end of 2049 as an essential element of its strategy to rejuvenate the PRC into a “great modern socialist country.”

 

  • In October 2022, Xi secured his third term as the general secretary of CCP at the Party Congress and his appointment of loyalists to top positions in the CMC probably will enable Xi to expand upon military modernization and operational goals during his next 5-year term.

 

  • During his October 2022 speech at the opening ceremony of the 20th Party Congress, Xi reaffirmed his commitment to the PLA’s 2027 milestone for modernization to accelerate the integrated development of mechanization, informatization, and intelligentization of the PRC’s armed forces. If realized, this capability milestone could give the PLA the capacity to be a more credible military tool for the CCP’s Taiwan unification efforts.

 

  • In 2022, the PLA continued discussing a new “core operational concept,” called “Multi- Domain Precision Warfare (多域精确战)” (MDPW). MDPW is intended to leverage a C4ISR network that incorporates advances in big data and artificial intelligence to rapidly identify key vulnerabilities in the S. operational system and then combine joint forces across domains to launch precision strikes against those vulnerabilities.

 

  • COVID-19 mitigation measures and multiple outbreaks throughout 2022 probably did not significantly impact PLA combat readiness.

 

FORCES, CAPABILITIES, AND POWER PROJECTION

 

 

  • The PLA has sought to modernize its capabilities and improve its proficiencies across all warfare domains so that, as a joint force, it can conduct the full range of land, air, and maritime as well as nuclear, space, counterspace, electronic warfare (EW), and cyberspace operations.

 

  • The PLA’s evolving capabilities and concepts continue to strengthen the PRC’s ability to “fight and win wars” against a “strong enemy (强敌)” (a likely euphemism for the United States), counter an intervention by a third party in a conflict along the PRC’s periphery, and project power globally.

 

  • People’s Liberation Army Army (PLAA). The PLAA continues to modernize equipment and focus on combined arms and joint training in effort to meet the goal of becoming a world class military. The PLAA demonstrated a new long-range fire capability in the PLA military response to the August 2022 U.S. Congressional Delegation (CODEL) visit to Taiwan. The PLAA continues to incorporate a twice a year conscript intake. The long-term effects of the policy are not clear.

 

  • People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN). The PRC has numerically the largest navy in the world with an overall battle force of over 370 ships and submarines, including more than 140 major surface The PLAN is largely composed of modern multi-mission ships and submarines. In 2022, the PLAN launched its third aircraft carrier, CV-18 Fujian.

 

‒  It also commissioned its third YUSHEN class Amphibious Assault Ships (LHA) and has likely begun construction on a fourth as of early 2023. In the near-term, the PLAN will have the ability to conduct long-range precision strikes against land targets from its submarine and surface combatants using land-attack cruise missiles, notably enhancing the PRC’s power projection capability.

 

‒  The PRC continues to challenge foreign military activities in its exclusive economic zone (EEZ) in a manner that is inconsistent with the rules of customary international law as reflected in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. At the same time, the PLAN conducts activities in the EEZs of other countries, including the United States, Australia, Philippines, Vietnam, and Malaysia.

 

  • People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) and PLAN Aviation. The PLAAF and PLAN aviation together constitute the largest aviation force in the Indo-Pacific region. The PLAAF is rapidly catching up to western air The PLAAF continues to modernize with the delivery of domestically built aircraft and a wide range of UASs. In October 2019, the PLAAF signaled the return of the airborne leg of its nuclear triad after the PLAAF publicly revealed the H-6N as its first nuclear-capable air-to-air refuelable bomber.

 

  • People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF). The PLARF is advancing its long-term modernization plans to enhance its “strategic deterrence” The PRC is developing new ICBMs that will significantly improve its nuclear-capable missile forces and will require increased nuclear warhead production, partially due to the introduction of multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV) capabilities.

 

‒ The PRC may be exploring development of conventionally-armed intercontinental range missile systems. If developed and fielded, such capabilities would allow the PRC to threaten conventional strikes against targets in the continental United States, Hawaii, and Alaska.

 

  • Strategic Support Force (SSF). The SSF is a theater command-level organization established to centralize the PLA’s strategic space, cyberspace, electronic, information, communications, and psychological warfare missions and The SSF’s Network Systems Department (NSD), sometimes referred to as the Cyberspace Force (CSF; 网络空间部队), is responsible for information warfare with an integrated mission set that includes cyberspace warfare, technical reconnaissance, electronic warfare, and psychological warfare. The PLA SSF’s Space Systems Department (SSD), sometimes referred to as the Aerospace Force (ASF; 航天部队), is responsible for military space operations. The PRC continues to develop counterspace capabilities—including direct-ascent anti-satellite missiles, co-orbital satellites, electronic warfare, and directed-energy systems—that can contest or deny an adversary’s access to and operations in the space domain.

 

  • Joint Logistic Support Force. The JLSF is concentrating its efforts on improving joint strategic and campaign-level logistic efficiencies through training and integrating civilian products and services. The JLSF supports multimodal transportation methods to facilitate the movement of PLA forces and equipment for training.

 

  • Special Operations Forces (SOF). Despite unilateral and multilateral training, all of China’s SOF units lack real-world combat experience. China’s SOF does not have a national-level special operations command to oversee all of China’s SOF activities. Despite an emphasis to conduct joint training, theater commanders have no authority over PAP units, making it difficult to incorporate PAP SOF into PLA training exercises.

 

JOINT CAPABILITIES IN DEVELOPMENT

 

 

  • The PLA is aggressively developing capabilities to provide options for the PRC to dissuade, deter, or, if ordered, defeat third-party intervention in the Indo-Pacific region, and to conduct military operations deeper into the Indo-Pacific region and globally.

 

  • The PLA has undertaken important structural reforms and introduced new military doctrine to strengthen joint operations and is testing joint capabilities in and beyond the First Island Chain (FIC).

 

JOINT CAPABILITIES FOR COUNTERINTERVENTION

 

 

  • The PRC’s counter-intervention strategy aims to restrict the United States from having a presence in the East and South China Sea regions—within the FIC—and increasingly to hold at risk U.S. access in the broader Indo-Pacific region.

 

  • Long-Range Precision Strike and Supporting ISR. PLA texts state that precision attack in all warfare domains is critical in modern war. PLA writings state that precision weapons are not only force multipliers, but also a means of “war control” to prevent escalation.

 

  • Integrated Air Defense System (IADS). The PRC has a robust and redundant IADS architecture over land areas and within 300 nm (556 km) of its coast that relies on an extensive early warning radar network, fighter aircraft, and a variety of SAM The PRC has also placed radars and air defense weapons on outposts in the SCS, further extending the range of its IADS.

 

  • Hypersonic Weapons. The PRC’s deployment of the DF-17 HGV-armed MRBM will continue to transform the PLA’s missile The system is possibly intended to replace some older SRBM units and is intended to strike foreign military bases and fleets in the Western Pacific, according to a PRC-based military expert.

 

COMING UP: DETAILED ANALYSIS WITH INDIAN PERSPECTIVE

 

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References and credits

To all the online sites and channels.

 

Disclaimer:

Information and data included in the blog are for educational & non-commercial purposes only and have been carefully adapted, excerpted, or edited from sources deemed reliable and accurate. All copyrighted material belongs to respective owners and is provided only for purposes of wider dissemination.