403: US REPORT ON CHINA: EXCERPTS WESTERN THEATRE COMMAND & INDIA

WESTERN THEATER COMMAND

Key Takeaways

The Western Theater Command is oriented toward India and counterterrorism missions along China’s Central Asia borders.

The Western Theater Command focuses on Xinjiang and Tibet Autonomous Regions, where the CCP perceives a high threat of separatism and terrorism, particularly among Uyghur populations in Xinjiang.

Since early May 2020, sustained tensions along the India-China border have dominated the Western Theater Command’s attention, including at least one border clash in December 2022 along the PRC border with India’s Arunachal Pradesh state that injured multiple soldiers.

The Western Theater Command is geographically the largest theater command within the PRC and is responsible for responding to conflict with India and what the PRC refers to as “terrorist threats” in western China. PLA units located within the Western Theater Command include 76^th and 77^th Group Armies and ground forces subordinate to Xinjiang and Xizang Military Districts; three PLAAF bases, one transportation division, one flying academy, and one PLARF base.

Within China, the Western Theater Command focuses on Xinjiang and Tibet Autonomous Regions, where the CCP perceives a high threat of separatism and terrorism, particularly among Uyghur populations in Xinjiang. According to the U.S. Department of State’s 2022 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, in the PRC, “genocide and crimes against humanity occurred during the year against the predominantly Muslim Uyghurs and other ethnic and religious minority groups in Xinjiang.” Authorities were reported to have arbitrarily detained more than one million ethnic Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and other Muslims in extrajudicial internment camps designed to erase religious and ethnic identities. Although PRC government officials justified the camps under the pretense of “combatting terrorism, separatism, and extremism,” information from the international community, including the UN, refute such justifications. Moreover, oppression of Muslim Uyghurs and other ethnic and religious minority groups in Xinjiang is likely used by extremist organizations as a propaganda and recruiting tool, generating new threats to the region.

Since early May 2020, sustained tensions along the India-China border have dominated the Western Theater Command’s attention. Differing perceptions between India and the PRC regarding border demarcations along the LAC, combined with recent infrastructure construction on both sides, led to multiple clashes, an ongoing standoff, and military buildups along the shared border. In response to a skirmish in June 2020 between PRC and Indian patrols in Galwan Valley, the most violent clash between the two countries in 45 years, the Western Theater Command implemented a large-scale mobilization and deployment of PLA forces along the LAC. Commander-level negotiations meant to reduce tensions continued in December 2022 with the 17^th round of talks. The Western Theater Command’s deployments along the LAC will likely continue through 2023.

2022 Western Theater Command Leadership

Commander– General Wang Haijiang [汪海江] Previous position: Commander, Xinjiang Military District DOB: July 1963

Age: 59

Birthplace: Anyue County, Ziyang, Sichuan Province

Education: Unknown

Political Commissar– General Li Fengbiao [李凤彪] Previous position: Commander, Strategic Support Force DOB: October 1959

Age: 63

Birthplace: Anxin County, Baoding, Hebei Province

Education: Xinyang Army Infantry School; received a Master’s degree in strategic studies from National Defense University

Chief of Staff– Major General Li Zhonglin [李中林]

Previous position: Commander, 71^st Group Army, Eastern Theater Command Army

DOB: Unknown

Age: Unknown Birthplace: Unknown Education: Unknown

PLA Force Laydown in Western Theater Command

INDIA

Key Takeaways

In 2022, the PLA increased the deployment of forces and continued infrastructure build up along the LAC.

Negotiations between India and the PRC made minimal progress as both sides resisted losing perceived advantages on the border.

Beginning in May 2020, PRC and Indian forces faced off in clashes with rocks, batons, and clubs wrapped in barbed wire at multiple locations along the LAC. The resulting standoff triggered the buildup of forces on both sides of the disputed border. Each country demanded the withdrawal of the other’s forces and a return to pre-standoff conditions, but neither China nor India agreed on those conditions. The PRC blamed the standoff on Indian infrastructure construction, which it perceived as encroaching on PRC territory, while India accused China of launching aggressive incursions into India’s territory. On 15 June 2020, patrols violently clashed in Galwan Valley and resulted in the death of approximately 20 Indian soldiers and four PLA soldiers. This incident was the deadliest clash between the two since the 1962 Sino-Indian War. (Actually this incident was the deadliest clash between the two since 1967 clash at Nathu la with nearly 500 causalities).

Following the 2020 clash, the PLA has maintained continuous force presence and continued infrastructure build up along the LAC.

In 2022, China continued to develop military infrastructure along the LAC. These improvements include underground storage facilities near Doklam, new roads in all three sectors of the LAC, new villages in disputed areas in neighboring Bhutan, a second bridge over Pangong Lake, a dual-purpose airport near the center sector, and multiple helipads.

In 2022, China deployed one border regiment, supported by two divisions of Xinjiang and Tibet Military Districts with four combined arms brigades (CAB) in reserve in the western sector of the China also deployed as many as three light-to-medium CABs in the eastern sector from other theater commands and an additional three CABs in the central sector of the LAC. Although some elements of a light CAB eventually withdrew, a majority of the deployed forces remain in place along the LAC.

On July 17^th, China and India held the 16^th round of Corps Commander-level talks focusing on the resolution of border disagreements in the western sector of the LAC. Both sides agreed to withdraw forces from the Gogra-Hotsprings area of the LAC and to maintain dialogue through military and diplomatic channels to reach a mutually acceptable solution to the remaining border issues. Two previous rounds of Corps Commander-level talks in March and January made no progress to resolve the China-India border dispute.

On September 8^th, Chinese and Indian forces began to withdraw from the Gogra-Hotsprings area along the western sector of the LAC. This withdrawal was the direct result of the 16^th round of Corps Commander-level talks held in July.

On October 14^th, representatives from China and India attended a virtual 25^th Meeting of Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination (WMCC). Both sides lauded the recent withdrawal of forces from the border and agreed to take measures to reduce border tension and shift from emergency response to regular management of the border areas. The 24^th WMCC was held on 31 May with no significant progress being made to disengage from the western sector of the LAC.

On 9 December, hundreds of Chinese and Indian forces clashed along the eastern sector of the LAC near the Yangtse area of Tawang, Both sides previously agreed to not use firearms along the border—instead they use sticks and clubs as weapons—however both Chinese and Indian forces sustained injuries. Media reports described the skirmish as the worst since the 2020 Galwan Valley incident.

On 20 December, China and India held the 17^th round of Corps Commander-level talks at the Chushul-Moldo border meeting point in This round of talks was not announced—unlike previous talks—and came 10 days after Chinese and Indian forces clashed along the eastern sector of the LAC near the Yangtse area of Tawang, India. No agreements were made during this meeting and both sides pledged to continue dialogue through military and diplomatic channels.

COMING UP: DETAILED ANALYSIS WITH INDIAN PERSPECTIVE

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September 1, 2023January 4, 2025

378: Q & A ON INDIA-CHINA STAND OFF

Pic courtesy: internet

Gist of replies to questions by a researcher on the subject.

Q1. How is the IAF acting as a force multiplier in the India-China military standoff in Ladakh?

The question needs rephrasing. IAF is an active participant and contributor towards dealing with the situation.

It is a national situation, requiring a whole of nation (i.e. all tools of statecraft) approach.

The defence services (Indian Air Force included) are doing the needful jointly and synergistically.

IAF undertakes missions to accomplish its roles and tasks (like any other defence force), including:-

- Political and strategic signalling. By deploying and operating aircraft, weapons and systems at appropriate places. Also by carrying out exercises in these areas.

- Rapid mobility, troop induction, and transfer. Rapid troop mobilisation undertaken by the IAF surprised everyone.

- Sustenance and supply (equipment, ammunition, weapons, rations, etc.). All IAF resources including heavy-lift aircraft, medium-lift aircraft, and helicopters are used for this task.

- Saving valuable lives by casualty evacuation and medical support as and when required.

- Enhancement of situational awareness by reconnaissance and information sharing by using all the reconnaissance assets and sharing information rapidly through its networked communication systems.

- Joint planning and monitoring by working synergistically with sister surface services.

- Training and equipping to meet challenges by periodic review of immediate, mid-term, and long-term plans.

All the assets of IAF are always available and are used to deal with prevailing or emerging situations.

Q2. How will you assess the IAF’s preparedness in case there’s a hot war between India and China at the LAC?

IAF is always prepared for any eventuality. It is a capable, motivated and battle-hardened force.

Please refer to the Global Air Powers Ranking (2023) by WDMMA (World Directory of Modern Military Aircraft, which provides the current ranking of the various air forces of the world. (https://www.wdmma.org/ranking.php)

It does not base its assessment purely on numerical strength but carries out a holistic analysis of numerous factors to ascertain warfighting capability.

According to the latest report, the IAF is a few points ahead in its war-waging capabilities, despite being short numerically.

Moreover, IAF always works on two plans. First plan to fight immediately with whatever it has. The second one is to enhance its potential (capability and capacity) in the short, mid and long term.

These plans are periodically reviewed, revised and activated.

This edge needs to be maintained. The warfighting capabilities have built up over the years however, it is the capacity (war endurance) that needs enhancement on priority. Appropriate actions have been initiated and they need to be executed speedily.

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August 8, 2023January 4, 2025

371: BANGLADESHI TANGO WITH CHINA

Pic Courtesy: Internet

Over the past five years, a significant improvement in areas of economic and defence cooperation has been observed between Bangladesh and China.

China has been following the policy of generous economic assistance, gaining considerable support within Bangladesh, both politically and among the general public.

Bangladesh is tending to become more authoritarian in recent times. China’s unwavering support for the government has also played a pivotal role in fostering this alignment. On the other hand emphasis on democratic values by the USA has strained their relations to some extent.

Deepening Economic Cooperation

Trade. Since 2017, Bangladesh has deepened its engagement with China. China has become Bangladesh’s largest trading partner.

Infrastructure. China has already invested around USD $9.75 billion in transportation projects in Bangladesh (including ongoing initiatives such as the Padma Bridge Rail Link, Bangabandhu Tunnel, and Dasher Kandi Sewerage Treatment Plant, etc).

FDI. China has also emerged as the largest source of foreign direct investment (FDI) in Bangladesh. It has also ranked as the top foreign investor in Bangladesh in 2022, with 104 investors operating in eight export-processing zones.

Duty-Free Access. From July 2020, China has granted duty-free access to 97 per cent (later increased further) of Bangladeshi products entering its market. This proved to be a significant development in bilateral trade relations.

Stronger Defence Ties

Arms Import. Bangladesh’s military partnership with China has also grown significantly and it has become China’s second-largest arms customer, after Pakistan.

Defence Cooperation. Defence cooperation between the two countries also includes military personnel training in China and collaboration in defence production.

Naval Capability Enhancement. In 2016, Bangladesh acquired submarines from China. In March 2023, Bangladesh’s Prime Minister unveiled the country’s submarine base (Constructed by China), named BNS Sheikh Hasina, in Cox’s Bazar. The facility has the capacity to accommodate six submarines and several warships. Currently, two Chinese-made submarines are stationed at the base, representing a significant development in Bangladesh’s naval capabilities.

Air Force Contract. China has recently signed a contract to supply 23 Hongdu K-8W intermediate training jets to the Bangladesh Air Force, further bolstering their military cooperation.

Geopolitical Aspects

Tug of war. In the post-COVID period and during the Russia-Ukraine war, geopolitical tension in the Indo-Pacific has also increased. Both China and the United States want Bangladesh in their camp.

Push and Pull. The United States had invited Bangladesh to join its Indo-Pacific Strategy, as a partner in the Indo-Pacific region. In response, China had warned that Bangladesh’s relations with China would be damaged if it joins the Quad, while also seeking Bangladesh’s participation in its Global Development Initiative and Global Security Initiative.

Strains. Bangladesh’s shift towards China, coupled with concerns over its dismissal of democratic values and human rights, has strained its relationship with the United States.

Drifting Apart. The international community has criticized the conduct of the 2014 and 2018 elections under the Awami League government. In response to human rights violations, the United States has imposed sanctions and implemented visa restrictions on individuals undermining democratic processes. Exclusion from the Biden Democracy Summit indicates a change in U.S. policy towards Bangladesh.

Pains and Gains. While the United States distances itself from the Awami League government, China is extending financial support and strengthening ties with Bangladesh.

Russian Angle. Russia is with China to counter the US influence in Bangladesh. Bangladesh and Russia have reached an agreement to use the Chinese yuan for payment in a nuclear power plant project (objected to by the USA).

Rohingya Crisis. The Rohingya crisis in Bangladesh poses a significant challenge to China’s geopolitical interests in the region. A peaceful resolution to this crisis, led by China, could further solidify its influence and foothold in Bangladesh. On the other hand, the United States has also taken steps to address the crisis, with the likelihood of an increase in its presence and influence in Bangladesh. The resolution of the Rohingya crisis holds implications for the geopolitical dynamics in the region, impacting the interests of both China and the United States.

Analytical Implications.

All key stakeholders in the Indo-Pacific such as the United States, China, Russia, Japan, and India are major development partners for Bangladesh.

Bangladesh’s shift towards China strained relations with the United States, and interests from India and Russia highlight the complex geo-political dynamics.

The choices made by Bangladesh in its alliances will have significant implications for its development and security. It will also have a far-reaching effect on the geopolitical dynamics of the region.

Through cooperation with Bangladesh, Beijing is also expanding its footprint in the Indo-Pacific.

Bangladesh’s increasing military partnership with China is encouraging anti-India sentiment in Bangladesh and will also put pressure on India.

Learning from Chinese engagement and its adverse effects, on other countries, Bangladesh will have to play with fire with caution.

Bottom Line

India should not lose Bangladesh to China (like Nepal).

Question

Are we enough in this regard?

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China in south Asia: Bangladesh tilting towards China by Shafi Mostafa on Southy Asian Voices.

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