Major Arms Transfers to Afghanistan (Last Two Decades)

SIPRI published a Topical backgrounder on 03 Sep 21, giving an overview of known international flows of major arms transfer to the Afghan armed forces between 2001 and 2020. The document discusses the supplier states, volumes, types and numbers of major arms deliveries.

Relevant extracts are as follows:-

Since 2001, significant numbers of major arms had been delivered to bolster the Afghan military and security forces, in the expectation that they would eventually be able to maintain security and suppress the Taliban insurgency without international support.

Sixteen states are known to have supplied major arms to Afghanistan.

Slightly over three-quarters of the major arms delivered, by volume, were newly produced, while the rest were second-hand, but in some cases modified prior to delivery.

Transfers from the USA

The USA was the largest major arms supplier to Afghanistan (74 per cent of country’s imports of major arms by volume).

Deliveries from the USA to Afghanistan included an estimated 21 924 armoured vehicles (e.g. HMMWV-UA, ASV-150/M-1117), 66 MD-530F armed light helicopters, 34 Cessna-208B armed light transport aircraft, and 53 UH-60A transport helicopters.

The USA also delivered 65 ScanEagle (unarmed) unmanned aerial vehicles and an estimated 250 Paveway guided bombs. Most of the arms were supplied to Afghanistan as aid.

Transfers from Russia

Russia was the second largest supplier of major arms to the Afghan armed forces in the period, accounting for 14 per cent of imports, by volume.

Deliveries from Russia mainly consisted of 90 second-hand and newly produced Mi-8MTV and Mi-17 transport helicopters.

Early deliveries were in the form of aid, but later, most of the transport helicopters were bought via and financed by the USA or United Arab Emirates.

Transfers from other suppliers

Several other states, mainly North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member states, delivered smaller volumes of major arms to Afghanistan directly or supplied major arms through US-run and US-funded programmes.

Italy accounted for 3.8 per cent of all deliveries of major arms to Afghanistan, by volume. These consisted of 16 second-hand G-222 transport aircraft in 2009–2012, financed by the USA. The aircraft were modernized in Italy before delivery.

Czechia supplied six Mi-24 combat helicopters and six Mi-17 transport helicopters. All were second-hand but were modernized in Czechia before delivery.

The United Kingdom supplied two Mi-17 transport helicopters.

Bosnia and Herzegovina, Slovakia and Turkey supplied a total of 128 second-hand artillery pieces

Norway supplied an estimated 159 TOW anti-tank missile in 2009. All these transfers came as direct aid or were financed by the USA.

Brazil was the fourth largest supplier, accounting for 2.7 per cent of all deliveries. These were 26 Super Tucano (A-29B) trainer/combat aircraft. They were bought through a US programme, financed by the USA and modified in the USA before delivery to Afghanistan. They became the main combat aircraft of the Afghan air force.

Switzerland supplied 18 PC-12 light transport aircraft in 2015. These reached Afghanistan via the USA and were probably modified in the USA for reconnaissance before final delivery.

India supplied three Cheetal light helicopters and four second-hand Mi-25 combat helicopters. It also financed the supply of four second-hand Mi-24V combat helicopters from Belarus in 2019.

Present State

 

The Afghan military and security forces received a substantial number of major arms in the last twenty years.

Despite this very substantial material investment, not to mention years of military training and combat support, the Taliban were able to seize most of Afghanistan from Afghan Government.

Some of the major arms listed were subsequently lost or scrapped. However, a substantial number have been captured by the Taliban.

Air Force Assets and Equipment

The Afghan Air Force was considered as Kabul government’s lethal advantage over the Taliban.

The Afghan Air Force once stood at approximately 200 fixed-wing and rotary aircraft, including A-29 Super Tucanos, AC-208 light attack aircraft, Cessna 208s, PC-12 Pilatus surveillance aircraft, C-130 Hercules transport planes, and a fleet of helicopters that included UH-60 Black Hawks and Russian-made Mi-8 and Mi-17s.

It is estimated that 25% of Afghan Air Force Fledm (to Uzbekistan), and remainder is in Disarray. Very few of the aircraft left behind are fly worthy due to lack of spare parts and maintenance support.

While the Taliban now controls a number of attack, surveillance, and transport aircraft, it still requires pilots to fly them. Taliban had been on a campaign to assassinate Afghan Air Force pilots to diminish the air strategic advantage. It is not known how many crews fled across the border or are in hiding. Aircrew shortage will further diminish their capability.

 

Analysis

Concern is about the effect of presence of these weapons on security and stability, both within and beyond Afghanistan’s borders.

It is unclear how many of these are or can be made operational.

The aircraft will need specialized maintenance and spare parts that are probably not easily available to the Taliban.

Other, simpler to maintain, major arms such as the light armoured vehicles can easily be operated for many years.

All in all, it seems unlikely that the major arms captured by the Taliban would pose any serious threat to stability in Afghanistan or neighbourhood.

However, the large numbers of small arms and light weapons and associated ammunition are potentially of much graver concern.

In India, concern is that these weapons may soon find a way into Pakistan, and then, through Pakistan-sponsored terrorists, to India, especially Jammu and Kashmir.

There is also a possibility that these weapons may get used for violence in Pakistan itself.

 

Questions

Taliban in Afghanistan has an Air Force, Will they be able to revive it and make it operational?

Will China and Pakistan help Afghanistan in its revival?

 

Suggestions and Value additions are most welcome

 

 

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References

https://www.sipri.org/commentary/topical-backgrounder/2021/transfers-major-arms-afghanistan-between-2001-and-2020

https://www.airforcemag.com/afghan-air-force-fled-remainder-in-disarray-sources-say/

Flavours of China’s Military Reforms

China has given priority to translate science and technology achievements into military capabilities.

 

China’s military capability enhancements in the new era are characterized by an emphasis on new security domains.

 

On the one hand China has improved its long-distance force projection and precision strike capabilities in the respective domains of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Rocket Force.

 

On the other hand, it has attached importance to new security domains, such as space, cyber, electromagnetic, and Information, as key fields for influencing the fate of future warfare.

 

China aims to overtake developed country’s militaries by making concentrated investments in state-of-the-art technologies and deepening military-civil fusion.

 

It hopes to achieve superiority in these fields and thereby overturn its inferiority in overall military capabilities.

 

China has already achieved the status of a major military power by 2021 (100th anniversary of its founding Chinese Communist Party).

 

The Xi Jinping administration has set ambitious goals to further establish China as a global power by the next centenary in 2049 (marking the 100th anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic of China).

 

It aims to be leader in overall military capabilities by becoming a cyber-power, a space power, and a manufacturing power of defence hardware and software.

 

While “active defence” as a military strategic concept has been consistently advocated by the PLA, its content has evolved reflecting changes in China’s national power, the international environment, and industry structure, as well as advances in military technology.

 

Its active defence strategy has changed from the tenet of “striking only after the enemy has struck,” (i.e. luring the enemy into one’s territory and then making a counterattack), to offensive actions of active defence.

 

Active defence is expected to take on a more offensive nature in the military strategy in the new era.

 

China has prepared itself for future “unrestricted warfare”, across a variety of domains.

 

To achieve vital information dominance, especially in cyberspace, China has promoted her informatisation and reviewed her cyber strategy.

 

In the space domain, China gives weight to securing space dominance by maintaining its use of space, denying use of space by adversaries, and providing information support from space.

 

China has steadily increased the number of satellites that can be used for military purposes, its space access capabilities, and its space situational awareness capabilities. It also develops capabilities for interfering with an opponent’s use of space through anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons, electronic jammers, and other means.

 

The Government of China, which prioritizes the role of S&T in the military, has established the “military-civil fusion strategy” as a national strategy.

 

Under this strategy, the government makes concentrated investments in S&T in new security domains, facilitates military use of advanced technologies, and promotes indigenization of core technologies.

 

The Xi Jinping administration established the Central Commission for Military-Civil Fusion Development, a CCP organ that has been given powerful authority. Under the commission, the administration aims to build a management system through which organizations of the state, military, and society cooperate with each other for executing military-civil fusion policies.

 

Military-civil fusion efforts place particular emphasis on the cyber, space, and maritime domains.

 

The PLA’s informatisation of the military system and increased reliance on space assets in military operations have created vulnerabilities that accrue from attacks on these systems.

 

China has made a rapid rise in S&T, but it is still in the developing stage. Especially with regard to talent and specific core technologies.

 

The enhancement of China’s military capabilities in new security domains has fuelled international competition over core technologies and technological infrastructure.

 

The PLA has expanded its operational domains in parallel with the rise of its military capability, and is reinforcing the offensive element of active defense.

 

Implications for India

As it prepares for intelligentised warfare in this context, the PLA is likely to test operate new technologies and capabilities.

 

In the near future, besides other countries, India will also face confronting situations and be compelled to respond to them.

 

In the long run, fulfilling the “Chinese Dream” of “the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” would include resolving the disputes with neighbouring countries in a manner consistent with China’s wishes.

 

Enhancement of the PLA’s military capabilities, and belligerent attitude of China, would necessitate enhancement of India’s military capabilities on priority.

 

Looking ahead to the medium and long term trends of military technology, India needs to invest in technology infusion into its military.

 

India needs to re-orientate and reorganise to develop capability of warfare in strategic domains of space, cyber, electromagnetic, and information.

 

Thought

Time has come to spend on Military capability enhancement even if it is at the cost of development.

Do You Agree?

 

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References

NIDS China Security Report 2021.

https://thediplomat.com/2021/04/chinas-military-has-a-hidden-weakness/

https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/is-china-speeding-up-military-modernisation-it-may-but-its-not-yet

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Modernization_of_the_People%27s_Liberation_Army

https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinas-modernizing-military

 

 

 

 

AIR POWER IN GREY ZONE OPERATIONS

 

My views on the issue of Air Power in Grey Zone Operations.

(For selective viewing, please click on the links below)

  1. Upto 03:10 – Introduction.
  2. 03:10 – 07:35 – Perspective on the issue.
  3. 07:35 – 13:10 – Defining Grey Zone warfrare.
  4. 13:10 – 21:00 – Difference between GZ and NWNP.
  5. 21:00 – 27:30 – India’s GZ Threat Scenario.
  6. 27:30 – 36:00 – Air Power vis-a-vis GZ.
  7. 36:00 -38:00 – GZ activity between friendly countries.
  8. 38:00 – 43:50 – Using AP in GZ.
  9. 43:50 – 57:30 – Capability building and reorientation to deal with GZ.
  10. 57:30 onwards – Concluding Thoughts.

 

Question

Does ongoing military reforms and proposed reorganisation cater for future grey zone operations?

 

Comments and value additions are most welcome

 

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Also read – Article on the subject

https://55nda.com/blogs/anil-khosla/2021/07/26/airpower-in-grey-zone-my-article-in-usi-journal/