665: DESPERATE MEN DO DESPERATE THINGS IN DESPERATE SITUATIONS: PAKISTAN ARMY CHIEF PLAYING WITH FIRE

 

My article was published on The EurasianTimes website

on 01 May 25.

 

The recent terrorist attack in Phalgam, Jammu and Kashmir, has once again brought the spotlight on Pakistan’s deep state and its time-tested strategy of using militant proxies to pursue its strategic aims in the region. Coming at a time when Pakistan is facing extraordinary internal and external pressures, the timing and nature of the attack raise pressing questions about the motives behind this provocation and the extent to which the current military leadership may be resorting to desperation-driven tactics. The phrase “desperate men do desperate things in desperate situations” encapsulates the narrative that Munir, grappling with Pakistan’s cascading crises, resorted to terrorism to unify a fractured nation and reassert military dominance. The question remains whether it is a calculated move or a strategic blunder that would result in a bigger crisis.

 

Desperate Act

On April 22, 2025, the serene Baisaran Valley in Pahalgam became the site of a horrific terror attack. Armed militants, later identified as members of Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), stormed a tourist campsite, killing 26  civilians, predominantly Hindu tourists. The attackers, wielding M4 carbines and AK-47s, verified victims’ religious identities before executing them, marking the deadliest assault in the region since the 2008 Mumbai attacks. The Pahalgam attack was no ordinary act of terrorism. Its precision, weaponry, and targeting suggest sophistication beyond typical militant operations. The attackers, led by Hashim Musa, a former Pakistan Army para-commando dismissed from service, infiltrated deep to strike a tourist hotspot 100 kilometres from the Line of Control (Loc).

The attack in Phalgam was a brazen act of desperation, targeting unarmed, innocent tourists in a relatively stable and tourist-frequented part of Kashmir. The use of high-grade weaponry and coordinated execution points toward sophisticated planning, likely beyond the capabilities of isolated local cells. Indian officials allege the attack was planned by Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), with direct oversight from Munir. A key piece of evidence is Musa’s background. Sources claim he was “loaned” by Pakistan’s Special Service Group (SSG) to Let, and the attackers’ weaponry, M4 carbines, are rare in militant hands, further pointing to state backing.

The attack’s communal nature adds another layer. The militants spared Muslim tourists, targeting Hindus in a deliberate bid to inflame religious tensions. This aligns with Munir’s April 16, 2025, speech, where he emphasised Pakistan’s Islamic identity and the Two-Nation Theory, framing India as an existential threat. The timing—six days after the hate speech—suggests a deliberate signal to terror groups. The Resistance Front (TRF), a LeT offshoot, initially claimed responsibility but later retracted, a move Indian analysts attribute to Pakistan’s attempt to distance itself from the backlash.

 

Desperate Situation

Under General Asim Munir, the Pakistan Army faces a precarious state that is a unique and combustible blend of crises, a collapsing economy, surging insurgencies, and eroding public trust in the military.

Economic Collapse. Pakistan’s GDP growth is under 2%, inflation is soaring past 20%, and the Pakistani rupee is plummeting. A $7-billion IMF loan, secured in 2024, imposes austerity measures that have sparked nationwide protests. The Karachi Stock Exchange crashed 3% in a single day post-Pahalgam, reflecting investor fears of regional instability. Pakistan’s economy is on life support, with an IMF deal hanging by a thread and foreign reserves dipping dangerously low. The economic hardship is palpable across society, eroding public faith in national institutions.

 Political Instability. Politically, Pakistan is a tinderbox. The 2023 arrest of former Prime Minister Imran Khan, widely seen as orchestrated by the military, has galvanised his Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) party. The military’s overt role in political engineering has backfired, leading to widespread public discontent and intra-elite fragmentation. Mass protests, often met with brutal crackdowns, have eroded the military’s legitimacy. Social media campaigns like #ResignAsimMunir, despite Pakistan’s ban on X, highlight Munir’s unpopularity. Analysts describe the military’s public support as at its lowest since the 1971 Bangladesh liberation, when Pakistan lost its eastern wing. For Munir, appointed Army Chief in November 2022, these crises threaten his leadership and the military’s grip on power.

Institutional Crisis. Militarily, Pakistan is under siege. The Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) has intensified attacks in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa, including a March 2025 train hijacking that killed several passengers. In Balochistan, separatist groups like the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) target Chinese-funded CPEC projects, undermining Pakistan’s strategic ties with Beijing. The military, once revered as the nation’s protector, struggles to contain these threats, with over 1,200 security personnel killed in 2024 alone. For perhaps the first time in decades, the Pakistan Army’s credibility is under sustained attack. Retired officers have voiced dissent, and social media campaigns have openly criticised the top brass—something previously unthinkable.

 Strategic Isolation. Once seen as a pivotal state in the U.S.-China rivalry, Pakistan is increasingly isolated. China’s Belt and Road investments have slowed, while Gulf nations redirect capital elsewhere. Washington remains wary, and New Delhi has successfully lobbied global forums to pressure Islamabad on terror financing.

 

Desperation Levels and Motives

The narrative of Munir’s desperation hinges on his need to reverse the military’s declining fortunes. With Pakistan unravelling, the Army Chief faces pressure to reassert control. Possible motives for orchestrating the Pahalgam attack include the following:-

Rallying Domestic Support. By reigniting the Kashmir issue, Munir seeks to unify Pakistanis under the military’s narrative of India as the eternal enemy. The military has historically used anti-India sentiment to deflect domestic criticism, as seen after the 1999 Kargil War and the 2016 Uri attack. With protests and insurgencies eroding public trust, a high-profile attack could galvanise nationalist fervour.

Disrupting India’s Kashmir Narrative. The region has seen relative stability since India revoked Article 370 in 2019, stripping Jammu and Kashmir of its autonomy. Record tourism (2 million visitors in 2024), successful elections, and infrastructure development have undermined Pakistan’s claim to Kashmir. The Pahalgam attack, targeting tourists, aims to deter visitors, disrupt normalcy, and revive Pakistan’s relevance in the dispute.

Risking Controlled Escalation. A limited conflict with India could restore the military’s image as Pakistan’s protector. Past crises, like the 2019 Pulwama attack, saw Pakistan weather Indian airstrikes while rallying domestic support. Munir may have calculated that India’s response—diplomatic measures, border skirmishes—would remain containable, avoiding all-out war given both nations’ nuclear arsenals.

 

Calculated Act or Strategic Miscalculation?

General Munir, a former ISI chief, is acutely aware of the strategic value and political risk of cross-border terrorism. His tenure began with promises of internal reform and a clean break from overt politicking. However, Munir has returned to the tried-and-tested path of external diversion under mounting internal pressures and the erosion of military dominance in domestic affairs.

A terrorist attack in Kashmir achieves several aims simultaneously: it unites domestic opinion around a perceived external threat, deflects criticism from internal dysfunction, and tests India’s threshold for retaliation. It may also galvanise the rank and file within the army, reasserting its role as the sole guardian of Pakistan’s ideological and territorial integrity.

The attack has plunged India-Pakistan relations into crisis. India responded with punitive measures: suspending the Indus Waters Treaty, closing borders, expelling diplomats, and cancelling Visas.  Small-arms fire along the LoC has escalated, with Pakistan closing its airspace to Indian flights. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi vowed a “befitting reply,” raising speculation of Military action.

 

India’s Options

India faces a complex decision matrix. A kinetic response, such as surgical strikes or air raids like Balakot in 2019, may yield short-term political dividends, especially if the Pakistan Army is seeking precisely such a reaction to rally domestic support. Conversely, restraint may embolden further provocations, especially if it is perceived as a lack of resolve. Therefore, India must pursue a calibrated strategy that combines tactical counter-terror operations with strategic multi-domain actions.

India’s response will be shaped by the need to address domestic outrage, signal strength to Pakistan, and manage international pressure to avoid escalation between the two nuclear-armed states.  The response is likely to be multi-pronged in several domains.

Diplomatic Offensive. India has already accused Pakistan of sponsoring terrorism, with Prime Minister Narendra Modi calling Pakistan a “rogue state” at the UN and vowing to pursue attackers “to the ends of the earth.” India will likely intensify efforts to diplomatically isolate Pakistan by raising the issue in international forums like the UN, G20, or bilateral talks with allies like the US, UK, and France.

Severing Diplomatic Ties. India has already expelled Pakistani diplomats and may further downgrade diplomatic ties, potentially recalling its high commissioner from Islamabad or imposing additional visa restrictions.

Economic and Trade Restrictions. India has suspended the Indus Waters Treaty, a significant move signalling economic retaliation. Further steps could include tightening trade restrictions or pushing for international financial scrutiny of Pakistan, leveraging India’s influence with institutions like the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), where Pakistan has faced grey-listing for terrorism financing concerns.

Cultural and Sporting Bans. To sustain domestic momentum against Pakistan, India may reinforce existing bans on cultural exchanges, sports events, and media collaborations.

Strategic Military Posturing.  India is likely to increase military deployments along the Line of Control (LoC) and international border, as implied by Modi’s “complete operational freedom” grant to the armed forces.

Surgical Strikes or Targeted Operations. India’s response to the 2019 Pulwama attack—a surgical airstrike on a Jaish-e-Mohammed camp in Balakot, Pakistan—sets a precedent. A similar operation targeting an appropriate target in Pakistan is possible.

Escalation of Skirmishes. Intermittent cross-border firing along the LOC, reported since the attack, may intensify. If not controlled, these skirmishes may escalate to a full-fledged war.

 

A Dangerous Game of Desperation

The Phalgam attack is not an isolated incident—it is a symptom of deeper rot within Pakistan’s civil-military structure. It underscores the Pakistan military’s enduring reliance on terrorism to counter internal and external pressures. But the diminishing returns of this strategy, combined with growing international scrutiny and a more assertive India, make this a dangerous game.

Desperate men in desperate institutions often resort to desperate measures. For Pakistan’s military, external provocation has long served as a tool to distract, deflect, and dominate. The costs may outweigh the benefits if General Munir pivots back to cross-border militancy as a pressure valve. Whether driven by Munir’s desperation or institutional strategy, the operation has reignited India-Pakistan tensions, risking escalation in a nuclear-armed region.

India must remain wise enough not to be baited, yet take appropriate multi-pronged, multi-domain retaliatory action, stay alert, agile, and strategically ready to counter these designs. India would be willing to climb the escalatory ladder, as Indian patience has run out, and a red line has been crossed this time. Once again, regional peace teeters on the edge of a dangerous gamble from across the border.

 

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References and credits

To all the online sites and channels.

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Disclaimer:

Information and data included in the blog are for educational & non-commercial purposes only and have been carefully adapted, excerpted, or edited from reliable and accurate sources. All copyrighted material belongs to the respective owners and is provided only for wider dissemination.

 

References:-

1. The Hindu, “Tourism Terror Targeted: Pahalgam Massacre,” April 23, 2025. https://www.thehindu.com

2. Indian Express, “How Pakistan’s Proxy War Is Mutating,” April 2025.

3. Dawn (Pakistan), “General Munir’s Gamble: What the Army’s Silence Hides,” April 25, 2025.

4. Reuters, “India Accuses Pakistan of Orchestrating Deadly Kashmir Attack,” April 2025.

5. Al Jazeera, “Terror Returns to Kashmir: Who Gains?” April 24, 2025.

6. Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA), India – Dossiers on LeT, TRF, ISI

Home Page

7. RAND Corporation Reports – “Proxy Warfare and Strategic Risk in South Asia” (2021). https://www.rand.org

8. Brookings Institution – “The Pakistan Army’s Strategic Calculus in a Post-Imran Era” (2024), https://www.brookings.edu

9. Carnegie India – “Pakistan’s New Military Doctrine: Continuity or Crisis?” (2023).

10. Observer Research Foundation (ORF), India – Reports on terrorism, India-Pakistan conflict cycles, https://www.orfonline.org

11. Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) – “Pakistan’s Internal Security Collapse” (2024), https://www.cfr.org

12. Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India – Official statements on the Phalgam attack and diplomatic responses. https://www.mea.gov.in

13. United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Briefings – Historical and recent discussions on Pakistan-sponsored terrorism. https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/

14. Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR), Pakistan – Official statements from Pakistan’s military. https://www.ispr.gov.pk/

662:INDIA’S WATER CANNON AGAINST PAKISTAN-SPONSORED TERRORISM: INDUS WATER TREATY

 

My article was published on the “Life of Soldier” website

on 29 Apr 25.

 

 

“Blood and water cannot flow together”

– Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi

 

The Indus Waters Treaty is a water-sharing agreement between India and Pakistan, signed on September 19, 1960, in Karachi by Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and Pakistani President Ayub Khan. The World Bank brokered it and governs the use of the Indus River system, which includes six rivers: Indus, Jhelum, Chenab, Ravi, Beas, and Sutlej. The Indus River system is critical for both countries’ irrigation, hydropower, and drinking water.

India held the Indus Waters Treaty in abeyance on April 23, 2025, following the Pahalgam terrorist attack that killed 26 civilians. India’s decision, citing national security concerns, grants it greater control over the western rivers, potentially impacting Pakistan’s agriculture and water supply. Pakistan condemned the move as an “act of war,” suspending the Simla Agreement and closing the Wagah border. The World Bank, a treaty signatory, has urged dialogue but lacks enforcement power. This development heightens regional instability and raises concerns about future conflicts and diplomatic relations.

 

Key Provisions

Division of Rivers. Western Rivers (Indus, Jhelum, Chenab) are allocated to Pakistan for unrestricted use, except for limited Indian uses (e.g., domestic, non-consumptive, and specified agricultural purposes). Eastern Rivers (Ravi, Beas, Sutlej) are allocated to India for unrestricted use.

Water Sharing. Pakistan receives about 80% of the Indus system’s water (around 135 million acre-feet annually), while India gets 20%.

Infrastructure. India can build run-of-the-river dams on Western Rivers for hydropower, but cannot store water beyond specified limits. Pakistan can object to designs that violate the treaty.

Permanent Indus Commission. A bilateral body with representatives from both countries meets regularly to monitor implementation, share data, and resolve disputes.

 

Context and Significance.

The treaty was necessitated by the 1947 partition, which split the Indus basin, leaving canal headworks in India and irrigated lands in Pakistan. A 1948 standoff, when India briefly cut off water to Pakistan, underscored the need for a formal agreement. It is considered one of the most successful water-sharing treaties globally, surviving three wars.

The Indus system originates in the Himalayas, with major tributaries flowing through Indian-administered Jammu, Kashmir, and Pakistani-occupied Gilgit-Baltistan, making it geopolitically sensitive. In 2016, after a terrorist attack in Uri, India reviewed the treaty. In 2022 and 2023, India issued notices to Pakistan for treaty modification, citing “fundamental changes” like cross-border terrorism and environmental challenges, but no formal revocation has occurred. In 2023, Pakistan sought arbitration over Kishanganga and Ratle, while India challenged the arbitration process, preferring Neutral Expert resolution.

Pakistan, heavily dependent on the Indus for 90% of its water needs, fears reduced flows due to Indian projects or climate change. Delays in its storage infrastructure (e.g., Diamer-Bhasha Dam) exacerbate vulnerabilities. Glacial melt, erratic monsoons, and floods (e.g., 2010, 2022) strain the treaty’s framework, which lacks provisions for climate adaptation.

 

Recent Development

India has officially held the IWT with Pakistan in abeyance, marking a significant shift in bilateral relations. This decision was announced on April 23, 2025, following a terrorist attack in Pahalgam, Jammu and Kashmir. India invoked Article XII(3) of the IWT and sent a formal notice to Pakistan. The Ministry of Jal Shakti cited Pakistan’s alleged support for cross-border terrorism, shifting demographics, and energy demands as reasons the agreement could no longer continue “in good faith.”​

With the treaty placed in abeyance, India is no longer obligated to share information regarding water storage levels or flow in the rivers of the Indus River System with Pakistan.​ India has ceased sharing hydrological data (e.g., water flow, snowmelt, flood updates) with Pakistan, halted technical meetings, and stopped allowing Pakistani inspections of Indian projects. India is no longer bound by treaty restrictions on building storage or hydropower projects on the western rivers (Indus, Jhelum, Chenab).

 

Adverse Impact on Pakistan

India’s suspension of the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) poses significant adverse impacts on Pakistan, particularly in agriculture, water supply, energy, and economic stability.

Agriculture. Pakistan relies on the Indus River system for 80% of its irrigated agriculture, supporting 16 million hectares of farmland. The western rivers (Indus, Jhelum, Chenab) allocated to Pakistan under the IWT provide 93% of its irrigation water. A 10-20% reduction in water availability could lead to significant declines in agricultural output, threatening food security and rural livelihoods. Pakistan’s agriculture sector, which employs 40% of the workforce and contributes 24% to GDP, faces severe risks. While India’s current infrastructure limits immediate large-scale water diversion, future dams or storage projects could reduce water availability, especially during critical sowing seasons (e.g., Rabi and Kharif), reduced flows could lower crop yields for wheat, rice, and cotton—key staples and export crops.

Water Scarcity in Urban Centres. Major cities like Karachi, Lahore, Multan, and Faisalabad depend on the Indus and its tributaries for drinking water and industrial use. Any reduction in river flows, even temporary, could exacerbate existing water scarcity. Pakistan already faces a per capita water availability of ~1,000 cubic meters, close to the “water scarce” threshold. Water rationing, public health crises, and industrial slowdowns could occur, particularly in Punjab and Sindh provinces, which rely heavily on the Indus.

Energy Sector. Pakistan generates significant electricity from hydropower plants like Tarbela (3,478 MW) and Mangla (1,000 MW), which rely on consistent river flows from the Indus and Jhelum. Reduced or irregular water flows could lower power generation, worsening Pakistan’s energy crisis. For example, a 10% reduction in Tarbela’s water inflow could cut its output by hundreds of megawatts, affecting millions of households.

Economic. Energy shortages could disrupt industrial production and increase reliance on costly imported fuels, straining Pakistan’s foreign exchange reserves. A decline in crop production would reduce export revenues (e.g., rice and cotton) and increase food import costs, exacerbating Pakistan’s trade deficit. Reduced agricultural output could lead to job losses in rural areas, driving migration to urban centers and rising social unrest. Higher food and energy prices and potential infrastructure damage from flooding (if India releases water abruptly) could fuel inflation. Pakistan’s external debt (~$130 billion in 2025) limits its ability to fund mitigation measures. A 2023 World Bank study estimated that a 20% reduction in Indus water flows could shave 5-7% off Pakistan’s GDP over a decade.

Social and Political Fallout. Water shortages could spark protests, particularly in Sindh and Punjab, where water allocation disputes between provinces are already contentious. Provinces like Sindh, which rely on downstream flows, may accuse Punjab of hoarding water, exacerbating internal political divides.

 

India’s Justification and Legitimacy.

India’s justification and Legitimacy for holding in abeyance the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) hinges on the principle of a “fundamental change of circumstances,” as outlined in Article 62 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. New Delhi argues that Pakistan’s continued support for cross-border terrorism, especially following incidents like the April 2025 Pahalgam attack, violates the underlying premise of peaceful bilateral relations that formed the basis of the IWT in 1960. India contends that a country facilitating terrorist activity cannot expect continued cooperation on vital issues like water sharing. While the IWT lacks a unilateral withdrawal clause, India maintains that suspension, not withdrawal, can be a legitimate, proportionate response to persistent security threats.

 

Diplomatic and Legal Aspects

Pakistan’s Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif called the suspension an “act of war” and announced retaliatory measures, including suspending the 1972 Simla Agreement and closing the Wagah border.

Pakistan may seek World Bank mediation or international arbitration. The IWT lacks a unilateral exit clause, and India’s suspension may not be easily challenged under international law if framed as a response to terrorism (per Article 62, Vienna Convention). Experts argue India’s suspension is permissible under Article 62 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, citing a “fundamental change of circumstances” due to Pakistan’s alleged terrorism support for terrorism. The World Bank, a treaty signatory, has urged dialogue but cannot enforce compliance.

Pakistan may seek neutral expert mediation or arbitration, but India’s refusal to cooperate could render these mechanisms ineffective. Escalating the issue to the UN or other forums may gain Pakistan sympathy but will unlikely force India to reverse the suspension.

 

The Only Way out for Pakistan.

The only viable way for Pakistan to restore the Indus Waters Treaty is through diplomatic engagement coupled with tangible actions to address India’s core security concerns, particularly those related to cross-border terrorism. India’s decision, justified under the “fundamental change of circumstances” clause in international law, is rooted in accusations of Pakistan’s support for militant activities. Therefore, Pakistan would need to:-

  • Stop escalatory rhetoric (including regular and brash nuclear sabre rattling) and retaliatory actions, as these would only harden India’s stance.
  • Demonstrate a verifiable crackdown on terror infrastructure operating from its territory, especially groups targeting India.
  • Offer security guarantees and confidence-building measures that acknowledge India’s national security concerns to rebuild trust and initiate fresh dialogue.

Ultimately, Pakistan’s path to treaty restoration lies not just in legal appeals but in restructuring the political and security context in which the treaty was suspended. Only by addressing the root causes—especially terrorism—can the IWT be revived in a stable, sustainable way.

 

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References and credits

To all the online sites and channels.

Pics Courtesy: Internet

Disclaimer:

Information and data included in the blog are for educational & non-commercial purposes only and have been carefully adapted, excerpted, or edited from reliable and accurate sources. All copyrighted material belongs to respective owners and is provided only for wider dissemination.

 

 

References:-

  1. Financial Times. “Undermining the Indus Waters Treaty imperils Indian security.” April 26, 2025.
  1. Reuters. “India suspends Indus Waters Treaty after Pahalgam terror attack.” April 23, 2025.
  1. Al Jazeera. “Pakistan calls Indus Treaty suspension ‘an act of war’.” April 24, 2025.
  1. The Hindu. “India halts hydrological data sharing with Pakistan under Indus Treaty.” April 25, 2025.
  1. BBC. “Water Wars? India wields Indus Treaty amid rising tensions with Pakistan.” April 27, 2025.
  1. Dawn. “Pakistan to seek World Bank mediation on Indus Treaty row with India.” April 28, 2025.
  1. Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA). Indus Treaty as a Strategic Lever: Implications for India’s National Security. Issue Brief, 2023.
  1. Rajagopalan, Rajeswari Pillai. India’s Water Diplomacy: Reclaiming the Strategic Narrative. Observer Research Foundation, 2023.
  1. Observer Research Foundation (ORF). India’s Options under the Indus Waters Treaty: A Strategic Overview. 2022.
  1. United States Institute of Peace (USIP). Resolving India-Pakistan Water Disputes: A Legal and Strategic Perspective. 2020.
  1. International Crisis Group. Water Pressure: Climate Risk and Security in Pakistan. ICG Asia Report No. 297, 2018.
  1. World Bank. Indus Waters Treaty and Current Status of Disputes. [World Bank Briefing Note, 2023].
  1. Wirsing, Robert G. The Indus Waters Treaty: Political Stability and Water Security in South Asia. Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, 2013.
  1. Salman, Salman M.A. The Indus Waters Treaty: A History of a Treaty that has Survived Wars and Disputes. Water International, Vol. 36, No. 4, 2011.

659: INPUTS TO THE QUESTIONNAIRE ON CHINESE AIRFIELDS.

China has been expanding its aviation infrastructure near the India-China border, constructing new airfields in strategic locations. These airfields are primarily located in the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) and Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR), with strategic significance due to their proximity to sensitive border areas, including India, Nepal, and Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK).

Detailed overview of the new Chinese airfields at Tingri, Lhunze, Burang, Yutian, and Yarkantir (based on available open source information) is as follows:-

 

  1. Shigatse Tingri Airport (Tingri, Tibet)
    • Location: Tingri County, Shigatse Prefecture, Tibet Autonomous Region, China.
    • Opened: December 24, 2022
    • Type: Dual-use (civilian and military)
    • Elevation: Approximately 4,300 meters (14,108 feet) above sea level.
    • Runway: 4,500 meters
    • Proximity to India: Approximately 60 km from the Indian border
    • Infra: Supports dual-use (military and civilian) operations, potentially for troop deployment and logistics near the Line of Actual Control (LAC) with India. Designed to handle high-altitude operations, likely with a runway suitable for small to medium aircraft and helicopters.
    • Strategic Significance: Supports China’s broader strategy to bolster infrastructure near disputed borders. Located across the Himalayas from Kathmandu, Nepal, and near the Indian border. Part of China’s “3+1” airport construction plan aimed to boost air connectivity in the region, enhancing civilian access and military logistics near the Line of Actual Control (LAC). Fills a gap between Burang (west) and Shigatse (east), enhancing China’s military and civilian aviation network in southern Tibet.

 

  1. Lhunze Airport/Shannan Longzi Airport(Lhunze County, Tibet).
    • Location: Longzi County, Shannan (Lhokha) Prefecture, Tibet Autonomous Region, China.
    • Elevation: 3,980 meters (13,060 feet) above sea level.
    • Features a 4,500-meter (14,800-foot) Class 4C runway with seven parking stands.
    • Operational since January 12, 2023, following construction that began in April 2021.
    • Type: Planned as a dual-use facility.
    • Designed to handle 180,000 passengers annually by 2030.
    • Equipped for high-altitude operations, likely supporting fighter jets and transport aircraft.
    • Proximity to India: Close to Arunachal Pradesh, India
    • Strategic Significance: Dual-use military and civilian airport, enhancing China’s ability to project power near the LAC. Aims to improve connectivity in remote border areas, facilitating civilian travel and military operations. ​Located approximately 45 km from the disputed border with Arunachal Pradesh, India, and opposite the Upper Subansiri district. Lhunze’s airfield strengthens China’s military presence in a contested region, with the potential to support operations against India. Part of a broader network of airfields and SAM (surface-to-air missile) emplacements near Arunachal Pradesh.

 

  1. Ngari Burang Airport/ Ali Pulan Airport (Burang County, Tibet)
    • Location: Burang County, Ngari Prefecture, Tibet Autonomous Region, China.
    • Opened: December 27, 2023
    • Type: Dual-use (civilian and military)
    • Elevation: 4,250 meters (13,940 feet) above sea level.
    • Runway: 4,500 meters.
    • Status: Operational since December 27, 2023, with construction approved in April 2021.
    • Designed for 150,000 passengers and 600 tons of cargo annually.
    • Runway and facilities support dual-use operations, including military aircraft and helicopters.
    • Proximity to India: Near the India-Tibet-Nepal tri-junction.
    • Strategic Significance: It enhances China’s ability to project power and provide logistical support in the western sector of the LAC. It is located near the trijunction of Tibet, Nepal, and India’s Uttarakhand state, approximately 400 km from New Delhi. It is positioned close to Mount Kailash and Lake Manasarovar and is touted as a feeder strip for pilgrims, but has clear military applications. It supports the Ngari-Gunsa airfield, located 220 km away, and enhances China’s control over the southwestern border.

 

  1. Yutian Wanfang Airport (Yutian County, Xinjiang)
    • Location: Yutian County, Hotan Prefecture, Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, China.
    • Elevation: Approximately 1,400 meters (4,600 feet) above sea level (lower than Tibetan airfields).
    • Runway: 3,200 meters, capable of handling medium-sized commercial and military transport aircraft.
    • Opened: December 26, 2020
    • Type: Primarily a civilian airport but with potential dual-use capabilities.
    • Annual Capacity: Designed to handle 180,000 passengers and 400 tons of cargo
    • Strategic Significance: This will improve connectivity in southern Xinjiang, which is strategically important due to its proximity to the western sector of the LAC. ​Situated in south Xinjiang, between Hotan and Qiemo airbases, along the Karakoram Highway. Enhances connectivity in Xinjiang, supporting China’s Belt and Road Initiative and military logistics near the borders with Pakistan and India. Strategically located near the Aksai Chin region, a disputed area with India. Yutian’s airfield supports China’s control over Xinjiang and its borders with India and Pakistan-occupied Kashmir. Likely used for surveillance and logistics, given its proximity to sensitive regions.

 

  1. Yarkantir/Yarkant/ShacheAirport (Xinjiang)
    • Location: Likely refers to Shache (Yarkant) County, Kashgar Prefecture, Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, China.
    • Elevation: Approximately 1,200–1,500 meters (3,900–4,900 feet) above sea level.
    • Shache Airport has a runway suitable for small to medium aircraft, with facilities for civilian and potential military use.
    • Status: Specific details about a new airfield in Yarkand are limited. However, the region has seen infrastructure enhancements, including upgrades to airbases like Hotan, approximately 240 km from the LAC.
    • Strategic Significance: Shache Airport (IATA: QSZ, ICAO: ZWSC) is an existing dual-use airport in Yarkant County. It is operational for civilian flights but has military potential. Located in a restive part of Xinjiang, near the Tajik Autonomous County and the Wakhan Corridor, it is close to Pakistan-occupied Kashmir and Afghanistan. It supports China’s internal security operations in Xinjiang and external defence along its western borders. Enhances China’s ability to project power in Central Asia and monitor borders with Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Tajikistan. Part of a broader network of airfields in Xinjiang, including Tashkurgan, which is under construction and strategically located near PoK.

 

Chinese Aviation Infrastructure Strategy.

Regional Strategy. The airfields in Tingri, Lhunze, and Burang are part of China’s efforts to strengthen its military presence along the LAC with India, particularly after the 2020 Galwan clash. Yutian and Shache (Yarkant) airfields support China’s control over Xinjiang, securing its western borders and facilitating connectivity with Central Asia.

Chinese Narrative. Official Chinese sources often frame these airfields as civilian projects to boost tourism (e.g., Burang for Mount Kailash pilgrims) or regional development. However, their proximity to sensitive borders and dual-use capabilities suggests a primary military purpose, which is downplayed in state media.

Geopolitical Implications.  These airfields enhance China’s ability to rapidly deploy troops, conduct surveillance, and support air operations in contested regions, posing a challenge to India, Nepal, and other neighbours.

 

Inputs to the Queries on Chinese Bases

(Based on the open sources on the net)

Q1. As reflected in the imagery, does the construction and upgrade of new Chinese airbases represent a serious threat to India?

The construction and upgrade of Chinese airbases in Tibet and adjacent areas do represent a serious strategic threat to India, mainly when analysed in the context of recent geopolitical tensions, evolving Chinese military capabilities, and infrastructural patterns since the 2020 Galwan clashes.

Airbases like Tingri, Lhunze, and Burang are located close to the Line of Actual Control (LAC), within 50–150 km. This proximity allows for the quick deployment of PLA Air Force (PLAAF) assets to forward positions and shorter response times in case of a border escalation. These airfields enable coverage of Indian positions in Arunachal Pradesh, Sikkim, Uttarakhand, and Ladakh.

Upgrades to dual-use airfields include extended and hardened runways to support heavier fighters and transport aircraft, and new hardened aircraft shelters (HAS) to protect valuable assets. Advanced radar stations and SAM sites will provide protection. Fuel and ammunition storage facilities reflect a long-term war readiness. These changes reflect a move from rudimentary forward airstrips to permanent, fully capable air combat hubs.

These bases offer greater depth, logistics, and density. The PLAAF can now rotate fighter squadrons and drones rapidly into forward bases.

The network of airbases (e.g., Burang supporting Ngari Gunsa, Tingri filling gaps between Shigatse and Burang) creates strike capability, mutual support, and redundancy.

Bases like Burang (near Nepal) and Tingri (near Bhutan) could pressure India’s neighbours, complicating India’s regional influence. The proximity to the Siliguri Corridor amplifies strategic risks.

Bases like Yutian and Yarkantir in Xinjiang would complement Western Theater Command operations and are positioned to project power toward India. This reflects China’s “strategic envelopment” doctrine, which increases pressure on India along a much broader front.

These Chinese airbases’ construction and systematic upgrading represent a serious and growing threat to India’s strategic posture, particularly by reducing warning time, enabling force concentration, and improving the PLA’s offensive and defensive air operations.

While it does not signal imminent war, it tilts the regional balance and compels India to accelerate military infrastructure development, deepen surveillance, and maintain credible deterrence across the Himalayas.

 

Q2. Do these new airbases and the consolidation and upgrade of existing ones in Tibet substantially balance out the IAF’s traditional advantage along the India-China frontier?

China’s construction of new airbases and the systematic upgrading of existing ones in Tibet and Xinjiang significantly narrows down, though not entirely erases, the traditional airpower advantage long held by the Indian Air Force (IAF) along the India-China frontier.

 

The establishment/modernisation of Tingri, Lhunze, Burang (near central and eastern sectors) and Yutian, Yarkantir (in Xinjiang) allows PLAAF aircraft to deploy closer to the LAC, reducing response time and extending their ability to hold Indian targets at risk.

While Tibet’s altitude still limits PLAAF aircraft (lower payloads, reduced engine efficiency), China is trying to mitigate this with more powerful engines and heavy reliance on drones, loitering munitions, airborne early warning aircraft (KJ-500), tankers, and ECM assets based in the rear (e.g., Hotan) but linked with forward bases.

China’s concept of “airbase clusters” means that even if one is targeted (say Lhasa-Gonggar), others nearby (e.g., Shigatse, Pangta) can support operations, enhancing tactical flexibility, survivability, and redundancy.

China’s new and upgraded airbases improve PLAAF’s forward reach, resilience, and responsiveness, mitigating the payload disadvantage of high-altitude operations. Bases like Lhunze and Tingri challenge the IAF’s dominance in the eastern LAC sector by enabling faster, more credible PLAAF operations.

While the IAF continues to enjoy certain operational advantages, China’s new airbases and upgrades in Tibet now provide the PLAAF with a more credible and resilient offensive and defensive posture along the LAC. The earlier asymmetry that favoured India is now more balanced, especially in terms of response time, reach, and multi-layered defences.

 

Q3. Does the construction of the Burang airbase represent a new and specific threat to airspace over Uttarakhand?

The central sector of the Line of Actual Control (LAC) has historically seen less militarisation compared to the eastern and western sectors (partly due to the rugged terrain and lower perceived threat).

However, the construction of the Burang airbase represents a new and specific potential threat to Uttarakhand’s airspace due to its proximity to the LAC (~60 km), ability to host fighters and drones, and support from nearby SAM systems.

It enhances China’s surveillance, deterrence, and limited power projection over Pithoragarh and Chamoli, particularly near the Lipulekh Pass and Barahoti.

Burang is located near the tri-junction of India, Nepal, and Tibet, directly facing India’s Uttarakhand sector, especially Barahoti, which has witnessed Chinese transgressions in recent years.

The base is less than 100 km from the Indian border, giving PLAAF aircraft and drones a very short flight time to Indian airspace, especially toward sensitive regions like Joshimath, Dharchula, the Kailash-Mansarovar route, and the central Sector’s critical valleys and passes (e.g., Lipulekh, Niti, Mana).

Establishing a permanent airbase at Burang shifts that balance, opening up the possibility of tactical surprise or probing manoeuvres and providing quick-reaction air support for PLA ground units, surveillance, and drones. Deploying long-range air Defence systems could threaten IAF aircraft operating from bases like Bareilly or Gorakhpur.

While the altitude (4250 mtrs) limits the payload of fighters at Burang (as with other Tibetan airbases), the proximity compensates by enabling shorter-range missions with lighter payloads, persistent ISR coverage through drones, and strike options with long-range PGMs even from short-runway-capable aircraft.

Burang can also serve as a forward operating base (FOB) or logistics/surveillance hub, rotating aircraft from rear bases like Shigatse or Lhasa.

This airfield increases airspace monitoring pressure on India, especially as it tries to improve the region’s border infrastructure and patrol routes.

It also forces India to extend air defence coverage into the central sector, possibly stretching resources from already active eastern and western sectors.

 

Please Add Value to the write-up with your views on the subject.

 

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References and credits

To all the online sites and channels.

Pics Courtesy: Internet

Disclaimer:

Information and data included in the blog are for educational & non-commercial purposes only and have been carefully adapted, excerpted, or edited from reliable and accurate sources. All copyrighted material belongs to respective owners and is provided only for wider dissemination.

 

References:-

  1. Lin, Christina. “China’s Strategic Airfields and the BRI: The New Logistics Backbone”, Asia Times / Comparative Strategy, 2023.
  1. Chellaney, Brahma. “China’s Infrastructure Strategy in Tibet and the Implications for India”, Indian Defence Review, 2022.
  1. Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Report example: “PLA Air Force Operations in Tibet and Xinjiang”.
  1. Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA), New Delhi, Reports on border infrastructure and PLA’s posture across the LAC.
  1. South China Morning Post (SCMP), Occasional reporting on PLA activities and airport developments in Tibet/Xinjiang.
  1. India Today / ANI / Times Now, Reports on satellite imagery and Indian assessments of Chinese activity post-Galwan.
  1. Air Power Asia, an Indian think tank with detailed airbase and aerial warfare assessments.
  1. Military Balance 2024, by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), Technical information on PLAAF deployment capacities and base hierarchy.
  1. Civil Aviation Administration of China (CAAC), official press releases on new airports and infrastructure development in Tibet and Xinjiang.
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