Tag: Higher Defence Organisation

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Double Celebration: One year of Blogging and 200th Post

Air Marshal’s Perspective

(Candid and to the point – काम की बात)

Ranked 13th in the list of Top 25 Indian Defence Blogs and Websites

 

 

 

This blog was started in the month of September 2020.  It has been one year since then, with 200 posts.

 

Enjoyed researching topics related to defence, security, geo-politics, technology, leadership and management etc. The posts were interspersed with some humour and quotes.

 

Tried to live up to the motto of the blog – “Candid and to the point – काम की बात”. Most of the posts are short ones (two to three pages), covering the essence of the topic in bullet form.

 

The credit for starting the blog goes to my course mate and friend Col Murali. He provided me the space, encouraged me and held my hand initially.

 

Credit also goes to another course mate Vicky Sheorey for getting me all the equipment needed for video conference and recordings.

 

Sincere Thanks to all the subscribers and readers for the encouragement.

 

To provide a panoramic view of the blog, here are the links to the posts on various topics:-

 

Suggestions and value additions are most welcome

 

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CHINA: OBJECTIVES, STRATEGY AND MILITARY ROLE

China: National Political Objectives

Like any other nation Chinese national political objectives can be broken into two basic categories: security and development. According to USA these objectives would include the following:

 

Security objectives would include:

  • Protection of the CPC as China’s ruling party.
  • Protection of Chinese sovereignty.
  • Protection of borders.
  • Internal security
  • Nuclear deterrence.

 

Development objectives would include:

  • Protection of Chinese economic interests at home and abroad.
  • Ensuring freedom of navigation for Chinese goods.
  • Procuring important commodities such as energy and raw materials.
  • Establishing new export markets for Chinese goods.

 

Chinese Grand Strategy

China end state desire is to achieve a world power status.

 

Incremental Approach. China views this final objective as incremental: it seeks to be a “prosperous society” by 2035, with the CPC still remaining the dominant political entity in China. The country desires to transition to a “leading world power” by the year 2049 (the centennial anniversary of the country’s founding), complete with a “world-class military.” These objectives are written into the CPC Constitution.

 

Towards this aim, smaller goals could be:

  • Global influence.
  • Economic development.
  • Internal security.
  • CPC primacy.

 

Chinese Strategic Objectives

China’s strategic objectives support her broad political goals dominance by 2035 and becoming a leading world power by 2049. They are also influenced by certain elements of Chinese culture and history: the importance of status and honor, the desire for peace through power, and the belief in Chinese Communism, among other aspects.

 

Chinese strategic objectives and involvement of PLA is as follows:

  1. Maintain Internal Security And Stability. Foremost in maintaining internal security and stability is ensuring the position of the CPC as the dominant political entity in China. PLA is the military components of the government. While maintaining domestic stability is the primary mission of the civilian police force and Peoples Armed Police (PAP), in extreme situations the PLA may be required to assist these forces in internal security operations.

 

  1. SECURE AND PROTECT LAND BORDERS AND COASTLINES. China’s long historic struggle with border security manifests itself today in a vast array of border security measures. Even China’s shared border with India is a source of friction and conflict. PLA needs to be geared up to meet these situations.

 

  1. Maintain Regional Stability. China feels maintaining regional peace and stability is a one of its responsibility as a regional dominant Force. This requires the PLA to be capable of conducting shaping and deterrence operations in the region.

 

  1. MAINTAIN FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION. China’s economy is largely dependent on exports, most of which travel via the world’s oceans. Maintaining safe and free passage through the international waters is necessary for Chinese political stability and economic development. Expeditionary capability would be required for this.

 

  1. RESOLVE MARITIME TERRITORIAL DISPUTES. China views several land masses and their surrounding territorial waters in the South China Sea and elsewhere in the Pacific as strategically important. Their importance is derived from their proximity to important global shipping lanes, and also their potential usefulness as military bases (particularly for naval and coast guard ships, fixed-wing aircraft, antisubmarine warfare capabilities, and land-based antiaircraft and ant ship missile systems).

 

  1. ESTABLISH POSITIVE CONDITIONS FOR POTENTIAL HOSTILITIES. China views conflict along a continuum, ranging from steady-state deterrence operations in peacetime (Grey Zone) to full-fledged combat operations. While China has mastered the art of grey zone operations, it is also expanding on overseas basing for the PLA, enabling force projection outside of Chinese borders and giving Chinese leadership greater flexibility in choosing how and where to employ military force.

 

Chinese Objectives and Military involvement

  • China’s history is deeply intertwined with its military.

 

  • Relationship between the PLA and the Communist Party of China (CPC) is a complex one.

 

  • In contrast to Western militaries, the PLA is deeply politicized.

 

  • While Western militaries are generally apolitical and are divorced from political parties, the PLA is officially the armed wing of the CPC.

 

  • It retains significant ties to Maoist and Marxist-Leninist political thought and has generations-deep connections with the CPC.

 

  • Today, with the primacy of the CPC virtually assured and few internal security threats, the People’s Armed Police (PAP) has taken over much of the internal security mission, while the PLA focuses primarily on development-related external objectives.

 

Military Modernisation

Historically, the PLA had little to no expeditionary capability, minimal mechanization, low-technology systems, and a severe lack of military professionalism.

 

Chinese Objectives and strategy requires a significant enhancement of PLA capabilities.

 

Chinese objectives require meaningful force projection capabilities:

  • A blue-water navy.
  • A modern air force.
  • Long-range targeting and strike capabilities.
  • Enhanced long-range air and sea strategic lift capabilities.
  • Well-trained, well-equipped, professional ground force.

 

Military modernization with economic development is a basic tenet of Chinese national strategy. This has guided the significant increase in annual defence budget for the past two decades.

 

This principle is now manifesting in China’s Military-Civil Fusion program, which seeks greater cooperation between military and civilian elements in achieving shared objectives. An important objective of Military-Civil Fusion is leveraging civilian assets and capabilities as a cost-efficient method of managing limited military resources.

 

Due to one of the largest and longest economic growth cycles in history, China has been able to fund the reform and development of the PLA, modernizing it over the last three decades from a force of poorly armed and poorly trained conscripts into a viable modern military.

 

Bottom Line

China is marching ahead at a very rapid pace.

 

Question

Are we gearing up to meet future challenges?

 

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References:

https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/ARN33195-ATP_7-100.3-000-WEB-1.pdf

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China’s Active Defence Strategy

 

Genesis. China’s Active defence Strategy appeared first time in  MAO’s writings in the year 1936. However, its meaning has been changing from time to time along with the war fighting philosophy of China.

 

Changes in War Fighting Philosophy. War fighting Philosophy of China has changed with the era of person in power. Over the years the changes are as follows:-

 

  • Mao Zedong – Final War (with reference to world wars)
  • Ding Xiaoping – Local War (Shift from world war to limited wars)
  • Jing Zemin – Local war with Hi Technology.
  • Hu Jintao – Informatised Local War (Network centric war)
  • Xi Jinping – Informatised and intelligentised war (Unrestricted War – including elements of hybrid and unconventional warfare even in the Grey Zone).

 

Initial Connotation. When the idea was conceived initially it meant allowing the enemy to come into own territory, in area of own choice and up to pre decide depth. Allow the enemy’s logistics supply lines get stretched out and dry down and at an opportune moment attack and defeat him. It was sort of offensive defence.

 

Present Framework. China articulates its Active Defence response as:

“China would never invade or expand, at the same time would never permit any piece of Chinese territory to separate from China & PLA will strike after enemy has attacked”.

 

Analysis & Implications

  • There is always a gap between what china preaches and practices. China although states that she will not expand, but is driven by the baser instinct of expansionism, considering herself as an empire state rather than nation state.

 

  • China decides as to what is part of China, by staking claims and producing conveniently select and doctored historical and legal documents.

 

  • China has left definition of enemy attack intentionally vague. It is not limited to military attack by kinetic means. It may include any action by the adversary which is against the interest of China.

 

  • In other words China decides what enemy attack is, and reserves the right to respond in a way it feels is appropriate.

 

  • It means China will always have the initiative and will have the legitimacy (in her opinion) for her actions.

 

  • China justifies her approach to this active defence strategy as strategically defensive but operationally offensive.

 

  • In tune with her war fighting philosophy of unrestricted warfare, the attack on enemy would be any domain (land, air, sea, cyber, space, electronic, information, psychological or even nuclear). It could use everything and anything as a weapon from the instruments of national power (DIME).

 

  • This strategy coupled with China’s practiced strategic approach of “achieving objectives without firing a shot”, would mean that China would continue to perpetuate grey zone warfare (inclusive of hybrid and unconventional warfare).

 

  • China’s formation of Strategic Support Force as a separate service, is in tune with the above mentioned strategy and actions.

 

Bottom Line

 There is an urgent need for reorientation and gearing up (not only by military) to deal with these challenges.

 

Question

Are we doing it?

 

YOUR SUGGESTIONS & VIEWS ARE MOST WELCOME

 

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